SIMON CAMERON

ANTE-BELLUM YEARS

LEE F. CRIPPEN

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
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MEN OF AMERICA
VOLUME III

SIMON CAMERON








Simon Cameron

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By
LEE F. CRIPPEN
Berea College



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To

my wife, Cathell Carroll,
and our daughter, Lois Elizabeth,
whose wholehearted and painstaking cooperation
has made this book possible.



EDITORS' FOREWORD

Simon Cameron played a distinguished role in both state and national politics during the turbulent years prior to the Civil War. His political activities in Pennsylvania enabled him not only to mould policies within the state, but also to help shape the destiny of the nation. Cameron witnessed the collapse of Jacksonianism, took part in the financial complexities of his time, determined public opinion by influencing directly or indirectly the press, witnessed the extension of the United States westward, and had a hand in the innumerable delicate questions centering about sectionalism and slavery. During the fabulous 'fifties he identified himself with the newly formed Republican Party and even hoped to gain the nomination which eventually was won by a prairie lawyer from Illinois. Even then, however, Cameron fought on. When, at first, Lincoln somewhat curtly indicated that he could not consider Cameron for a cabinet post, the Pennsylvania politician persisted until he became the President's first secretary of war.

Dr. Crippen is well qualified to interpret this colorful character against the dramatic backgrounds of his times. For years Professor Crippen investigated manuscript materials pertaining to Cameron in the Library of Congress and other depositories. Public documents which gave insight into Pennsylvania politics and Pennsylvania leaders were scrutinized in order to evaluate Cameron and his friends and enemies. Newspapers also were searched so that editorial comment, political opinion, and abuse and praise might be properly weighed and become a part of the narrative. Private papers, notes, and letters, under Dr. Crippen's careful eye, were woven into the story. Finally, a large collection of material written by Cameron and owned by members of the family was interpreted. As a result Dr. Crippen's volume is a substantial and carefully documented volume which is the first comprehensive biography of a major figure in American politics.

> P. D. J. C. M. T.



PREFACE

Simon Cameron, born of humble parents at the close of the eighteenth century and apprenticed to the printing trade in his 'teens, became, before the Civil War, one of Pennsylvania's leading financial and political figures. At one and the same time he was president of a bank, three railroad companies and one insurance company. He entered political life as a Democrat and supported that party—with some irregularity—until the eighteen fifties. Becoming dissatisfied with the leadership and tariff policies of the Democrats, Cameron cast his lot with the opposition, aided in the establishment of the People's (Republican) Party in Pennsylvania, and became its first Senator from his state. In the short session of Congress preceding Lincoln's inauguration, he exhibited a spirit of conciliation and manifested a strong desire to compromise the difficulties between the North and the South.

During the last half-century he has frequently been the victim of misrepresentation. Various phases of his career have been subjected to study with an excessive amount of attention paid to certain of his actions. This has resulted in a distorted view of his career and thrown it out of focus. Some writers have based their stories on no firmer foundation than rumor and malicious gossip, while others have presented a perverted picture through failure to make use of available documentary material.

The Simon Cameron Papers in the Library of Congress, only recently made available to scholars, cast important fresh light on the character and career of Cameron. In the preparation of this volume I have read the letters to and from Simon Cameron in this and other Cameron collections as well as much material in miscellaneous collections. His record in four sessions of the United States Senate prior to the Civil War has been carefully studied. Not only have his speeches been covered, insofar as they have been reported, but his votes on all important questions have been noted wherever the *yeas* and *nays* were recorded. For contemporary opinion regarding his public policies

as well as his public career I have perused a number of newspapers as well as the letters, diaries and reminiscences of those who were brought into contact with him. I can only express the hope that I have succeeded in moving the story a little nearer to the place that it ought to occupy in historical memory.

A footnote reference to the Cameron Papers, unless otherwise noted, always refers to the collection in the Library of Congress. In the use of newspapers I have italicised only the main word or words of the title and have not put the place of publication in italics, thus I have modified a bit the practice of

the American Library Association.

For the inspiration of this book I owe all to Professor William O. Lynch who, when I was a student in Indiana University, first aroused my interest in this subject. It was a very great privilege to have him as a friend, mentor, and teacher; his kindness has been inexhaustible, and I take this opportunity to pay an

affectionate and grateful tribute to him.

In the collection of material I wish to express my appreciation for the courtesy shown and the obliging assistance given me by the staffs of the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Archives Division of the Pennsylvania State Library, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, and numerous university, college, and public libraries. Various local historical societies and individuals have graciously permitted me to make use of their collections of materials bearing upon the subject.


I am also under grateful obligation to Dr. E. Taylor Parks, of the department of history and political science of Berea College, who has painstakenly read the entire manuscript and offered many constructive criticisms and suggestions. Finally, I welcome this opportunity to acknowledge the debt I owe, in the preparation of this book, to my wife for her encouragement, patience, and constant cooperation; and to my daughter, for her

arduous hours of typing and proofreading.

Lee F. Crippen

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CHAPTER I

FAMILY BACKGROUND, BUSINESS FOUNDATIONS

THE ELECTION of Simon Cameron to the United States Senate from Pennsylvania in 1845 was significant in that it brought to the forefront a man whose career is unexampled in the history of the commonwealth. Colonel Alexander K. McClure wrote of Cameron a few years after his death:

From the time he became United States Senator in 1845, until his death, nearly half a century later, there is not an important complete chapter of political history in the state that can be written with the omission of his defeats or triumphs, and even after his death until the present time no important chapter of political history can be fully written without recognizing his successors and assigns in politics as leading or controlling factors.¹

Noticeable from very early manhood, the wonderful energy and perseverance displayed by him and his ability to brush aside obstacles and force success, where nothing but overwhelming defeat seemed possible, marked him as a resourceful man. Such distinguishing traits of character brought him to the attention of leaders in public life, and very early his assistance and influence were earnestly sought. He mingled business and politics. He aspired to leadership and this ambition fostered opposition. While he had hosts of friends who were loyal and enthusiastic in their support, he also had uncompromising and bitter enemies. He has been praised for his "ability, patriotism, and fidelity to the public trust."2 A critic declared that "Pennsylvania never produced a more adroit political manager than Cameron." He has been condemned as "an unconscionable party trickster,"4 and "the most consummate scoundrel in Pennsylvania." Such diverse estimates as these are the expressions of contemporaries with whom he was associated in both state and national politics. The American scheme of government tends to produce leaders who dominate portions of the political field

rather than the whole. A free government cannot function efficiently without responsible leadership, for leadership without responsibility is bossism. In the development of state bossism in Pennsylvania, Cameron founded a dynasty which dominated Pennsylvania politics for half a century; this dynasty included, among others, his son James Donald, Matthew Quay, and Boies Penrose. Cameron was one of the first powerful state bosses in

American politics.

To comprehend intellegently and appreciate fully the character of Cameron and also the marked service rendered by him to both state and nation, one must consider his forebears, as well as the circumstances and conditions which influenced his youth. Simon Cameron, son of Charles Cameron and Martha Pfoutz (Pfautz), was born on March 8, 1799, at Maytown, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. On the paternal side he descended from the clan Cameron of Scotland. Sir Ewen Cameron (d. 1719), Lord of Lochiel and leader of the clan, has been called the Ulysses of the Highlands. The Cameron clan shared its fortunes with the unfortunate Charles Edward, the Young Pretender, whose doom was sealed in the battle of Culloden, 1746. Donald Cameron, the Gentle Lochiel, a grandson of Sir Ewen, was a participant in that memorable battle, and having escaped the carnage made his way to France where he died in 1748, at Borgre, of "inflamation of the head." Another Donald Cameron and his son Simon, grandfather of the subject of this work, and lesser members of the clan, came from Inverness, Scotland, to America in 1755 and established themselves at Donegal Church, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. They had been farmers in Scotland and pursued the same occupation after coming to America. The proprietary and state tax lists of Lancaster County, 1782, show Simon Cameron as possessing a farm of two hundred acres, cattle, etc., with a tax of 11 £ 12s 2d.7 He and his brother John participated in the American Revolution. They took the oath of allegiance on June 1, 1778. Some earlier writers have indicated that General Simon Cameron was a direct descendant of the Gentle Lochiel. The author has been unable to find material which would warrant such a claim and the grandchildren of the General do not accept the validity of the claim.8

On the maternal side Cameron descended from Hans Michel

Pfoutz, who was one of the first Palatines to arrive in Pennsylvania, in September, 1727. He settled in Strasburg, Lancaster County. In 1754, he moved to Pfoutz's Valley in what is now Perry County. This valley perpetuates his name as a hero of the border warfare in Pennsylvania in the days when the Delawares and the Shawnees were attacking the homes of the outlying settlers. Hans Michel's son, Conrad, was the father of Martha Pfoutz, mother of Simon Cameron. Simon Cameron's mother, being a Pfoutz, and his wife, a Brua, bear testimony to the mixed marriages between Scotch and German families which have formed the backbone of so many of the rugged and important families of nineteenth—and twentieth-century Pennsylvanians. Cameron frequently prided himself on possessing the doggedness and determination of his German forebears and the

aggressiveness of the "Scotch Rebels."

Charles Cameron, a tailor by trade, had a large family-eight children—of whom Simon, the third child, became the most prominent. The family moved to Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, when Simon was nine years old. They were in poor circumstances and occupied a frame house on St. Johns Street. The house was unplastered and had partitions of boards with three rooms each on the first and second floors. Some time after the family moved to Lewisburg the father died and Simon, with his older brothers, William and John, was faced with the problem of winning a livelihood. He had neither superior education nor powerful friends to aid him. His education at this time consisted of such "schooling" as the public schools of those days afforded and the advantage of reading a number of books. Among his favorite books was Plutarch's Lives. Having a passionate fondness for books he looked upon the printing office as a chief center of thought and as a means most likely to satiate his appetite. Therefore, on May 4, 1815, he apprenticed himself to the printing business of Andrew Kennedy, editor of the Northumberland County Gazette at Northumberland.9 Due to financial reverses, his employer was obliged to close his establishment a few months later. Simon was now seventeen, small of stature, and with anything but vigorous health. He made his way on foot and by river-boat down the Susquehanna to Harrisburg, where he renewed his apprenticeship, this time to James Peacock, editor of the *Republican*. This publication was the leading newspaper of Pennsylvania outside of Philadelphia. After two years' apprenticeship he was made assistant editor.¹⁰

Political dissension had arisen in Bucks County and in Doylestown, the county seat, between members of the Democratic party which led to the development of two well organized factions. One group controlled the Doylestown Democrat, while the other group, in order to gain expression of their views, established in 1816 the Bucks County Messenger. The two newspapers, both claiming to be the Democratic organ and being bitterly antagonistic, tended further to distract the party. The saner politicians desired to unite the warring factions and for this purpose Samuel D. Ingham invited Simon Cameron to come to Doylestown, where he acquired the Bucks County Messenger from a Mr. Siegfried. Cameron travelled by stage. Benjamin Mifflin, proprietor of the Democrat, was a fellow-passenger. He and the other passengers freely discussed the rival newspapers, Cameron's coming to the town, and the political situation generally, while Cameron prudently remained silent. When the stage arrived at Marple's Tavern, where Cameron was known, he was announced as the new printer, much to the chagrin of his fellow-travelers. 11 He issued the first number of his paper on January 2, 1821.

Shortly thereafter, in an advertisement in the *Pennsylvania Intelligencer*, he announced his purchase of the *Messenger*, his purpose to continue its publication, and that the "character of the *Messenger* shall be purely democratic. At the same time it will keep aloof from all local divisions and prejudices that may exist in the republican ranks." As editor of his first newspaper he exhibited a breadth of information which, in view of his limited advantages, seems astonishing. In March of the same year, the *Bucks County Messenger* and the Doylestown *Democrat* were consolidated and published by Cameron and Mifflin under the name of the *Bucks County Democrat*, which was in turn sold to General William T. Rogers before the end of a year. Though the partnership of Cameron and Mifflin was of short duration, it was long enough to harmonize the factions.

Cameron desired to make a closer study of national political movements, and, after disposing of his newspaper interests in Doylestown, he went to Washington. Here he obtained work as a journeyman printer with Gales and Seaton, publishers of the *National Intelligencer*, and printers of the *Annals of Congress*. Much of his spare time he spent in the houses of Congress and in cultivating the acquaintance of political leaders who might become useful friends, among whom were President James Monroe and John C. Calhoun. He also studied, first hand, the mechanics of practical politics, such as how "followings" are built up and held together by doing real favors so as to have funds and influence from the rich and votes and cheers from the poor. This was valuable experience for Cameron, for it brought him into close touch with leaders and activities at the national capitol, thus broadening his political horizon.

In 1822, he returned to Harrisburg and entered into partnership with Charles Mowry, publisher of the *Pennsylvania Intelli*gencer. This newspaper was at that time the organ of the Democratic Party at the state capitol and enjoyed the official patronage of the state administration. The paper, under the new ownership, carried the sub-title or motto "Truth Without Fear."

The proprietors jointly announced that:

having associated their interests . . . [they] solicit the patronage of their friends, and that of the democratic republican family throughout the state. An important epoch is approaching in the political world. Already the public eye is casting about for a new candidate to fill the presidential chair, as well as one to succeed the present governor of this state. Pennsylvania is looked to, with no little anxiety, on the first of those subjects, and her decision in both cases will be cast in the same mould. For, should the candidate for governor to which the federal party shall cling be again elected, the vote for president will be of the same character. To avert such a state of things will be the chief aim of the editors . . . they wish distinctly to be understood, that they are not bound by any secret pledge or promise to support any particular individual, for either of those important stations. Their endeavor will be to follow, rather than attempt to lead public sentiment; and to allay, rather than to excite sectional jealousies; to have the best man taken up, let him come from what quarter he may.14

The Harrisburg Republican was bought some time later by Cameron and merged with the Pennsylvania Intelligencer. His editorial position enabled him to take an active part in both state and national politics. He became a staunch advocate of

high-tariff doctrines, and, in 1824, desired that the support of Pennsylvania be given to the early candidacy of Calhoun. His growing prestige brought him the remunerative position of state printer, an office he held for several years. This position brought to him contracts from other sources and profits from his printing business grew. He was an early friend and supporter of Governor J. Andrew Shulze (1823-29) and was honored in 1826 by an appointment as adjutant general of Pennsylvania, the duties of which office he discharged with ability and to the satisfaction of the public. Cameron continued to fill the office of adjutant general long after the expiration of Shulze's second term. It was from this office that he acquired the military title, "General," which clung to him during the remainder of his life.

Cameron continued his connections with the Pennsylvania Intelligencer until 1827, though Mowry had two years earlier disposed of his interests to David Kraus. 16 In 1827, Cameron's efforts to create party harmony were again successful. The Pennsylvania Reporter was established by S. C. Stambaugh, with himself (Stambaugh) as editor and publisher. He stated editorially in the first number that the paper was contemplated because of exhibited symptoms of hostility to General Jackson, the presidential candidate of the party, by the Pennsylvania Intelligencer, which had for so long been regarded as the organ of the party. The policy of the paper as stated "will be purely and energetically democratic." Cameron's valedictory as editor of the Intelligencer published in the first number of the Reporter announced that "the Intelligencer and this establishment have become consolidated." The Pennsylvania Reporter, therefore, was a continuation of the older, democratic Harrisburg Republican and the later Pennsylvania Intelligencer, "in new habiliments and under a new title." The young editor wrote:

The causes which led to this result, are in some measure of a personal character, but principally arose from the desire to see the democratic party move on in harmonious prosperity, which I felt assured it could not do if two papers, both professing to be democratic, and striving for the ascendancy, were established at the seat of government . . . Mr. Stambaugh comes highly recommended . . . and I feel assured that he will make the paper one of the most respected in the state . . . As the

editor of the paper I hope that my friends . . . will give him their warm and hearty confidence and support, as the surest means of preserving in existence a powerful auxiliary to the permanence of the party.¹⁷

With this editorial Cameron ended his career as a newspaper editor, though his interest in journalism, for obvious reasons, continued throughout his life. He was financially interested as a silent partner, or otherwise, in the press for years to come. He recognized the press as a source of power. His failure to hold fast to the ideals expressed in his earlier days, in the *Messenger*, enabled a hostile critic to declare in later years that he had no other conception of a newspaper than that it was a means to mislead the public, or to assail such as would not be misled. This attitude was all too common among newspaper editors in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

the latter half of the nineteenth century.

As soon as his position and reputation were established and his purse was sufficient, he began to enter other fields which promised greater financial gain than the press. This was an era of internal improvements and the ambitious young printer quickly perceived money-making possibilities in ventures along this line.

perceived money-making possibilities in ventures along this line. Freight transportation in Pennsylvania in the early nineteenth century was by way of covered Conestoga wagons over turnpikes, to a large extent privately owned. With the development of the Erie Canal, Pennsylvania became fearful lest its western trade be drawn off to New York. Pennsylvania was overcome by the mania for canal building and in 1822 the state legislature authorized the building of the Pennsylvania Canal from Columbia, on the Susquehanna, to Pittsburgh. Supplementary legislation provided for the connecting of sections of the canal by railroad and directed the locating and constructing of a railroad from Philadelphia through Lancaster to Columbia. By 1834, this entire line of combination canal and railroad, by way of the Susquehanna, Juniata, Conemaugh and Allegheny rivers, was opened to commerce and travel from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. It covered a distance of three hundred ninety-four miles and in its larger divisions

consisted of the railroad from Philadelphia to Columbia, eighty-two miles; the eastern division of the canal from Columbia to Hollidaysburg, one hundred and seventy-two miles; the Portage railroad from Holli-

daysburg to Johnstown, thirty-six miles; and the western division of the canal from the latter place to Pittsburgh, a distance of one hundred and four miles.²⁰

Prior to 1836 horse-cars were used on the Columbia road and nine hours were required for the eighty-two mile trip. The Pennsylvania Canal brought prosperity to all the towns along its route—to Harrisburg and Middletown particularly. Middletown had the added advantage of the Union Canal, eighty-two miles in length, connecting this place on the Susquehanna with Reading on the Schuylkill. It became a great lumber market and for a number of years was a serious rival of Harrisburg in

its expanding business and growth in population.21

The Cumberland Valley Railroad, between the Susquehanna River and Chambersburg, was completed about 1837 except for a bridge. The Harrisburg and Lancaster Railroad was built between 1835 and 1838, and the first locomotives placed on this line were built by Matthew Baldwin of Philadelphia. Abortive attempts were made toward the construction of a railroad to connect the Delaware and Ohio Rivers. Not until 1846 did the project assume tangible shape by the incorporation of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. On December 10, 1852, a train was run through from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh at this time using the old Portage Railroad over the mountains beyond Hollidaysburg. The Pennsylvania Railroad opened its line over the mountains early in 1854. This road became one of the primary arteries for transportation of troops and supplies from the West during the Civil War, its president, Colonel Thomas A. Scott, serving in the Department of War as a co-ordinator of transportation.²²

These and many other canals and railroads, especially in the central Pennsylvania area, were in the process of construction at the time Cameron was seeking wider business opportunities. He soon established a reputation for himself as a contractor in the construction business and also became financially interested in businesses and industries which were allied to canal con-

struction and railroad building.

General Cameron began his venture in canal construction in 1826, in connection with the building of the Pennsylvania Canal.

He obtained contracts for the construction of sections of both the eastern and the western divisions. Sections numbered seven and nineteen of the Susquehanna or eastern division were built by him.²³ By 1829, he was consulted for advice by other people who were interested in submitting bids for canal contracts,²⁴ and he had also by this time established a business for the sale of

equipment needed in canal construction.25

An interesting episode in Cameron's business career was his connection with the building of the canal linking the Mississippi River with Lake Ponchartrain. In granting a charter for the establishment of a State Bank, Louisiana had provided that the bank should undertake the construction of a canal from New Orleans to Lake Ponchartrain. During the early months of 1830, a route was laid out, and later the contract awarded to a Mr. McCord and Cameron. Extensive preparations in men and equipment were made. Twelve hundred men were employed in Philadelphia and sent to New Orleans by sea, while Cameron and his engineers traveled by way of Pittsburgh, down the Ohio and Mississisppi.

McCord, of Philadelphia, failed, and, because of this embarrassment, Cameron requested the New Orleans Canal and Banking Company to release him (Cameron) from the contract. This request was readily accepted by the board and the work was accomplished by the awarding of two new contracts to other parties. Cameron, however, was employed by the company to superintend the work. He was considered by members of the company a very able man.²⁶ The work of construction progressed rapidly, but before the canal was completed General Cameron was summoned by General John H. Eaton, former Secretary of War under Andrew Jackson, to return to Pennsylvania and organize a delegation to the National Convention,

which had been called to meet in Baltimore.

This New Orleans venture, by taking Cameron into another portion of the vast country, greatly broadened his outlook. In a letter to his friend ex-Governor Shulze, he really became enthusiastic about the lower Mississippi Valley area. Two of his ships had already arrived, the men were getting pretty well organized, and the work was getting under way. Everything appeared favorable, the climate delightful and the people "the

most hospitable that I have ever met." Always with an eye for business, he described New Orleans as the place of greatest business opportunity outside of New York. "It would be a great place for a brewery—not one within 1500 miles. A tallow chandler would make a fortune soon. Tallow 3½ cts. a pound—candles 20 cts. Everything else in the same way." Raw materials were very cheap and manufactured goods very high. The reason, he observed, was "that nobody likes to work. All depend

on the Negroes."27

The development of internal improvements, as has been noted, greatly stimulated the growth of Middletown. The Pennsylvania Reporter early in 1829 carried an article from a resident of Middletown pointing out the great need for a bank to serve the river trade in that locality.28 It was not until three years later that the legislature made provision for the establishment of the desired bank. Cameron's name appears among those of the sixteen commissioners who opened the books for subscriptions to stock,29 and when the bank began business he was cashier, a position he held for many years. The bank prospered from the beginning. Though no dividend was declared for the first six months, the directors did declare a four per cent dividend on stock the second six months and an extra dividend of five per cent for the same period.30 During its first year the Bank of Middletown became a depository for state funds.31 A decade later, apparently upon the recommendation of Senator Buchanan, it became a depository for federal funds also.32

Cameron was an exceedingly social man in his habits, and was endowed with a remarkably faculty for remembering faces and names of persons whom he had met but once. These traits were of great value to him both in business and politics. When he was a resident of Middletown it was his habit to spend much time after banking hours and during evenings at the hotels and other public places. There he met old friends and made the acquaintance of a great number of people from other parts of the state. His social habits frequently brought him returns in the form of banking business, and friendships that later were of

inestimable political value.

The panic of 1837 interrupted the prosperity of the Bank of Middletown and Cameron struggled during the next five years

to keep the bank open. Hard times became apparent in Pennsylvania in the spring of 1837, and the suspension of specie payments gave much trouble, particularly to the banks of the country. An optimistic note crept into his letters, concerning the banking situation, in 1839, but there were many discouraging periods after that before conditions returned to normal. There was a general revival of business in the summer of 1839 and a new collapse later that year. The worst period of the depression was about 1841. His letters show the difficulty of securing collateral for loans and of collecting loans outstanding. Cameron was frequently annoyed by the interference of the directors with his policies in the management of the bank. Their views were much more conservative and legalistic than his. He would always waive some points of judgment in order to aid a friend. In the spring of 1841 he considered buying out a sufficient number of stockholders to give him entire control of the bank. At this time he had already become a stockholder in the Harrisburg Bank.³³

The legislature was besieged during the earlier years of the depression by bankers throughout the state for more favorable banking legislation. Cameron was a leader in this movement and spent much time in Harrisburg earnestly working for the passage of desired banking bills. He kept other bankers informed of the progress of bank measures and even solicited expense

money from them.

There should be some funds sent to enable those who are here to defray the necessary expenses. Your institutions are deeply interested in the matter, and should bear a part of the burthen. I have been giving my own time, and spending my own money—one of which should be enough. Mr. Wharton, of Reading, is doing the same. He is so important that we could not get along without him. I write this for your own eye, only; but the contents you will use as to you may seem discreet.³⁴

Funds were made available and he wrote again, four days later:

I will accept the offer of your institution. It is but fair that the Banks in the city should incur some of the expenses necessary to their safety. I should not, under other circumstances accept anything from them. But you know a man cannot live at Harrisburg upon the wind.³⁵

Bills satisfactory to the banks were passed; Cameron wrote to

Simon Gratz that it was "a great and glorious victory," adding "the Banks, therefore, are safe." The lobbyists had succeeded in defeating resolutions to direct the banks to resume specie payments two months hence and to make the stockholders liable.

With the passing of the Second United States Bank, the federal government had deposited its funds in selected institutions. This action was far from satisfactory, for it tended to encourage over expansion of bank notes and laid the government open to charges of favoritism. President Van Buren, in 1837, arguing that it was not the business of the government to assume the management of domestic or private exchange, proposed that the government establish an independent treasury to care for its own funds. By this plan he hoped not only to divorce the government from the business of banking, but by the use of specie for government business to lessen the demand for bank notes. James Buchanan, United States Senator from Pennsylvania, supported the president's position, while Cameron, being a banker, lacked Buchanan's enthusiasm. Cameron wrote to Buchanan, from Middletown, "The banks will not be much disturbed. I feel much more attached to them since my salary has been raised," and added in a jovial spirit, "we presbyterians are against all 'divorces.' "36 He continued his connection with the Bank of Middletown throughout his active business and political career.

The full flush of prosperity for canals had scarcely been reached before canals were challenged by another form of transportation—the railroad. Railroads had many advantages over the canals. They were cheaper to construct; were not affected by change of seasons—freezing, droughts, or floods; provided more rapid transportation; and could be constructed to reach into almost any part of the country. The Mauch Chunk Railway, in Pennsylvania, was one of the first built in the United States. The earliest railroads designed for passengers as well as freight service were built to supplement the canal system, such as those referred to above—the lines from Philadelphia to Columbia and from Hollidaysburg to Johnstown.

Just as canal construction had been Cameron's chief interest in the period of the canal boom of Pennsylvania, so, in the next period, he turned to the development of railroads. It was largely through his personal efforts that the Harrisburg and Lancaster Railroad was built. He began promoting this road early in 1834, completed it about three years later, and became its president. He was disappointed that Buchanan would not accept the presidency of the railroad when it was being organized, believing that his name would lend prestige to the enterprize. He was perhaps over-optimistic as to the ease with which the project could be financed. He wrote to Senator Buchanan in February of 1834 that "we have nearly enough stock subscribed to make our road; and if you wish to invest in a going concern it is now offered. It will be the best stock in America."37 However, in the fall of 1836, the company sought a loan of \$200,000 from the Second United States Bank for completion of the railroad, pledging as security the credit of the road and such other securities as the bank might desire. It was stated that the capital was \$400,000, a quarter of which had already been expended. At that time ten miles of the road were finished, twelve miles more would be completed in a few days, and by December first all but three miles would be in operation. The remaining three miles would be completed in time for the western trade the next spring.38

It has been related that among the many expedients adopted by Cameron to promote the sale of stock in this railroad was a public meeting at Elizabeth, a town a few miles east of Harrisburg. Samuel Fullweiler, a German, one of the leading business men of the town as well as a personal friend of General Cameron, presided. In the course of his remarks Cameron said that "he expected to see the day when he would be able to eat his breakfast in Harrisburg, go to the city of Philadelphia, transact his business, and return to Harrisburg by early bed-time." This was too much for the old German. He sprang from his chair, and, addressing Cameron, said: "Simon, I always thought you a little rattlebrained, but I am sorry to see you make such a dunce of yourself as to try to hoodwink these people into subscribing money to an enterprise that you know won't come out as you

say it will."39

Cameron kept a vigilant eye on the legislature at Harrisburg, scrutinizing all general canal and railroad legislation as well as promoting bills which would favor his own projects and those of his friends. He endeavored to obtain legislation favorable to

a Maryland friend, C. Howard, who was building a road from Baltimore to York. He felt that the trade with the West was more than sufficient to feed the enterprise and employ the capital of many cities, and sought therefore to promote the business interests of Middletown by advocating the building of a road to connect Middletown and York, writing to Howard that "I know full well that the interests of my little town will be augmented by a Bridge and railroad from this place to York and I will take care that everybody here shall be a committee of vigilance to procure the bill." He projected and established the railroads from Harrisburg to Sunbury and from Harrisburg to Lebanon and was a stockholder in other roads. 41

In time the stage passed in which railroads were built merely as feeders for canals and connecting links between rivers and artificial waterways. Great trunk lines dependent upon themselves alone were established both by new construction and by the combination of independent lines already built. Cameron created and became president of such a road, Northern Central Railroad, which tied the central area of Pennsylvania with Baltimore. This so-called "Cameron road," became one of the great arteries for transportation of troops and war supplies during the Civil War, and in more recent times it became a part of the great Pennsylvania Railroad System.⁴²

In addition to the above enterprises, Cameron owned a fulling mill and blast furnaces that produced considerable quantities of pig iron.⁴³ He acquired real estate in Pennsylvania and in the northern Middle West near Prairie du Chien.⁴⁴ He also speculated in grain and various kinds of stock.⁴⁵ Notwithstanding the diversity and responsibility entailed in the management of his many enterprises, Cameron is credited with perform-

ing his business duties with skill and success.46

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL APPRENTICESHIP

ESPITE THE TIME and effort required for his many business enterprises, Cameron maintained a keen interest in state and national politics even in his early manhood. Great numbers of his business letters include sentences or paragraphs inquiring about some phase of politics in the region of the person to whom the letter is addressed, or a statement that the writer is going to certain places soon on business and will look into the

political situation while there.

Cameron's early manhood was a period of great political turmoil in both state and nation. The passing of Jefferson and the failure to find another such unifying leader resulted in the splitting of the old Jeffersonian party which had dominated national politics for more than two decades. This was further complicated by the rise of the Antimasons. In Pennsylvania, as in many other states, after 1825, the Jeffersonians formed two groups one following the leadership of John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, the other following the leadership of Andrew Jackson. In the period of transition when new party names developed, each group attempted to fasten the name Federalist, as a term of opprobrium, upon the other.1 Especially did Democratic Republicans denounce hostile leaders if they had ever been Federalists. Out of the confusion of the middle and later 'thirties came the designations, Whigs and Democrats for the Clay and Jackson followers, respectively.

To aid Pennsylvania's growing industries, Cameron early became a staunch advocate of high-tariff doctrines, proclaiming their merits through the columns of his newspapers. His own iron interests later made these convictions more personal. He was among a group who, in 1824, supported John C. Calhoun as favoring protection; but, by the time Calhoun had manifested his change of principles by his vote, as president of the Senate,

on the woolens bill of 1827, Cameron had already abandoned

his camp.

James Buchanan, a former Federalist, became a Jackson supporters in 1824, and Edward Channing feels that in the campaigns for the presidential elections of 1824 and 1828 Jackson's interests in Pennsylvania were much more ably managed by Buchanan and his lieutenants than were the interests of the other candidates.2 The Jackson papers in Pennsylvania in 1824 raised a hue and cry against the nomination of Crawford by a congressional caucus, and against the caucus method as a means of selecting a candidate regardless of his qualifications. Cameron's Pennsylvania Intelligencer, a Jackson paper, declared the caucus to be the work "of the friends of a single individual, held in utter disregard and defiance, of the known wishes of the democratic party in congress and throughout the Union." In fact, the Pennsylvania papers almost unanimously opposed the caucus.4 Some of the papers saw in the American political tradition of elevating the Secretary of State to the presidency what looked to them like the succession of a royal dynasty. For a generation, no one but a former Secretary of State had become President, and now came Andrew Jackson, "pure, untrammeled and unpledged, from the bosom of the people."5 The Jacksonians of the Pennsylvania legislature issued the call for a state convention to meet in Harrisburg on March 4. This convention bore many resemblances to nominating conventions of a later day as to both organization and proceedings. In high-sounding resolutions it nominated Andrew Jackson for the presidency, with but one dissenting voice, and John C. Calhoun for the vice presidency.6

Pennsylvania, a strong tariff state, was therefore among the first of the states to embrace the Jackson cause. Since a large portion of his strength lay in the southern and southwestern states, sections naturally inimical to the tariff, he was placed in a rather embarrassing position. His managers in Pennsylvania made the most of the fact that Jackson had acted with the protectionists in passing the Tariff Act of 1824, and they succeeded in keeping him quite silent on the tariff issue during the campaign. The fact that Jackson received a popular vote in Pennsylvania of 36,100, as opposed to a combined vote of 11,247 for his opponents, Adams, Crawford, and Clay, is a tribute to the

genius of his political managers.⁷ Cameron during the 1824 campaign supported Jackson but was not yet a strong Jackson enthusiast. The failure of the House of Representatives' vote to elect Jackson was a blow to his followers, who almost immediately became articulate in their determination to elect him in 1828. His popularity was on the increase in Pennsylvania and by the end of 1828 at least four-fifths of the members of the legislature were in favor of Jackson for the presidency. Early in January, 1827, a joint resolution was proposed in the state senate to give Jackson Pennsylvania's undivided support at the next election.⁸

Cameron, as has been seen, closed his public editorial career before the election year of 1828. However, he maintained, as a silent partner, newspaper connections with the *Pennsylvania Reporter* through that year and a part of the next. This paper energetically supported General Jackson and did what it could to discredit the opposing party, declaring that the Adams men's support of the tariff was thoroughly false and that Adams was the "candidate of the Hartford Convention party." It claimed also that the tariff act of 1828, favoring Pennsylvania interests, was the result of a Jacksonian Congress. Cameron, doubting the sincerity of the claims of the Jackson managers in Pennsylvania regarding his views on protective tariff, was somewhat slow in coming wholeheartedly to the support of the General. In this period, he was attempting to play a cautious hand in both state and national politics: supporting Shulze's candidacy for the governorship of Pennsylvania; visiting Washington to watch the course of national affairs in Congress; and secretly keeping Buchanan informed, and advised, concerning the changing political winds in their home state. His correspondence shows how completely he kept in touch with political activities in Pennsylvania, conversing with the leaders of the various groups or parties, weighing this action against that, and planning a course to accomplish the purpose he had in mind. Particular descriptions of the purpose he had in mind.

For at least two years prior to the Harrisburg Convention of March 5, 1832, Cameron worked in the interest of his friend former Governor Shulze, hoping to gain for him the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Cameron was away from Pennsylvania, because of canal construction at New Orleans, from the fall of 1831 to the late spring of 1832. He had "pulled strings" for Shulze up to the very time he left the state, and later bombarded his friends with letters urging them to get things lined up for Shulze. He saw the possibility of gaining Antimasonic support and wrote to Shulze from New Orleans that he felt confident from observations in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh

that your election would be certain, if you were nominated in any way. For this reason I regret my absence from Pennsylvania as I feel certain that a little exertion would accomplish much . . . I feel that we can beat the rascals [referring to Governor George Wolf's administration] and now is the time to act.

He assured Shulze he would "be at home in the spring and be ready to aid in the Battle." Cameron seems to have underestimated the unity of the Wolf organization. Wolf was nominated for a second term, receiving one hundred thirty-two votes, the unanimous vote of the delegates present. The Antimasons gave their support to Joseph Ritner, who had been their guber-

natorial candidate in the previous election.

The building of canals and railroads in Pennsylvania was state-controlled and under the direction of politically elected commissioners. This matter became quite an issue during the late 'twenties and early 'thirties between the followers of Clay and of Jackson. The election of a canal commissioner every year came to be looked upon as an annual test of party strength, or a check on it. In the state campaign of 1832, both parties in Pennsylvania made earnest efforts to disassociate politics and the state's great internal improvement projects, the desire being that the work should continue regardless of which party might win the election. Cameron, in a letter to John A. Dix adequately summed up the matter about nine months after the election. He declared that the defeat of Wolf for re-election would have had no effect upon the internal improvements policy. If Ritner had been elected, he would have been compelled to finish the work commenced, which was all that would be done by Wolf.15

President Jackson, in his first annual message to Congress, December 8, 1829, expressed himself as favoring a single term for the chief magistrate. Within a few months the presidential henchmen were seeking means of circumventing this single-

term idea. Major W. B. Lewis of the "kitchen cabinet" urged upon a member of the Pennsylvania legislature the importance of the re-election of General Jackson in 1832, and Cameron is credited with zealous effort in starting what would in a later day be called a "draft" Jackson movement. A caucus of the Democratic members of the Pennsylvania legislature passed resolutions urging the candidacy of Andrew Jackson for re-election, and sent a letter to the President signed by sixty-eight members of the legislature importuning him to stand for re-election. In the language of Carl Sandburg "this rang a bell." Many other states followed Pennsylvania's lead in sending memorials to the President, so that the impression was formed that Jackson was yielding only to popular demand. He was thus able to enter the campaign without embarrassment either to

himself or to his supporters.

The break between Jackson and Vice-President Calhoun came in the middle of Jackson's first administration. The President determined that Calhoun should be replaced in 1832 by a man sympathetic with the administration. Jackson desired the nomination of Martin Van Buren for the office of vice-president and the machinery was set in motion to affect it. Jackson's leaders decided that the best way to accomplish this end was by calling a party convention. The Democrats probably used the new method because the time was appropriate. The convention method happened to make it easier to nominate the vice-presidential candidate. The caucus system had been replaced temporarily by the method of nominating through state legislatures. The Democratic Republican national convention followed those of the Antimasons and the National Republicans. Democratic newspapers began calling for a convention, which was planned to meet in Baltimore on May 21, 1832. Jackson's agents were active in the organization of delegations to the Baltimore Convention. In the spring, after the state convention at Harrisburg, Cameron was summoned from New Orleans to look after the Jackson interests in Pennsylvania.²⁰

The careful planning bore fruit in the convention, which proceeded with machine-like precision to accomplish its purpose of nominating a running mate for President Jackson. Cameron was appointed by the convention as the representative of

his state on a committee, made up of one person from each state, to report to the convention the names of the delegates in attendance. The first day of the convention was occupied with the routine business of organization. The morning session of May twenty-second brought forth the resolution which was to become historic that "two-thirds of the whole number of votes in the convention shall be necessary to constitute a choice." The thoroughness of the work of the Jackson organization is indicated by the result of the first ballot, which gave Van Buren two hundred eight votes of the two hundred eighty-three delegates; the remaining votes were divided between Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, twenty-six, and Philip P. Barbour of Virginia, forty-nine. Thus, having received more than two-thirds of all the votes, Van Buren was declared the candidate of the

convention for the vice presidency.21

Cameron had succeeded in having Pennsylvania's thirty votes in the Baltimore Convention cast for Van Buren. This was positively not the free choice of the Democrats of Pennsylvania. At the state convention in Harrisburg on March fifth, two and onehalf months earlier, there had been a struggle extending through ten ballots, principally between the friends of Senators George M. Dallas and William Wilkins, which resulted in favor of Wilkins as the candidate for the office of vice president. The majority of the Democrats of Pennsylvania still favored the bank²² and opposed Van Buren. The legislature had adopted resolutions against the institution. During the Pennsylvania state convention, Van Buren never received more than four of the one hundred thirty-two votes on any of the ten ballots cast. Buchanan, who wrote a letter to the convention declining the nomination, received a small vote though larger than that given to Van Buren. Thus Van Buren had made a very poor showing for fourth place in Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the convention, to guard its interests, resolved that should its nominees, Senator Wilkins, for any reason cease to be a candidate for the vice presidency, then the electors nominated by this convention should cast their votes for George M. Dallas for that office.²³

Democratic Republican newspapers in Pennsylvania were not at all pleased with the way matters were handled by Cameron in throwing the state's vote to Van Buren. The Easton Argus, in an editorial on the Baltimore Convention, declared "the farce is at an end." It referred to Simon Cameron as one "whose politics have always been doubtful upon the Presidential question, and who never has been a sincere and decided Jacksonman," and charged further that Van Buren meetings were held in only six counties of the state by Van Buren friends and that therefore the people of Pennsylvania were misrepresented at the national convention. It must also be remembered that in the electoral college the Pennsylvania electors cast their thirty votes for Wilkins for vice president.

When writing to Buchanan some four years later Cameron philosophized on his political fortunes and misfortunes and alluded to the case of Van Buren, in whose behalf he took up cudgels in 1832, spent his own money in getting up the Baltimore Convention and holding meetings in the different counties. For this effort he gained for his pains the eternal ill-will of every office holder and adherent of Governor Wolf, who blamed him with bringing up Van Buren to put Wolf down. He had indeed gained from it little but opposition and hatred. "Tis true, that in all probability Mr. V. B. knows nothing of my exertions for him, for I have never spoken to him on the subject," said Cameron, adding "However, I need not complain for I had more enjoyment by pestering the folks at Harrisburg, until they actually swallowed the dose of Van Burenism, than I ever had in anything connected with politics."26 What Cameron did in 1832 was primarily for Jackson rather than for Van Buren. Jackson therefore owed him much and gave him much in deferring to his requests in the succeeding period. Cameron was on good terms with Van Buren, writing to him about Pennsylvania politics in relation to national, explaining the part played by Samuel McKean, Ingham, and the Calhoun "junto," and exposing the insincerity of their support of Jackson, in the 1832 campaign. He was even somewhat prophetic in his forcast as to party reorganization in Pennsylvania.²⁷ Later Cameron was to receive favors from the hand of Van Buren.

Shortly after the Baltimore Convention, perhaps partly in recognition of his services to the administration, Cameron was selected by President Jackson as an official visitor to West Point, an appointment which carried with it little more than the honor of political recognition. Following the completion of his duties at West Point, he made his first visit to New England, taking the opportunity to visit and inspect the paper mills and various

other manufacturing establishments in that area.28

James Buchanan had been elected to the House of Representatives in 1820, where he served during the next five congresses. It was his intention to retire from public life at the end of the session that closed in March of 1831. He was now, however, a well known political figure in the dominant party, and neither the people of Pennsylvania nor the national administration was ready to permit his retirement from public service. Many of his Pennsylvania friends began advocating his nomination for the vice presidency in 1832. Prior to this, in May, 1831, Major John Eaton, at the request of President Jackson, wrote confidentally to Buchanan informing him that the post to St. Petersburg was expected shortly to become vacant, and that it would afford the President pleasure if Buchanan would accept the appointment as minister to Russia. After some correspondence it was agreed that, upon John Randolph's return and resignation, Buchanan should receive the appointment but need not make plans to leave this country before the next spring.29 In due course this took place. Buchanan left for Russia in April, 1832, successfully performed his diplomatic duties and returned to the United States in the fall of 1833.

Dallas retired from the United States Senate in 1833 and was appointed attorney-general of Pennsylvania by Governor Wolf. Samuel McKean, secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, had the support of the administration for the Senate vacancy. Strong opposition to him developed from anti-administration quarters. Cameron had not forgiven McKean for his opposition to his national convention activities in 1832. With the return of Buchanan from Russia, Cameron did what he could to promote his chances for the Senate. The time was short but up to the end Cameron, who was keenly observing the legislature, did not give up hope. Writing to Buchanan he stated: "Thirty democrats can now be counted against him [McKean] and the force is increasing. My impression is that it will concentrate after a few ballots on you." Three days later he wrote of his disappointment. "McKean is elected; and he succeeded in

part by the votes of the Claymen," although, "yesterday we had

43 democrats against him."30

As Middletown was only about ten miles from Harrisburg, Cameron was able to spend considerable time there during the ensuing months, as well as to make an occasional trip to Washington, where he had "no especial business, other than to see and be seen." He kept Buchanan, who was spending much time in Washington, informed on Pennsylvania political conditions and especially on the bank question, which was seriously dividing the Democratic Republican party in the home state.31 In a letter to Benjamin J. Bonsall, a political leader in Philadelphia, Cameron showed that he was lined up with those opposed to the United States Bank, doubted "our being able to re-elect Gov. Wolf," and feared "the effects of his defeat on the next election for the Presidency." He suggested the nomination of someone else for the governorship as a master stroke of political policy, in that it would "kill off Ritner and leave the defeat of the Bank and elect Van Buren."32 Besides requesting Bonsall to express his opinion on the above, he got in an appeal for Buchanan: "I hope you will pay some compliments to Buchanan. He is a fine fellow who deserves to be remembered and is the only distinguished Pennsylvania who [sic] we can expect to place in any of the high places at Washington." Two days later he expressed the same views in a letter to another friend, W. Donaldson. He believed that those favoring the Bank were on the weak side in Pennsylvania. He solicited the continued support of the "little Dutchman." Since both of them favored Buchanan's eventual elevation to the presidency, he hoped Donaldson would speak a favorable word for Buchanan during the July Fourth celebration.33

The failure to elect Buchanan to the Senate in December of 1833 did not lessen Cameron's determination to gain the place for him. Buchanan's own disappointment was expressed in a letter to President Jackson about six weeks after the election.³⁴ As Cameron watched the activities of the Pennsylvania legislature, he thought he saw a possibility that some other office might be provided for United States Senator William Wilkins, who had angered many of his constitutents by his stand on phases of the Bank issue. If this could be done there would be

"no doubt of your election as his successor," Buchanan was assured. But again plans went awry. The legislature did nothing for Wilkins.35 Buchanan became discouraged, feeling that there were no further prospects for him in politics, and informed Cameron of his decision to practice law in Baltimore. Cameron opposed this move and together they went to Washington. While they were at the Capital, Senator Wilkins requested Cameron to exert his influence to gain an appointment for him to the Russian embassy, the office having remained vacant since Buchanan's return. The Wilkins faction had been unfriendly to Cameron since the Baltimore Convention, when he had turned Pennsylvania's Wilkins-instructed electors to the support of Van Buren for the vice presidency. Here was his opportunity to conciliate the Wilkins faction. He appealed to President Jackson in Wilkin's behalf. Wilkins got the appointment to Russia and resigned his seat in the United States Senate. Now the play turned back to Pennsylvania, where a new effort was

made to line up the legislature for Buchanan.

The task was not so easy as Cameron had anticipated. Opposition appeared and Buchanan was somewhat discouraged. "I suppose you can prophecy [sic] opposition from a certain quarter," wrote Cameron in a letter containing also much more encouraging news, and asked Buchanan not to withdraw his name. By December second, Cameron wrote that he believed all was right. However, the same night he found that "there were traitors in the camp" and every effort was being made to defeat Buchanan. On the third he wrote a rather detailed letter to Buchanan on the political situation in Harrisburg among the members of the legislature and among those who were there in the interest of the election, indicating to him who were his friends and what were the forces working against him. Conditions looked discouraging but Cameron had not given up hope.³⁶ The balloting took place on the sixth, with twelve names registered on the first ballot. Buchanan received less than twenty per cent on the first vote, but his support increased on each succeeding ballot, until, on the fourth, he received sixty-six votes to a combined vote of sixty-four for his four remaining opponents, and was thus elected.37 Cameron was as much pleased as Buchanan and wrote jubilantly from Harrisburg to VicePresident Van Buren, informing him of the results of the election.³⁸ His successes in regard to the Wilkins appointment and the election of Buchanan not only pleased both of these men but also greatly enhanced his own influence.³⁹ Buchanan dined with Cameron the next week on his way to Washington. "I went with him to Harrisburg where we had a high time," wrote Cameron. "No man has ever left Harrisburg under more favorable auspices and I feel confident he will not deceive his friends."

In 1834, on the death of General George B. Porter, a native Pennsylvanian who was Governor of Michigan Territory, Cameron first sought appointment to federal office at the hands of the President. In support of Cameron, Buchanan wrote to President Jackson:

He is an intelligent, shrewd, and enterprising man, and so far as I am capable of judging would be as well qualified to conduct the administration of a territory as any person within my knowledge. His influence is extensive & powerful throughout this State, and to my knowledge many of the Democratic members of our last Legislature were among his warmest friends. I need scarcely add that his politicks [sic] are sound in every respect. —If, consistently with your views of public duty, you can confer this appointment upon General Cameron, it would be very gratifying to his numerous friends in Pennsylvania & to no one more than myself.⁴¹

Cameron's correspondence with Bonsall and Buchanan indicates how completely he was working the field for the support of his own appointment. "If recommendations can do any good, I shall get along well enough," he wrote Buchanan. "I believe nearly every prominent democrat in the state has written . . . and various other dignitaries . . . and are warm for my success." Others had the inside track, however, and Cameron consoled himself by feeling satisfied that he was better off without the office. He was proud of his recommendations and would never forget those who had framed them. 43

The 1835 Pennsylvania gubernatorial election disrupted the Democratic Party in the state to such an extent that it never again recovered the unity and strength which it had displayed prior to that time. Governor Wolf had served two terms and much opposition was directed against him because he was not

content to retire, but sought a third term. His period of six years was a period of great activity and intensity of feeling in Pennsylvania, as in the nation as a whole. Party organizations were being disrupted and the Antimasonic movement was strong. Pennsylvania was in the midst of its elaborate and expensive program of internal improvements which, due to mismanagement, had brought the state to the verge of bankruptcy. For six years, the policies of Wolf had been exposed to bitter criticism, frequently emanating from members of his own party. Many political leaders felt that the strategic move for the preservation of party harmony would be for Wolf to retire and permit the state convention to nominate someone else. Many doubted whether he could be elected if nominated and feared the effects of this defeat upon the national elections of the next year. Wolf and his followers were determined that he should continue to lead Pennsylvania for another three years.44

The regular convention was to be held, as was customary, on the fourth of March in Harrisburg. Electioneering was begun more than a year prior to the convention and by the fall of 1834 the Democratic opposition to Wolf was converging upon Henry Augustus Philip Muhlenberg, of Reading. Muhlenberg, formerly a Lutheran minister, had been elected to Congress by Berks County in 1828, and re-elected in each succeeding election. He gave loyal and intelligent support to President Jackson's measures and was a good friend of Martin Van Buren. The strength of these two ebbed and flowed to the very day of the convention. Cameron reported to Buchanan in December that "the chances are with Mr. Wolf because the office-holders will have the principle [sic] hand in selecting delegates, but very many of our wisest and most distinguished politicians doubt the policy of running him again." Eleven days later he declared: "It may be that I am to [sic] sanguine, but my present impression is that Muhlenberg will carry the nomination." Cameron was personally opposed to Wolf and saw grave danger that the excitement against him had reached such heights in the campaign that he could not be elected if nominated. However, being closely wed to the party at that time, he stated, "I will vote for him, if nominated, but," he added significantly, "I will do all I can to prevent such a contingency." Muhlenberg wrote to

Cameron that he felt great hesitancy on his own part in declaring himself a candidate for state office. He questioned whether he could serve the people of Pennsylvania better in Washington than at home in Pennsylvania. He declared that he would nevertheless yield to the wishes of his friends.⁴⁶

Cameron's longstanding opposition to Wolf was well understood by the administration faction, which courted a more friendly attitude. In reporting to Buchanan a celebration of the citizens in Harrisburg he stated that the best and most reliable were all for Muhlenburg; that "the office-holders and their dependants [sic] sung the praises of Gov. Wolf. But they are alarmed. For the last five years they never treated me as politely as they are now doing."47 There was clever maneuvering on both sides. While the friends of Wolf were actively trying to mend his political fences, the friends of Muhlenberg were garnering support and votes among those who opposed the administration, or were lukewarm towards it. The vote of the Philadelphia delegation was to be very important. Congressman Joel Barlow Sutherland of Philadelphia was both powerful and influential. It was known that his friendship for Wolf was not very sincere. The Muhlenberg advocates therefore sought his support, even asking Van Buren to aid them in winning him over, declaring that "whichever way he casts the balance, the nomination will go."48

As might have been expected, the convention was a fiasco. The delegates instructed to support Wolf would not yield to the Muhlenberg supporters and vice versa. After three days, it was resolved by a vote of fifty-one to forty-one to dissolve the convention and refer the matter back to the people. New delegates were to be chosen and they were to meet at a second convention to be held at Lewistown on the sixth of May. The Wolf adherents had played a strong hand for control of the Harrisburg Convention and their aspirations had been stymied.

They were a resourceful group, however, and on the night of March sixth, several hours after the dissolution of the convention and after many of the Muhlenberg delegates had gone home, a caucus was held. Plans were made to organize in convention the next morning to nominate Wolf. On March seventh the Wolf party held the convention and carried it for their

candidate with only two dissenting votes (for Muhlenberg), after which a ticket was made of electors for president and vice president. Delegates to the national convention were appointed, with instructions to support the nomination of Martin Van Buren for president. Such high-handed conduct, of course, stirred the anti-Wolf group to scathing denunciations of the "irregular caucus nomination." Invectives continued to be hurled back and forth as preparations were made for the Lewistown Convention.⁴⁹

Cameron wrote that he could not fail to hear the curses, deep but not loud, which his Excellency and his parasites heaped upon him, but that all which passed on both sides came to his knowledge. He felt that Wolf could not under any circumstances succeed but that, if he and Muhlenberg would both submit to the Lewistown Convention, party harmony could be restored. This really would have meant the withdrawal or submission of Wolf for, as Cameron saw it, the friends of Muhlenberg stood upon democratic ground. The convention had been fairly and publicly dissolved. Rather than vote for the candidate of a caucus in which they had no chance to participate, they would let Mr. Ritner the Whig-Antimasonic candidate, or any other person who would make a change, be elected. This was the position taken by great numbers of the anti-administration Democrats.

The Lewistown Convention met on May sixth as scheduled. It proved to be more factional than the March seventh meeting, for now there were one hundred twenty-four delegates and every vote was given to Muhlenberg. A resolution of this convention also recommended the nomination of Van Buren for President of the United States. The Philadelphia American Sentinel and the Pennsylvanian maintained the same attitude concerning Wolf and Muhlenberg as had been registered toward the respective candidates in March.⁵¹ Bitterness of speech and temper continued throughout the campaign. Wolf and his leaders actively toured the state while Muhlenberg left the campaigning largely to his friends. Buchanan wrote confidentially to Van Buren concerning the political situation in Pennsylvania and was pointedly non-committal regarding Wolf and Muhlenberg. He believed that the division of the party would make

Ritner governor but that it would not seriously affect the presidential election.⁵² As Cameron, Buchanan, and many other Democratic leaders in Pennsylvania foresaw, with their party divided and the opposition united, the result was inevitable. The Democratic schism made Ritner an easy victor. He was elected by a large plurality, almost thirty thousand, his supporters being about equally divided between Antimasons and Whigs.⁵³

The Antimasons had been opponents of Wolf since his first administration and had made strong charges of corruption and wastefulness against him and his administration.⁵⁴ They had long been called advocates of a union of church and state. In this campaign the Wolf Democrats imputed the same doctrines to Muhlenberg, who had been for many years a minister. The Muhlenberg faction endeavored to capitalize on this with efforts to win over the German Antimasons. It singularly failed to win them over as a body, but a few of them, led by Richard Rush, did give their support to Muhlenberg.⁵⁵ To that extent the

plurality of Ritner was lessened.

The national convention of the Democrats met in Baltimore on May twentieth. Cameron's name does not appear on the list of delegates to the convention, though he had done much spadework in Pennsylvania in support of Van Buren. Each branch of the split Democratic Party of Pennsylvania sent a full delegation to Baltimore. Cameron had witnessed their passage through Harrisburg and noted that they were eager for the fight. He wrote to Buchanan: "They will find their wrath useless. The 'Magician' will take care that no difficulty in Penna shall redound to his injury—and will therefore have both sets admitted." He went on to comment on how strange public opinion ishow three years before not one-third of a single delegation could have been gotten to Baltimore in favor of Van Buren, and now the whole state was fighting for the honor of singing his praises. 56 The convention did just what Cameron had suggested -voted to seat both of Pennsylvania's delegations, allowing each delegate a half-vote. Since both delegations favored the nominations of Van Buren and Richard M. Johnson and cast their votes accordingly, the two factions did not present a problem. However, each delegation felt that the other should be excluded. The report of the convention indicates that the Pennsylvania delegations caused some confusion, and were very bitter against each other, and that each was ready for "a row." ⁵⁷

During the national campaign in Pennsylvania it does not appear that Cameron was as active as might have been expected, when one remembers his prior exertions in support of Van Buren. He served on one of the committees that arranged the Fourth of July celebration at Harrisburg in 1836, and favored inviting President Jackson to be the principal speaker.⁵⁸ The contest was close in the autumn elections. Not until the twenty-first of November, seventeen days after the election, was the *American Sentinel* able to publish a complete record of the Pennsylvania vote. With a total of 178,586 votes cast, Van Buren had carried the state over Harrison by a majority of only 4,364 votes.⁵⁹ Pennsylvania's thirty electoral votes were cast therefore for Van Buren.

Following the election, Cameron's interest turned towards the seeking of some reward for Pennsylvania through presidential appointment. He wrote to Buchanan that he would be glad to hear when Van Buren should have determined "what lucky number is drawn by this highly flattered and badly paid commonwealth."60 Ten days later he joined with O. F. Johnson in a joint letter to Van Buren concerning Pennsylvania's representative in the Cabinet. They expressed their belief that Muhlenberg was the only man who could be safely taken. 61 That pressure was being exerted upon Van Buren for a cabinet officer from Pennsylvania is further indicated by a letter from Buchanan to the President-elect, on February 28, in which he stated that "not only the strength but the preponderance of our party in Pennsylvania depends upon your selecting a Cabinet Officer from the State." He went on to say that he had no views towards himself and that he would not leave his position in the Senate for any other. 62 Nevertheless, Van Buren retained the Cabinet as constituted at the close of Jackson's administration, making only one immediate appointment, Joel R. Poinsett as Secretary of War, and that was to fill an existing vacancy. Muhlenberg was offered the Secretaryship of the Navy and the mission to Russia but felt that he could not afford to accept either of them. He did, however, the next year, become the first United States Minister to Austria. George M. Dallas accepted the appointment to Russia in March of 1837. Therefore, Pennsylvania did receive recognition from Van Buren even

though not a post of such high rank as desired.

Cameron believed that Van Buren weakened his own position of leadership by retaining the former cabinet and felt that he should dispose of them and form a new cabinet composed of men who would care more for his own interests. Cameron thought that another vote of the Keystone State could be obtained for the President but was aware of an undercurrent developing to defeat him. He said that Van Buren "has the frailty of most politicians, which is evinced in a desire to count enemies and forget early friends." He added a bit of his own political philosophy, that if he himself wished to be rewarded for political services he would always oppose the man he expected to succeed.⁶³ In other words he would play for bargaining power.

In preparing for the state nominating convention of March 4, 1838, Cameron played a less active part than was his custom. He had been defeated for the office of delegate of his district to the convention but was not distressed when the office went to one of his friends, John Knepley. As to supporting and campaigning for one or another of the candidates, he thought he would act as a prudent man for once in his life by waiting to see the winning horse approach the goal before betting on him. He was happy when David R. Porter was nominated, and in reporting the convention to Buchanan declared: "I was on the winning side, having been warmly advocating P's nomination ever since I heard Muhlenberg was to be out of the field." He stated also that there was great rejoicing in Harrisburg among all the Democrats and that he believed there would be united effort to win the election.

Cameron was frequently travelling about Pennsylvania on business during this hotly contested campaign and took every opportunity to make political soundings. To use his own words when he was going on business into the upper part of the Susquehanna Valley, he intended "to recreate a little upon politics." He found some defection in the Ritner ranks and assurance that some of the Ritner men would vote for Porter. The relations of Van Buren with the Porter interests were not as cordial as might be desired and it seemed that the success of Porter would

be no index to the opinions of men in Pennsylvania in regard to the presidency. Therefore, Cameron became active in trying to commit voters to his own views.⁶⁵

Porter won the governorship with a majority of less than ten thousand votes. The Whigs had a substantial majority in the state senate, but the control of the house of representatives hinged on the admission of certain members from Philadelphia whose seats were contested. The struggle in the house of representatives resulted in the organization, and the election of a speaker, by each party. The question then was which of the two organizations would be recognized by the senate and the governor. Unruly and disorderly crowds took possession of the lobby and halls of the Capitol interrupting all business and proceedings by their disgraceful and menacing conduct. Governor Ritner ordered out the militia and danger of collision was imminent for several days. Finally the senate voted to recognize the section of the house organized by the Democrats and the trouble was virtually ended. 66 This insurrection is commonly referred to as the "Buckshot War." Thaddeus Stevens was at this time Canal Commissioner and played a leading part with the Antimasons in the "Buckshot War." Albert G. Riddle believed that the bitter feud between Cameron and Stevens dated from this event.67

Several delegations of Indians had visited Washington during 1837 and treaties had been arranged with them. When these treaties had been confirmed by the Senate a number of appointments would have to be made, agents or commissioners, to examine and settle the accounts of those having claims upon funds provided by the government. Cameron sought Buchanan's aid in gaining an appointment for himself. His principal reason for desiring an appointment, he stated, was that he wished to have some tangible evidence that his early and, as he believed, efficient services in favor of Van Buren were remembered. Furthermore, the trip would enable him judge fairly all the advantages of a portion of the Union which he had long thought possessed attractions for one of his habits and temperament. He placed no value on the mere enjoyment of the office or the emoluments to be derived from it, but there were other considerations which induced him to look for success with much pleasure. 68 Cameron

learned in June of his appointment by the President but was satisfied that he owed the appointment more to the President's desire to retain the good opinion of Buchanan than to any kindness towards himself. He felt that the "tongue of slander and detraction" had been used against him in Washington. He believed that there was a chance of making some reputation in the discharge of the duties as commissioner, and declared that he would see that they were executed to the best of his ability.⁶⁹

An interesting interlude came between Cameron's appointment and his western journey on the Indian Commission. The appointment had met with the disapproval of some—among them Dr. Luther Reily of Harrisburg, Representative in Congress from Cameron's district. A friendly member of Congress wrote to Cameron that Dr. Reily "blows like hell and will visit the President and Depts. on the subject." The district delegates' meeting to nominate a Democratic candidate convened shortly afterwards and, in order to vindicate himself against the charges of Reily, Cameron sought and obtained for himself the nomination. The situation can perhaps be best explained in Cameron's own words:

I had believed the Doctor, personally my friend, and was therefore much surprised and mortified. I had however, objected to his nomination [1836] on the ground of his not belonging to the party, though I had a great personal regard for him, and we had to believe from his own assertions that he did not wish to go to Congress. It seems however, I was mistaken, and that my objections at that time must have rankled in his bosom. I never suspected it for I never bear malice myself, and judged him by that rule. But when I heard of his threats, my course was soon taken. I knew the influence which his station gave him at Washington, and I judged that his argument would be the old one which you have often heard, and which I have seldom cared about contradicting, viz.: that I am unpopular, that I am obnoxious to the party and that I have no influence. Knowing this I determined at once to be nominated as his successor, believing it would be the best reply I could make to him. I accomplished it . . . without any of the exertions usually resorted to. The old and the young men of the party were in the convention and they gave me the nomination [nearly a unanimous vote] in such a way as to make me proud. And that it will sustain you in the kind of support you gave me in presenting my name to the Secry of War is not the least part of my pride and gratification. I have not determined to accept the nomination and told the delegates that I should take time to reflect.

Having received the appt. I was not afraid it could be affected by the ill feeling of the Doctor but I am fearful he might lower me in the estimation of the Dept. and I wish to go on that mission with their full confidence, so that if any reputation is to be acquired, I may have full opportunity to make it mine. I have not yet received my instructions, and cannot, therefore tell how long it will require my absence, or when I shall have to start. My future movements will in some degree depend on that. I will do nothing which can interfere with the mission. If I should determine to be a candidate I believe I shall succeed, though the odds at present look much against the success of our ticket. But I have great confidence in my own exertions when centered on a single object, and I know that the many little acts of kindness which I have been privy to for the last 18 years, without asking for remuneration, will like bread cast upon the waters, return to me whenever I look for it. It is through friends of that kind, who are never suspected by my enemies, that I have always triumphed, whenever I have had a desire to carry a favorite object.⁷⁰

Cameron's assurance to Buchanan that he would do nothing that would interfere with the Indian mission did not deter him from actively organizing his campaign for election to Congress. During the latter part of July he received his official notification of appointment as a commissioner to examine the claims of the half-breed relatives of the Winnebago Indians, and the debts due by the same Indians, along with instructions and directions that he should make arrangements to be in Prairie du Chien by August twentieth.⁷¹ This meant that he would have to be away from Pennsylvania during the period when campaigning should be most vigorous. He closed a letter to a business and political friend with "I suppose I shall have to decline the Congress affair though I had begun to think the election safe." He felt that his purpose of discrediting Reily was accomplished, and he was satisfied.

General James Murray of Maryland was appointed co-commissioner with General Cameron to examine and pass upon the Winnebago Claims. They were each to be allowed as compensation eight dollars for every twenty miles of travel, by the shortest and most direct practicable route, from their homes to Prairie du Chien, in Wisconsin Territory, and return; the same compensation for necessary travel in the Indian country; and eight dollars for every day actually and necessarily otherwise spent in the execution of their duties while there.⁷³ Due to low

water in the Ohio and the Mississippi, they were obliged to take the route of the northern lakes and did not arrive at their destination until the twenty-ninth of August. They immediately entered upon their duties. Many of the claims were presented in a "queer manner" and the commissioners were frequently under pressure from the claimants. They were determined that justice should be done and settlements should be made according to instructions. By late September, Cameron thought they would be able to get away from Prairie du Chien by the eighth or tenth of October. Yarious matters delayed the conclusion of their business and they did not leave St. Louis on the homeward

journey until the eighth of November.

General Cameron gained considerable notoriety as a result of his connection with the settlement of the Winnebago Claims, particularly the part which concerned payments to the half- and quarter-blood relatives of the Winnebagoes. The instructions from the Office of Indian Affairs were quite specific as to the general routine to be followed and also designated considerable discretionary powers to the commissioners. They were the same as those issued to the commissioners appointed to examine similar claims under the treaty with the Sioux Indians.75 These instructions indicated that the commissioners were to determine the amount due each mixed-blood claimant and give him a certificate for the amount allowed him. This certificate with draft for the amount drawn on Major E. A. Hitchcock, Military Disbursing Agent, was the basis for payment to the claimant. Major Hitchcock suspended payment of the Winnebago half-breed money on the grounds that the commissioners had decided not to require payments to the individual claimants but, almost exclusively, to third parties, attorneys in fact, guardians, and trustees. Furthermore, these persons were not required to give bond for the faithful disposition of the money. Major Hitchcock's action was sustained by T. Hartley Crawford, the commissioner of Indian Affairs in the War Department,76 and eventually a new commissioner was appointed to re-examine and pass upon the Winnebago Claims. The matter was not concluded for another year.

The commissioners, Cameron and Murray, remained in Prairie du Chien longer than would have been necessary if money for payment of the claims had been sent to them when expected. Through no fault of the commissioners, the money was delayed. Winter was near, and the Indians were becoming restless and anxious to get back to their hunting grounds to provide food for their families. Cameron and Murray were advised by Henry Dodge, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Wisconsin Territory, that "a chief from each of the different bands will be sufficient representation of the nation to sanction any official act of yours." This would thus free most of the Indians to return to their camping grounds. The matter was arranged in that manner by a document addressed to the commissioners and signed by fourteen of the Indian chiefs. The document specifically designated Nicholas Boilvin to act for them. The arrangement, therefore, for settlement through a third party rather than directly, was sanctioned by the Territorial Superintendent of Indian Affairs and was satisfactory to the Indians concerned.77 Concerning the failure to require those serving as trustees, etc., to provide bond, the commissioners declared their instructions did not give them the power to require such persons to provide bond. Coming from men with the business experience of Cameron and Murray this seems but a weak excuse.

Major Hitchcock filed with his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Washington letters he had received from General Joseph M. Street, Indian Agent with the Sacs and Foxes. General Street said that his duties with these Indians kept him away from Prairie du Chien the whole time the commissioners were there and that he never saw them. He wrote extensively about wholesale frauds being perpetrated on the Indians: that General Cameron "had brought on \$60,000 in notes on the Middletown bank of which he was cashier," and intimated that these notes were used to purchase the half-breed claims under pressure for a small fraction of their face value; also that the commissioners worked in close collusion with a lawyer named Daniel M. Brodhead, who came along with them; that he, Brodhead, persuaded the Indians to sell their claims to him for a fourth to a third of their face value. 78 General Street's letters are couched in such terms as "an opinion that," "I am told," and "the impression has obtained currency here." It was on evidence such as this that payments were suspended, and

that the commissioners' report of December fifteenth to the

Department was overruled.

Cameron and Murray felt that the Department should have consulted them before harshly setting aside their proceedings. On the sixteenth of February, they filed a joint letter with the Secretary of War offering some suggestions in vindication of the course they had pursued. This was followed by a letter from Cameron on the twentieth with supporting testimonials, and a long letter from Murray on the twenty-fourth.79 Cameron declared that he did take with him \$5,000 in notes on the Middletown bank out of which he paid the expenses of himself and family, and also the commissioners' contingent expenses, which were thrown upon him in consequence of Major Hitchcock's refusal to pay the commissioners' draft for contingencies. A part of the balance he invested in land80 and a part he took back to Pennsylvania with him. As to the charge that the commissioners brought Brodhead to Prairie du Chien with them, Murray declared that he never saw him or heard of him in his life until they met on a steamboat at Detroit on the way to Chicago. He saw Brodhead once again while he and Cameron were on a side trip into Indian country on business of the commission, and found him (Brodhead) at Prairie du Chien upon returning there. As to their being a party to fraudulent speculations in the purchase of claims, the commissioners in their joint letter "assert, in the most unqualified manner, that, until after the awards were made in favor of the mixed bloods, and the certificates delivered, we had no knowledge that speculations had been made by attorneys in fact in those claims; and we challenge contradiction." If speculations were carried on as openly and shamelessly as General Street intimated, it seems unreasonable to believe that Cameron and Murray would not have known about it. Cameron does not mention Brodhead in his letter and it has not been possible to learn whether they were acquainted prior to August 1838.

The commissioners did perhaps violate the letter of their instructions in permitting appearance by attorney-in-fact, and the granting of certificates to those representatives, instead of directly to the claimant. It will be remembered that the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Wisconsin Territory, Henry

Dodge, advised certain action which was not in accord with the letter of the commissioners' instructions. He recognized the necessity of permitting many of the Indians to return to their camping grounds to make preparations for winter. He probably understood local conditions better than did the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Washington. Commissioner Crawford, in making his report to the Secretary of War, did not take into consideration extenuating circumstances and conditions, neither did he call in Cameron or Murray to explain why they had not followed the instructions according to his interpretation. Cameron and Murray both deplored the spirit in which the Commissioner had written his report. They felt that as a result of this report they must needs vindicate even their moral characters from grave and serious charges. They both expressed a desire to the Secretary of War for the fullest investigation of all the facts and documents connected with their official proceedings.

Brodhead, in the letters of General Street and Major Hitchcock, was made, if not the villain in the case, at least one of the fellow conspirators. In defense of the commissioners, Cameron and Murray, and of his own part in the dealings, Brodhead submitted two long letters along with seven supporting documents to Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett.81 He upheld the actions of the commissioners in the mode of settlement of the Winnebago Claims and refuted the charges made against them. He made no effort to shield himself; frankly stating his part as both attorney in fact and speculator in claims, but denying such a large number of cases as was intimated by General Street's letters. He stated that he took something less than \$40,000 to Prairie du Chien with him. The nature of this currency is not stated.82 He maintained that his actions were on an honorable business basis, and invited Poinsett to subject him to the severest scrutiny. He suggested that Major Hitchcock was endeavoring to explain away his own violation of duty by imputing frauds

to the commissioners and himself.

Brodhead showed that some of the charges made by General Street were utterly false, as could be readily ascertained by an examination of the commissioners' report on the settlement of the mixed-blood claims; and that others were no more than repetitions of petty fables and village scandal. He explained General Street's zealous witnessing for Major Hitchcock on the ground of personal interest. His son T. P. Street was a merchant and postmaster at Prairie du Chien, and his son-in-law was the United States sub-agent for the Winnebagoes at the same place. Brodhead had had difficulties with them and charged them with gross official misconduct. He had made a distinct and public pledge that when he returned home he would see that their respective departments subjected their behavior to

scrutiny and censure.

Miss Ida M. Street, granddaughter of General Joseph M. Street, published in 1905 an article of forty-nine pages on "The Simon Cameron Indian Commission of 1838."83 Her account was presented from the point of view of her grandfather and his friends. She revealed Cameron in the most unfavorable light. More than forty-eight pages, almost one-half of the material submitted by the War Department to the House of Representatives and printed as *Executive Document* Number 229, consists of letters and documents supporting the action of the commissioners and Brodhead. Miss Street disposed of this important portion of the record in a few brief paragraphs as of no consequence. She made out that Cameron, Murray and Brodhead constituted merely a group of fraudulent operators endeavoring to justify their acts after they had been caught. Her insinuations were decidedly unfair to Cameron.

Miss Street's article was only one of many published about Cameron during a period when muck-raking was the vogue. Although the charges against Cameron were not proved, he suffered unjustly, since the public knew far more about the letters of General Street than it did about the other portion of the material in the records. Stories of Cameron's transactions with the Winnebagoes were repeated with garnishments and embellishments until the facts were almost completely lost in

fable.84

It required Cameron several months after his return from the West to complete his connections with this, his first, federal activity. He wrote to a close business associate shortly after his return that his western trip had been neither very pleasant nor profitable.⁸⁵

Judge John Fleming, Jr., was appointed as the new commissioner to settle the Winnebago Claims. He went to Prairie du Chien and met the Winnebagoes during September and October of 1839. The Indians were rather unresponsive to this new commissioner. They resented being called together again to act anew on matters that they had done their part to settle in the previous year. Concerning the rehearing of the claims of the traders against them, for funds provided by the Federal Government, the Indians would only confirm their settlements agreed to before the 1838 commission.86 The attitude of the Winnebagoes and the action of the new commissioner, as well as other news in Prairie du Chien, were reported to General Cameron by letters from friends in Prairie du Chien and in St. Louis.87 Judge J. H. Lockwood wrote that General Street now admitted that he had lied and wanted to beg off, after the mischief had been done, because he had been found out. Lockwood expressed the hope that after this affair was settled Cameron would not rest until Street and his son Thomas were removed from office.88 General George M. Brooks, of Fort Crawford, Prairie du Chien, had been informed earlier of General Street's perjury and had written to Brodhead about it.89 Cameron and Murray had lodged at Fort Crawford during the first few days in Prairie du Chien; later they arranged for quarters at the hotel. Thus they became well acquainted with General Brooks, who was the commanding officer at the Fort. He wrote to Cameron during the summer of 1839 that he had not noticed the least official impropriety in the conduct of the commission. He had heard rumors, after the commission's departure, that Cameron and Brodhead had been connected in speculating on half-breed claims, but he could not and would not believe such a report. He admitted knowing, however, that Brodhead had bought up many claims, but he declared that the purchases were made openly and publicly and that he could see no impropriety in Brodhead's actions.90

Cameron saw Judge Fleming in Philadelphia, by appointment,⁹¹ after he had completed his work at Prairie du Chien, and the Judge assured him that his conduct in the proceedings in 1838 was satisfactory and that he would do the former commission justice in his report.⁹² A month later Fleming submitted

his report, as commissioner to settle the Winnebago Claims, to T. H. Crawford, Commissioner of Indian Affairs. In his report, referring to the former commission, Judge Fleming said:

It is due to the Department from which those Commissioners [Cameron and Murray] received their Commission and instructions and is but an act of common justice to themselves, in a personal point of view that I should state that during the discharge of my official duties at Prairie du Chien, no evidence came before me to impeach either their integrity or their judgment.⁹³

In March, Fleming wrote a brief note to Cameron stating that after innumerable disappointments he had closed all things in the most satisfactory manner and that Cameron had come out triumphant.⁹⁴ James Cooper, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania, expressed his willingness to aid Cameron in vindicating his character from the aspersions cast upon it, and to place his acts in a proper light before the Committee on Indian Affairs and before the country.⁹⁵ The genuineness and liberality of a statement given by Cooper in the heat of a senatorial campaign some years later, with Cameron as his opponent, should have been sufficient to remove any stigma which still clung to Cameron as a result of the Winnebago Claims controversy.⁹⁶

Cameron wrote to Buchanan in the spring following his return from Prairie du Chien that his own personal and pecuniary interests, which had been expanding lately, had been so much interfered with by his western trip and the trouble occasioned by its adjustment at Washington that he could not give to the political situation in Pennsylvania the time which he considered necessary. He said he would do all he could, and advised Buchanan to make his other friends work more and talk less than they had been doing.97 As a result of the disrepute acquired from the Winnebago Claims controversy, Cameron passed for a time into partial political eclipse. Even Senator Buchanan's high opinion for Cameron's influence waned. In reality all that Cameron had done thus far in state and national politics was but the prologue to his entrance upon the political stage. His career as a masterful politician can hardly be said to have begun before 1840.98

CHAPTER III

CAMERON AND THE CONTEST OF 1844

ENNSYLVANIA, like other states, was engulfed by the economic depression that swept over the nation in the late thirties. Like certain other states, the enthusiasm for internal improvements had carried her to the brink of financial bankruptcy. Unlike some of the other states, Pennsylvania succeeded in maintaining her credit when faced not only with the huge state debt that had accumulated, but also with the prostration of industry and trade resulting from the panic of 1837. The burden of retrieving the desperate situation fell largely upon the shoulders of Governor David Porter, who served two terms, from 1839 to 1845. Against the rising demand, that was particularly strong in 1840 and 1841, for repudiation of the debt, Porter fought desperately to maintain the honor of the commonwealth. He demanded that the reckless policy of continually undertaking new public improvements be abandoned. He resorted to additional borrowing; to the imposition of new taxes; and even to the issuance of so-called relief notes by the state banks, secured by the pledge of the state. Though for two years the state was unable to pay the interest on its bonds, this interest was added to the principal and eventually every dollar of the indebtedness was paid in full.2

Before the end of Porter's second term, Pennsylvania was well on the road to economic recovery.³ During the two decades prior to the Civil War Pennsylvania made rapid strides in economic development. Also her political life was replete with problems which wrought transformations ultimately resulting in the ascendancy of the new Republican Party. The growth and expansion of industrial interests helped in the shaping of new party alignments. Another factor of importance was the slavery question, which increased in significance as the Civil War period approached. Cameron's opposition to abolitionism

was, at this time, based not upon moral or humanitarian conviction but rather upon its disruptive influences on party organization. He foresaw the coming struggle and wrote to Buchanan concerning the issue: "The question . . . I am afraid will occupy more of public attention during the coming year than will comport with the peace and good order of our state. Every village is now cursed with some hired lecturer who is

daily engaged in adding fuel to the growing flame."4

The shadow cast over Cameron by the Winnebago Claims settlements made political leaders reluctant to do anything which might indicate a close tie or association with him. In 1839 he endeavored to make peace with those who opposed him by a considerable sacrifice of his own feelings. He thought he had "squared" himself with John W. Forney, editor of the Lancaster Intelligencer only to find an article in that paper a week later which greatly mortified him.⁵ Such experiences were not novel. Cameron was sensitive to the ostracism to which he was being subjected. In some cases, he sensed a coldness to himself and a reserve in the actions of persons to whom he felt most closely attached politically. With the possible exception of his support of Governor Shulze, Cameron gave his most loyal and unwavering support, prior to 1845, to the advancement of the political interests of James Buchanan. Yet he wrote to him in 1844:

For some cause or other, I don't feel as if I got your wishes and opinions with the same unreserved confidence as I used to, and therefore I have a delicacy in acting for you as I would do, if I knew that my acts would be properly construed. It may be that this feeling is all on my side, and that the bad, very bad treatment I have received from your intimate friends at Lancaster, makes me cool toward you, without knowing it myself. But be that as it may, I could not be your opponent, if I would, and so strong is my habit of being your friend, that I find myself advocating your cause whenever there is a chance of serving you. . . . Wherever your fortunes need a friend, I will be found.⁶

With the same devotion to Buchanan's interests that he had shown during the 'thirties, Cameron urged his re-election to the United States Senate in 1842. This was the year for Pennsylvania's gubernatorial election, and the choice of a governor and members of the legislature would have great influence upon her

choice of a United States Senator. Cameron's letters to Buchanan during this year were replete with reports on the progress of the campaign, the state of politics in Pennsylvania; the attitude of various individuals, both friends and opponents; advice as to the best strategy against opponents; and always an optimistic note in his expectancy of an easy victory. He was warned against taking sides with some of the office-seekers in the state because factional strife ran high with certain persons and might result in unfavorable reaction.7 Cameron was convinced that some persons who Buchanan thought were his friends were not treating him (Buchanan) fairly in Harrisburg, but that these could be defeated. It would require vigorous and energetic measures, he wrote, "and perhaps such as your prudence and better judgment might not approve."8 He was much mortified and distressed at the treachery he saw in some of these men, thought to be friends and supporters of Buchanan, and advised that "we" should have someone of prudence and zeal that could be depended upon to remain in Harrisburg and look out for "our" interests. Cameron also endeavored to win the friendship and support of Governor Porter for Buchanan, and showed him that for reasons of self-interest others had tried to poison him against Buchanan.10

The Democrats of Pennsylvania rejoiced at the outcome of the October elections. The result of Governor Porter's campaign was a majority greater than he had registered three years earlier. The Democrats had a majority in both houses of the legislature with a fifty-per-cent majority over the Whigs on combined senate and house membership.¹¹ Cameron wrote jubilantly to Buchanan: "Now the state is in your hands; and you have only to tell your friends what you want done." The legislature met and organized on the third of January. Buchanan headed the list of nominees for the United States Senate, and won an easy victory on the first vallot, by a vote of seventy-four to fifty-four, over John Banks, his Whig opponent. Thus the Senator was re-elected for six years from the fourth of March.¹³

The elections in Pennsylvania, in both October and January, were in accord with Cameron's interests and desires. His letters of the following year reflect very little of political interest either in state or in national affairs. His time was almost com-

pletely absorbed by his business interests. However, his letters of the early months of 1844, another year of national conventions, campaigns, and elections, show that he had been keeping abreast of men and issues and was ready to play an active part.

The Democratic Party could not reconcile itself to its 1840 defeat by the Whigs. Even before the inauguration of Harrison, the friends of Van Buren resolved that they would bring him forward again and elect him. The canvass of 1844, therefore, lasted for four years and might have paralleled closely that of 1828 if Van Buren's chances had not been blown up at the Baltimore Convention. This movement of the Van Buren element did not represent such unity of the Democratic Party as was witnessed among the friends of Jackson at the earlier date. Other candidates for the nomination appeared. Some of those who did not think the nomination of Van Buren advisable urged the claims of General Lewis Cass of Michigan. Colonel Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, who had served as Vice President under Van Buren, received support from various quarters in addition to that of his native state.

Colonel Johnson made a tour through the North, as far as Boston, in behalf of his own candidacy. Great Johnson meetings were held in various parts of the country. Such a gathering met in Harrisburg on the night of January twenty-third. Cameron was opposed to the nomination of Van Buren and for the time was inclined toward Johnson. He wrote to Buchanan on the day of this meeting that he was very much inclined to attend it and make a speech against Van Buren. He said that "the masses" were in an uproar and needed only a leader to make them blow up every chance of Van Buren's success in Pennsylvania.15 Due to the uncertainty and indecision of his friends, Colonel Johnson was left in a quandary as to what course he should follow in the convention. He summed up his position in a letter of January twenty-eighth to the editor of the Globe, the organ of the Democratic Party at the Capital. He stated that some of his friends advised him not to submit his name to the decision of the national convention, while others, more numerous, wished him to accept the nomination for the office of vice president provided a majority of the delegates should think

it proper after choosing another for the office of president. He declared further:

I am now, as I ever have been, identified with the democratic party. I never expect to change that identity. The success of the measures of that party are too dear to me to be jeoparded by any selfish considerations on my part; and, therefore, I ask nothing and expect nothing, at the hands of the convention, that will in any manner injure or hazard the success of the common cause. If the convention in their wisdom, should consider the use of my name for the first or second office or for neither, as advisable, my acquiescence is heartily given.¹⁶

Cameron was among those whose correspondence with Johnson favored his nomination for the presidency. In reply to General Cameron's letter communicating the proceedings of the Johnson meeting held on the twenty-third of January, in which the Kentucky Colonel was nominated for the presidency, Johnson wrote on the ninth of February reiterating in emphatic terms the principles he had earlier expressed:

Under the firm conviction tha tthe principles and measures which now divide the great political parties of the day are essentially the same which separated them in 1789, I consider the triumph of our cause more to be regarded than the election of any man to office, particularly myself.¹⁷

The Democratic State Convention assembled in Harrisburg on the fourth of March. Henry A. Muhlenberg, whom Cameron was supporting, ¹⁸ was chosen and announced as the Democratic candidate for Governor, ¹⁹ after which the convention turned its attention to the question of presidential candidates. Preference for Van Buren for the presidency was expressed in ninety-one of the one hundred twenty-eight votes cast. Richard M. Johnson received thirty-six votes and Lewis Cass one. After this vote Colonel Johnson was unanimously nominated for the vice presidency. ²⁰

Some weeks before the Baltimore Convention assembled a large majority of the delegates were pledged to Van Buren, and it seemed that his nomination would be inevitable. Those opposed to him, however, were bitter and determined. They declared that if nominated he could not be elected, and that it would be suicide for the party to nominate him. Cameron, along with other protectionists, did not like the free-trade views

of Van Buren. Dissension in the industrial states came from this quarter, while, in the South, during the month prior to the convention, much more bitter opposition to him arose as a result of his views opposing the annexation of Texas. His opinions on the Texas question were expressed in a letter of April twentieth, published in Niles' Register of May 4, 1844.21 The same issue carried Henry Clay's Raleigh letter of April 17 which expressed opinions quite in harmony with those of Van Buren. They both believed that the annexation would mean war with Mexico and both regarded annexation without the consent of Mexico as dishonorable. The sentiment of the South was very strongly in favor of the "re-annexation" of Texas and the question therefore became a political issue of the first magnitude. Many who had been steadfast Van Buren men only a month earlier began to hedge. Members of some delegations from Southern states already instructed to vote for Van Buren resigned rather than obey. Others declared that they knew that the wishes of their constituents would be modified by Van Buren's recently disclosed opinions, and therefore they would support another candidate. 22

In the meantime the friends of Cass, Johnson, and Buchanan continued to urge the support of their favorite and endeavored to turn the alienated Van Buren feeling to their advantage.

The Democratic members of the Pennsylvania legislature in January of 1843, when notifying Buchanan of his re-election to the Senate, expressed their desire to present his name to the nominating convention of their party as the favorite candidate of Pennsylvania for the presidency. While he was profoundly grateful to them for this expression of their confidence and support, he was led in the following December "by an anxious desire to drive discord from the ranks of the party, and secure the ascendancy of democratic principles, both in the state and throughout the union," to issue an address to the Democrats of Pennsylvania withdrawing his name as a presidential candidate.²³ By May of 1844, many of his friends were again urging him to enter the race with vigor. Cameron believed that Buchanan could now be nominated if his case were well managed, and advised him that he "should have some wise and skillful man in Washington from now until the Convention, who would show the southern and western men the wisdom of coming out at once for you." General Cass was making headway and his friends were creating the impression that Buchanan was not a candidate and could not carry his own state. Cameron felt that Van Buren was losing the South and that if the Southern delegates would come out at once for Buchanan then Pennsylvania would be compelled to bring his forward. Cameron advised Buchanan to throw off some of his reserve and endeavor to make

a party for himself.24

Buchanan had just written a letter to Mrs. James J. Roosevelt of New York, in which his private feelings on the whole matter of this nomination were expressed freely. He recognized that a large majority of the delegates had been pledged to Van Buren, and that Van Buren's letter on the annexation of Texas would cost him much Southern support. He still felt that he had pursued the wise and proper course in withdrawing his name. However, he recognized also that a very strong party in the South would now favor his nomination, because the Texas question had displaced the anti-tariff feeling there, and in all other respects he would be acceptable to that portion of the Union.²⁵ Buchanan was watching the pre-convention alignment of delegates with close attention, but there seems to be no reason to doubt the sincerity of his stated position. Two days before the convention opened, he replied to the questions of two members of the Pennsylvania delegation that he could not be a candidate against Van Buren before the National Convention. He had withdrawn his name after a majority of the delegates to that convention had been instructed or pledged to support Van Buren. This was done for the purpose of concentrating the strength of the party. In consequence of his act the delegates of Pennsylvania also had been instructed to support Van Buren. He was thus placed in a position where he felt himself bound both in honor and in principle not to become a competitor of Van Buren. He gave his consent to the presentation of his name with certain qualifications:

Should Mr. Van Buren, after a fair trial, either be withdrawn by his friends, or should they be satisfied that he cannot obtain the nomination; & the Delegates from Pennsylvania be thus left at liberty to make a second choice, —in that event I should felt myself restored to my orig-

inal position & they would then have my consent to present my name if they thought proper as a candidate to the Convention. 26

Cameron seemed unwilling to understand or accept the principles which restrained Buchanan. He continued to urge the support of Buchanan in Pennsylvania and, though, he had failed in his effort to have the Pennsylvania delegation sent to the convention without instructions and he himself was not made a delegate, nevertheless he did go to Baltimore on May twenty-fifth to be a first-hand observer and play any part he could for Buchanan.

The Democratic National Convention convened in Baltimore at noon on Monday, May 27, 1844. Immediately after the temporary organization was affected, R. M. Saunders of North Carolina moved that the rules of 1832 be adopted for the governing of this convention. The significance of Saunders' motion was recognized at once. Though it had to give way to the business of establishing the permanent organization of the convention, it was the chief issue of debate that afternoon and was debated for four hours the next morning. It was a motion for the two-thirds rule which Saunders himself had submitted in the 1832 convention and had championed in the interests of Van Buren in the 1835 convention. If it were not adopted at this time Van Buren could be sure of an easy victory in the convention; if it were adopted, then he might be defeated. In other words, a vote for the two-thirds rule would be a vote against Van Buren, for it would make it more difficult for him to obtain the nomination. The chief opponent of the motion was Benjamin F. Butler of New York, who spoke for an hour in opposition to the two-thirds rule. He had written to Van Buren on Monday morning of the general excitement over the question of the two-thirds rule, and declared that the fate of the question would depend on Pennsylvania and Tennessee. "If they stand firm . . . the rule cannot be imposed on us."27 Butler was supported by other delegates from Van Buren strongholds. Saunders was supported on his motion by such persons as Senator R. J. Walker of Mississippi, whose delegation had been instructed in January for Van Buren but now stood for Cass; and J. W. Tibbatts of Kentucky, whose delegation was instructed for Johnson. An analysis of the report of the debate shows that the burden of argument for the two-thirds rule rested largely upon the shoulders of the supporters of Cass and Johnson, and in some cases on delegations earlier instructed for Van Buren.²⁸ I. L. O'Sullivan in a report written to Van Buren on Monday and Tuesday (May 27, 28) revealed that Virginia also had an opportunity to defeat the two-thirds rule. The vote stood one hundred thirty-one to one hundred eighteen with Virginia still out, the members having retired for consultation. Virginia's seventeen votes could have defeated the two-thirds rule. Virginia, however, cast her votes for the rule. When the result became known, O'Sullivan wrote, "Great cheering from the world of Traitordom."29 Buchanan hardly entered the picture, and the extent of Cameron's work behind the scenes in support of the two-thirds rule is pure conjecture. We do know conclusively from his letters that he was strongly opposed to the nomination of Van Buren, and that his friends of the Pennsylvania delegation voted for the two-thirds rule although pledged to Van Buren. Therefore we have no reason to doubt Cameron's position on the issue.

The vote on the Saunders motion was taken about one o'clock on Tuesday, the second day of the convention. The two-thirds rule was adopted by one hundred forty-eight votes to one hundred eighteen. An analysis of these returns shows that the vote of the delegates of the northern states was fifty-eight yeas to one hundred four nays, and the vote of the delegates of the southern states was ninety yeas to fourteen nays. The delegates were perfectly aware that the adoption of the two-thirds rule would greatly imperil the chances of Van Buren's nomination, yet only four northern states and one southern state gave him the unanimous support of their delegates, while four northern state delegations and nine southern state delegations voted unanimously with the opposition. A further analysis shows that, if the delegations whose states had previously passed resolutions for Van Buren or instructed their delegations for him had voted in his support, the two-thirds rule would have been overwhelmingly defeated.30 The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that a number of the delegates were willing that Van Buren

should be sacrificed, and the Saunders motion was a convenient

method by which the purpose could be accomplished.

Balloting for the presidential candidate began that afternoon. After seven ballots without the requisite two-thirds vote for any candidate, the meeting adjourned until the next morning. On the first ballot Van Buren had received one hundred forty-six votes to a combined vote of one hundred twenty for other candidates, and except for the two-thirds rule would have been selected with a majority of twenty-six votes. Of these votes, twelve were from the one hundred five votes of the southern states and one hundred thirty-four from the one hundred sixtyone of the northern states. With each succeeding ballot of that afternoon, his vote steadily declined, the seventh ballot giving him only ninety-nine votes. The eighth ballot showed fortyfour votes for James K. Polk of Tennessee. During the ninth ballot, Butler of New York made known that he had in his possession a letter from Van Buren authorizing him to withdraw his name from the convention at any moment that such a step might be necessary to its harmonious action. He had consulted other friends of Van Buren in the convention and with their consent and advice he now withdrew Van Buren's name from further consideration by the convention. This announcement was greeted with loud cheers. Butler then stated that New York's vote would be cast for James K. Polk, whom he eulogized.31 This was the signal for the convention to stampede to the banner of Polk, who on this ballot received the unanimous vote of the convention. During the afternoon session Senator Silas Wright of New York was nominated by an almost unanimous vote, two hundred fifty-six, for the office of vice president. Senator Wright was notified by telegraph and immediately replied peremptorily declining the nomination.³² The next morning, May thirtieth, George M. Dallas of Philadelphia was chosen on the second ballot to be Polk's running-mate.33 The author finds little evidence to support Professor W. E. Dodd's view that Cameron was one of the bosses who decided for Polk in 1844 and thereby made him the candidate of the party.34 Instead, he was one of those balked by the swing of the Van Buren forces to Polk. Cameron was for protection and though he accepted Polk as the party nominee and worked for his

election, he distrusted the sincerity of his statements on tariff. Cameron's labors in 1844 were for the success of the Democratic Party rather than the result of a deep personal interest in the success of Polk.

The Van Buren men who were faithful to his interests resented the "treachery" of those who had been instructed for him but voted for the two-thirds rule. These true-blue Van Buren delegates determined not to bolt the convention, as some suggested they should do, but to remain and cast their vote in such way as not to benefit the candidates supported by the two-thirds rule advocates. Thus when they withdrew the name of Van Buren they gave their support to Polk.³⁵ Strangely enough the supporters of Polk had been grooming him for the office of vice president and not until the eve of the convention was serious consideration given to his name for the higher office. Their energies were earlier expended in endeavoring to think of a presidential candidate with whom to link Polk. The solution, that of making him a presidential candidate, was seemingly very remote from their minds.³⁶

The Democratic platform recommended the "re-occupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period"; opposed alliance of the government with banking institutions; and favored tariff reform.³⁷ The Whigs on May first had unanimously nominated Henry Clay by resolution and on the third ballot had chosen Theodore Frelinghuysen of New Jersey as his running-mate.38 Their platform called for a wellregulated currency, not mentioning a bank; provided for the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of public lands; and favored a protective tariff.³⁹ The failure of the Democrats to nominate Van Buren and the determined attitude taken by them on the Texas question upset the pre-convention design of Clay,40 and baffled the hope of keeping the annexation question out of the presidential campaign. Clay issued another letter on the Texas question in which he greatly modified the position he had taken in the Raleigh letter.41

The tariff of 1842 had been popular in Pennsylvania because of its protective features. While the Democrats of the South, and many of Pennsylvania⁴² and the North, desired to lower the 1842 rates, Cameron opposed any downward revision. The

tariff principles of Clay and the Whigs were very close to those of Cameron. Polk, however, had some free-trade views, evidenced by his votes on tariff measures in Congress during the previous two decades. The problem to be solved was that of making Polk acceptable to the protectionists while at the same

time retaining the votes of free-traders.

On June 19, 1844, three weeks after the Democratic Convention, Polk addressed a letter to John K. Kane of Philadelphia. The first part of this letter was devoted to his own past record on tariff measures: he voted against the tariff act of 1828, voted for the tariff act of 1832, which contained modifications of some of the provisions of the earlier act, and voted for the compromise tariff act of 1833. This statement was for the benefit of those favorable to free-trade. In the latter part of his letter he declared that, in his judgment, it was

the duty of the government, to extend, as far as it may be practicable to do so, by its revenue laws and all other means within its power, fair and just protection to all the great interests of the whole Union, embracing agriculture, manufactures, the mechanic arts, commerce, and navigation.

He declared further that he heartily approved "the resolutions upon this subject, passed by the democratic national convention, lately assembled at Baltimore." His expression, though rather all-embracing and certainly open to double interpretation, was seized upon by the friends of Polk in Pennsylvania and set forth as declaring his favorable attitude towards protection. The cry in Pennsylvania soon became: "Polk, Dallas, and the tariff of 1842."

In the Kane letter, Polk expressed his belief in a tariff for revenue, sufficient "to defray the expenses of the government economically administered." The "just protection" was, in his view, incidental protection. Some weeks earlier, Senator Robert J. Walker had advised Polk that "We must have the vote of Pennsylvania in order to succeed," and, "you must go as far as your principles will permit for incidental protection." Polk adhered quite closely to the historic doctrines of his party. The letter was tortured into a promise of favorable protective tariff in order to delude protection Democrats, but nothing in the

letter itself warranted such a construction.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, as Polk was cried up, Clay, the father of the "American system," was systematically cried down as an enemy of protection, and the voters of Pennsylvania were invoked in the name of protection of American industry to vote against him. Carl Schurz has characterized this as "one of the most audacious political frauds in our history."⁴⁶

Cameron had acquired large iron interest in Pennsylvania and his hesitancy in the support of Polk was due to his apprehension that the Tariff of 1842 would be overthrown by the success of the Democratic candidate. His party regularity, however, overbalanced his judgment as to the economic principles of the candidate, and he labored for the success of the party in the November election.

Cameron's apprehensions regarding Polk's tariff principles were confirmed when in 1846 the Polk Democrats did succeed in passing a measure lowering the rates of the act of 1842. Cameron at that time was in the United States Senate and worked with the Clay Whigs in a vain struggle to sustain the earlier measure.

Pennsylvania was regarded by the Democrats as a key state for their success in 1844. Cameron desired to play the game as shrewdly as possible and to gain from the administration recognition of Pennsylvania's responsibility for the victory. He continued to look to Buchanan's advancement as the political hope of his native state, and wrote to Buchanan early in July that "The acceptance of Polk for one term only, will do him good. His letter on the tariff too, is I think well expressed. . . . You must go for him zealously. He must owe the state to you; and you can . . . command the nomination in '48."47 He further advised Buchanan to leave Lancaster and move to Philadelphia, where he would be clear of all cliques, and thus not be affected by the follies of his friends. Here he would have greater opportunity to see all the active men of the party as they visited the city.48 He urged Buchanan to cast off his reserve, declaring that he had never done justice to himself because of neglecting to gratify and flatter his constituents and to see and be seen by them on more occasions.49

As the campaign progressed the people of Pennsylvania were

convinced that Polk would favor a protective tariff. Buchanan wrote to Polk in September concerning the general situation in Pennsylvania, and expressed the belief that he would carry the Keystone by a fair majority. He declared also that "your discreet and well-advised letter to Mr. Kane on the subject of the Tariff has been used by us with great effect."⁵⁰ Muhlenberg, while a member of the House of Representatives, had become well acquainted with Polk, and desired to bring about a more cordial relationship between Polk and Cameron. He pointed out to Polk that Cameron occupied a strong position in the Pennsylvania Democracy, that "No man knows Pennsylvania better than he does and he can give you much valuable and correct information as to its present political state."51 He was apparently successful, for correspondence between Polk and Cameron was begun and Cameron confirmed Buchanan's view that the Kane letter was used effectively to hold the Pennsylvania voters in line. "We have succeeded in fixing the belief," he wrote to Polk, "that you are as good a tariff man as Clay," and added significantly that no man known to be opposed to a protective tariff could possibly carry the state. 52 Polk did nothing to undeceive his supporters in Pennsylvania nor did he, on the other hand, in any of his public utterances commit himself to a tariff for protective purposes.⁵³ Shortly after the election the Sunbury American stated that the people who were almost unanimous for a tariff that would help the manufacturing establishments had voted for Polk "with a firm belief that he would foster their interests, as they had been assured by himself and his friends."54

The Democrats carried Pennsylvania by a "fair majority" though probably not the "handsome majority" Buchanan had hoped for.⁵⁵ Polk had a clear majority of more than three thousand votes over the combined vote for Clay of the Whigs and James G. Birney of the Abolitionists,⁵⁶ with an advantage of more than six thousand votes over Clay. Pennsylvania, therefore, was returned to the Democratic column in presidential elections after having gone Whig by a very narrow margin four years earlier.

Pennsylvania's gubernatorial election had taken place in October. The sudden death of Henry A. Muhlenberg, the can-

didate of the Democratic Party, in the midst of the campaign, provided an opportunity to test the strength of the elements in the Democratic Party. Feeling ran high between the supporters of Muhlenberg and of Francis R. Shunk prior to the time of Muhlenberg's nomination. Very soon after his death the State Central Committee called a convention and Shunk was made the nominee. This was in harmony with strong public sentiment. The problem remained for Shunk to allay any hostility among the Muhlenberg supporters that might have carried over from the earlier contest. Buchanan proved to be a good friend to Shunk. He talked with the editors, assuring them that Shunk would forget all that had transpired before his nomination, and that he would be the last man to harbor any resentment against those who had sustained Muhlenberg. He advised Shunk to pursue a course of wisdom and caution; Shunk must conciliate the Muhlenberg element by every honorable means, and the former Muhlenberg friends ought to be informed that they would have a fair share of the Governor's patronage. Shunk's special attention was called to General Cameron who was "a man of warm temperament and of strong personal attachments." He had been a devoted friend to Muhlenberg, declaring: "I have ever considered him the life and soul of the Muhlenberg party. His energy and activity and skill will always make him a formidable foe or a useful friend." Buchanan had seen Cameron on the train the day before and believed from their conversation that he was sincerely desirous of supporting Shunk. Buchanan felt that it would be wise for Shunk to show Cameron that he cherished no personal hostility to him.⁵⁷

Buchanan's conversation with Cameron undoubtedly had some effect in gaining Cameron's support for Shunk. Cameron's feeling of party loyalty also led him in that direction. It was the attitude of the personal friends of Shunk, rather than that of Shunk himself, that made Cameron's problem difficult. They opposed Cameron's presiding over a Democratic meeting in Harrisburg, which opposition "only tended more fully to expose their folly and weakness." Cameron declared to Buchanan that the actions of these men would have no effect upon his course until after the election. He would give Shunk his cordial support and take Buchanan as security that their actions would

not be countenanced by Shunk. For a fuller statement of his position in regard to Shunk, he referred Buchanan to the Harrisburg *Union*, which published his address upon taking the chair

at the above-mentioned meeting.58

The Democrats carried on a vigorous campaign with the result that in the October election, Shunk defeated his Whig opponent, General Joseph Markle, though his margin of victory was less than five thousand votes. ⁵⁹ After the Whigs lost the Governor's election they redoubled their efforts in Pennsylvania for the national elections of November. The Democrats of eastern Pennsylvania called upon their Governor-elect for aid in the campaign. He stumped the area east of the mountains for Polk, with great effectiveness. ⁶⁰ The victory was won for Polk, but with a majority somewhat less than that attained by Shunk.

Cameron had advised Buchanan during the campaign that he must by his efforts make Polk feel that he owed Pennsylvania's vote to him. Polk was thoroughly convinced of the importance of Pennsylvania's vote in his victory. Cameron was highly gratified therefore that Polk offered the chief post in his cabinet to Buchanan. On February seventeenth Polk sent to Buchanan a copy of his inaugural address for his perusal, and accompanied it with a letter setting forth his views and opinions relative to cabinet positions and tendering to him the office of Secretary of State. Buchanan replied the following day, accepting the office and expressing his gratitude to the President-elect.⁶¹

Although the formal offer of a cabinet office to Buchanan was not made until February seventeenth, it had been well known for many weeks that such an offer would be made. In December Cameron had reported to Buchanan that there was much speculation in Harrisburg about the senatorship. He declared that he was beginning to stand pretty high in the estimation of several gentlemen "whose notice flatters me very much." Early in January the members of the Pennsylvania legislature were concerned about the electing of a United States Senator necessary to fill the remainder of Buchanan's term after he should go into the cabinet. Cameron became very much worked up about the intrigue developing in Harrisburg relative

to the senatorship and also the desire of some to shelve Buchanan politically. Buchanan counseled him through Henry Welsh to keep cool about matters. He replied that he would do so "but there is much forebearance required. Your enemies are in the ascendent and I am the scape goat. I will bide my time."63 He wrote to Buchanan on February eighth that Vice Presidentelect Dallas was endeavoring to get into his own hands the distribution of patronage in Pennsylvania. He said also that Dallas' friends in Philadelphia were exceedingly desirous of arranging a judicial appointment for Buchanan as a means of easing him out of the political picture. Cameron and his friends were doing what they could to counteract such movements, and he had no fear that the Dallas faction would prevent Buchanan from being "at the head of Mr. Polk's cabinet." He added somewhat mysteriously: "I will tell you, one of these days, in confidence who will succeed you in the Senate."64

Buchanan resigned as United States Senator the day after Polk's inauguration, and the Pennsylvania legislature was faced with the task of electing his successor for the four years remaining of his unexpired term. The Whigs knew that there was no probability that they would be able to elect a candidate of their own, because of the Democratic majority in the legislature, and therefore held no caucus and made no nomination. The Democratic members of the legislature assembled in caucus on the evening of March twelfth. George W. Woodward of Luzerne, a promising young judge of the Centre judicial district, was selected by more than a two-thirds vote as the candidate of the party. He favored a tariff for revenue with incidental protection.65 He was thus in harmony with Polk's avowed policy. The party had a majority of twelve in the legislature on joint ballot and his election should have been assured. However, a number of the Democrats regarded this nomination as a violation of the tariff pledges made to the people during the campaign, and refused to support the caucus nominee. 66 Since the November election it had been established that the leadership of the Democratic Party was in the hands of those who favored the principle of tariff for revenue, and gave little consideration to protection.⁶⁷ The recently delivered Presidential Inaugural Address contained little of comfort for the

Pennsylvania protectionists. Cameron, recognized as one of the leading protectionists of the state, had a sufficient number of supporters of that principle among the Democrats in the legislature to hold the balance of power between the Whigs and the administration Democrats. McClure credits Cameron with having conceived and successfully executed the plan of uniting the protectionist Democrats and the Whigs to elect himself to the Senate. The sincerity of Cameron's devotion to protection was undoubted. He had been urging protection in his writings and public utterances for the past two decades, and at that time one of his largest interests was the manufacture of iron.

General Cameron was formally addressed by letter, by several gentlemen belonging to the Native American Party,69 and also by several belonging to the Whig Party, inquiring his views regarding some of the outstanding political issues of the day. The Native Americans were interested in making more stringent the naturalization laws and sought his views on the question. He wrote that he would respect the rights of all persons born abroad who had become citizens under our laws, but with the growth of the country and its population he believed it would become necessary to extend the term of probation of foreigners before granting to them citizenship. The Whigs inquired concerning his views on distribution of the proceeds of the sales of public lands among the states. He replied that he would support such a measure, and added that he believed the best application Pennsylvania could make of her share would be its employment in the discharge of the state debts. Both groups asked his views on the tariff. On this question he said:

During the recent presidential election, the tariff of 1842 was much discussed. The democratic party of this state took a decided stand in favor of this measure. The leading interests of the state are involved in its preservation. The people, without distinction of party, concur in desiring that its provisions should remain unaltered, and regard any attempt to change them as hazardous to the interest of American industry. Supported by the democratic party of the state in my views, and feeling the importance of the measures to Pennsylvania, I have no hesitation in declaring that I am in favor of the tariff of 1842, and if elected to the senate of the U. States, I will sustain it without change.

He added that this reply was merely a repetition of his long-entertained and often expressed sentiments.⁷⁰

Balloting for the election of United States Senator took place on March thirteenth. Judge Woodward's vote showed great consistency on the part of his supporters varying from a low of fifty-three on the second ballot to a high of fifty-six on the fourth ballot. Cameron's vote showed a steady increase of ten or more votes on each successive ballot as votes were gradually transferred to him from the Whig and Native American candidates.71 On the fourth ballot Cameron had fifty-five to Woodward's fifty-six, with nineteen scattered votes. The fifth ballot gave Cameron sixty-six votes, Woodward fifty-five, and five scattered. Cameron was thereupon declared duly elected Senator of the United States in the place of the Honorable James Buchanan.⁷² Sixteen of Cameron's votes came from the Democratic members of the legislature, six or seven from the Native Americans, and the remainder from the Whigs. This victory for Cameron is an indication that the people of Pennsylvania, without distinction of party, favored retention of the principle of protection in tariff policy. Commenting on the results of the Pennsylvania senatorial election, the New York Courier and Enquirer took the position that since Cameron had answered the questions propounded to him by the Whigs prior to his election, on the tariff of 1842 and the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of public lands, so decidedly and unequivocally in the affirmative there could be no doubt as to the course the new Pennsylvania Senator would follow.73

It will be recalled that Cameron had written to Buchanan from Harrisburg on February eighth that he would tell him some day, in confidence, who would succeed him in the Senate.74 Again from Harrisburg, he wrote immediately after his election, "I have kept my promise—I am your successor."75 This letter was returned to Cameron some years later and he penned the following note on the back: "I told Mr. Buchanan in Washington, in Feb. 1845, that I would succeed him in the U. S. Senate." Apparently Cameron had conferred with Senator Buchanan on the matter of his successor without obtaining the hearty support and co-operation he had expected. Lewis S. Coryell, a friend of General Cameron's, explained Cameron's victory and Woodward's defeat on grounds of reaction. Woodward had the caucus machinery in his favor. He was a devoted Bentonian. Also he was very hard on the foreigner in that he proposed in convention twenty-one years probation for citizenship and the prohibition of office-holding by them in Pennsylvania. Coryell felt that the legislature elected Cameron as the most effective means of getting rid of Woodward. He expected Cameron to be perfectly orthodox in all his voting, except on the tariff, and believed he would not be very obstinate on that.⁷⁶

Buchanan openly showed his disappointment at the defeat of Woodward, although he does not seem to have exerted himself in behalf of the election of the caucus nominee. Cameron felt that his own long years of service in the advancement of the political interests of Buchanan merited reciprocation now on Buchanan's part. Buchanan, however, recognized that the protectionist principles of Cameron were out of harmony with the tariff views of the new administration and therefore felt obliged to withhold his support. John W. Forney, a Buchanan lieutenant, with less restraint than most of Cameron's opponents and with unmerited insinuation wrote to a friend on the day following the election, "Simon Cameron's the Senator! God save the Commonwealth." The year 1845 marked the beginning of a break in the relations of Cameron and Buchanan which until that time had been cordial and friendly, and, on the part of the former, at times almost worshipful. Their correspondence, which often in the past had been rather heavy, suddenly declined and far fewer letters passed between them during the succeeding years.

The defeated branch of the Democratic Party was unwilling to accept the results of the election quietly. The group assembled in Harrisburg on March fourteenth, the day after Cameron was elected to the United States Senate, and unanimously resolved "that a committee of seven be appointed to draft an Address to the democratic party of the state, stating the means used to defeat the election of the democratic nominee for U. S. Senator." At a subsequent meeting, a month later, attended by nine senators and thirty-eight representatives, the committee reported an "Address to the Democracy of Pennsylvania" together with letters from George M. Dallas and James Buchanan.

The committee had previously addressed letters to Dallas and Buchanan calling upon them to condemn "the disorganizing conduct of an individual whose pledge to whigs and natives should, and we believe will, sever him from the association and confidence of the democratic party." Cameron became aware of an organized attack being made upon him by the Democratic members of the legislature who had supported Woodward, and had been told that Buchanan had agreed to reply to their letter of denunciation of him. To this Cameron wrote:

This of course I do not believe. It is bad enough to be slandered by your confidential friends, but I should weep for human nature, if I could believe that you, whom I have served only as a son serves a father for 12 years, whom I have loved for his purity and honesty—could suffer fears engendered by the clamor of disappointed opponents to induce you to use your position, which I have so materially aided in making to do me wrong. I repeat, that I do not think so badly of you.

Feeling confident in my own strength, I have never asked any aid from you. I do not ask any, but I do expect that the men who breathe

only by your permission shall retract their slanders. . . .

I have told all leading men here who are about the Governor that I prefer peace, but if a war is to wage it shall not be one-sided war.⁷⁸

The Address compared the recent defeat of the low-tariff Democrats to the defeat of Andrew Jackson in 1825, and declared the election of Cameron was accomplished by a coalition of sixteen Democratic members of the legislature, less than onefourth of the Democratic strength, with the Whigs and Natives, as a result of Whig negotiations with him in which it became apparent that his view regarding the tariff and the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of public lands were in agreement with their principles. In the replies of Dallas, March twentyfourth, and Buchanan, March thirty-first, each refused to issue any censure of the personal conduct of Cameron, while both condemned strongly the lack of party loyalty which made possible his election. Buchanan believed that to push the matter further would only cause more party dissension and advised that for the sake of party harmony they submit to the result of the recent election and leave the censure of the recalcitrant members to the action of their respective districts.79

CHAPTER IV

UNITED STATES SENATOR

DURING THE summer of 1844 several friends of Polk proposed that a newspaper more friendly to the southern wing of the Democracy be substituted for the Globe, established in 1830, which was edited by Francis P. Blair and John C. Rives and had been the leading Democratic organ at the Capital since that time. Polk favored such a proposal as a means of uniting the various elements of the party, particularly because he felt that Blair's recent course as editor of the Globe had indicated anything but personal or political friendship for himself.¹ In April, 1845, after the consideration of various plans, the Globe was purchased from Blair and Rives, and the Union was established and became the organ of the Polk administration. Thomas Ritchie, for many years editor of the Richmond Enquirer, was installed as editor and Major John P. Heiss of Tennessee as business manager.²

Public interest and curiosity concerning the fall of the *Globe* were aroused on two phases of the matter: first, the influences that led to the change in party organ; second, the source of the funds that were necessary for the purchase of the *Globe*.

The Benton-Blair-Rives story of the influences which led to the change in the organ, namely, that a deal was made with a friend of Calhoun (F. W. Pickens) for South Carolina's support and with President Tyler for his withdrawal from the presidential race on the basis of the ousting of Blair,³ seems none too well founded. Pickens' report to Calhoun of his conversations with Polk does not support the statement of Benton,⁴ and Tyler categorically denied that he had taken any part in forcing the withdrawal of Blair and Rives from the Globe.⁵ With the Globe representing the Jacksonian Democrats, the Madisonian representing the followers of John Tyler, and the Constitution upholding Calhoun and the ultra-southern Demo-

crats, there certainly was need of some organ to unify the fac-

tions of the Democratic Party.

However, a wholly sufficient cause for the removal of Blair and his influence may be found in Polk's own feelings on the subject. Polk, as President, could not continue the Globe as the official organ of the Democratic Party, especially with Blair as editor, because on numerous occasions in the past five years Blair had either openly snubbed or at least passively neglected him. These views Polk confided to the pages of his Diary after expressing them to Senator William Allen of Ohio, who, in the spring of 1846, had urged upon him the appointment of Blair as associate editor of the Union.⁶ Polk himself must be credited with having determined the removal of Blair. Before it was decided to abandon the Globe the names of several persons to replace Blair as editor had been suggested. Early in March of 1845 Cameron wrote to Andrew J. Donelson, nephew of Andrew Jackson, proposing that Donelson become the editor of the new government organ. Donelson refused to have anything to do with the proposition because of his friendship for Blair and because his acceptance would be a denial of the correctness of the general policy of the Globe, with which he agreed.7 The selection of Ritchie as editor of the new organ was made very shortly thereafter.

The second topic which excited the curiosity of the political observers was the question of the source of funds with which the *Globe* was purchased and the *Union* established. According to the Benton-Blair-Rives version of the story, Simon Cameron in November, 1844, had obtained an order from George M. Bibb, Tyler's Secretary of the Treasury, for the transfer of fifty thousand dollars of government funds from a bank in Philadelphia to the Bank of Middletown. These funds were used by Cameron to pay three annual installments on the purchase of the *Globe*, and the Treasury did not reclaim the money from the Bank of Middletown during that period. Robert J. Walker was Polk's Secretary of the Treasury and Benton declared that he "was the chief contriver and the zealous manager of the arrangements which displaced Mr. Blair and installed Mr. Rit-

chie."8

In 1850-1851, a controversy arose concerning these funds

when Rives published charges in his re-established Globe. The matter was aired in the columns of the Union. Former President Tyler scornfully denied the slightest cognizance of the alleged financial transactions. Not denying that money might have been placed on deposit in the Middletown bank, he declared that if such were the case he had no doubt it was done for reasons entirely satisfactory to the secretary of the treasury and on securities of the most ample character. He further stated that, if Secretary Walker did not withdraw the funds until 1847, it was doubtless because of considerations having exclusive reference to the public interests.9 Walker, whom Tyler characterized as "fully equal to the task of explaining his own course," circumstantially denied any collusion on his part in regard to the funds in the Middletown bank. Ritchie told what he knew about the financial arrangement. Admitting that he knew very little, he denounced the allegations of Rives. Major Heiss wrote concerning Cameron: "We never received one dollar from him as a loan, nor did he advance one dollar toward the purchase of the Globe newspaper." Beyond this Heiss was uncommunicative. When the Globe was purchased it was well-known that neither Ritchie nor Heiss was financially in a position to make the deal for himself; yet Heiss had met the annual installments and Ritchie said in 1851 that Heiss to that day had never informed him from what source he derived the necessary funds.11

In spite of such categorical statements, the answer to the question is not evident. Rives had re-established the *Globe* in 1848 and, in his controversy with Ritchie, he published several letters, or extracts from letters, of Jackson to Blair. Jackson knew of Cameron's interest in the establishment of a new party organ. He looked upon Blair and the *Globe* as his god-children and any attack upon them as an attack upon himself. He referred to Cameron in his letters to Blair, on April eighth and ninth, in a most uncomplimentary manner. On April seventeenth Blair wrote to Jackson giving the Middletown bank story. The fifty-thousand-dollar treasury deposit had been made in Cameron's bank before Tyler left the presidency. Cameron had since made a conditional purchase of the *Madisonian*, which in the end would be swallowed up. Blair continued: "Cameron is here now, and, although I know nothing of his having any-

thing to do in connection with the purchase of the Globe, it is not improbable that he has some dominant interest, inasmuch as

he has long had a hankering to supplant it."12

Further evidence is found in a letter of William A. Harris, a former member of the House of Representatives from Virginia and later the editor of Calhoun's newspaper the *Constitution*. He wrote to Calhoun in the summer of 1845:

You probably do not know the partners in the *Union*. Ritchie owns one half [sic], Heiss a fourth, J. Knox Walker the President's nephew and private secretary a fourth, and Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania did hold the other fourth, but for some reason or other they made him sell out, and it now stands in the name of L. S. Coryell of Pennsylvania, who has from the first been a very active agent in the business; though he assures me that he really had no pecuniary interest in it.¹³

The above letter is supported by letters of Cameron to Coryell, and of Cameron and Coryell to Heiss. On March 31, 1845, Cameron wrote to Coryell: "I have my eye on the 'organ' and am to be informed when the funds are needed." Two weeks later he again wrote to Coryell: "If only 1/3 of \$40,000 is needed, it will be easily arranged. I suppose Heiss is to find only 1/2 of that 3d."14 Shortly after the last installment on the purchase of the newspaper was due, Cameron wrote to Heiss, on May 27, 1847: "I have your note of 22nd and thank you for paying the note. I expect to be in Washington before long and will bring with me the papers alluded to." A note penned on this letter, and dated June 15, 1847, in the handwriting of Heiss states, "This letter is in answer to my request to Senator Cameron, to send the papers to me showing him to be the owner of one fourth of my interest in the Union office. I have purchased his interest in said office and paid him for the same in full. He still holds the papers."15 In a letter from Coryell to Heiss six months later, he recalled the final transactions between General Cameron and Heiss and the part he himself had played in advising both parties. Heiss had offered Cameron thirteen thousand dollars plus certain claims, the same amount he was to pay I. Walker Knox for his fourth-interest. Cameron countered with an offer to sell for fourteen thousand and relinquish all claims. After some negotiations settlement was completed.¹⁶

Rives, in his attack on Ritchie, alleged that Cameron, testifying before a congressional committee, had admitted that he had advanced money to Heiss and that this part of the testimony was suppressed.¹⁷ Blair made much of the point that Cameron had admitted furnishing the money for the payments and that the obliging committee had omitted this from their report by request.¹⁸ The statement of Major Heiss that Cameron had never made him a loan or an advance of money for the purchase of the *Union* certainly is not borne out by the evidence. The correspondence shows that Cameron for some years did own an interest in the *Union*.

Senator Buchanan in 1844 had recommended General Cameron's Bank of Middletown as a safe depository for a portion of the public money. Blair raised the fifty-thousand-dollar incident as a specter to haunt him in his campaign for the presidency in 1856. A decade later Buchanan in a letter to Horatio King betrayed some uneasiness on the subject but attempted to assume a nonchalant manner.¹⁹

More evidence of Cameron's participation in the overthrow of the Globe is presented in a letter from Blair to Cameron of 1856. It must be remembered that at that time both men had left the Democratic Party, and were leaders in the establishment of the Republican Party and supporting Fremont for the presidency. Blair sent to Cameron Jackson's letter of April 9, 1845, and explained that the exasperation against Cameron evinced in it grew from Jackson's supposition that Cameron was the author of the plot to supplant the press which he had established in Washington in 1830. This inference, Blair said, was founded on Cameron's letter to Major Donelson offering him the editorship. He investigated the matter and found at once that the design had not originated with Cameron, but with Calhoun, Tyler, Pickens, Buchanan, and Polk. Blair declared that personally he did not blame Cameron for participating in the scheme. He had assailed Cameron in the Globe, not from any personal hostility, but because he and Cameron differed most essentially in regard to the policy of the administration, and because he was a man of consideration and influence in Pennsylvania whom Blair thought it important to disarm of political power under the then existing circumstances. Cameron had a right in self-defense to get rid of the *Globe* as an antagonist. Blair perhaps went a bit too far when he added an assurance to Cameron that he had never felt the least animosity towards him

for the part he had taken in the matter.20

Immediately after his election by the Pennsylvania legislature, Cameron went to Washington. His credentials were laid before the Senate by Vice President Dallas on Saturday, March fifteenth—the Senate being in special session. On the seventeenth Cameron was presented by his colleague Daniel Sturgeon, took the prescribed oath, and was seated. The special session of the Senate adjourned three days later.²¹ During the months that intervened before the meeting of Congress in December, he made several trips to Washington, on both public and private business. His letters to Buchanan, Coryell, and others reveal his interest in national questions and his eagerness for the meeting of Congress, that he might have opportunity to take a part in the settlement of some of the pending national issues.

A great Fourth of July celebration was arranged at Middletown, Cameron's home, in which honor was done to its foremost citizen. General Cameron was "President of the Day." The formal program consisted of parades, band music, speeches of a political and patriotic nature, and was closed by the offering of some two-score toasts. Several of these toasts were to

General Simon Cameron.²²

The twenty-ninth Congress assembled in December, 1845, with the administration party dominant in both branches. In the Senate, Vice President Dallas occupied the chair which Senator W. P. Mangum had filled as president pro tempore during the administration of President Tyler. Daniel Webster and John C. Calhoun were soon returned to the Senate after having held posts in Tyler's cabinet. Webster, Thomas Corwin of Ohio, and Reverdy Johnson of Maryland lent strength to the Whigs in the Senate. The Democrats were reenforced by Calhoun, Lewis Cass of Michigan, John A. Dix of New York, and Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania. Cameron's colleague, the senior senator from Pennsylvania, was Daniel Sturgeon, who had been elected for a second term. The environment into which Cameron was thrust was none too friendly. He had attained office by uniting the forces opposed to the regular candidate of the

Democratic Party and now neither Whigs nor Democrats were quite willing to accept him in full fellowship, though he felt his personal attachments to be Democratic. McClure declares that Senator Cameron proved to be "a most valuable friend and a most dangerous enemy." At an early period in his service and throughout his four-year term he was recognized as an important figure both in politics and in legislation. He was undoubtedly one of the shrewdest political managers of his day.

On the day of his election Cameron wrote to Buchanan requesting him to assure the President that no man in the Senate would support his administration with more good will than would he. 24 This was an honest expression of intention on Cameron's part, and yet as the months and years passed he frequently found that his principles and views were in conflict with those of the President. On various occasions he was lined up with those in opposition to the administration. His greatest and most fundamental difference with the President concerned their respective views on the tariff question, but even here Cameron hoped that trouble might not be encountered. The presidential message was delivered to Congress on the second day of the session.25 That evening a number of members of Congress called at the White House and expressed their approbation of the message in what President Polk described as "strong and decided terms." This may be modified a bit in the case of Senator Cameron, whom Polk recorded as having pleasantly said: "We Pennsylvanians may scratch a little about the tariff but we will not quarrel about it." He then added that they "were well pleased with the rest of the message." Despite this friendly remark Cameron was one of the most aggressive in combating the Tariff of 1846. The message was highly acceptable to the Southern Democrats.

The Democratic Party Platform in 1844 had declared in rather vague and general terms against fostering "one branch of industry to the detriment of another." In the popular view of that day this took on something of the aspect of a struggle between the agricultural and the manufacturing interests. In his inaugural address Polk laid some stress on this feature and de-clared against a tariff for protection.²⁷ He reiterated his views in his first annual message to Congress,²⁸ defining the revenue

standard as that which would forbid the increase of duties to a point where the receipts from tariff would begin to diminish, condemning the 1842 tariff as not agreeing with such a standard, and recommending a revision which would substitute ad valorem for specific duties. Robert J. Walker was secretary of the treasury.29 In his report to Congress, on the day following the delivery of the President's message, Secretary Walker ably reviewed the whole subject of tariff and made recommendations in line with those of the President.30 He arraigned the manufacturers as enjoying unfair advantages under the 1842 tariff, advantages held at the expense of almost every other class. Buchanan had voted for the Tariff of 1842 and had effectively used the Kane letter to Polk's advantage in the Pennsylvania elections. Whatever may have been the sincerity of his views on protection the close agreement of President Polk and Secretary Walker on the tariff issue was effective in silencing him.³¹

Action on the tariff bill was somewhat delayed by pressure of several other questions, especially those concerning the United States' relations with Mexico growing out of the annexation of Texas, and with Great Britain concerning the notice of abrogation of the Oregon convention. In time a bill, later to be known as the Walker Tariff, was framed in accordance with Secretary Walker's report. On April fourteenth this measure was reported to the House by Chairman James J. McKay of the Committee of Ways and Means.32 It was debated earnestly in the Committee of the Whole during the last two weeks of June. Representative Moses McClean of Pennsylvania offered and had read into the records, resolutions of the senate and house of representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requesting her Senators and Representatives in Congress to oppose all attempts to alter or modify the tariff act of 1842. These resolutions declared that the tariff of 1842 produced "no more than sufficient revenue to defray the necessary expenses of the General Government" and afforded "only an adequate incidental protection to American industry and American manufacturers against foreign competition," and expressed the belief that "the people of Pennsylvania were opposed to any alteration in the existing tariff until further experience has shown that a modification is required to secure a continuance of such

protection.'33

The bill came to a vote in the House on July third and was carried one hundred fourteen to ninety-five.³⁴ The entire Pennsylvania delegation, with one notable exception, both Democrats and Whigs, voted in accord with the resolutions of the Pennsylvania legislature. Moses McClean, Richard Brodhead, James Thompson, John Blanchard, and Henry D. Foster actively opposed the bill, and with most of their Pennsylvania colleagues voted against every move to change the pre-existing

tariff legislation.

David Wilmot, a Democrat, was the one member of the Pennsylvania delegation who voted for the bill. During the balloting on the various sections of the bill and the many proposed amendments, Wilmot introduced a number of amendments. His motions, all of which were lost, were for increasing the protection on raw hides, skins, steel, and iron above that provided in the bill. He believed the Tariff of 1842 to be unjust, oppressive, burdensome to industry, contributing to a privileged class. He considered it a form of partial legislation hostile to the spirit of American institutions, and fatally subversive of the rights and liberties of the people. He predicted that the restrictive policy would eventually paralyze the great agricultural interests which were as worthy a branch of American industry as the manufacturing interests. He denied that he was a free-trader, as charged by fellow Pennsylvanians who opposed modification of the Tariff of 1842, and claimed to be a protectionist within the revenue standard.35 In other words, some of his views were in close harmony with those of the administration. Wilmot had been pledged by his constituents, an agricultural people, to a modification of the Tariff of 1842, yet he wanted to retain a measure of protection for Pennsylvania's industrial interests. He felt that the new bill of 1846 provided too great reduction on many items. He also urged the laying of specific instead of ad valorem duties. His vote for the bill was a redemption of his pledge to his constituents and was given after he had exhausted every effort to secure the interests of his state.³⁶

The tariff bill was received in the Senate from the House on Monday, July sixth, and was made the special order of business of the Committee of the Whole for the next Monday. Chairman Dixon H. Lewis of the finance committee on the latter date presented and ably reviewed the bill before the Committee of the Whole.³⁷ During the next two weeks the bill was earnestly debated, and its fate remained exceedingly doubtful until the final vote. Senator Cameron presented innumerable petitions and memorials particularly from groups of laborers employed in the coal and iron industries of Pennsylvania, against the passage of the new tariff bill. He interjected brief remarks frequently during this two-week period. Always he championed protection as being for the best interests of the industries and the citizens of his state. Pennsylvania's interests were paramount with him. He deeply resented the statement of Senator Ambrose H. Sevier of Arkansas, who compared the petitioners of Pennsylvania with the slave labor of the South in his remark that laborers were the same everywhere. Cameron declared that:

The laborers of Pennsylvania were white men; they were freemen; they were intelligent men; and they asked no favors from Government but to be let alone in the enjoyment of their labor. . . . He was acting with the Democracy of his own state; and he desired to learn no new democracy from gentlemen who compared his laboring fellow-citizens with the negro laborers of the South.³⁸

In the course of the debate on the tariff bill Senator Cameron made one set speech, which has been characterized as the most important speech in his rather long career in the United States Senate. This speech of July twenty-second was very decided in its tone against the new bill. Cameron criticized the methods used by the Administration to enact the new tariff measure, particularly the undue haste of the Administration to rush the bill through the Senate after it had been incubated in the office of the secretary of the treasury and before the House of Representatives for more than six months. He reviewed the recent history of Pennsylvania in the fields of agriculture, coal, iron, manufacturing, and wages. He attributed the growth and prosperity of the state in these fields to the wholesome effects of the Tariff of 1842. He contended that the effects of the new bill on both the revenue and on the various industries of the country would be most disastrous. He concluded

by quoting from a speech of Honorable George M. Dallas, made in 1832 while he was a Senator, in favor of the protective system and stated his belief, that, in the event of the question depending for its issue on the casting vote of the Vice President, that officer would not prove recreant to the interests of his own state.³⁹

On July twenty-seventh, the protectionists won a brief victory by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-seven to recommit the bill to the Committee on Finance with instructions to modify the schedules, Cameron voting in the affirmative. The next day Senator Lewis reported back the bill and asked that the committee be discharged from further consideration of the instructions of the previous day. This excited prolonged debate and was finally carried twenty-eight to twenty-seven, and the committee was discharged, Cameron having opposed the action. Senator Daniel Webster offered an amendment to strike out the whole of the ninth section of the bill, which he considered "would be of no possible use, on the contrary, would be productive of a great deal of fraud upon the treasury." The amendment was carried by a margin of two votes. An effort to commit the bill to a select committee with instructions quite similar to those of the previous day failed. Cameron made two further attempts to amend the bill in order to obtain a greater degree of protection than was provided. Both of his amendments were rejected. 40

At this point calls came for the amendment to be engrossed and for the bill to be brought to a third reading. Senator Spencer Jarnagin of Tennessee had become convinced earlier that the bill could not be amended and therefore had voted for the discharge of the committee, but he now refrained from voting, thus causing a tie and forcing the decision upon Vice President Dallas. Jarnagin, a Whig, was favorable to protection. The Democrats had won a majority in both houses in the Tennessee legislature and were opposed equally to the principle of protection and to the Tariff of 1842. This legislature passed a resolution in harmony with the Administration's tariff policy for the instruction of the state's Senators and Representatives in Washington. Senator Jarnagin personally opposed the bill before the Senate, discussing at length his objections to it, urging

strenuously the duty of changing many of its provisions and favoring greater protection. He declared that while he felt bound in obedience to his legislature to uphold the bill in the end, he considered himself at full liberty to use his utmost exertions to get the bill amended so as to render it as little injurious as possible to the business interests of the country.⁴¹

Dallas was placed in a difficult position. His past record was that of a protectionist and it was on this record that Pennsylvania had supported him for the vice presidency. As the Senate was evenly divided on this important question, Dallas took the opportunity to state the principal reasons for the vote he was about to cast. He analyzed the vote in the Senate which by no means showed a sectional cleavage. He believed that there was ample proof that a majority of the people and of the states desired to change the system heretofore pursued in assessing the duties on foreign imports. This majority, he said, had manifested itself in various ways, and its desire was attested by the approval of the bill in the House of Representatives. There were provisions in the bill of which he did not personally approve, though he believed that the bill was more equal, more temperate, and more just than the act of 1842. The fact that its provisions dealt with some of the pursuits and resources of his native state less kindly than she might have expected did not relieve him of his duty, but only made his performance of it reluctant and painful. He cast his vote in the affirmative and the bill was ordered to a third reading.42 This vote meant that Dallas abided by the party platform and tariff principles of the Administration in the face of the almost unanimous opposition of his native state. For this act he was castigated by the Democratic press of Philadelphia and Harrisburg. 43

One more effort was made to delay action on the bill in a motion for postponement, which was lost by a margin of one vote. The bill was then read a third time by its title and after brief discussion it was brought to a vote. The fate of the bill now largely hung upon the action of Senator Jarnagin. Would he vote according to his convictions, or as instructed by his state legislature, or would he refrain from voting? Until the roll was called, some Senators expected that Dallas would be called upon to cast the deciding vote. Jarnagin voted for the

bill, as instructed, and it carried twenty-eight to twenty-seven. Thus Dallas was relieved of casting the deciding vote on a tariff bill which was execrated in Pennsylvania and which was honestly believed, by a large portion of the leaders, to be inimical to the highest degree to the interests of the American manufacturer and the American mechanic.⁴⁴

On July twenty-ninth the House received and considered the bill from the Senate with the amendment. Several efforts were made by gentlemen from Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania to obstruct action on the measure, but to no avail. By a vote of one hundred fifteen to ninety-two the House concurred with the Senate as to the amendment, and the bill needed only the signature of the President to become a law. 45 The bill was presented to President Polk the following day. He approved and immediately signed it.46 This tariff act of 1846, which is usually referred to as the Walker Tariff, was one distinctly based upon the ad valorem principle. The commodities with which the act dealt were divided into nine schedules, distinguished by the letters A to I inclusive. Rates from one hundred per cent on articles in Schedule A decreased through the alphabetical schedules to Schedule I which specified the list of articles to come in free of duty.47

Cameron did not accept the Walker Tariff schedules as having firmly fixed the rates for any long period. He continued to preach the protective doctrine. Before this tariff was six months old he introduced the following resolution:

that the Secretary of the Treasury be directed to report to the Senate on what articles embraced in the tariff act of 1846 the duties can be increased beyond the existing rates so as to augment the revenue; and to what extent the said duties can be increased, and what additional revenues would accrue therefrom.

The ostensible purpose of the resolution was to furnish the government with more money for carrying on the War with Mexico. However, in his presentation of the resolution, he took the opportunity to analyze the shortcomings of the tariff and to show that it was injurious to the revenue while at the same time it destroyed the domestic manufacturer. For his illustrations he chose iron, sugar, and other items of particular interest to the

people of Pennsylvania.⁴⁸ The resolution, with amendments, was adopted. Fourteen and a half months later, in March, 1848, he called the attention of the Senate to the need of protection for coal and iron; and in February, 1849, a month before his term would expire, Cameron presented at one time one hundred thirty-two petitions of the citizens of Pennsylvania asking such an increase of the tariff as would afford protection to the do-

mestic industries of the country.49

While the Walker Tariff by no means provided free trade, it was certainly a step in that direction. The drift towards free trade continued until checked by the Civil War. In the meantime, Congress saw fit, in 1857, to make a further reduction in tariff rates, while Cameron was still supporting protection. The period from 1846 to 1857 was one of general prosperity for the country. The evident causes of that prosperity were numerous, and, since there is no way of eliminating the other factors and determining how much should be ascribed to tariff alone, it can be said of the low tariff only that it was undoubtedly one of the contributing factors.⁵⁰

The firm and consistent stand of Senator Cameron in 1846 for the interests of his native state is characteristic of his whole political career. That his efforts did not go unnoticed or unappreciated by protectionist elements outside Pennsylvania was evidenced a year later at Saratoga Springs. An article from there bearing the date line of August 11, 1847, describes an interesting incident. A respectable deputation of manufacturers from different states who were visiting the Springs waited upon Senator Cameron, also a visitor there, and expressed their appreciation for his efficient and valuable services during the last session of Congress in behalf of the cause of domestic industry. The writer went on to bear personal testimony to the zeal and labor which General Cameron bestowed upon the tariff question during the discussion and the progress of the bill in the Senate. He had consulted him frequently at the time and found him not only always well-informed, but also ready and anxious to co-operate in any just policy that would save the great interests which it was believed would be doomed by the new bill. Though he failed in the cause for which he was fighting he was none the less "entitled to the gratitude of those who prefer

protecting American labor to that of the convicts and paupers of European workships."⁵¹ The editor of the Lewisburg *Chronicle*, who quoted the above from the Philadelphia newspaper, added his own tribute:

to the remarkable tact, talent, and efficiency displayed by General Cameron during the last session of Congress, and his unwavering fidelity to the interests of the working classes. Indomitable energy and perseverance are distinguishing traits of his character.⁵²

While the House of Representatives was considering new tariff legislation both the House and the Senate were called upon to consider a matter of foreign relations growing out of the election of Polk, the Oregon problem. This question was one of national ownership of the Pacific Northwest. By successive treaties the territory was defined to mean the area west of the Rocky Mountains, north of the forty-second parallel, and south of fifty-four degrees and forty minutes. Four nations had held conflicting claims to this area. Spain by the Treaty of 1819 relinguished to the United States all claims north of the fortysecond parallel. Russia, whose claims were the weakest, withdrew all claims south of fifty-four forty by separate treaties with the United States and Great Britain in 1824 and 1825, respectively. By the Convention of 1818, Great Britain and the United States had drawn the boundary-line between Canada and the United States on the forty-ninth parallel west to the Rocky Mountains and had provided for joint occupation of the Oregon Country by the subjects and citizens of both powers. This joint-occupation treaty was renewed in 1827 with the provision that either party might terminate the agreement by giving one year's notice to the other party.

During the succeeding years, population had poured into the territory, and unsuccessful efforts had been made by the United States to reach an agreement with the British for division of the territory on the proposed line of the forty-ninth parallel.⁵³ The Democratic Party's slogan of "fifty-four forty or fight" may have been a bit rash, but it was in line with growing desire in the United States for a settlement of this issue. President Polk in his annual message reviewed the problem and the unsuccessful efforts to reach a boundary settlement with the British.

He declared that the title of the United States to Oregon was the strongest now in existence and that the British proposition of compromise "can never, for a moment be entertained, by the United States, without an abandonment of their just and clear territorial rights, their own self-respect, and the national honor." He suggested that, under the provisions of the Convention of 1827, Great Britain be given notice for termination

of the agreement for joint occupation.

The question was discussed by both Houses of Congress and finally, on April twenty-third, both Houses accepted the conference committee's report on a joint resolution authorizing the President to give to the government of Great Britain the required notice. 55 Senator Cameron, in voting for the joint resolution, declared that he was in favor of a plain notice to the British Government. He considered that the interests of the country could be best served if the action of Congress on this matter indicated a high degree of unanimity. He hoped for speedy settlement. The President had asked for authority to give the required notice; having full confidence in his integrity, capacity, and patriotism, Cameron was willing to trust the whole question to his hands. He believed fully in his government's right to the whole area in dispute, that title to the territory was "ours" to fifty-four forty; but he did not think this the proper time or place to argue the question. That could be better done by the Executive in arranging a treaty or insisting upon our rights. When a treaty should be negotiated by the representatives of the two countries the Senate would then have opportunity, if it were deemed wise, to revise their acts. Cameron thought this course would be more respectful to the President and in the end better for the country.⁵⁶

Acting under the authority given him by this joint resolution of Congress the President, a few days later, transmitted the required year's notice for termination of the treaty, expressing the hope that this would hasten a friendly settlement. Early in June, the British government suggested a compromise boundary settlement in line with that sought at earlier periods by the United States, and proposed a convention for the adjustment of their differences with the United States on the Oregon question. This proposal was transmitted to the Senate on June tenth.

On the twelfth the Senate voted thirty-eight to twelve to advise the President to accept the proposal of the British Government for a convention to settle the boundaries between the United States and Great Britain west of the Rocky Mountains. An agreement was concluded on the fifteenth and submitted to the Senate. In the ensuing debate, an effort to amend the treaty to give the whole of the territory to the United States failed by a vote of five yeas to forty-two nays. Shortly thereafter, on June eighteenth, the Senate voted forty-one to fourteen to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty. On all three votes, Senator Cameron and his colleague from Pennsylvania, Senator Sturgeon, expressed their opposition to relin-

quishing any of the Oregon country to the British.⁵⁷
Two years later a bill was before Congress providing for the establishment of territorial government in Oregon. In both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the bill was much delayed by heated arguments on the question of permitting or prohibiting slavery in the territory. It passed the House on August second with a slavery-restriction clause similar to that of the Ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory. The Senate added several amendments to the bill, including one to strike out the slavery-restriction clause. The House refused to concur in these amendments and it appeared that a deadlock had been reached.⁵⁸ Finally, on August twelfth, or rather on Sunday morning of August thirteenth, the day before the close of the session, the Senate receded from its amendments one by one and the bill was passed in the form in which it came from the House of Representatives. Cameron voted for the Oregon bill as sent to the House with Senate amendments; and, although he had supported some of the amendments, when it appeared that the deadlock might prevent the passage of the bill during the current session, he voted in the affirmative on all division and recorded votes on receding from the Senate amendments.59

The method used by Cameron to gain election to the United States Senate could not be calculated to have gained for him the goodwill of the Administration, especially since it had meant the defeat of the candidate of the Democratic Party caucus of Pennsylvania. Although on many occasions he had professed his support of President Polk and his administration, he felt very keenly that the President had not accepted him and paid to him due respect in the matter of patronage in Pennsylvania. To Cameron it seemed that the President's nomination of Judge George W. Woodward to the Supreme Court was a deliberate

effort to place himself in an embarrassing position.

Cameron had defeated Woodward for the seat in the Senate. When President Polk sent his nomination to the Senate, it appeared to Cameron to be an attempt to placate the friends and supporters of Woodward. The Senate had a narrow Democratic majority and it was not doubted that the nomination would be confirmed. It was only natural under the circumstances that Cameron should exert himself to have the nomination rejected. The President suspected that Buchanan had given countenance to Cameron's opposition.⁶⁰ That the President's suspicion was correct seems to be confirmed by a letter of Cameron to Buchanan written on December twenty-fifth, two days after the nomination was sent to the Senate. Cameron said that he was greatly disappointed at the nomination of Judge Woodward after understanding the President to say he did not intend to make it. He added: "This will hurry my return to Washington and I will try to see you on Sunday. I hope you will permit me to see you on the afternoon of that day."61 The inevitable inference is that Cameron was hurrying back to Washington to work against this nomination in the Senate, that in so doing he was carrying out Buchanan's wish, and that he desired to counsel with him as to methods. Cameron enclosed, with the above note, letters which he had received protesting in strong terms against the proposed appointment of Woodward and urged that strenuous action be taken to prevent ratification. Buchanan had expressed to the President a desire to have the place on the bench for himself. Polk had been quite reluctant to have him leave the Cabinet and after some days of reflection Buchanan had notified the President of change of mind. In doing so he had urged the appointment of John M. Read of Philadelphia to the place. 62 Buchanan was greatly disappointed and dissatisfied at the appointment of Woodward.

On January twenty-second the Senate rejected the nomination of Judge Woodward to the Supreme Court. This was ac-

complished by the votes of six Democratic Senators acting with the Whig members. Polk believed Cameron was the active member in the Senate in procuring this rejection, and furthermore he was indignant because certain that Buchanan had conspired to defeat the nomination in order that he might secure the office for himself. The office was permitted to remain vacant for some months. During the summer it was offered to Buchanan, who again decided to remain in the Cabinet. Polk, on August third, nominated Judge Robert C. Grier of Pittsburgh, an appointment which was entirely satisfactory to Buchanan, and which was confirmed by the Senate two days later. This appointment was personally acceptable to Cameron. Another case in which Cameron drew swords with the Presi-

dent concerned the nomination of Henry Horn as collector of the port of Philadelphia. Buchanan objected to the appointment of Horn, but later reluctantly withdrew his opposition and Polk sent the nomination to the Senate. Cameron apparently had not been consulted. He made his opposition manifest by a resolution in the executive session of the Senate calling on the President for the recommendations upon which Horn had been appointed collector of Philadelphia. He also called for the protest made to the Senate by certain members of the Philadelphia delegation in Congress against this nomination. This was an unusual procedure and rather disturbing for the President and for the Administration leaders in the Senate. On February eleventh, while calling on the President, Cameron expressed his opposition to the appointment of Horn; at the same time, admitting that he was honest and was qualified for the office. The President was convinced that Senator Cameron's real objection to the appointment was that Horn did not belong to his particular clique in Pennsylvania. He then explained to Cameron the circumstances under which the appointment had been made. Cameron spoke despairingly of all the other appointments at Philadelphia except one. He intimated that Horn had it in his power to have the opposition to his confirmation by the Senate withdrawn. He suggested that some friend might write to Horn and ask him to call on him [Cameron]. Polk confided to his Diary that he certainly would not write to Horn but would leave Cameron to take his own course.65

On May twenty-fifth Cameron took advantage of the absence of several Democratic Senators to call up the nomination of Horn. His nomination was rejected by the solid Whig vote with additional opposition votes of Senators Calhoun, Cameron, and James D. Westcott of Florida. President Polk was irritated by this action of the Senate. He placed the full blame upon Cameron, whom he referred to as "a managing, tricky man in whom no reliance is to be placed." Because of the circumstances of the rejection President Polk determined to renominate Horn for the same post. Cameron called upon the President and failed in his efforts to dissuade him from the course.⁶⁷ The President later asked Secretary Walker to write to Horn inviting him to come to Washington and through Secretary Buchanan arrangements were made for him to have a conference with Senator Cameron. 68 Horn and Cameron apparently were unable to reach an agreement, for on June twenty-fourth the Senate for the second time refused to confirm the nomination of Horn. Again this rejection was accomplished by Calhoun, Cameron, and Westcott voting with the Whigs.69

It must be remembered that the evidence presented by President Polk was biased because Cameron appeared to him to be obstructing the will of the Administration, though he steadfastly maintained that he was a Democrat. It should be recalled also that Cameron's opposition to the Administration's tariff policy was based upon defense of interests which he considered vital to his native state. His opposition to some of the President's Pennsylvania appointments was on a somewhat different basis.

Cameron had labored long years in the interest of the Democratic Party, and now occupied one of the highest offices to which he could be elevated by his state. This office carried with it, especially if he were of the party in control of the Administration, certain courtesies and respects with reference to patronage. It was, therefore, a matter of honor to him that the President should defer somewhat to his wishes and party tradition in Pennsylvania appointments. When the President chose to ignore him, Cameron retaliated by using the only method available to show the President that he must be given consideration—that of organizing opposition to block Pennsylvania appointments which he did not favor. Cameron was in the early

stages of building a political following of his own. He could not permit such a slight to go unnoticed. Before the end of Cameron's first Congress, the President had many opportunities to observe that he was a force that must be reckoned with. President Polk had followed another party tradition—he had tried to ignore a Senator irregularly elected against a regular candidate.

Cameron's letters of 1846 and 1847 indicate his disappointment in Polk's leadership of the Democratic Party. They also show, along with his actions in the Senate, some weakening of his own attachments to the party though frequently he professed strict allegiance. He was so thoroughly convinced of the ineffectiveness of Polk's leadership to bring about political unity of the national Democracy that, in January, 1847, he declared to a friend concerning the presidential election of the next year that "the democratic party cannot succeed unless we have a new man to carry the flag." The reversals suffered by the Administration in the 1846 congressional elections had strengthened Cameron's convictions.

The unsatisfactory relations between the United States and Mexico were hastened to a serious conclusion by the sending of American armed forces into the disputed territory immediately north of the Rio Grande. The district of Texas when a part of the Mexican state of Texas-Coahuila had not extended south of the Neuces River, but the Texans after their revolution and independence had asserted their boundary to be the Rio Grande. When Texas was annexed to the United States it was naturally assumed that Texas' claims to the disputed area were valid and Polk endeavored to adjust the boundary by peaceful negotiations. When the Mexican Government refused to receive the United States minister-plenipotentiary, John Slidell, and evaded peace discussions, President Polk ordered General Zachary Taylor to advance to the Rio Grande.

This movement of American troops occurred in March, 1846. For some weeks nothing happened. Polk appeared to be anxious for some overt act on the part of the Mexican Government that would give him opportunity to ask for a declaration of war on the basis of an attack on the United States. On Saturday, May ninth, it was decided by the cabinet, Secretary of the Navy

George Bancroft dissenting, that the President should recommend to Congress a declaration of war against Mexico to collect payment for the adjudicated claims on which Mexico had stopped paying. That evening despatches arrived from General Taylor announcing the attack by Mexicans on United States forces north of the Rio Grande. The Cabinet was hastily reassembled and it was unanimously agreed that war existed by an act of Mexico and that a message should be sent to Congress on Monday laying before them all the information concerning relations with Mexico and recommending vigorous and prompt measures to enable the Executive to prosecute the war.⁷²

The message was prepared on Sunday and sent to Congress the next day. The Sunday are the House of Representatives on the same day, by a vote of one hundred seventy-four to fourteen, passed a bill declaring that "by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government and the United States," and providing for the prosecution of the war. On Tuesday the Senate received and passed the declaration by an overwhelming vote, forty to two. On Wednesday it received the President's signature. During the period when the measure was before the Senate, Cameron used his influence to hasten enactment. Throughout the course of the war he and the people of Pennsylvania, in general, approved the war meas-

ures pursued by the Administration.⁷⁶

A few months after the war began, and before Congress adjourned in the summer of 1846, President Polk requested an appropriation with which to negotiate peace, it being supposed that the United States would acquire some territory from Mexico. A bill to provide funds as requested was moved in the House of Representatives on the eighth of August. At this juncture David Wilmot, a Democrat from Northeastern Pennsylvania, heretofore identified with the politics of the Administration, proposed an amendment. Conditional to the acquisition of any territory which the United States might gain from the Republic of Mexico by virtue of any treaty which might be negotiated between them and to the use by the Executive of the funds granted under this bill, he proposed that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude should ever exist in any part of the said

territory.⁷⁷ This amendment became famous as the Wilmot Proviso.

A fruitless effort was made to amend the Wilmot Proviso in such a way as to limit its application to the region north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes and thus to extend the principle of the Missouri Compromise. The House passed the appropriation bill on August eighth carrying the Proviso by a vote of eighty-seven to sixty-four. The next day being Sunday, the bill was not brought in the Senate until the tenth of August. When the bill was taken up Senator Dixon H. Lewis of Alabama moved to strike out the House amendment. Senator John Davis of Massachusetts objected to the removal of this amendment, and, gaining the floor, occupied it until twelve o'clock, the hour at which the two Houses by their joint resolution had previously agreed to adjourn. The measure was thus killed.

In the next session of Congress a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to appropriate three million dollars for the purpose of peace negotiations. The Wilmot Proviso was added and the amended bill carried on February 15, 1847, by a vote of one hundred fifteen to one hundred five. 80 Within the next two weeks there was much sharp debate in the Senate on the slavery question, growing out of the Proviso added to the House bill. Finally, on March first, or rather on the early morning of the second, the Senate refused to accept the amended bill of the House of Representatives, but did pass one of its own based on the House bill which provided for appropriating the same sum.81 Then on the last day of the session, March third, the House, after a vain effort to add the Wilmot Proviso to the Senate bill, accepted the Senate measure.82 Three million dollars therefore became available to the President without the Wilmot restrictions.

Cameron voted for the Wilmot Proviso and against the bill after the amendment had been voted down. This vote did not represent any intense personal conviction on his part; he merely carried out the instructions of the Pennsylvania legislature. He said that for the first time he was called upon to give a vote not the result of his own reflection. He digressed briefly to give

his opinion upon the responsibility of obeying instructions from the state legislatures.

He was free to say that he would not obey instructions not in accordance with the opinions and wishes of the people who elected the legislature giving them; or if they should instruct him to do an act which subsequent information should convince him they had adopted upon wrong information, he would not hesitate to take the responsibility of disobeying them, and would rely with confidence on the purity of his intentions and the result of his vote as his justification with the people, who were the common masters of all representatives. But upon a question on which public opinion was clear, he should never hesitate, and would cheerfully obey—for, in his opinion, no principle was more clear than that the agent was bound to carry out in good faith the wishes of his principal. So clear was he on the subject, that he would never hesitate to give up his own opinion, and adopt that which he knew to be the decided opinion of his State.⁸³

There could be little room for doubt concerning the stand of Pennsylvania on this question. A majority of the people were at least moderately opposed to the acquisition of any more slave territory. The legislature requested the Pennsylvania Senators and Representatives in Congress to vote against any measure by which territory might be acquired unless it carried a provision prohibiting slavery. So united was the legislature that out of a total of one hundred thirty-three members, only three votes were recorded against the resolution. Under such circumstances Cameron's course was clear. To explain the position of the people of Pennsylvania further he pointed out that the people of his state would "never interfere with the constitutional rights of their southern brethren," that they "would be among the first to pour out their blood and treasure to sustain the Union, or to protect from wrong the people of the southern states." The people of Pennsylvania did not desire to interfere with the local and peculiar institutions of the South and many of them believed that:

if left to themselves, the entire southern people will in due time, and in their own good way, abolsh the entire institution of slavery; they think, too, that this great community of States may, like members of a partnership, before the purchase of new territory with the common funds of the firm, decide among themselves what use shall be made of the purchase.⁸⁴

Two weeks after the funds were made available, Polk appointed Nicholas P. Trist with full powers to negotiate a treaty with Mexico. States Although his commission was revoked in the fall, Trist stayed on with the United States' forces at the city of Mexico and concluded the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo on February 2, 1848. Despite the conditions of its negotiation Polk submitted the treaty to the Senate with his recommendation that with certain modifications it should be ratified. After approximately two weeks of debate, during which several modifications were made, the Senate approved the treaty by a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen. Both of the Senators from Pennsylvania voted for ratification.

During the course of the war, Cameron seldom spoke at length in the Senate on any of its issues. He supported the Administration in making the necessary provisions for the successful prosecution of the war and was ever alert on measures which would benefit the common soldiers. He was responsible for proposing bills for better equipment, better pay, greater inducements for enlistment, and, looking to the time of their honorable discharge from the army, for the granting of land bounties to them.⁸⁸ Attention to such things also might well be calculated to aid Cameron in the building of a political following not only in his own state but also in the nation.

The Harrisburg Argus, the leading Administration newspaper at the Pennsylvania capital, reported the action of various county groups throughout the state. It noted the action of the Democracy of Berks County in relation to "the patriotic course pursued by General Cameron in the Senate of the United States—especially the noble and gallant bearing that distinguished his conduct toward the volunteer citizen soldiery of the republic." Similarly the Democracy of Dauphin, his home county, assembled in full convention and passed strong resolutions in approbation of his public acts. It declared that:

the patriotic and philanthropic conduct of Senator Cameron, in the American Senate, toward the volunteers—in elevating their character and improving their condition, is in perfect harmony with his past history—showing his devotion to their welfare and the public honor is not assumed for the occasion, but sincere . . .

and added: "The volunteers will never cease to remember the name of Simon Cameron with respect and confidence—to reward his services with the lasting gratitude of a soldier's heart." The convention resolved that "his services in the United States Senate in behalf of the citizen soldiers of our common country have given other parts of the Union an evidence of that patriotism and goodness of heart which we have long known that he possessed in an eminent degree." The New York *Tribune* spoke of General Cameron in an article on the United States Senate as one of the new members, who, by his talents and attention to the public business, aided in sustaining the high character of that illustrious body. This was high praise com-

ing as a voluntary tribute from a political opponent.

In the spring of 1847 William Brua Cameron, the elder of Simon's sons, desired to obtain an appointment as a Lieutenant of Dragoons, or of the Marines. It being a delicate matter for his father, Brua wrote several letters soliciting Buchanan's aid. He was anxious to be in Mexico before the fighting was over, and ceased asking Buchanan's aid when he heard of several American victories and believed the war about at an end.91 He did not wish to continue in the army and would have resigned after the war ended. Finally, on April eighth, Buchanan wrote to Cameron about his son's solicitations. Cameron replied that he was mortified by Brua's attempts to get a place in the army. He would have had no objections to his having gone with a volunteer company for a year at the beginning of the war, "or even now if the country needed him"; but he declared he had a horror of men living off the public and "nothing would pain me more than to see my son entering the army for a living or expecting to be supported by the Government in any way." Cameron felt that a commission now would require a period of training before he could be of service and by that time the war would be over and no service rendered for the salary received. There were other considerations also. Cameron wanted Brua to take his place in business. This would be precluded if army life proved particularly attractive. He declared Buchanan would do him a kindness if he would write a few lines of advice to Brua. 92

The acquisition of extensive territory along the Pacific coast, as a result of the Oregon Treaty and the Mexican Cessions

under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, opened a new era in the history of the United States and brought to the front the problem of establishing a more rapid means of communication with this area. Much time of the Congress which met in December of 1848 was consumed in the consideration of this problem. Memorials and petitions from William H. Aspinwall and others were presented in the Senate, looking towards a solution of the question through the building of railroads across the Isthmus of Panama or the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, or the construction of a plank road across the former. Other petitions prayed for the construction of a national railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean. Cameron believed that the public interests imperatively demanded that Congress should do something to facilitate communication between our Atlantic and Pacific coasts.⁹³ Several bills were presented which would provide for the construction of roads across the Isthmus of Panama and across the western area of the United States to the Pacific. Congress adjourned, however, without passing any. The measures usually provided for government aid in the form of money grants or otherwise to carry out the project. In the debates on the question of governmental aid sought by individuals Cameron declared himself as utterly opposed to connecting the public treasury with the interests of individuals. He cited the experience of Pennsylvania in building the Union Canal twenty years earlier. The state became involved first by guaranteeing the interest on a million dollars of stock for constructing the canal and ended by becoming involved in a debt of more than forty millions of dollars. He believed the Federal Government should endeavor to induce competition instead of conferring exclusive privileges and felt that as important as the isthmus railroad project was to the trade of the world, it was not of sufficient magnitude to require the assistance of the govern-

As the time for the close of the thirtieth Congress approached with its pressure of many bills yet to be enacted, night sessions became unavoidable. The nerves and the patience of legislators became worn, and too often gentlemanly demeanor was abandoned and the legislative chambers were profaned. The last day of the session—the last day of Cameron's first term—was

one that he probably long remembered. It was Saturday, March third, and the evening session lasted through the night to final adjournment at seven o'clock Sunday morning. "Observer," writing his letter of March fourth for the *Public Ledger*, declared:

The session last evening was a terrible one—fights and squabbles in both Houses. . . . You can have no idea of the noise and confusion in both Houses, the epithets and blows that were exchanged, and the general uproar that rendered it almost impossible for members to know what they voted upon.⁹⁵

In the Senate, Henry S. Foote of Mississippi took offense at some of the things which developed in debate on the floor and centered his venom particularly upon Senator Cameron. Words passed back and forth between them until "something approaching a personal collision occurred," as the *Congressional Globe* recorded it. This is clarified by an item in the *Pennsylvania Telegraph* bearing the date-line of Washington, March seventh:

Mr. Foote made a personal explanation in regard to his encounter with Mr. Cameron. . . . He admitted that slight blows had been exchanged and expressed his regret that the dignity of the Senate had been violated through his rashness. The difficulty with Mr. Cameron, he said, had been amicably settled.⁹⁷

The editor commented editorially on the same page, "It is said that Mr. Foote, after he got sober on Sunday, made an apology to General Cameron for his rudeness," and to the editor it seemed that the General should be satisfied, "having both punished Foote for his insolence, and then received an apology from him."

Cameron was not an orator and only rarely did he enter at any length into debate. His voice was weak and did not carry well, yet when he did speak on the floor of the Senate, as, for example, against the provisions of the Walker Tariff, he spoke with strong conviction. His record in the Senate during the twenty-ninth and thirtieth Congresses was one of close attention to the public business and of vigilant watchfulness for any legislation that might work a discrimination against the poor or less privileged classes, whether they were common soldiers, country editors, or laborers on the Capitol grounds.

CHAPTER V

STATE POLITICS AND THE CONTEST OF 1848

THE DEMOCRACY of Pennsylvania was in anything but a placid state for some weeks following the election of Cameron to the United States Senate in March of 1845. The party regulars of the legislature issued an "Address to the Democracy of Pennsylvania" condemning the unscrupulous means used by their political opponents to gain their objectives and calling down the wrath of the Democrats upon Cameron. They desired that he should be severed "from the association and confidence" of the party. The saner counsel of Buchanan prevailed, however. He admonished them to submit to the election results rather than, by pushing their views, cause further distraction and division within the party. The feeling of indignation gradually subsided. Nevertheless, for some months Cameron remained under a political cloud. Except for being feted by his home community in the course of the Fourth of July celebrations, he was practically ignored by the Democrats of the state. Not until he took such a decided stand for the welfare of Pennsylvania in the tariff discussions in Congress did he begin to regain for himself a place of leadership at home. In the meantime, an endorsement by General Cameron would have proved a definite liability to a candidate in many sections of the state.

In the October elections of 1845, eleven senators and one hundred representatives would be chosen for the legislature. Although the Democrats felt fairly safe as far as the representatives were concerned, they expected a close race for control of the senate, partly because the terms of service of eight Democratic senators had expired to only three Whig senators. The Democratic press pointed out the importance of inculcating a spirit of "the utmost harmony in the brotherhood of our party."

The official returns of the election show that of the eleven districts where senators were to be elected, Whigs gained four

formerly Democratic districts and lost one district to their opponents. This net gain was not sufficient to enable them to take the control of the senate away from the Democrats, who now had eighteen senators to the Whigs' fourteen and the Natives' one. In the house of representatives, Democrats held better than a two-to-one margin—sixty-eight to thirty-two. Thus the Democrats organized both branches of the Pennsylvania legislature. The senatorial district in which Cameron lived, Dauphin and Northumberland Counties, switched from the Democratic to the Whig column; and his representative district, Dauphin, also went to the Whigs, although the Northumberland district returned a Democratic member.²

By 1845 the western interests of Virginia and Pennsylvania were demanding that their legislatures make provision for the granting of a right of way for the extension of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to any terminus that the company might select in either state. Yet the eastern interests of the two states opposed these demand on the ground that the extension of this railroad would injure the existing improvements of the states in question and have a tendency to carry the trade of the West to Baltimore instead of securing it for their own commercial centers. Cameron had earlier become involved with this issue when he was endeavoring to establish a railroad from Harrisburg to Baltimore. At that time he expressed his firm belief that the volume of western trade would be sufficient to feed the enterprise and employ the capital not only of Philadelphia and Baltimore but also of several other cities of similar size.⁴

The railroad controversy proved to be the greatest and most exciting topic before the Pennsylvania legislature in 1846. It occupied the legislature during the whole session and caused much division. The northern area of the state desired a connection with New York's system of improvements in order to get produce to market and to obtain supplies with greater facility. Pittsburgh and western Pennsylvania urged a connection with the Maryland system of improvements for the same reasons. Philadelphia and central Pennsylvania resisted both these attempts to draw trade away from their own trading centers, and from the public works which the state had been to so much expense to construct. All kinds of log-rolling maneuvers were

employed by the different sections for the attainment of their several interests. In order to keep the trade within the state, the Philadelphians inaugurated a project for what they termed the Central Railroad, to connect the two principal cities of the state, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, by a continuous railroad. The Pittsburgh interests and western Pennsylvanians generally treated this project as a mere expedient for defeating their demand for a cheap and expeditious thoroughfare to market. Finally the legislature passed a bill granting the right of way to the Baltimore company, and also chartered a company to undertake the project of establishing a continuous railroad from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. In both cases the companies were hedged by such conditions and provisos as to make the grants rather unsatisfactory.⁵

The autumn elections of 1846 tended to reflect the unfavorable reaction of Pennsylvania to the federal tariff policy. Two years earlier Pennsylvania had returned to Congress a majority favorable to the Democrats. The people of the state now felt that they had been deceived by the Democratic leaders and replaced a number of them with Whigs. The result was that the state's representation in the next House of Representatives was sixteen Whigs, seven Democrats, and one Native American. The state legislature also had a substantial majority of Whigs in each

branch.6

David Wilmot was the only member of the Pennsylvania delegation who had voted in Congress against the retention of the Tariff of 1842. It was natural, therefore, when he sought reelection in the twelfth district in 1846, that he should be the object of a converging attack by the protectionist forces of the state. The plan adopted to accomplish his defeat was to organize and unite all opposition to him. Although the Democrats of the twelfth district nominated him, there were dissenting Democratic elements. These forces were marshalled and on September sixteenth the bolters nominated Robert G. White, a protectionist Democrat, to oppose Wilmot. The Whigs met in convention the following day. With a proper resolution on the tariff, one expressing a high consideration for the welfare of Pennsylvania, and an expression of confidence in White, they deemed it inexpedient to nominate a third candidate from the district, as

they were satisfied White would, if elected, act in concert with the Pennsylvania delegation in Congress in sustaining the interests of the state and the nation.⁷ Despite the machinations of his opponents Wilmot won over White with a majority of nearly

eight hundred.

The general landslide of Whig votes in Pennsylvania in 1846 is attributable largely to distrust and disapproval of the tariff of 1846. It is a remarkable fact that Wilmot, who alone in his state had supported the bill, should be one among the few of his party to be returned to Congress. His election at this time was due to the popularity of the low tariff of 1846 in the twelfth Pennsylvania district and to his strong hold on the confidence and affection of his supporters.8 It must be remembered that Wilmot had expressed himself during the campaign of 1844 as favoring an alteration of the tariff act of 1842, and that he was not entirely in favor of the bill of 1846, as his votes show. When the tariff bill was returned to the House of Representatives from the Senate with an amendment he voted for indefinite postponement, and when that failed he cast his vote against the measure.9 Cameron and Buchanan were among the Democrats of Pennsylvania who backed the movement to defeat Wilmot. Cameron reported the results of the election in Pennsylvania to Buchanan about a week after it took place. He was not happy at the general outcome, writing: "I need not tell you that we have been routed. The only county in the state that has made a democratic gain is Dauphin, and here we hung out our banner with the tariff of '42, in the brightest colours, marked upon it."10 The implication is clear that he was anything but gratified at the returns of the twelfth district of Pennsylvania, for, in the same communication, he declared, "Wilmot has escaped by the hair of his head, and only because White did not work as he should have done to deserve success." Cameron's irritation at White's remissness and Wilmot's victory was obvious.

The results of the 1846 election caused much worry among the Democratic leaders of Pennsylvania. They looked forward to the election of a new governor in 1847, although the prospects of a victory for their party were none too favorable. Buchanan, whose followers always kept him well informed, wrote

in November:

I confess I look with much apprehension to the present political condition of Pennsylvania. Our system of internal improvements was conducted in such a manner before the accession of Governor Shunk, as to engender a swarm of blood suckers who grew rich upon the plunder of the State. An honest administration has rendered these men desperate and nothing will satisfy them but the selection of a Governor whom they can use for their own advantage.¹¹

Buchanan urged greater exertions in behalf of the nomination and re-election of Governor Shunk. Cameron had very actively supported Shunk in 1845, but in this period seemed satisfied to let things take their course without exerting himself greatly in Shunk's favor.

Governor Shunk was nominated for a second term in spite of the opposing elements to which Buchanan had referred. The Whigs nominated as their candidate General James Irvin of Milesburg, who had been a member of Congress from 1841 to

184512

The federal administration not only had disappointed Pennsylvania in tariff legislation but also had opposed the Wilmot Proviso. Pennsylvania had been moderately opposed to slavery since the days of William Penn. The failure to add the Proviso to the appropriation bill in the closing hours of the twenty-ninth Congress did not stifle the sentiment in Pennsylvania for it. It had received the entire vote of the state's delegation in both House and Senate, and it continued to gain popularity in the state. It asserted the doctrine of the Ordinance of 1787 against slavery, to which principle Pennsylvania was wedded. By the summer of 1847, it appeared that the Democratic Party was in danger of losing control of the state largely because of the reaction to policies pursued by the national administration. Extraordinary exertion would be required to prevent Democratic overthrow.

Buchanan was invited to participate in celebrations to be held in Reading on the twenty-eighth of August in the interest of strengthening the Democracy for the coming elections. Although pressure of public duties kept him in Washington, he wrote a long letter to the committee-in-charge in which, in a wily and artful way and with much palaver about compromises, he endeavored to pour oil on the troubled waters. He reviewed the history of the slavery question which threatened to convulse the country and argued in favor of a sacred regard for the federal Constitution and for the reserved rights of the states as the basis on which alone the party could safely rest. By the compromises on slavery in the Constitution, he contended, our forefathers made an agreement with their brethren of the South and it is not for the descendants of either party in the present generation to cancel this solemn compact. When the question threatened the dissolution of the Union after Missouri sought to be admitted to statehood, a spirit of mutual compromise prevailed. Under the Missouri Compromise the United States should have no more slavery north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, and south of that line the decision should be left to the people. Buchanan opposed the Wilmot Proviso, and advocated the extention of the Missouri Compromise as a means of settling the present agitation on the slavery question. He declared it to be his opinion that "the harmony of the States and even the security of the Union itself require that the line of the Missouri Compromise should be extended to any new territory which we may acquire from Mexico." He then offered the wellknown arguments concerning the unadaptability of the slave system to the area west of Texas.¹³ This letter was published by the Democratic press in various parts of the country and was commented upon very favorably.14

Cameron opposed Buchanan on the issues concerning the Wilmot Proviso and the Missouri Compromise; he had supported the Wilmot Proviso in the Senate. It must be said, however, that his vote was based upon the request of the Pennsylvania legislature for its delegation in Congress to support the measure, rather than upon any deep-seated convictions upon

slavery.

Buchanan was encouraged by the spirit shown among the Democrats in Reading, who planned the afore-mentioned celebration, yet a tone of anxiety pervaded his letter to them. He believed that the consequences of this election were all-important not only for Pennsylvania but also for the Union: that on its result might probably depend "the ascendancy of the Democracy of the Union for years to come." The candidate for governor was above reproach; he was honest, able, well-tried,

and had been regularly nominated by the party. In the light of past political experiences he advised careful and close party organization and action, adding, "Our vigilance ought to be constantly on the alert until the moment of victory." 15

The contest was close and hard fought. The Democrats succeeded in re-electing Governor Shunk over his Whig rival, General Irvin. His majority was slightly larger than that won over Markle three years earlier. Governor Shunk was not a man of outstanding ability but had gained by sheer industry and integrity the respect of friends and foes alike. His energies during his first administration had been largely devoted to maintenance of the public credit of the state. His popularity was due in considerable measure to his unblemished integrity. 16 In the legislature the Democrats lost control of the senate, which stood fourteen Democrats to nineteen Whigs. However, they retained a large majority in the house, sixty-three Demo-crats to thirty-seven Whigs, and would have a majority of twenty-one on any joint ballot.17 The importance of the Pennsylvania election for the national administration is signified by the administration newspaper, the Washington Union, which jubilantly congratulated the country upon the results of the election, and added its reasons thus:

We hail this victory, therefore, as the most important which could be won. We have carried Pennsylvania against the tariff of the manufactures. We have carried it against the authors of the Wilmot Proviso. The enlightened people of Pennsylvania have decided the issue of war in favor of their country.18

Many of the Pennsylvania Democrats could not forget Cameron's adroit management of the senatorial election of 1845, which had resulted in the defeat of their candidate, Woodward, and the choice of himself. He had not taken an active part in the 1847 campaign, and the re-election of Governor Shunk was made the signal for an attack upon Cameron by many people in Shunk's confidence, under the general leadership of Col. Reah Frazer. They began by asserting in distant quarters that Cameron had voted for General Irvin, the Whig candidate. Cameron pretended no personal attachment to Shunk, but he declared it was well known to everyone in Middletown that he had voted for him. The papers had reiterated his intention of doing so up to the time of the election. He had worked hard for Shunk in his first election but this time he merely did his duty to the Democratic Party. This attack hurt and worried Cameron. He appealed to Buchanan, on the basis of past unremitted services of a friendly character, to get John W. Forney, a newspaper editor and one of Buchanan's lieutenants, to insert a statement of the facts relative to the matter in his newspaper.¹⁹

The New York Tribune, a Whig newspaper, placed on its front page an article from its correspondent in Westchester, Pennsylvania, in which he explained the defeat of the Whigs on the grounds that the State Central Committee had advised a quiet campaign. It was believed that Porter, Cameron, Muhlenberg, and other leaders among the Democrats desired the defeat of Shunk. They advised the Whigs to make no great stir in the campaign but quietly to give their vote for Irvin, and the dissatisfied Democrats would insure Shunk's defeat. A strong and excited Whig campaign would drive all the Democrats into the ranks of Shunk. The writer charged that the Whigs were deceived and betrayed. The quiet campaign had lulled thousands to sleep and they had not gone to the polls to vote. The support which was promised for Irvin did not materialize, while the Democrats turned out in their usual strength for Shunk. He charged also that the portion of "the Democracy" which pretended to be opposed to the re-election of Shunk was made up of earnest advocates of General Zachary Taylor for president. They wisely apprehended that the election of the Whig candidate for governor would give Clay an advantage over their favorite for Whig support; hence they voted for General Irvin's defeat.20 The Democrats appear thus to have duped the Whigs in the shrewd game of politics. Cameron was still a Democrat. The known fact that he and some of the other Democratic leaders of Pennsylvania did not at the time bear the blessing of the party provided a perfect setting for just such scheme as described in the columns of the Tribune.

Governor Shunk was in ill health at the time of his second inauguration in January, 1848. On July ninth, confined to his bed by an advanced stage of tuberculosis, he resigned his office.²¹ Two days earlier Cameron, having learned that Shunk would

resign, wrote to Buchanan about the necessity for a new election in Pennsylvania and declared: "I have come to the conclusion, after much reflection that you should be the candidate. It can be presented in such a shape as to make your acceptance the result of a wish to save the party—as Wright did in 1844."22 Cameron strongly urged this course upon Buchanan and hoped he would make no decision against it before they had a chance to talk it over. George Plitt, an ardent Buchanan supporter from Philadelphia, wrote: "Were we allowed to use your name for Governor, as many have suggested, we would give the ticket an overwhelming majority." He sought Buchanan's opinion as to what the State Central Committee ought to do.23 The tone of Plitt's letter was solicitous while that of Cameron's had more of a commanding note—a note of decision. The heavy demands of his office and the recent campaign had sapped Shunk's strength beyond ability to throw off the disease. He lived but eleven days after his resignation.24

William Freame Johnston, a Whig and speaker of the senate, succeeded to the governorship according to the provisions of the constitution. The constitution made the further provision, that, in the event of a vacancy in the governorship as much as three months before the general fall election, the temporary executive should order a new election. The requirement was that the writ should be issued three calendar months before the election. Inasmuch as Governor Shunk's resignation was written upon the last day possible to allow a special election for his successor that fall, and inasmuch as Johnston did not assume the governorship until July twenty-sixth, a delicate question of constitutional interpretation was raised. Johnston demonstrated his democratic spirit and settled the question by ordering

a new election to be held in October, 1848.25

In state conventions held by the Whigs and the Democrats at the end of August, the former nominated Johnston and the latter nominated Morris Longstreth.²⁶ The contest in October was very close. Johnston was elected over Longstreth by the small majority of three hundred and two. In the legislature the Whigs increased their senatorial majority, giving them twenty-one members to the Democrats' twelve, and swept the Democrats from control of the house of representatives, with sixty-

five Whigs to thirty-five Democrats.²⁷ Johnston was an ardent protectionist and attracted votes from that wing of the Democratic Party. He had been a Democrat but, influenced by the tariff issue, had changed parties in 1841.²⁸ The part played by Cameron in the state elections this year is not known. Undoubtedly his tariff principles drew him close to Johnston. The unpleasant aftermath of the election of the previous year was still fresh in his mind and he was not ready to break openly with the Democratic Party. He seems to have kept his own counsel and remained quiet during the campaign.

The *Public Ledger*, three days after the election and with incomplete returns, noted that the Whig vote was heavier than in the 1847 election and believed that Johnston was beyond

doubt elected. It further noted that:

two-thirds of the members of Congress have probably also been carried by the same party [Whig], with a majority of the Legislature. This secures the Whigs the control of the State for the next year, through the Assembly, and the control of the Assembly for three years through the Governor, and gives them a United States Senator in place of Mr. Cameron.

On the basis of the results of this October election, the Whigs claimed the state for Taylor. The paper pointed out that the Democratic confidence which existed before the election was destroyed, and that the interest of all parties in the approaching national election was increased.²⁹

Public interest in the presidential election of 1848 was being whetted at least twenty months before the event. Throughout the nation greater interest was evinced in the candidacy of Zachary Taylor than in that of any other candidate of either party. In April, 1847, Niles' Register noted that "the public Journals of the country are teeming with the proceedings of Taylor meetings." A month earlier he had been formally nominated in a large meeting of the Whigs of Iowa, composed of the most influential and leading men from all parts of the state. Although in several sections of the country he had been nominated by local groups, it was believed that Iowa was the first to endorse him in a state-wide meeting. James Cameron, observing the Taylor movement, wrote from New Orleans his

belief that Taylor would be the next president. He also expressed a hope that his brother Simon could be the vice presidential candidate on the Taylor ticket.³² There is no evidence that Simon had either the desire or the ambition to be the running mate of Taylor. The letter is interesting as indicating the dissatisfaction of the Camerons with Democratic policies under Polk and their political instability at this time; also perhaps a bit of opportunism is revealed, a characteristic which becomes

more apparent at a later period.

It was no secret that many of the Cameron men of Pennsylvania did more than merely look with favor upon General Taylor's candidacy. On the twenty-first of September, a Democratic meeting was held at New Berlin in which John Snyder, a former member of Congress, offered resolutions nominating Taylor for the presidency. They were voted down three to one by the Shunk men, after which the Cameron men withdrew in a body.33 Two months earlier Taylor had been nominated at a meeting in Harrisburg. Judge William Dock, president of the meeting, communicated the action to Taylor, who replied with expressions of gratitude for the honor bestowed upon him and of assurance that if elected he would zealously endeavor to serve them for the good of the country.34 In answer to a friend's letter, Cameron wrote in January, 1848, that "Gnl. Taylor will be nominated, I think beyond a doubt by the Whigs, and it is pretty certain that he will accept the nomination as he has ours and all others. Mr. Clay will not be a candidate I am assured upon good authority."35 With reference to procedure in Pennsylvania Cameron advised:

You can better judge the proper course for our friends to pursue than I can at this distance from you. My belief is however, that we should not select an Electoral ticket until matters are a little more developed. You might appoint a committee with authority to select a ticket hereafter.³⁶

Occasionally a local Whig meeting in Pennsylvania would adopt resolutions for the nomination of Henry Clay for the presidency. Taylor, however, was the favorite in almost all of the Whig gatherings. Many Democratic meetings also passed resolutions favoring him.

The Democrats of Pennsylvania in the early stage of the

campaign divided their support between several candidates. Among those most frequently mentioned in the resolutions for nomination were Buchanan, Dallas, Van Buren, and Shunk, the latter more in the spirit of a compliment to their Governor than with serious intentions. The precarious state of his health would have prevented Shunk from actively engaging in a presidential campaign. The caucus of the Democratic members of the legislature in February, 1848, came out strongly in support of James Buchanan. In a prepared address, unanimously adopted, he was recommended to the coming Democratic national convention. The Washington Union of February fourteenth gave a full column to the subject of the selection of a candidate for the presidency and to the claim that Pennsylvania should have the candidate, contending that the nomination of Buchanan had been too long deferred.³⁷ Buchanan, from the viewpoint of background and training, was probably the fittest candidate whom the Democrats could have nominated. He had made it a rule, however, never to press his claims upon the consideration of his party at the risk of impairing party harmony or efficiency. He had adhered to this rule on more than one occasion in the past and did not now depart from it.

The Democratic national convention assembled in Baltimore on May 22, 1848, preceding the Whig convention, which was to meet in Philadelphia, in about two weeks. Despite whatever aid and encouragement Cameron and his men may have given to the Whig supporters of General Taylor in Pennsylvania during the winter of 1847-1848, Cameron was himself in the Democratic ranks. The Democratic caucus nominated Buchanan as Pennsylvania's favorite son for the presidency, and the state's delegation to the Baltimore Convention was instructed to support him. Cameron boarded the Buchanan band-wagon and went to the convention as a member of the Pennsylvania dele-

gation.38

During the convention there appeared to be a revival of that cordial relationship between Cameron and Buchanan, the former again the faithful lieuetnant of the latter. Cameron worked for Buchanan's interests and kept a close watch over other delegations which they hoped would support the Pennsylvania nominee. Each night of the first three days of the convention

Cameron wrote to Buchanan setting forth in some detail the intriguing and bargaining that was being conducted at the convention, even within the Pennsylvania delegation; and, at the close of the convention, reported on what he considered a blunder of the Pennsylvania delegation in favoring, against his advice and urgent opposition, the admission of the contested New York delegation. The Pennsylvania delegation included several men who were rather hostile to Buchanan. They favored Shunk, but would take either Dallas or Cass in preference to Buchanan. Cameron kept Buchanan informed on the brightening or waning of his prospects. Early in the convention he believed that Buchanan stood an equal chance with others of receiving the nomination of the convention.³⁹

Buchanan was nominated by W. McCandless of the Pennsylvania delegation. Lewis Cass of Michigan, and Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire, along with Buchanan, were the leading candidates, none of the others receiving more than nine votes. Cass lacked but one vote of receiving half those cast on the first ballot. The two-thirds rule having been adopted the voting was continued through four ballots. The Cass vote steadily increased while Buchanan's vote, which gave him second place on the first ballot and third place thereafter, as steadily decreased. The fourth ballot gave Cass one hundred seventy-nine, ten votes more than were necessary for nomination. William O. Butler of Kentucky, received the nomination for the office of vice president. Throughout the balloting, the Pennsylvania delegation abided by its instruction, each time casting its twenty-six votes for Buchanan.

The Whig national convention assembled in Philadelphia on June seventh. The leading names presented were Zachary Taylor, Henry Clay, Winfield Scott, and Daniel Webster. On the fourth ballot Taylor received one hundred seventy-one of the two hundred eighty votes cast and was declared the party's nominee. Millard Fillmore of New York, was chosen as Taylor's running-mate on the second ballot.⁴¹

One more political convention must be mentioned for this campaign year, not because the party was conceded any chance of success, but because it polled more than one tenth of the votes cast in the November election, drawing so heavily from

the Democratic strength in New York that it turned the result in favor of the Whigs. The "Barnburners" withdrew from the Baltimore convention with a frank avowal of purpose not to accept the nomination of Lewis Cass. They met in convention at Utica, New York, on June twenty-second and twenty-third. However, this convention gave place in importance to the Free-Soil convention which met at Buffalo on August ninth. It was designed to unite into one party various bolting elements: the Barnburner Democrats, the Conscience Whigs, the Liberty men, and all others who would submerge past political differences in common opposition to slavery extension. The Buffalo Convention nominated Martin Van Buren for president and

Charles Francis Adams for vice president.42

The campaign in Pennsylvania in 1848 was not far different from that of presidential canvasses of previous years. The slight interest in the state in the third party ticket added only a bit of variation. It did not change the results. The Democrats at their national convention in Baltimore directed the appointment of a central committee of one member from each state to take general charge of the canvass and of the party's interests throughout the nation. This marked the beginning of the party national committees.43 It tended to give greater permanence and unity to party organization. Pennsylvania's vote was important in determining the outcome of this election; and, since the major parties were so evenly divided there, party leaders from other states spent time in the state during the campaign urging and pleading the cause of their candidates. A notable example of this was the work of Senator John M. Clayton of Delaware. Clayton rendered valuable service for the Whigs in Pennsylvania and was later rewarded by Taylor with appointment to the office of Secretary of State.44

The early elections in some parts of the country had shown a definite trend in favor of the Whigs. The popular vote in November gave Taylor a plurality over Cass of almost forty thousand, while Van Buren polled more than two hundred ninety-one thousand votes. A comparison of the votes of 1848 and 1844 indicates that the votes of Van Buren came primarily from the Democrats, especially in New York, where Cass had therefore no chance.⁴⁵ The electoral votes for Taylor reached

one hundred sixty-three; Cass received one hundred twenty-seven. The change of the vote of either New York or Pennsylvania from Whig to Democratic would have elected Cass rather than Taylor. The decision, however, really rested with New York, where Taylor won by a plurality, with Van Buren carrying a larger vote than the Democratic candidate, Cass, while

in Pennsylvania Taylor had a clear majority.46

The Whig victory in Pennsylvania was foreshadowed by the October state election, which had shown a marked development of Whig strength. Taylor received a plurality of more than thirteen thousand five hundred over Cass and a majority of more than two thousand over the combined votes for Cass and for Van Buren.⁴⁷ Cameron's home county, Dauphin, gave the Whigs sixty-two per cent of the votes cast.⁴⁸ As early as two o'clock Wednesday morning, November eighth, a dispatch from Philadelphia to the New York *Tribune* conceded Whig victories in many sections of the state. It also stated that the Democrats conceded the state to the Whigs who were talking of a ten thousand majority.⁴⁹

Efforts were made to explain the defeat of the Democrats in 1848, and undoubtedly Cameron correctly set forth the cause of defeat in Pennsylvania. He placed the blame upon the Walker Tariff of 1846. In his arguments against this measure before the Senate he had declared: "Pass this bill, and the democratic party must again be defeated."50 The Pennsylvania Telegraph after the election quoted extensively from this speech by Cameron, referring to it as fulfilled prophecy. The paper declared that the passage of the Tariff Act of 1846 in defiance of the wishes of Pennsylvania, in the face of the Kane letter, and the universal declarations of the party leaders before the election, laid the chief foundation for the Whig success in 1848. The people of Pennsylvania felt that they had been deceived by their trusted leaders-they had therefore decided to try other and "more reliable men." The article closed with a ringing note: "Let it be recollected that Pennsylvania has always voted for the successful candidates for the Presidency. She has made her power felt in every Presidential election-let demagogues beware how they abuse her confidence."51

On the floor of the Senate, five weeks after the election, a de-

bate grew out of the reading of Secretary Walker's Treasury Report. Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi moved the printing of twenty thousand extra copies embodying the new system of finance which, he said, had been in operation long enough to be tested by the people. Cameron, who was a member of the committee on printing, challenged this view and hoped so large a number would not be ordered. He thought that the country had already decided on the merits of the Secretary's system of finance, and had decided against it. In Pennsylvania the question upon the financial system had been fairly before the people and their decision was beyond question. It was his opinion that the candidate of the Democratic Party at the last election was defeated chiefly on account of the opposition of the people of the United States to this financial system of the Secretary of the Treasury, and that the Democratic Party would not have been prostrated had it not been for this system.⁵² James G. Blaine corroborated Cameron's views with the opinion that the Tariff Act of 1846 had no small influence in the overthrow of the Administration in the next congressional election, and in the defeat of General Cass for the presidency in 1848. As senator from Michigan, Cass had voted for the bill, influenced thereto by his southern associates. Pennsylvania, Blaine said, punished Cass for his free-trade course by giving her electoral vote to Taylor in 1848. If she had given her vote to Cass he would have been chosen president.⁵³ It is true that tariff was discussed as one of the issues in Pennsylvania in the campaign of 1848, but apparently it played very little part as an issue in other states.⁵⁴

With the general election out of the way, political interest in Pennsylvania turned next to the election of a United States Senator. Cameron's term in the Senate would expire on March 4, 1849. What were the prospects for his re-election? His official political career began with his election to the United States Senate in 1845 to succeed Buchanan, who resigned to become Polk's Secretary of State. Though no important chapter of the political history of Pennsylvania for the ensuing generation can be written without recognizing the power and influence of Cameron, this victory did not yet establish his control over the state. His election had been won by fusion methods in which he organized the opposing groups and defeated the caucus

nominee of his own party. This incurred bitter Democratic opposition to him. The Whigs desired to be represented by a man of their own political faith, and Cameron had been out of harmony with the Polk administration too frequently in the past four years to be able to command the endorsement and sup-

port of the Democrats.

Judge James Campbell of Philadelphia, who was a leader of the Democratic forces opposed to Cameron's re-election, wrote that the work of selecting proper delegates had been accomplished in his city and county "in spite of the most vigorous exertions of all the friends of General Cameron, all of whom took the deepest interest in the contest." The friends of Cameron resorted to an old political trick which did not meet with success. Knowing they could hold their own votes they caused other candidates to be set up in order to draw support away from the leading opponent, and thus win by dividing the strength of the opposition.⁵⁵

Shortly after the general election in November the Blair County Whig, rejoicing in the victory of the Whigs in Pennsylvania, declared that it secured to them a United States Senator for six years. It raised the question: "Who among the many noble and patriotic statesmen of Pennsylvania shall receive the honor of that station?" It answered its own question by raising its voice in favor of the Honorable James Cooper of Adams County. This newspaper declared that "he not only deserves it for his long and able advocacy of Whig Principles, but the interests of this great Commonwealth demand that she should be represented in the United States Senate by one of admitted

ability and legislative experience."56

Preliminary to the meeting of the legislature in a joint session or convention to elect a United States Senator, the senate on January fifth nominated nine persons, both Democrats and Whigs, whom it deemed worthy of consideration by the joint session. Among these nine were Simon Cameron, George W. Woodward, James Cooper, Thaddeus Stevens and John Sergeant.⁵⁷ In order for Cameron to be returned to the Senate for a full term, it would be necessary for him to effect a reconciliation with the Democrats or to duplicate the coalition of four years earlier. He was unable to do either.

The legislature, meeting as a single body on January ninth, on the third ballot elected James Cooper, Whig. The final vote stood Cooper, sixty-six; Richard Brodhead, sixty-two; and Thaddeus Stevens, three.⁵⁸ Brodhead had gained the support of the Democrats and his votes did not waver from the total of sixty-two on any of the three ballots. Cameron apparently was not nominated in the convention, for his name does not appear on any of the ballots. Cooper resigned the office of attorney general of Pennsylvania. His credentials were laid before the Senate on January twelfth by Vice-President Dallas.⁵⁹ March fourth was to mark for Cameron a withdrawal from political office-holding which was only temporary. Greater accomplishments came after this rather brief eclipse. The last weeks of his first term in the Senate were spent, as previously indicated, in close attention to matters of national legislation, but he was constantly watchful concerning the interests of Pennsylvania.

General Cameron continued his financial and business connections during his senatorial term, even branching out into some new fields. For a time after March fourth, business matters, long somewhat neglected because of pressing congressional duties, again absorbed most of his attention. He was prepared to maintain his interest in politics and to move forward with his business without delay. Buchanan, who went out of office as soon as his successor, John M. Clayton, was ready to take over the duties as Secretary of State, also returned to Pennsylvania with the intention of retiring from public life. Having purchased "Wheatland" from William M. Meredith the preceding fall, 60 Buchanan took up life on his new estate just outside Lancaster, which had been his home for almost forty years. "Wheatland" became his permanent abode, except when he occupied official residences in London and Washington, until his death in 1868.

While Cameron had served but four years in national public life, and, having maintained his private interests, could easily step into private life again, the situation was somewhat different for Buchanan. He was a member of the legal profession. He had been in federal public service, in either elected or appointed positions, almost constantly since 1821. Although he held no public office during the four years of the Taylor and Fillmore

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administrations he could not avoid taking an active interest in public affairs; and when his party returned to power in 1853, Buchanan again entered the public service as United States Minister to the Court of St. James.⁶¹

CHAPTER VI

BUSINESS AND POLITICS

THE FOURTH of March, 1849, marked for Cameron not retirement from politics but merely a temporary eclipse in his upward struggle for political leadership in Pennsylvania. He devoted his talents first to the expanding and broadening of his material fortune, business having occupied a secondary place during the past four years. It must be borne in mind, however, that he had no intention of retiring from the political arena and therefore kept his finger on the pulses of the state and the nation.

During his term in the Senate, Cameron was a member of the Naval Affairs Committee. Among the bills reported was one providing for the construction of floating dry-docks at Philadelphia. His efforts to further naval work at Philadelphia were fruitless for the time being,¹ but his work with the committee gave him a practical insight into the business of construction and repair of naval craft. He was able in the summer of 1847 to turn his interest in naval affairs to private gain by providing Duff Green with capital for a business venture. Through his friendship with John Y. Mason, secretary of the navy, Green secured a contract to construct and repair vessels of the government. A. Mehaffy was employed to conduct the work, and in the fall Green opened the Gosport Navy Yard, at Norfolk, Virginia.² This ship-yard did a thriving business until the outbreak of the Civil War.

Another private investment was being made in New Orleans during this year. Cameron had not visited that area since 1830 when he had been connected with the building of the New Orleans Canal, which connected the Mississippi River with Lake Ponchartrain. At that time he had written favorably about the outlook for New Orleans and the broad opportunities for enterprising business men. James Cameron, a younger brother of

Simon, had gone to New Orleans to recuperate after a period of illness. James, who reciprocated Simon's fondness for him, wrote that he had purchased several lots in New Orleans and would purchase more. He had the deeds made out to Donald, the son of Simon, and expressed the belief that this investment would make Donald a rich man.3 It is not clear from the letter whether the transactions were made by James acting as agent for Simon or by James on his own authority merely venturing an investment for Donald. It might well have been the latter, and probably was, since James had no children and held such deep affection for his brother and his children. His will made two years later designated Simon as one of the executors and directed that after his death his real estate should be sold, bills paid and balance divided into four equal parts: one fourth to go to Simon, each of the other fourths to be established as lifeinterest trust funds, the interest therefrom to go to his [James'] wife Rebecca and the sisters of James and Simon, Eliza and Catherine; after the death of these three the principal to go to Simon and his children.4

The Tariff of 1846 had worked a serious hardship upon the industrial interests of Pennsylvania. The ironmasters and coal operators tended to feel that they had been particularly singled out for destruction. Even the war demands left the ironmasters with a discouraged outlook. Cameron was hopeful that news of peace with Mexico would "cheer up our drooping business."5 This view was not shared by Thomas Elder, another Pennsylvania ironmaster, who admitted, however, that peace could not place them in a worse position than they were already. He saw that the business was going down and that "many must smash."6 The complaints of the ironmasters, and coal operators, against the Tariff of 1846 must be understood as natural complaints against an act which tended to cut down their profits. Some iron furnaces and coal mines were closed for a time but sound business establishments were not "smashed." In less than a decade, under this same tariff, these enterprises were enjoying boom times.

During the early and middle eighteen-fifties a vast amount of the correspondence found in the Cameron Papers deals with purely business matters: banking; iron manufacture; real estate; stock deals; railroad building, expansion, and consolidation; and many other business interests of a lesser nature. Varied opportunities for investment were offered Cameron in numerous parts of the state by both friends and strangers. Innumerable were the letters written to him with special appeals for loans or gifts.⁷

As earlier noted in connection with the business of the Bank of Middletown, Cameron was a man of most loyal devotion to his friends, and it was difficult for him to refuse a loan to a friend. Loans were frequently made to business and political associates without sufficient security. He felt hampered and harassed by his board of directors because of their demands that he insist on mortgages or other forms of security for the bank in order to cover loans which he made.⁸ It was difficult for a man of such sentiments to conduct a banking business

successfully.

In 1852 James Donald Cameron, the younger of Simon's sons, was graduated from Princeton and returned to his home in Middletown. His father had planned a career in law for him. With a place for study assigned to him in the bank he began his course of reading law. While thus occupied he overheard most of the conversations relative to the business of the bank. He learned that the bank's finances were in a shaky condition, because of his father's practice of leniency in making loans to friends with insufficient security. He persuaded his father to permit him to give up the planned legal career and take over the banking business. He almost immediately demonstrated that he had in a large measure the energy, ability, and shrewdness which characterized his father. He became cashier and later president of the Bank of Middletown. As the elder Cameron became increasingly absorbed in state and national politics, and as the younger man demonstrated his financial and business acumen, more and more of the family properties came under his management. By the time General Cameron returned to the United States Senate in 1857, Donald was practically the financial manager of the family's affairs.9

In addition to the management of his father's affairs Donald also gained practical experience through participation in business on his own responsibility. The Union Canal needed improvement and repairs. Simon Cameron and George Smuller, collector of tolls at Middletown for twenty-two years, until he resigned in April of 1858, signed as security for Donald, who invested five thousand dollars in partnership with John O. Rockafellow and H. S. Dupp to make improvements and do repair work on the Canal.¹⁰ In succeeding years Donald's business ventures led him into much the same fields that had occupied the attention of his father: railroads, real estate, stocks,

and many other cash enterprises.

In 1853 Cameron was elected president of the Lebanon Valley Railroad Company, a company recently organized and at first badly managed financially. Under his wise leadership and management the financial status of the road was improved.11 It was later consolidated with others to form a larger system, the Philadelphia and Reading. Cameron was also mainly instrumental in the formation of the Susquehanna Railroad Company, which later consolidated with the Northern Central Railway. The Susquehanna Railroad connected the upper valleys of the Susquehanna with the capital of the state. This road with the Lebanon Valley Railroad laid the basis for direct and continuous rail connection with New York City. A better idea of the extent of his business and financial interests may be obtained by noting that about 1854 he was at the same time president of three railroad companies—the Northern Central, the Susquehanna, and the Lebanon-President of the Commonwealth Insurance Company, and Cashier of the Bank of Middletown, besides being a director or manager of several other institutions and having a large private business of his own to manage and superintend.12 An admirer who desired to do some building for the Lebanon Valley Railroad wished Cameron were president of all the railroads and banks in the country.13

Pennsylvania early felt the effects of the panic of 1857. Cameron regretted the stringency of the money market, both in the city and the country banks, which prevented him from accommodating old friends. He tended to place the blame for the condition upon the system of economy fostered upon the country by the low-tariff policy. His mail during the latter part of 1857 and through 1858 is burdened with facts about the depression, which was in essence the collapse of a boom, and particularly about the suffering of the workers in the coal and

iron industries. Henry McCormick, an ironmaster of Harrisburg, urged upon Cameron the necessity of protection for iron. He cited the cost of manufacturing of American rail as forty-five dollars per ton while English railroad-iron was quoted in New York the past week at forty-one dollars per ton for one lot of fifty thousand tons. He declared that "in our region, Harrisburg and Columbia, eleven of the fourteen furnaces are out of blast." Men were literally begging for work for enough wages merely to buy bread for their families, and would be content with fifty or even forty cents per day. The coal region, he said, was even worse smitten, as the coal market was so much dependent upon iron manufacture. Cameron needed no urging to support protection. He had been a leading advocate of protectionism for almost forty years and was better known for his allegiance to this than to any other political doctrine.

During Cameron's term as United States Senator he had interesting experiences. He made many friends among the members of the Senate and his letters then and later reveal that he thoroughly enjoyed life. He made many trips to Washington in the months following March, 1849, and it was only natural that he should seek to return to a senatorial seat.

James Cooper had succeeded him for the six-year term. Daniel Sturgeon, the senior Senator from Pennsylvania, would complete his second term in March, 1851, and it was understood that he would not seek re-election. Cameron therefore fixed his attention upon the election of 1851. It would be a fight against great odds. He had been given almost no consideration for re-election in 1849, and the Whigs with a majority in the legislature had easily elected their nominee. He had won many friends among the Whigs by his tariff policy, but, with a majority, they preferred a member of their own party; yet he retained many Whigs among his following. In the eyes of many Democrats he was a deserter who could not be trusted to carry out their policies.

The Democrats regained control of the Pennsylvania legislature in October 1850¹⁶ and therefore seemed assured of retaining a Democrat in the United States Senate in 1851. William Bigler was being groomed for the nomination for the governor-

ship in 1851. Reports made to him by his friends in various parts of the state serve as a barometer of feeling not only towards his candidacy but also towards Cameron. By the summer of 1850, General Cameron was very actively campaigning and it was reported from Pittsburgh that he was meeting with much encouragement. George P. Hamilton, a regular Democrat, regretted this situation and said he "would prefer seeing the Democratic party disbanded and Whig will prevail throughout the whole country than the election of Simon Cameron to the U.S. Senate." He felt that Cameron had struck at the very heart of the Democratic political organization and had done more to prostrate the party than its open and avowed enemies had done.17 From Philadelphia, it was reported that Cameron and the Whig governor, Johnston, had made an alliance, offensive and defensive, each to assist the other for the senatorship, as circumstances might require.18 The writer of this report was also a Democrat. He believed that the election of a Senator at the coming session would prove very interesting. These cases serve to illustrate the intensity of hostile feeling against Cameron that existed in his own party and indicate that he was tackling a task with the odds against him.

Several of the aspirants for the senatorship were in Harrisburg a week or more prior to the election. Although the election was close at hand the race for the Democratic nomination seemed to be wide open. E. A. Penniman, a Democratic member of the legislature, declared he had not made up his mind for whom he would vote, but that he would not support Cameron in the caucus. William J. Hemphill observed that Cameron is here and is very industrious and entertains a great deal of company and some of his friends think that he will be

nominated but I think not."20

Cameron's friends were looking after his interests and making every effort to gain votes for him. The Berks County Democrats had passed a resolution instructing their members of the legislature not to vote for General Cameron. One week prior to the election the Berks County Democrats held another meeting at the court house. The resolution was reconsidered and voted down. The members of the legislature were thus by implication instructed to vote for Cameron.²¹

Penniman's analysis of the situation made two days before the Democratic caucus listed five contenders to be reckoned with: Jeremiah S. Black, Henry D. Foster, Richard Brodhead, Simon Cameron, and George W. Woodward. Black, he believed, was out of the question. Foster and Brodhead were the strongest candidates, with the edge in favor of Brodhead; Cameron, he believed, preferred Brodhead if he himself could not obtain the nomination. Woodward's strength would grow if the balloting were prolonged. Penniman felt that if the combined support of Black, Foster, and Cameron could be thrown to Brodhead, he could easily be elected and the unity of the party preserved.²²

The caucus of the Democratic members of the legislature was held on Monday, January thirteenth. It required twelve ballots to select a nominee. On this ballot Richard Brodhead received thirty-four votes to twenty-four for Judge George W. Woodward, and nine votes were scattered among the other candidates.²³ On the following day, the legislature, assembled in joint convention, elected Brodhead United States Senator

by the whole Democratic vote.24

During the years 1850 to 1852 there were three political matters which drew the particular attention of General Cameron: the choice of a United States Senator, the nomination and election of a governor, and the choice of a presidential candidate for 1852. The first of these matters was settled in January, 1851. The second and third were very closely related, in that at many of the local conventions which backed one or another of the gubernatorial candidates there were also resolutions passed favoring the support of particular presidential aspirants.

Although the nominating and electing of a governor for Pennsylvania would not take place until 1851, the Democrats were active in lining up voters and obtaining pledged support at least a year earlier. Governor William F. Johnston was a Whig and would lead his party for re-election. The Democrats were determined to regain control of the state in 1851. The regular branch of the Democrats backed William Bigler, while Colonel Samuel W. Black of Allegheny received the pre-convention support of the other wing of the party.

The Bigler Papers mirror the position of Cameron in this

campaign. The correspondence recevied by Bigler shows almost every shade of feeling towards Cameron, with the major portion of the writers agreed that Cameron was decidedly unfriendly towards Bigler. Samuel S. Bigler, in a four-page, closely-written letter to his brother, William, expressed very strongly his conviction that Cameron was not Bigler's friend, presenting as evidence for this conclusion Cameron's opposition to the move to instruct the Dauphin County delegates for Bigler. George Sanderson of Lancaster declared that Cameron was hostile to Bigler's nomination and, as an out-and-out friend of Black, would leave nothing undone that he could do to defeat him. On the other hand, A. Boyd Hamilton of Clearfield thought that Cameron feared Black and every prominent man in the state. He suspected that Cameron's opposition to Bigler existed because he had never forgiven Bigler for his strong support of George W. Woodward in the senatorial election of March, 1845.

J. Glancy Jones of Reading felt that it would be fatal to Bigler if Cameron declared for him. He believed that Bigler had a large body of personal friends in the regular wing of the party which could not be taken away from him—what he needed was to bring in the radical wing in a body and that would be secured by Cameron's going against him.²⁷ Stephen Weston of Northumberland attributed the failure of his county to pass a resolution to instruct their delegate for Bigler to the fact that Cameron, "that Bird of evil omen," had been through the county a few days before the delegates' meeting and that the Cameron men of Northumberland and Sunbury controlled the meeting. William Wilson, "one of Simon's pliant tools," was mainly instrumental in defeating the resolution.²⁸ He commented also on the low state of the Democratic Party in Northumberland County, reporting that at the county delegates' meeting they had even voted down a resolution that the representative of Northumberland in the legislature be instructed to support by his vote the nominee for the United States Senate who should be selected by the Democratic caucus. Four months before the nominating convention Thomas Tyler of Philadelphia reported that Bigler had all the delegates from his county and that there was not "a Cameron man or a fishy Democrat

in the whole number."²⁹ He himself thought well of Cameron but felt that most of his friends in his locality were rascals, and declared that "the trouble is Cameron has been shamefully led

by these vile men."

In contrast to the above, G. R. Long of Halifax wrote to Bigler of "our kind and mutual friend, General Cameron," stating: "I love Gen'l C. as I love myself, and will go to any length or distance for him." Cameron had so many friends in Dauphin County that Long was confident that anything Cameron wished could easily be carried. A. Ebough of York County wrote that the friends of General Cameron in his county would be found to be among the warmest of Bigler's supporters. He believed that the course of the Bigler representatives in regard to the recent election of United States Senator would have the effect of reconciling the Cameron party and inducing them to give Bigler their full and undivided support. The Cameron forces were important since they had control of a number of newspapers throughout the state, including one of the leading papers at the Capital; and during the campaign gained control of others.

In this period of strong political feeling within the Demo-cratic Party Cameron played a shrewd game of politics. Letters to Bigler illustrate the intensity of passion in regard to Cameron, in its various stages pro and con. Cameron desired the restoration of the Democratic Party to the control of the executive branch of the government, and believed that Bigler was the strongest man the party could support for that purpose. Being cognizant of the ill-feeling towards himself within the party, he revealed his purposes and plans to but few, and in these cases to persons who would report them to Bigler. F. W. Hughes of Pottsville, a Bigler adherent, met General Cameron while he was in Washington. They talked very freely about Bigler's candidacy for the governorship. Cameron explained the proceedings of the Dauphin County meeting in a manner consistent with support of Bigler and explained the opposition to the instruction of delegates on the ground of his lack of respect for the person who proposed them. He said that he had nothing to gain by leaving Bigler and that he had no disposition to do so. He requested Hughes to say to Bigler that he expected to

support him but that at the same time he thought it best for both Bigler and himself that matters should remain in public estimation just as they were. Hughes thought that Bigler would not dissent from this idea. 33 Samuel S. Bigler's earlier report of the Dauphin County meeting to his brother declared that General Cameron had argued that he was friendly to Colonel Bigler and thought highly of him but that instructions were premature. However, the report indicates that its writer believed this was just a front put on by Cameron to fool the people and that he

was utterly insincere.34

In the latter part of August, 1850, Bigler wrote to his uncle, William Dock, of Harrisburg, requesting him to have an interview with General Cameron and to endeavor to obtain his support for him in the gubernatorial contest. Dock was not to let Cameron know that he had sought him out for the interview. Dock agreed to carry out the mission, which he felt could easily be arranged because of his fairly intimate acquaintance with Cameron.35 Dock and his wife rode to Middletown ostensibly to visit her relatives, and while in town he strolled into the bank where he "accidentally" met his friend. Their conversation was reported by letter the next day to Bigler.³⁶ Cameron knew Dock and undoubtedly knew that Bigler was his nephew. He could hardly have been hoodwinked by the subterfuge of Dock. Dock was most deeply interested in the outcome of the campaign, and felt that it would not do for his two friends, Bigler and Cameron, not to understand each other correctly. Bigler, he knew, was the friend of Cameron and esteemed him highly. Cameron reciprocated this sentiment. Cameron asked Dock to write to Bigler that he was his friend and would assist in having him nominated. The Dauphin County delegates, although not instructed for Bigler, should and would at the Reading Convention vote for him, and York County likewise. The banker-politician also talked as if Schuylkill County would elect Bigler delegates at his personal request. He expressed the same opinion to Dock that he had expressed to Hughes, that for Bigler's interests it would be better that they maintain the relations which the public accepted, meaning that should Cameron come out openly for Bigler then his enemies would turn against Bigler and hazard his nomination. Dock assured Bigler that Cameron was all right. He had recently talked with James M. Anderson of York and, before he had said a word about General Cameron, Anderson had told him that in York Cameron's friends were all Bigler's friends and Bigler's friends were Cameron's friends.

The Democratic State Convention met in Reading on June 4, 1851, and completed its work the next day. The Buchanan men, supporters of Bigler, organized the convention. Colonel Samuel W. Black was the opponent of Bigler for the nomination. It was generally supposed by the regular Democrats that he had the backing of Cameron and that Cameron would leave nothing undone to obtain his nomination.37 However, just before the nominations, Black had a letter read to the convention in which he withdrew from the contest. William Bigler was then unanimously nominated for governor. He was introduced and delivered a speech before the convention. Commenting editorially on the candidate and the convention, the New York Tribune, a Whig paper, believed Bigler "the strongest man his party has run for several years." Bigler stood on the ground of zealous adherence to the entire compromise policy of the federal government, and the convention passed resolutions of the most decided stamp in its favor.³⁸ The Washington *Union*, at the national Capital, considered the unanimity displayed at Reading "cheering to the hopes of democracy not only in Pennsylvania, but throughout the Union."39

The Whig State Convention was held on June twenty-fourth in Lancaster. It assembled in the court house, which was entirely inadequate as to room and other facilities. As was expected, Governor William F. Johnston was renominated unanimously by acclamation. The convention passed numerous resolutions, among them some which strongly asserted the doctrine of protection of American labor. The New York *Tribune* declared that the welfare of Pennsylvania was thoroughly identified with the triumph of Whig policy; that industry lay prostrate and suffering from an anti-American tariff; and that on the occasion of such an election as this it must renew in the strongest terms the proclamation of fidelity to that Whig doctrine. About three weeks earlier the Whigs had held a local convention in Pittsburgh in which they renominated Johnston

and passed resolutions favoring a protective tariff and opposing the Fugitive Slave Law. The *Tribune* at that time asserted that Johnston stood on grounds entirely antagonistic to the Democratic stand, that the Whigs were out-and-out supporters of Free-Soil and stood against the present mode of slave-catching. The *Tribune* said further in reference to slavery:

The Governor himself, at the last session, refused his approval to a bill repealing the law above mentioned [law of March 3, 1849, forbidding use of the jails of the commonwealth to the slave-catchers of the Federal Government] with reference to the jails. Pennsylvania, they say, having long since abolished slavery herself, is hostile to its extension or to any interference with it by her State officers.⁴¹

The campaign during the summer and fall of 1851 was not particularly different from earlier ones in Pennsylvania. Cameron accepted the convention's choice, but there was suspicion and the fiction of the bitterness of Cameron's feeling for Bigler was maintained during that period. The election took place on October 14, 1851, and resulted in a victory for Bigler, who received 186,499 to 178,030 for Johnston. 42 Buchanan wrote a letter of congratulation to Bigler on his victory and commented at some length on Cameron. He declared that Cameron's treason had given Bigler a Whig senate. A Dr. Heck, the Democratic candidate in Cameron's district, was defeated by John C. Kunkel of Harrisburg. The next legislature would have seventeen Whigs to sixteen Democrats in the senate. Buchanan felt that Cameron had "at length done a deed which must forever exclude him from the rank of the Democratic party," and that the party throughout his own county would now move in strong column against him.43 It is true that Dauphin County returned a Whig to the senate in 1851. It is true also that this county had given Whig returns for several years past. It must be noted, also, that the Democrats gained a small percentage in the Dauphin County vote of 1851 over that of three years earlier.44 Therefore, Buchanan's charge that Cameron was responsible for the election of a Whig in his county is not justifiable.

Cameron wrote to Bigler on the same day as did Buchanan. He declared to Bigler: "I am sincerely rejoiced at your success." The contents of this letter indicate that he and Bigler had been, whether directly or not, in close communication with each other during the campaign. Concerning the defeat of Dr. Heck, Cameron wrote that he was beaten by the folly of some of his own zealous friends around Harrisburg, who had imported to the canal project some worthless pipe-layers. Cameron declared that:

the rascals were, on the day of the election bought to oppose Heck. I worked from noon till night as I never have worked on the ground, but we were largely beaten with Heck while you had a large vote in this and the adjoining district, the scene of the pipe laying.⁴⁵

Cameron besought Bigler to write immediately to his brother, Samuel Bigler, and to William Dock to make them operate on the Bigler friends and to prevent a renewal of the fight in Dauphin County. A war at the beginning of his administration which might last for years would be harmful, yet it was about a matter in which Bigler could feel no interest. Cameron believed it would all be stopped if Bigler would but say the word in time. He assured Bigler that nevertheless "we can beat them, and we will if they compel me to go into it, but I do not want the trouble."⁴⁶

In November Cameron wrote to the governor-elect that he had heard much about proposed persons to be appointed as his secretary of state. Some said that the office would go to James Campbell; others said it would go to George W. Woodward. Cameron had "too much confidence in your good sense to suppose you will treat yourself with either of them."47 A month later Colonel James Burnside wrote to Bigler that Cameron said it was not his business to interfere with his appointment of cabinet officers, and that if Bigler was satisfied that Judge James Campbell should be attorney-general he would not complain, provided F. W. Hughes should be made secretary. He closed with the statement that General Cameron seemed to desire Bigler's future promotion and thought his position would secure it if he did not make a false step. This was a sentiment to which Burnside also subscribed.48 Neither Campbell nor Hughes was among those on the cabinet when the membership of that body was announced at Bigler's inauguration in January. Despite acerbity of feeling between the wings of the Democratic Party of Pennsylvania in 1850 and 1851, Bigler and Cameron, if indeed they did not bear any strong affinity for one another, at least understood each other.

Governor Bigler looked upon the Compromise of 1850 as an honest attempt to settle the difference between the North and the South and avert civil strife. He therefore favored Pennsylvania's enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act and other legislation relative to slavery. In his inaugural address he requested the repeal of the act which forbade the use of the jails of the commonwealth for the detention of fugitive slaves. The legislature complied with this request and Pennsylvania was again in accord with the federal government. The stain of nullification, within the statute, caused by acts of the last state administration, was removed.⁴⁹

The third matter which drew the attention of Cameron in this period was the choice of a presidential candidate for 1852. Interest in this centers particularly in the feud which had developed between Cameron and Buchanan. These two, intimate political friends and allies for two and one-half decades, followed by estrangement and only occasional co-operation during Polk's administration, had completely severed their political alliance by 1850. Although Buchanan was looked upon as Pennsylvania's favorite son for the nomination in 1852, Cameron labored to turn the sentiment in favor of Lewis Cass, Buchanan's leading competitor. Their warfare soon degenerated to the stage of calling each other names. Buchanan was referring to Cameron as a "scamp," and "unprincipled rascal," and an "arch intriguer," and Buchanan's friend William R. King of Alabama was calling Cameron an "unprincipled intriguing fellow." ⁵⁰ Cameron considered Buchanan an "old political hack" so fallen that he could not carry a county and so anxious for adulation that he would accept it from any source.51 This mutual feeling of hostility between Cameron and Buchanan was brought before the public time and time again by the newspapers.

In March of 1850 Cameron called upon Senator Jefferson Davis in Washington and produced an old newspaper of 1820 to show him that Buchanan was against slavery and against the admission of any more slave-holding states. It was also reported in Washington that Buchanan recoiled from the proposition to

extend the Missouri Compromise line in 1848 with the admission of the right to take slaves into the territory south of that line. Hence Buchanan was unfavorably compared with Cass, who had, it was reported, said to friends that he would go thus far.⁵²

All through Bigler's campaign for the nomination for the governorship, Cameron worked against Buchanan by having resolutions in favor of Cass slipped in on the heels of many county meetings. The Pennsylvanian, a leading Democratic newspaper published by John W. Forney, and with Buchanan allegiance, refused to print the resolutions of some of the local conventions because it could not notice a part without the whole—and the Cass resolutions it would not publish. Forney was friendly to Bigler but considered the Cass resolutions a Cameron movement against Buchanan, and refused publication. J. Glancy Jones expected to receive the congressional nomination, with election practically assured; and since Forney looked to him for his next chance for the clerkship of the House of Representatives, he assured Bigler that after his nomination he could do pretty much as he pleased with the Pennsylvanian.⁵³ George P. Hamilton of Pittsburgh regretted to see that Cameron was taking advantage of Bigler's popularity "to carry resolutions in favor of General Cass for the Presidency, and to crush Mr. Buchanan." Thus far in nearly every county where resolutions had been passed in Bigler's favor there had also been an expression in favor of General Cass. This coincidence was attracting public attention, and some of Bigler's enemies were pointing to it as evidence of collusion between Cass, Cameron, and Bigler. Hamilton could not accept this view for he had always regarded Bigler as the devoted and political friend of Buchanan.⁵⁴ Alexander B. Cummings observed to Bigler that he would perceive from the New York Times that the war between Buchanan and Cameron had assumed a personal nature and no one could tell where it would end.55

A month before the Reading Convention, Judge Luther Kidder wrote to Buchanan that he felt that the presidential question should be kept out of the convention. It would operate as a firebrand at that time, when perfect union and harmony were so much to be desired. He believed that Cass had lost ground

in Pennsylvania during the last few months and that the way would be clear for Buchanan and his success certain if he would take the same pains for a year to come that he had during the last few months to soothe asperities. Many Democrats regretted that Buchanan and Cameron were not friends. Living so near one another, and having so many common interests, it was worse than idle for them to be enemies. Both were stockholders in Pennsylvania banks and railroads, and in the coal and iron industries. Both were members of the Democratic Party and sought to advance the interests of the party; yet they were rivals for power and the control of the Pennsylvania Democracy. Their policies conflicted in reference to the tariff issue, Buchanan supporting a low-tariff policy. Kidder believed that if the Pennsylvanian would cease to attack Cameron (which Cameron charged to Buchanan) an understanding might be brought about between them, and offered his services to accomplish this object.⁵⁶ Buchanan replied that such an object would be difficult, almost impossible to accomplish. He declared that Cameron had made war upon him openly, without any cause, and he expected opposition to the end. He disclaimed any responsibility for the Pennsylvanian's attacks upon Cameron but in a measure gave them his approbation. He appreciated Kidder's kind offer of interposition but believed it could produce no good effect.57

The New York *Tribune* noted, as the Reading Convention was assembling, that there was too much acerbity between the different wings of the Democratic Party and that bitter words were being exchanged between the friends of Cass and those of Buchanan. It believed great efforts would be made to stave off any expression of opinion on the presidential question.⁵⁸ The Cincinnati *Gazette*, on the other hand, thought that, while the expressed object of the convention was to nominate a governor, the real bone of contention was the position of Pennsylvania on candidates for the coming Democratic nomination for president.⁵⁹ As to whether Cass or Buchanan would be chosen by the Democrats, the *Gazette* thought it would be of no consequence if the Whigs were awake. Though the friends of Cass in Pennsylvania were old tacticians, Buchanan had the numerical strength to win in the state convention. The latter succeeded

in organizing the Reading Convention and also the Harrisburg Convention to nominate candidates for judge, a week later. The Reading Convention adjourned without a direct expression of

its presidential preference.60

As the campaign progressed during the summer, the Cass papers in Pennsylvania, the *Keystone*, the *Lancastrian*, and others, published old speeches of Buchanan which were intended to present him as out of harmony with the will and interests of the Democratic voters. ⁶¹ The Lancaster *Intelligencer and Journal*, a Buchanan paper, at the same time defended Buchanan, and in an article published on July 8, 1851, condemned the attacks being made upon him by Cameron papers. ⁶² When the Democratic committee of Westmoreland County recommended Buchanan for the presidency, local meetings denounced the committee's action as unauthorized. In Dauphin County, Cameron's home, Cass was nominated by the Democratic County Convention by a vote of fifty-three to three. ⁶³

Buchanan seemed fairly confident that Cameron would not be able, in the end, to prevent him from obtaining the support of the Pennsylvania Democrats. He was mortified, however, that Cameron and his faction were using the show of opposition to him in Pennsylvania to try to convince other friendly states that he could not carry his own state if nominated. It also vexed him greatly as he saw certain persons, such as Senator Brodhead, whom he had regarded as his own personal and devoted friend, won over by Cameron and made bitterly hostile to him.64 He felt, after the results of the October (1851) elections were known, that Cass would be beaten by a large majority in Pennsylvania in 1852 by any Whig nominee. Judge James Campbell, a Catholic, had been a candidate for the state supreme court in 1851. Buchanan charged that he was defeated by fraud, that the special friends of Cass, "Cameron, the Cummingses, and all that corrupt clique," sent circulars over the whole state to clergymen and others for the purpose of exciting prejudices against popery. The Catholic Democrats were deeply wounded by this religious persecution and Buchanan doubted whether they could ever be rallied as a whole for any Democratic candidate, and he felt it entirely impossible in regard to Cass, who was "openly and perseveringly sustained by Cameron and his clique."65 Buchanan estimated the Democratic Catholic vote in Pennsylvania at twenty-five thousand, and since no election in the recent history of the state had been carried by more than half that number

this was an element which could not be neglected.

There seems to be no evidence to support Buchanan's charge that Cameron was guilty of responsibility for sending out circulars for the purpose of exciting prejudices against popery in the election of 1851. The evidence found points to the contrary. Cameron's correspondence shows him to have been a man of deep religious feeling and in such matters a man of great tolerance. Further, Cameron was certainly too shrewd a politician to risk the alienation of a huge block of voters. As a matter of fact he did not lose Catholic support as undoubtedly would have been true had Buchanan's charges been correct. As Cameron and his followers looked forward to the next senatorial election, James Collan informed him that John C. Dunn, chief clerk in the post office at Pittsburgh, a Roman Catholic, was his friend and would be a power for him in the Catholic group.66 Dunn's letters show him to be a partisan of Cameron, reporting to him on political conditions in the Pittsburgh area and advising as to the best methods of handling certain individuals with reference to gaining support and votes for the senatorship.67

An interesting episode in the struggle between the Cassites and the Buchananites occurred at a meeting of the Philadelphia Democratic County Convention. The convention assembled in Northern Liberty Hall, February fifth, with Alderman Peter Rambo presiding. After electing delegates to the Baltimore Convention, a resolution was offered instructing them to vote in the state convention for Lewis Cass. An amendment was introduced substituting James Buchanan's name for that of Cass. The chair put the vote on the amendment viva voce, and declared it carried; and the resolution, as amended, quickly carried in similar manner. Then ensued a scene of great confusion, in the midst of which the question of adjournment was put, and also pronounced carried. The officers of the convention then retreated via a back window. In the efforts of the Cassites to haul back the presiding officer to have the questions regularly voted on, they tore off a part of his coat. Subsequently the majority (it was said) of the convention re-organized with William Byerly in the chair, and the Cass resolution was unanimously adopted. It was explained that the members of the convention, when elected, were principally Buchananites but many had changed their views in opposition to Pennsylvania's favorite son because of

dissatisfaction at the Bigler appointments.68

The Democratic State Convention assembled in Harrisburg on March fourth with the Cass and Buchanan elements each determined to advance the cause of its favorite. During the evening session of the first day, the convention adopted a resolution that the chairman appoint a committee to select a delegation to the national convention, subject to the approval of this convention. This called forth a strong protest from the Cass men who were in the minority. The protest was presented by John Scott of Huntingdon, and in part read as follows:

We solemnly protest against the resolution just adopted, as a wanton disfranchisement of Congressional Districts which we in whole or in part represent. We denounce it as a flagrant usurpation of power—as a desperate alternative resorted to by a tyrannical majority to manacle and silence a large minority in this Convention upon a vital question—it is a trampling under foot of a usage sanctioned by the action of the Democratic party in its Conventions for the past 17 years—it is not only a violation of usage but it is a sacrifice for a temporary purpose of a cardinal Democratic Principle.⁶⁹

The next day Hirst, from the committee appointed for that purpose, reported the names of fifty-four delegates to represent the state in the national convention at Baltimore, and also twentyseven presidential electors. Delegates from four Cass districts proposed to the convention the names of gentlemen from their respective districts⁷⁰ as delegates and electors. The report presented by Hirst was adopted by ninety-seven yeas to three nays. About thirty delegates declined to vote on the question on the ground that the proceeding was in violation of party usage and an act of gross injustice to the minority.71 Resolutions for support of Buchanan and requiring pledges to that end from each delegate and elector were finally adopted—the Cass men fighting most desperately up to the last moment.72 The Tribune observed that Buchanan had carried his state by force, and that the achievement was not received very pleasantly by his antagonists within the party.

Thus Cameron was worsted, by the Buchanan forces, in his efforts to gain the Pennsylvania delegation for Cass. He had presented stubborn opposition but could not command a majority. Notwithstanding the action of the convention in choosing Buchanan delegates, there were some of the Cameron newspapers, the Pottsville Emporium and Press, the Lancastrian, the Keystone, and others, which were for some time as firm as ever in their advocacy of Cass.

In 1850 measures were passed by Congress to compromise the major issues between the North and the South. Leaders throughout the country deluded themselves into thinking that all matters of differences had been settled, or at least principles established upon which all future questions would be decided. They believed that the people would regard a reopening of agitation between the sections as meddlesome and unpatriotic.

In the light of the compromise measures, the Democratic Party occupied a more favored position in 1852 than did the Whig Party. They had quite generally acquiesced in the settlement and would go into the election a united party if a candidate could be found who would not be objectionable to either branch of the party. Lewis Cass (defeated in 1848), James Buchanan, Stephen A. Douglas, and William L. Marcy appeared as the leading candidates prior to the national convention.⁷³

The Whigs were far worse off than the Democrats. They were likely to lose some of the votes of the antislavery element that had frequently supported them in the past. The possibility of anything like a hearty union of the Whigs seemed remote to careful students of the situation. Daniel Webster was undoubtedly their greatest statesman, but after his Seventh of March Speech he was unacceptable to that wing of the party which regarded the compromise measures of 1850 with abhorrence. On the other hand, the Southern wing of the party regarded acceptance of these measures as a basic qualification for a candidate. President Millard Fillmore had stood by the South during the passage of these measures and it would seem that he was the logical candidate. One other candidate, General Winfield Scott, loomed large before the convention. No one knew what was his position on the "compromises," and even during

the convention a letter from him was read which left his position in the dark.⁷⁴

The weather was extremely hot on Monday, May thirty-first, as immense crowds poured into Baltimore for the Democratic National Convention which would assemble the next day. Hotels and boarding-houses were crowded to overflowing, and many private citizens of the Democratic faith threw open their doors to accommodate their friends. From the throngs in the streets, it would seem that the people had all turned out in celebration of a national holiday. Congress had recessed and there was a general hegira of politicians, great and small, from Washington to Baltimore. In the convention hall palm-leaf fans and iced-water were liberally supplied in an effort to gain some relief from the oppressive heat.⁷⁵

The interests of General Cass in the convention were committed to the hands of Cameron, Daniel S. Dickinson of New York, and Jesse D. Bright of Indiana. He ran stronger than any of the other leading candidates. The correspondent of the New York *Tribune* deemed the adoption of the two-thirds rule to be fatal to Cass,⁷⁶ and it proved too much for all whose names were before the convention. The balloting extended over three days, June third to fifth, with the followers of Cass and Buchanan in a deadlock. After the first day Buchanan thought it highly improbable that he could receive the nomination.⁷⁷ On the afternoon of the third day some states went to Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire. This started a stampede in his favor which gave him the nomination on the forty-ninth ballot by an almost unanimous vote.⁷⁸

The Whig National Convention met about ten days later in the same auditorium. The voting for a presidential nominee was prolonged through fifty-three ballots and finally resulted in the choice of General Winfield Scott.⁷⁹

Both parties included "finality" planks in their platforms and thus endeavored to silence the slavery question as a campaign issue. The unity within the Democratic Party on this question was fairly complete, while it met with some opposition among the Whigs. Seventy free-state delegates, who steadily voted for General Scott in the convention, recorded their votes against the "finality" plank, and many Whig newspapers in the North

refused to be bound by it.⁸¹ The presidential campaign was the mildest the country had witnessed in more than a decade. It was lacking in the spectacular as to both issues and candidates.

Late in August, the Pennsylvania Democrats held a convention to nominate a candidate for canal commissioner in place of William Searight, their recently deceased candidate. They chose General William Hopkins of Washington County, who had gained notoriety years before as speaker of the house during the "Buckshot War." At the same convention, George W. Woodward, candidate in 1845 for United States Senator, was

unanimously nominated for the supreme bench.82

Cameron believed that the October state election would reveal the outcome of the presidential contest in Pennsylvania. He hoped that the whole ticket would be elected, "including Woodward," the organization candidate whom he had defeated in 1845. While he thought the state would go Democratic, he hoped that every Democrat would work as if the result depended upon his own efforts. Hopkins and Woodward each won over their Whig opponents by almost twenty thousand majority. The Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin* remarked that the total state vote was smaller than any cast since 1848 and only a little larger than the presidential vote of 1844. It stated that the election in November would doubtless call out a much heavier one. 84

Neither the Democrats nor the Whigs presented a strong candidate for the presidency and both parties stood on the same ground in regard to the slavery issue; therefore the voters who were inclined to be independent had an opportunity to decide upon and express a preference for policies on the basis of the past records of the two parties.⁸⁵ The Whigs had stood for a protective tariff, the Democrats for a tariff for revenue with only incidental protection. The Whigs favored a United States Bank; the Democrats opposed it. The former advocated Henry Clay's plan for the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of public lands; the latter rejected the plan. In state constitutional conventions of this period the Whigs tried to keep the suffrage restricted; the Democrats favored a broadening of the franchise. All such matters were pondered by the independent voting element in the presidential contest of 1852. The Barnburn-

ers, who had formed a third party in 1848, had returned to the Democratic fold before the 1852 election, and insured New York to Pierce.

The result of the November election was a crushing defeat of the Whigs both in the popular and in the electoral vote. Scott carried but four states with an electoral vote of forty-two, while Pierce won twenty-seven states with an electoral vote of two hundred fifty-four. Ref Pennsylvania went to Pierce by almost twenty thousand over Scott. The Democrats showed a gain in the state of more than twenty-seven thousand over the 1848 figures, while the Whigs lost almost six thousand for the same period. Cameron's home county, Dauphin, went to Scott

by a thousand majority.87

A month after the election, Pierce wrote to Buchanan requesting advice on the formation of his Cabinet.88 In reply Buchanan stated his general views and commented rather pointedly on certain Pennsylvania Democrats. He characterized Cameron and his leaders as persons who had "always been disorganizers whenever their personal interests came in conflict with the success of the party." Buchanan felt very deeply the attacks which they had made on him during the past two or three years. He commended in most favorable terms Judge James Campbell and ex-Governor David R. Porter.89 Judge Campbell was appointed postmaster-general in March, 1853, and a few months later Buchanan was appointed minister to Great Britain. The Cameron organization had been strongly opposed to Campbell when he was a candidate in 1851 for the supreme bench in Pennsylvania, and had been charged by Buchanan with accomplishing his defeat through an appeal to religious prejudice. As above indicated his charges against Cameron were unjustified.90 The press declared that Campbell, a Catholic, was chosen postmaster-general in spite of bitter opposition from his own state. The supposition was that he was chosen chiefly on account of his religious opinions, and in order to clear the President's "skirts" of anti-Catholic charges brought against him during the campaign.91

CHAPTER VII

FINAL BREAK WITH THE DEMOCRATS

AMERON was well satisfied with the results of the presidential contest in 1852. He looked forward to a return to the United States Senate, though Pennsylvania was not due to elect another Senator before the early months of 1855. In the meantime, Cameron would devote his energies to the building of his political fences: seeking appointments, federal and state, for his friends and associates; winning the support of key persons from the camp of his opponents; performing little favors here and there which would put individuals under friendly obligations to him; and doing the many other things within the repertoire of an adroit and shrewd politician.

In the matter of federal appointments in Pennsylvania, Cameron frequently took cases directly to the President. He recommended the choice of Judge Nimrod Strickland for the office of director of the mint at Philadelphia. He felt that Judge Strickland's appointment would be a move towards harmonizing the Democratic Party in Pennsylvania and would be acceptable to the whole party, since Strickland had not created enemies by warmly advocating the nomination of either Cass

or Buchanan in the recent contest for the presidency.1

Cameron had far greater success in attaining federal offices for his followers than had Buchanan. The latter complained to Postmaster-General Campbell upon noting in the *Pennsylvanian* the appointment of a Cameron man as district attorney for Western Pennsylvania, that Cameron, Moorhead, Dawson, and their clique, now controlled this area and that juries would be but political caucuses of their friends. He believed the same would follow in the eastern part of the state. People whom Buchanan thought faithful to himself had gone over to Cameron. He feared the President would alienate his true friends in supporting this group. Buchanan deplored the fact that he had

not succeeded in obtaining the appointment of a single individual beyond the limits of his own county, and closed his letter with expressions of opinion decidedly unfavorable towards Cameron.² A year later J. A. Parker, recently removed from the office of the librarian of the House of Representatives, and a warm friend of Buchanan, remonstrated with Campbell for having appointed so few friends of Buchanan to office, adding that Campbell had been appointed to the Post Office Department through Buchanan's recommendation. The latter statement Campbell denied.³

In considering the selection of candidates for the canal board in Pennsylvania, Cameron cautioned Coryell that "our friends should not act without concert and reflection." He stated that the public works of Pennsylvania needed reform, adding:

They are infested with worthless, dishonest men, and we need a man of courage, as well as honesty and intelligence in the Canal Board, who will select men for the stations under him for their capacity for honesty instead of as now, because of their noisy pretentions.⁴

Francis J. Grund of Pennsylvania, a correspondent and political editorial writer for the Philadelphia Ledger, Harrisburg Union, and other newspapers of the state, was Cameron's most prolific correspondent from the national Capital. His letters during the mid-'fifties kept Cameron informed not only on the national issues but also on the attitude of the various Pennsylvania members of Congress towards the local issues and candidates. He cautioned Cameron not to go too strongly for the Nebraska Bill, believing that it would be sure to break down the Administration whichever way it went, a prospect which Grund did not look upon at all unfavorably.5 This was good advice for, though the Democratic congressmen from Pennsylvania favored the measure, the people "back home" did not present a united front. The state was closely balanced between Whigs and Democrats, and E. B. Chase, editor of the Montrose Democrat and ex-speaker of the house of representatives of Pennsylvania, believed Cameron the only man who could carry the state for the Democrats for the senatorship. Cameron was not believed to be publicly committed on the repeal of the

Missouri Compromise and that question would control several votes from the northern area.⁶

Colonel Reah Frazer, editor of the Lancastrian and formerly an opponent of Cameron, had switched camps by the early 'fifties and his newspaper was now a force for Cameron at the Buchanan county seat. When a group of Buchanan followers launched attacks on Cameron in 1853, Frazer believed their acts inspired by fear of Cameron's strength and thought them premature. His opinion of the group was anything but favorable. He advised Cameron to pursue an even tenor but to be ever alert and to fight all the time. Many of Cameron's friends hoped that J. Glancy Jones could be won to his support. He had great strength in Reading and vicinity, and could be very useful to the organization. Cameron was asked to refrain from attacks upon him. In seeking to bring about this reconciliation, Henry A. Muhlenberg pointed out to Cameron that he had forgiven Frazer, whose sins were greater than were those of Jones, so why not do as much for Jones when it would work

so greatly to his own advantage.8

Innumerable letters came to Cameron from all over the state with expressions of confidence and determination to support his candidacy for the United States Senate. Judge Luther Kidder of Wilkes-Barre, a friend of Cameron from childhood, reviewed his services during his first term, especially during the Mexican War, and declared he would go farther to see Cameron re-elected to the Senate, than for any man of the State.9 Judge Jeremiah S. Black looked upon him as the great "boss politician," the biggest figure in one column or the other of every leading calculation. People asked, "How does General Cameron feel?" That was the question which had to be answered before any prediction could be hazarded about a public issue. Cameron was thoroughly posted, shrewdly observant, and always in the thick of every contest. 10 David Wilmot, who had not always been on the most friendly terms with him, wrote that the matter of the senatorship was safe from any harm at his hands and he would see that Cameron lacked nothing in his quarter. He desired an opportunity to repay in part Cameron's kindness of the past.11

The Pennsylvania Democratic Convention of 1854 assembled

in Harrisburg on March eighth and nominated Bigler for reelection to the governorship by a vote of one hundred twentyeight to five. Judge Black was nominated for the supreme court by acclamation and Henry S. Mott of Pike County was nominated for canal commissioner on the second ballot.12 The unanimity of the convention was highly gratifying to the Democratic press. The Union declared that the only circumstance "which causes us any regret is the fact that it was not determined by the convention to give the great principle of non-intervention, as affirmed in the Nebraska bill a direct and specific endorsement."13 This detail was properly taken care of two months later, on June fifteenth, when, at the meeting of the Democratic State Central Committee in Harrisburg, it was unanimously agreed to go into the canvass for governor upon the principles of non-intervention and popular sovereignty, as settled by the Compromise of 1850 and embodied in the Kansas-Nebraska Act. 14 This act, which had been debated in Congress for five months, passed the Senate on March third and the House on May twenty-second.¹⁵ The Democratic members of Congress from Pennsylvania had voted almost unanimously for the bill. Wilmot had fought strenuously against it. Pressure was used by the Administration in the course of its passage by the House and the Administration press made capital of the victory.16

The Philadelphia municipal election early in June resulted in the choice of R. I. Conrad, a Whig, for mayor by eight thousand majority. In fact, the whole Whig ticket was elected.17 This seems to have created no great alarm in Democratic circles. It was felt that the defeat in Philadelphia was the result of local circumstances and that nothing else could have been expected. The Democrats believed that if they all worked together their triumph in October would be complete and overwhelming; however, the counties and districts must be looked to carefully.18 An act of greater consequence to the Democrats occurred in Harrisburg on August twentieth. The Free-Soil Mass State Convention withdrew its state ticket and recommended the support of Judge James Pollock, the Whig candidate for governor. The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, an independent newspaper, felt that this action might have a very important bearing upon the October election. The chief object of the

Free-Soil Party in Pennsylvania, at the time, was to procure an expression of opinion against the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and it concluded that this would be best done by supporting Judge Pollock. Such a vote, with the major parties as nicely balanced as they appeared to be, it believed of great consequence, and hoped it might determine the result of the elction.¹⁹

Governor Bigler and Cameron were on friendly terms during the campaign, and Bigler indicated to Cameron where his services could be effectively used. A Mr. Rosenthal, editor of the German newspaper at Philadelphia, favored Cameron for the senatorship, but was undecided on the governorship. He was an admirer of Wilmot and was opposed to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Bigler needed the German vote and suggested that Cameron see Rosenthal, who would be largely controlled by his views and wishes.²⁰ The friends of Cameron were by no means all supporters of Bigler; some even expressed fear that he might be re-elected.21

Adherents in various parts of the state, in writing to Cameron concerning the progress of the campaign in their respective areas, frequently urged him to visit their district personally as a means of clinching the support of some who were doubtful or who could be won for him by the use of the right tactics. Others sought checks of from two hundred to a thousand dol-

lars to be used for local campaign purposes.22

Despite earlier Democratic expressions of confidence, the election of October tenth worked a veritable political revolution in Pennsylvania. Bigler would not denounce the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and all the anger that had been generated against it in Pennsylvania piled up against him. Pollock won the govvernorship by a majority of more than thirty-seven thousand votes.²³ Bigler had won the place three years earlier by more than eight thousand majority, and President Pierce had carried the state two years earlier by almost eleven thousand. The revolution was also overwhelming in the election of Pennsylvania congressmen. In 1852 Pennsylvania had elected sixteen Democrats and nine Whigs; in 1854 it elected five Democrats and twenty Whigs.²⁴ However, Judge Black won over his Whig opponent for the supreme court by a vote of more than two

to one, and Mott for canal commissioner by a vote of more than three to one.²⁵

In the legislature, the number of Democrats dropped from eighty-eight to forty-nine while the Whig representation advanced from forty to sixty-one. The new "American" or Know-Nothing Party pushed the third-party advance from five to twenty-three. The reaction seems to have been chiefly with reference to federal rather than state policy and was based during the campaign largely upon the Kansas-Nebraska question. There had been a rising tide of indignation among the independent voters, who determined to repudiate the attempt to commit them to federal administrative policies by forcing these policies as a part of party regularity. The efforts of Bigler to dissociate national and state issues were futile. He had repudiated, during his term as governor, pre-election promises to support the antislavery movement and now endorsed the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Their vote was decisive.

The last legislature had contained an overwhelming Democratic majority. The new legislature, which would have the duty of electing a United States Senator, would lack a majority of either major party. This placed the "Americans" in a position to hold the balance of power with their twenty-three votes. The strong reaction shown in the election against the Democrats led the *Independent Whig* of Harrisburg to conclude that the contest for United States Senator lay between the Honorable Thaddeus Stevens and the Honorable David Wilmot.²⁷

As a result of the set-back of October, 1854, some of the Democrats became discouraged and were ready to give up the fight, but that was not the case with Cameron. He wrote encouraging letters to his followers urging even greater efforts. He also directed some of his trusted lieutenants to write letters to newly elected members of the legislature where there was a chance they might be won for him. In reply to one of Cameron's letters, E. B. Chase wrote "your letter encourages me to continue to fight on." He had about abandoned hope but now had hope that the senatorship could be saved for the Democrats. At Cameron's request, Judge George Rahn of Philadelphia wrote to Benjamin Christ that of all the persons considered for the senatorship Simon Cameron could best guard and pro-

tect Pennsylvania's interests. He had been tried and proven by having served in the Senate. The tariff situation since 1842 was reviewed. Cameron was depicted as in a better position than other candidates to serve the great coal and iron interests of the state.²⁹ The letter was effective in winning the support of Christ.³⁰ It was desirable to have many friends come to Harrisburg and work among the members of the legislature in Cameron's interest during the weeks prior to the election. Such a request was extended to Lewis S. Coryell, an old business and political friend, with the admonition that skill, prudence, and discretion would be needed.³¹

The old bugaboo of the Winnebago Claims Settlement was again revived by the opponents of Cameron, during the early weeks of 1855. Senator James Cooper, whose term would expire on March fourth, 32 had become a member of the House of Representatives the year following Cameron's service on the Winnebago Commission, and he had later served as chairman of the Indian Affairs Committee. Cameron now wrote to him recalling that some disappointed claimants had assailed the character and motives of the Commission and that the subject was brought into Congress and referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs. He pointed out that some malicious persons during the present campaign seemed determined to renew the charges against him of misconduct and dishonesty. He requested Cooper, from his knowledge of the matter as a member of the committee, in fairness and generosity to him (Cameron) to make a statement of the facts relative to the case.³³ Cooper replied that John Bell was chairman of the committee when the investigation was made. Later, when he was chairman, the subject was again brought to the attention of his committee. He declared that:

it is but due to truth and justice to state that in the course of the examination, no fact was elicited, calculated, in my judgment to reflect in the smallest on your integrity or honesty as a man and as an officer. After a full examination the subject was dismissed, the Committee regarding the charges as unfounded and as originating either [in] ignorance or malice.³⁴

J. K. Kane of Philadelphia, who had been retained by Brod-

head to support his own claims on the subject, was also asked for a statement. Kane declared that the Secretary of War refused to recognize Brodhead's purchases of the Indian certificates of claims, on the grounds that they had been bought at inadequate prices, "but," added Kane, "I did not understand that he controverted the fairness of the awards themselves or the conduct

of the commissioners by whom they were made."35

John M. Kirkpatrick, a member of the Pennsylvania house of representatives, issued a series of interrogations to Cameron which, as a candidate for the senatorship, he was requested to answer. The questions dealt primarily with slavery but also included some on tariff, congressional appropriations for rivers and harbors, and the period of residence required of aliens for citizenship.³⁶ Cameron immediately sent a reply to Kirkpatrick. On the slavery questions his answers placed him in opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, favoring a restoration of the Missouri Compromise, and ready to act with the North in a revision of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. On the question of slavery in the territories, he stood on the Wilmot Proviso principle. He favored a protective tariff giving the same reasons set forth in his speech of July 19, 1846. He recognized the right of Congress to legislate and to appropriate funds for rivers and harbors and deplored executive vetoes of such measures. He favored the extension of the residence requirement for foreign persons seeking citizenship to twenty-one years.37

Perhaps Cameron extended himself a bit in his reply to Kirk-patrick—he was intent upon gaining the support of the "American" membership of the legislature and also the antislavery element. The caucuses in February were soon to show that many members of the legislature elected on both the Democratic and the Whig tickets were in reality "American"; in fact, the "American" Party virtually displaced the Whig Party in Pennsylvania. On the basis of the 1854 election there were sixty-one members of the legislature listed as Whigs; yet only eight of these appeared in the Whig caucus to nominate a candidate for the senatorship. There were forty-nine members of the legislature listed as Democrats, but only twenty-six took part in

the Democratic caucus.

In the caucus of the "American" members of the legislature,

held on February ninth, which included ninety-one of the one hundred thirty membership, Cameron was the leading candidate for the senatorship. On the first ballot he polled twentyseven votes, to eleven for Andrew G. Curtin, while fifty-one votes were scattered among seventeen other candidates. The next four ballots showed a steady increase for both Cameron and Curtin. The fifth ballot gave Cameron forty-six, Curtin thirty-seven, with nine scattered votes. This meant a total of ninety-two votes had been registered with only ninety-one persons in the caucus. Great excitement ensued. Twenty-nine members left the room rather than participate in another ballot, one being an officer of the meeting who openly avowed that there was no wrong to be imputed to any one in relation to the extra vote-that it was a mere mistake, which could have occurred under any such circumstances at any time with any persons. On the sixth ballot, Cameron received forty-four, Curtin eleven, James Cooper two, and Henry M. Fuller two. Three members declined to vote. Cameron had forty-four votes from sixty-two members present and on motion the nomination was made unanimous for him.38 One newspaper reported that during the three weeks following this caucus various "American" and Whig mass meetings were held throughout the state endorsing by resolutions the caucus choice of General Cameron, the great champion of Pennsylvania's interests.³⁹

Alexander K. McClure declared that Curtin and Cameron became implacably estranged as a result of this contest for the senatorship in 1855. The feud continued to the end of their political careers, and from that time they never met or exchanged the ordinary courtesies of life except on ceremonial occasions. This became a matter of considerable importance in the early months of the Civil War, when, with Curtin as Governor of Pennsylvania and Cameron as Secretary of War, co-opera-

tion was so necessary.

The editor of the *National Era* expressed some doubt as to the sincerity of Cameron as an opponent of slavery and as to the wisdom of the Know-Nothings in nominating him, declaring that the action had created some surprise. Cameron was classified as one of the old body-guard of slavery who, when in the Senate before, was uniformly subservient to the slave power.

The editorial closed with the caustic supposition that "his nomination is to be accepted as an evidence of the Anti-Slavery character of the Order." A correspondent telegraphed the Cincinnati *Gazette* that charges of fraudulent balloting were made and a row was expected when the election should take

place.42

Those "American" members who withdrew from the caucus drew up and had printed circulars or hand-bills addressed "To the Public." The circulars were for the purpose of justifying their action before the public and as a protest against the nomination of Cameron. The bolters declared that they withdrew after several ballots, when they became convinced of intrigue and treachery in many who openly repudiated but secretly voted for Cameron. They then proceeded to vilify that gentleman. Twenty-eight of those who withdrew signed the document.⁴³ Cameron kept a copy of this circular with his papers and on the back are two endorsements in his handwriting. In the first he stated: "My election in 1857 was a complete vindication and triumph." The second, written much later, read: "Nearly all the men who signed this paper lived long enough to express their regret and to ask and receive substantial favors from me. Many of them too showed the sincerity of their regret by voting and aiding to elect me to the U. S. Senate in 1857."

These "American" bolters called a caucus in which feeling was intense but little was accomplished. They did not unite on a candidate. The day before the election, the Democratic caucus, composed of the Administration or Kansas-Nebraska Democrats, with twenty-six present, nominated Charles R. Buckalew of Columbia. On the same day the Whigs, with only eight present, nominated Thomas Williams of Allegheny. A reporter for the New York *Times* observed that the results of the election were looked upon as quite uncertain and that efforts would

be made to stave off the election.44

The joint-session of the legislature convened on February thirteenth. On the first ballot, Cameron had fifty-eight votes, Buckalew twenty-eight, J. Prengle Jones eleven, Wilmot nine, and the remaining twenty-three votes were scattered among several others. On the next ballot Cameron gained one, Bucka-

lew lost one, Jones dropped to seven, and Wilmot gained two. On this ballot, with only one hundred twenty-seven votes cast, Cameron was within five votes of election, and that was to remain his peak in all the balloting. It appeared evident that none of the leading factions could secure enough votes to elect its favorite. The convention therefore, by a vote of sixty-six to sixty-two, agreed to an adjournment until February twenty-

seventh, when they would resume balloting.45

The two-week recess was used by the various factions to strengthen their political fences through efforts both to win new support and to undermine the support of rival candidates. Wilmot was indignant because E. B. Chase, the anti-Wilmot editor of the Montrose *Democrat*, obtained and published in garbled form a personal note written by Wilmot to Cameron more than a year earlier expressing a preference for the latter over his rivals of the old-line Democracy. The garbled publication was made to appear as an endorsement of Cameron's candidacy at the immediate time and under the existing circumstances. 46 John C. Dunn wrote that a Mr. McCalmot was going to Harrisburg soon. He would endeavor to induce his cousin to vote for Cameron, and failing this would try to keep him from the convention when the vote was taken. He suggested that Cameron's friends do him a similar kindness by taking some of his opponents to Philadelphia or New York. 47

Letters poured in from all over the state offering any services possible to Cameron; many persons expressing willingness to come to Harrisburg to exercise personal influence on various members of the legislature. K. Pritchette wrote from the national Capital that efforts were being made to direct to others some of the votes pledged to Cameron and that John W. Forney and David R. Porter were both working hard to defeat him. From his vantage point, he offered suggestions to Cameron

as to certain tactical procedures.48

Old-line Democrats and bolters from the "American" caucus made this recess period an occasion to hold indignation meetings against Cameron. The strength of the Cameron organization was sufficient at times to make the meetings backfire on those who called them. Such a meeting was held in Easton on February twentieth. It was called for the purpose of

adopting resolutions denouncing Major Fry, of the senate, for supporting General Cameron. William H. Hutter, editor of the Argus, submitted a series of resolutions to this end. A Mr. Fox (an American-Democrat) moved a modifying amendment to the resolutions which was rejected. Then occurred a scene which the reporter declared beggared description. The result was that the "American" portion of the meeting drove the oldline Democrats out, after which resolutions were passed commending the course of Mr. Fry, and instructing their members of the house, Messrs. Bush and Johnson, also to support General Cameron in the legislative convention when it re-assembled on the twenty-seventh. 49 A similar meeting occurred in Pittsburgh three days later, attended by three hundred persons.⁵⁰ It was a farce and a failure as far as the purpose for its calling was concerned, though it did not turn the tables for Cameron in such a determined manner as had been done in the Easton meeting. Among other things, resolutions were read favoring a western candidate. No one was named and the resolutions were not acted on.

The Pennsylvania house of representatives appointed a committee to investigate charges of bribery in relation to the senatorial election. On the afternoon before the convention was to re-assemble, this committee reported that twenty-five witnesses had been examined; four or five whom they wanted to examine had not been found. It stated further that the testimony was imperfect and unsatisfactory and in the present shape should not be published. Thus far, no testimony had been elicited tending to fix on any candidate for Senator, before the convention, any attempt to obtain his nomination and election by corrupt or improper influences. F. Jordan, the chairman of the committee, and one other member refused to sign the report, because they placed a different estimate on the evidence.⁵¹ Jordan was one of the "American" caucus bolters who had signed the petition against Cameron two weeks earlier.

On Tuesday, February twenty-seventh, the two houses of the legislature assembled in convention to try again to elect a United States Senator. Three ballots were taken without effecting a choice. The votes did not vary much from those taken a fortnight earlier; Cameron received fifty-five (except on the second ballot, when he had one less) and Buckalew received twenty-three, while the remaining fifty-odd were scattered among a number of candidates.⁵² Far from making the electing easier, the two-week recess worked in the opposite direction. The votes for Cameron and for Buckalew fell off several points. Several new candidates were brought into the field—fully a score of men at one time or another entered the contest for the senatorship—and only in four cases did any candidates other than Cameron and Buckalew poll more than six votes.

The convention, hopelessly divided on a senatorial choice, rejected a motion to adjourn until the next day; but, by a narrow margin of one vote (sixty-six to sixty-five), agreed to adjourn until the first Tuesday in October next.⁵³ This action virtually meant an indefinite postponement, for it would require the Governor's call to bring it together after the adjournment of the legislature. Furthermore, it gave to Governor Pollock the power of appointing a Senator to act until an election could be

effected.

General William Larimer, Jr., a friend of Cameron in Pittsburgh, wrote to him some two weeks after the indignation meeting was held in that city.⁵⁴ He noted that there were men in that part of the state who would not vote for Cameron, feeling that one Senator should be from western Pennsylvania. He solicited support for himself if Cameron saw he could not win, and pledged himself to carry out Cameron's wishes to the letter. He believed that Cameron would have no difficulty in succeeding Brodhead in the Senate when his term should expire in 1857, since Brodhead was from eastern Pennsylvania.

The motion to adjourn the convention until October had been carried by only one vote. It was therefore but natural that its opponents should seek to rescind the action. In the senate on March eighth, a series of resolutions was offered to annul the vote of adjournment. They were referred to the committee on

the judiciary,55 where they were allowed to die.

Cameron desired the election of Senator to be made without waiting until fall more than he desired his own success. He said so to his confidential friends and made the distinct proposition to Governor Pollock that he would withdraw his name from the contest on the condition that the Governor would put his

influence behind a movement with Cameron's friends to bring the convention together. Cameron stated only one other condition, namely, that the selection should not be made from among those who had made war on him. He was tired of the contest but declared that, if the election went over to the fall, self-respect and regard for his friends would compel him to be a candidate until a Senator was elected. Cameron's friends also vainly endeavored to persuade the Governor to re-assemble the legislature. He could not be prevailed upon to do so, believing that no business could be brought before it but that of electing a United States Senator. He did not desire to prevent the meeting but was unwilling to assume the responsi-

The convention therefore was not re-assembled. The campaign for the senatorship continued, and Cameron stayed in the thick of it. His followers continued to file reports with him on local conditions throughout the state. Candidates for office in the October election, from various localities, wrote to him requesting loans of from one hundred to five hundred dollars in order to be able to devote more time to the task of winning the election. Others begged leave to spend some hundreds of Cameron's money to aid in the election of the candidates of their districts suggesting that to make the election reasonably certain five hundred or six hundred dollars must be distributed in the county for wages.⁵⁸ Some requested "loans" while some appealed outright for gifts. Evidently Cameron was not deaf to all these pleas, for Dr. H. E. Muhlenberg of Lancaster wrote that he had received Cameron's check and the money was being distributed to the best advantage.⁵⁹

Another significant point to be noted in Cameron's struggle for political power in Pennsylvania is that, by the summer of 1855, his correspondents began referring to the political "machine" and asking Cameron to tell them what he wanted done in specific cases. They were now looking to him as the directing genius

of the organization.60

The Democratic local conventions throughout the state during the summer and early fall were rather enthusiastic, and well they might have been, for there was great division among their opponents. They passed strong resolutions against the

"Americans" or Know-Nothings, lauded the Constitution and the Union, and emphasized the national adherence to Demo-

cratic policies.

There were features of the Know-Nothing Party, carry-overs from earlier Nativist movements, which were strongly opposed by many of the newer adherents to the party; particu-larly distasteful were the policies of secrecy and anti-Catholi-cism. A state convention of "Americans" was held in Lancaster early in April, at which ex-Governor Johnston, Simon Cameron, and other prominent persons were present. A debate arose upon a motion to do away with the secrecy of the order. It was said to have ended in a feud which finally broke up the convention.⁶¹ Two months later the Know-Nothings held a national convention at Philadelphia. A great and enthusiastic banquet attended by four hundred fifty people, featured the program.⁶² In the convention, the wrangle over secrecy and anti-Catholicism was continued, both policies being maintained, and little generosity was shown to a Catholic delegation from Louisiana. The Know-Nothings in New Orleans repudiated the platform of this Philadelphia Convention. The slavery clauses suited them well enough, but they objected to the part which excluded Catholics and it was said that they would vote the Democratic ticket.⁶³ The twelfth (pro-slavery) section of the national platform was shortly afterwards repudiated by the Pennsylvania state council of the party as repugnant to the great body of the people of the state and to the sentiment in favor of prohibiting slavery in the territories—a sentiment which could not be removed from the minds of Northern people.64 Thus the Pennsylvania Know-Nothings were unable to work in harmony with the national organization.

Before the fall elections in Pennsylvania, the state was subjected to still further political convulsions. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 produced a situation which meant the death of the Whig Party as a nation-wide organization. Even before the passage of the bill a movement had been started to unite all elements opposed to slavery extension into a new party. Dr. Gamaliel Bailey, editor of the *National Era*, had for some time been persistently urging through the columns of his paper that the advance of the slave interests could not be

effectively checked by action through the old parties. Israel Washburne of Maine accords chief credit for the founding of the party to Dr. Bailey. Bailey probably did little more than point out the difficulties in the way of checking the advance of slavery by action through the old parties and stimulate men's thoughts towards other action. The meetings at Ripon, Wisconsin, in February, 1854, and Jackson, Michigan, in July, 1854, laid the real basis for the movement which resulted in the organization of the Republican Party. 65

Almost simultaneously, during 1854 and 1855, in different parts of the Middle West, in New England, and in the Middle Atlantic States, the party grew through the formation of committees and the holding of mass meetings. These were followed by local and state conventions which in turn promulgated the policies and purposes of the party. Not until 1856 was the name Republican adopted for the organization in some of the states.

In that year it was organized on a national scale.⁶⁶

By the summer of 1855 several Whig newspapers of Pennsylvania were urging a Republican organization for the state. The Pittsburgh Gazette, for many years the leading and most ardent antislavery Whig newspaper in western Pennsylvania, noted on July second that there was a very strong Republican movement in the western counties led by the Whigs. It believed that the time for decided political action was rapidly approaching. It recommended that Whigs throughout the state get busy, that they follow the example of the Whigs in some of the western counties and organize the Republican Party.⁶⁷ The same paper a few days later, observing the dissatisfaction of the old-line Democracy of Pennsylvania with the administration policy relative to slavery,⁶⁸ trusted that "the friends of Freedom in Pennsylvania" would speedily take steps to organize themselves into the Republican Party, as had been done in Ohio.⁶⁹

The Gazette of August eighth sounded a call for a state convention at Pittsburgh. It was signed by leading Republicans in all parts of the state. A local meeting in Reading, with representatives from ten counties, called upon the people to assemble in mass convention at Pittsburgh on September fifth.⁷⁰ At the Pittsburgh Convention, the state organization was perfected and a platform adopted under the name Republican.⁷¹ For the

one state office to be filled, that of canal commissioner, the convention nominated Passmore Williamson, an antislavery lawyer, who was at the time in prison as a result of contempt of court in a fugitive slave case. The nomination was not acceptable to

the more conservative Whigs and Know-Nothings.72

The antislavery interests realized the futility of entering the contest with several candidates. On September twenty-seventh the state committees of the Whig, Know-Nothing, and Republican Parties met in Harrisburg, effected a fusion, withdrew their respective candidates, jointly nominated Thomas Nicholson of Beaver as candidate for canal commissioner, and issued an address to the people of the state calling for united antislavery support for Nicholson. They explained their action as an effort to concentrate the votes of the anti-Nebraska people on one man, and to prevent the election of Arnold Plummer, the Nebraska candidate of the Democrats.⁷³ The fusion was accomplished only about a week before the election, and support was not entirely withdrawn from the original nominees. Plummer was elected by more than eleven thousand majority. If Nicholson had received the united support of the fused parties, he would have won by almost three thousand votes.74

The Democrats regained control of the legislature. Though the opposition was numerically stronger in the state its vote was divided. The Democrats maintained their same strength in the senate, seventeen, to sixteen for the opposition. In the house they jumped their membership from thirty-two to sixtysix.⁷⁵ This gave them a majority of thirty-three on joint ballot.

The results of the October election eliminated the opportunity of Cameron to be elected to the United States Senate by the next legislature. The Democrats had a large majority on joint ballot and Cameron's dealings with the Know-Nothings in the last legislature and in the recent election placed him beyond their consideration. On January fourteenth former Governor William Bigler was elected by the united Democratic vote of the legislature, the opposition casting its vote for the Honorable Edward J. Morris of Philadelphia. Pollock had not appointed a Senator and Pennsylvania had had only one Senator since the expiration of the term of James Cooper on March fourth of the previous year. Two weeks after his election Big-

ler appeared before the Senate; Senator Brodhead presented his

credentials; he was qualified and took his seat.77

Brodhead's term would end on March fourth of the next year. In the meantime Pennsylvania would elect another legislature which in turn would select Brodhead's successor. What were Cameron's prospects? Viewed from January of 1856, they were none too promising. He had broken with the Democratic Party a year earlier when he had sought to repeat his achievement of 1845. He had failed, though he had come within a very few votes of his goal. After his first wandering, the Democrats had grudgingly accepted him back into the fold. It was hardly likely that they would forgive him for "taking a walk" a second time. He had lost his affection for the party leaders and their principles, and, during 1854, 1855, and 1856, had courted opposing elements. Party ties were breaking in Pennsylvania, as elsewhere,79 following the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and, in this period of transition, efforts were being made in the state to form a group that could present a united front against the Democratic Party. Could it be accomplished in time for the next senatorial election? If so, what chance had Cameron of leading the forces? To start with he had the advantage of having built up during past years a rather large following of loyal supporters (not based entirely on old party lines) who looked to him for advice and leadership, and who could follow him upon whatever political paths he chose to lead them.

David Wilmot, chairman of the Pennsylvania State Republican Committee, acting with the chairmen of four other state committees, issued the call for a meeting at Pittsburgh for February 22, 1856, to organize the national party and prepare for a national convention. An informal gathering of the delegates was held on the evening of February twenty-first in the parlor of the Monongahela Hotel, Pittsburgh, for the purpose of making preliminary arrangements for the convention. At that meeting plans were made for the selection of the Hon. Francis P. Blair, Sr., of Silver Springs, Maryland, as chairman. The convention adopted the recommendations of George W. Julian of Indiana, chairman of the committee on national organization, providing for the appointment of a national executive committee consisting of one from each state and the holding of a national

nominating convention in Philadelphia on the seventeenth of June. It was suggested that the Republicans of the different states complete their organization at the earliest practicable moment. This was a mass rather than a representative or delegate convention, and, since no roll of members was preserved, there is available today only a partial list of those present—the names of those addressing the convention and those appointed to offices, committees, etc., as recorded in the proceedings and in

the newspaper reports.

As a year of national nominating conventions, campaigns, and elections, 1856 proceeded from an early start in February. The "Americans," or Know-Nothings, assembled on February twenty-second in Philadelphia. With very little opposition, Millard Fillmore was nominated for president and Andrew J. Donelson for vice president.⁸² A quarrel concerning slavery and the authority of the national council to make the platform of the party resulted in the secession of many delegates who later met in New York on June twelfth and nominated Nathaniel P. Banks of Massachusetts for president and ex-Governor William F. Johnston of Pennsylvania for vice president.⁸³ There were seceders from this convention who in turn nominated still other candidates. Eventually most of the members of both of these groups supported either Fillmore or Fremont.

The Democrats assembled in Cincinnati on June second and were in session five days. John E. Ward of Savannah, Georgia, was made permanent chairman. Buchanan, Pierce, and Douglas were the chief contenders for the nomination. Buchanan led the list on every ballot, with his vote and that of Douglas showing steady gains as support was gradually withdrawn from Pierce. On the seventeenth ballot, after some states had changed their votes, Buchanan won and was then unanimously nominated. The vice-presidential nomination went unanimously to

John C. Breckinridge on the second ballot.84

The Republican National Convention met in Philadelphia on June seventeenth as had been planned at the Pittsburgh meeting. Henry S. Lane of Indiana was made permanent chairman. Seward and Chase were withdrawn before balloting began, leaving John C. Fremont of California by all odds the strongest candidate, as shown by an informal ballot. After much

speaking on the part of delegates who had voted for other candidates, a formal ballot was taken in which Fremont received all but thirty-eight votes, thirty-seven of which were cast for Judge John McLean of Ohio. On the motion of General J. W. Webb of New York, Fremont's nomination was made unanimous. 85 An informal ballot was likewise taken for vice president. William L. Dayton of New Jersey received almost half the votes cast. A formal ballot followed and after various states changed their votes Dayton was unanimously nominated.86 Fremont believed that the nomination of Dayton was the great mistake of the convention. He wanted Cameron, Buchanan had just been named the Democratic candidate for the presidency and Fremont believed that with Cameron for his running-mate the Republicans would have been enabled to wage a stronger fight in Pennsylvania.87 He believed that Blair was responsible for the convention's blunder. Weed, writing to Cameron after the November election, agreed: "The first, and as I still think fatal error, was in not taking a Vice-President in whose nomination the North Americans would have concurred cordially." However, he placed the responsibility elsewhere, declaring that "The McLean men, aided by Greeley, threw us off the track."88

The Democratic platform reiterated the principles of platforms since 1840, adopted additional resolutions upholding the principles of the compromise measures of 1850, making special reference to the territories, and endorsing the Kansas-Nebraska Act. 89 The Republican platform was formulated by a committee of whom David Wilmot was chairman. It implored a return to the principles promulgated in the Declaration of Independence and embodied in the federal Constitution; advocated the Wilmot Proviso principle, terming polygamy and slavery "twin relics of barbarism"; and excoriated the policy of the Administration towards Kansas. For practical vote-getting planks, it advocated federal aid in the construction of a railroad to the Pacific and congressional appropriations for improvements of rivers and harbors of a national character. 90 The platform, strangely enough, was silent on the tariff.

The campaign which followed was an extraordinary one, especially in the North. Here the Republicans conducted a canvass rivaling that of 1840 in enthusiasm, and having what the

former campaign lacked—a definite purpose and a clearly understood policy. Great political clubs were organized. Torchlight parades and immense public meetings were featured. A correspondent of the Boston *Atlas* suggested that as the Buchanan men in Pennsylvania were forming "Wheatland Clubs" (named for Buchanan's residence) the banner inscribed with Fremont's name should have for its device a threshing machine. Pa

Pennsylvania's state election on October fourteenth was looked upon as crucial. The antislavery feeling in Pennsylvania pervaded the minds of several factions, the Republican organization being one. The only hope of defeating the Democrats lay in united action. Pursuant to this conviction some members of the legislature had issued a call for a Union State Convention to meet in Harrisburg on March twenty-sixth.93 It was composed of Republicans, a few who still called themselves Whigs, and "Americans" of a variety of degrees of antislavery sentiment. Many of the Republicans had recently been Whigs, some of them had been Democrats; most of the "Americans" had been Whigs, while some had been Democrats. An argument developed between the "Americans" of the eastern and western sections of the state, but they finally arrived at a working agreement, drew up a kind of platform, and made nominations for state offices.94

The October election was expected to show how Pennsylvania would go in November. Each party girded itself for the struggle. The strategists of the national parties turned their attention to Pennsylvania. Speakers and money were poured into the state from other parts of the Union. The Republicans were in straitened circumstances financially to a far greater degree than were the Democrats, and their state organization was weaker. E. D. Morgan of New York, chairman of the Republican National Committee, exerted strenuous effort in the campaign to raise funds for the party. The Democrats had the further advantage of the "favorite son" plea and a better newspaper coverage of the state. There was a feeling among some Pennsylvania leaders as late as August that the state's importance was not recognized by the Republican National Committee and therefore was neglected. 96

Greater efforts to carry Pennsylvania were put forth by the

Republicans during the last two months before the election. Thurlow Weed informed Cameron of a meeting of the national committee at the Astor House on August twentieth, and asked him to attend. Cameron's advice and co-operation were deemed very important. Weed requested that if Cameron could not go to New York he should meet him in Philadelphia earlier to go over important matters.⁹⁷ Francis P. Blair, the Maryland member of the national committee, rendered valuable council and advice. He and Buchanan had formerly been friends and both had been admirers of General Jackson. Blair and Buchanan had broken during the Polk administration, and Blair, in 1848, became a Free-Soiler, while Buchanan remained a Democrat. In the eighteen-fifties they drifted into a state of bitter enmity towards each other and in the campaign of 1856 were speaking of each other as "Old Buck" and "Old Blair."98 Cameron shared with Blair this feeling towards Buchanan. The latter wrote to the former reviewing some of Buchanan's past acts towards those who had aided him politically, expressed a very unfavorable opinion of him, and urged an all-out effort to compass his defeat.99

The Democrats met the Republican challenge in Pennsylvania with a more adequate treasury and with an array of speakers drawn from all over the United States. With masterful organization, under the leadership of John W. Forney as state chairman, every quarter of the state was supplied with a continuous list of speakers properly chosen for the section. They depicted the Republican Party as the party of radicalism, which had its effect upon Pennsylvania audiences; and at the same time they tried to keep as large a gap as possible between the Fremont and the Fillmore supporters. The day before the election Forney wrote to George N. Sanders of New York:

We are resolute, confident, and energetic. We have returns from every county in the State, all of which have been districted and canvassed, and I have yet to find a Democrat who does not believe that we will defeat them [the Republicans] tomorrow by from ten to fifteen thousand majority.

However, Forney expected the Democrats to be defeated in Allegheny County and in the Wilmot district, declaring: "Both

regions have been thoroughly penetrated and canvassed and yet up to this moment they seem to be impregnable to truth or to effort."¹⁰¹

The October election resulted in a Democratic victory in Pennsylvania. Their candidate for canal commissioner won by twenty-seven hundred votes, and they won control of sixty-eight seats in the legislature. The latter gave them a majority of three votes on joint ballot. The Democrats also won fourteen of the twenty-five seats in the national House of Representatives. The vote was close. In a total of four hundred twenty-three thousand cast, the Democrats had carried the state election by less than three thousand and the congressional election by less than two thousand. On the same day as the Pennsylvania election the Republicans had met disaster also in the Indiana state election.

The results of the October elections dampened the enthusiasm of some of the Republicans, while others, such as E. D. Morgan, chairman of the Republican executive committee, increased their endeavors to raise funds and were still hopeful of Republican success. ¹⁰⁴ In a small group discussing the prospects of the November election, Henry Wilson said in a spirit of hopeful enthusiasm: "Well, they may beat us this time, but we will win in 1860." Cameron, Weed, and Blair were all much older men; and Cameron, always practical in his ideas, replied that it was very well for Wilson to look hopefully for future triumps for the new party, but that as for himself, Blair, and Weed, he "didn't see much in future victories if they had to begin by waiting four years." ¹⁰⁵ He little dreamed that four and a half years after this conversation he would be Lincoln's first secretary of war.

The Republicans hoped, because of the small majority by which the Democrats had carried the state ticket, that some means might yet be found of saving the state for Fremont. They realized that unless they formulated some scheme of union stronger that that of March, Buchanan would carry the state. Cameron, Blair, Weed, McClure, and Wilson, in conference in Philadelphia immediately after the October election, developed the plan of a Union electoral ticket. ¹⁰⁶ Pursuant to this a Union State Convention met in the hall of the house of representatives

at Harrisburg on October twenty-first. This convention issued an "Address to the People of Pennsylvania" over the signatures of members of the state executive committees of the Republican, "American," and "North American" Parties, urging united action to defeat the Democratic ticket. They arranged a scheme whereby a joint-ticket of twenty-seven electors was chosen, twenty-six in common, with the names of respective presidential candidates heading the several tickets. The agreement was, in the event of their election, to vote for the respective candidates of the above parties in the exact proportion to the popular vote given to each ticket. In the event that the entire vote would elect any one of these three candidates, it was agreed to cast all of it in his favor. This formed a complete union of the opposition strength in Pennsylvania, while it enabled every voter to indicate his preference of the presidential candidates, without any compromise of principles. Cameron was one of the electors, 107

Many of the Fillmore men lacked enthusiasm for the scheme and at a meeting in Philadelphia on the day before the Union Convention at Harrisburg adopted resolutions repudiating the convention and endorsing the Fillmore electoral ticket. The Republican politicians played up this Fillmore movement as a conspiracy to elect Buchanan, an artifice to mislead honest men to throw away votes which would otherwise go to "Fremont and Freedom."

After the Union Convention the Republicans redoubled their efforts to carry the state. Cameron, Chase, Truman Smith of Cincinnati, and other political leaders from various parts of the country canvassed the state. They delivered speeches and were authorized to dispense funds wherever they deemed it most judicious, their expenditures not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.¹⁰⁹

Buchanan carried Pennsylvania on November fourth by twenty-seven thousand over the Union ticket, but his majority of the total vote was less than one thousand.¹¹⁰ Several counties, especially in the southeastern section, which were carried by Buchanan in November, polled a Fillmore, or "American," vote of sufficient strength to have changed the election result if these votes had been given to Fremont or the union ticket in accord-

ance with the union committee agreement at Harrisburg.¹¹¹ It would not be justifiable to adopt the generalization that the votes given to Fillmore proved disastrous to the Fremont cause. Fremont was considered radical by many voters, and there is no available evidence to indicate that those who voted for the conservative Fillmore would have voted against the conservative candidate Buchanan had there been no "American" Party.

There was a notable lack of enthusiasm for Fremont in eastern Pennsylvania as contrasted with the western part of the state. Some Republican leaders attributed the defeat to "side door transactions" of Forney, chairman of the Democratic State Committee, and J. P. Sanderson, chairman of the "American" State Committee. They sought to obtain a straight "American ticket vote and thus to undercut the effectiveness of the union ticket. Corruption charges were numerous on both sides.

A few days after the November defeat, Cameron wrote to Weed: "From the first I saw little hopes of Pennsylvania. I saw the error committed in placing the movement in the hands of ignorant and conceited men. The Whigs of this State cannot control a campaign; and they would not permit Democrats to advise or help them." He added that he believed that if he and Weed had met in July and laid complete plans for Pennsylvania they could have carried the state. Weed admitted in his reply that "Our organization in your state was sadly neglected. We had feeble men in Philadelphia." He also expressed regret over the Republican Party's loss of Pennsylvania in the October election, and the hope that the senatorship might yet be saved. 115

Buchanan, on the other hand, had been confident of victory from the beginning. Writing of the issues in the campaign and the national prospects of the Democratic Party, he condemned the "out-lawry" of the Black Republicans committed against fifteen of the states of the Union at their Philadelphia Convention and declared: "We are fighting the battle in this State almost solely on the great issue, with energy and confidence. I do not think there is any reason to apprehend the result, certainly none at the Presidential election, so far as Pennsylvania is concerned." 116

CHAPTER VIII

RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE

Judge Timothy Ives of Potter County, in the first flush of victory that came as a result of the his area, in the state elections in October, 1856, was ready to put forth all effort to see that the Republicans should send Cameron to the United States Senate. The final returns of the elections, however, gave the Democrats a legislative majority of three on joint ballot, although their combined opponents had a majority in the senate. Cameron always enjoyed a good political scrap and was not one to back down when the odds seemed stacked against him. He had been a Democrat all of his life except for his irregularities in 1845, 1855, and 1856. He had stood for certain economic policies though his party leaned heavily in the opposite direction, but many Pennsylvania Democrats held the same views. Could he rely on some Democratic support after the intensity of feeling generated during the recent campaign? Would it be possible to obtain the united support of members of other parties in the legislature? This would be necessary in the face of the Democratic majority. These and many other questions had to be considered in laying the groundwork and formulating the strategy for the campaign. There were Republican leaders who for many years, even before the organization of the party, had advocated ardently its principles and who were deserving of such a reward as election to the Senate. Possibly not one of them, however, could command enough Democratic votes, if any.

The matter of first consideration was to learn what could be expected from the Republicans. After the November election leaders were approached with the scheme of obtaining Democratic votes to supplement the united vote of the other members of the legislature as a means of vindication of their principles from the recent defeat. Wilmot replied that he was glad that

Cameron had by his support of Fremont identified himself with those opposed to the extension of slavery. The state senator and the representatives of his district would support Cameron for the United States senatorship.2 Thaddeus Stevens wrote that he had spoken to several members of the legislature and other influential men, including the governor and the secretary. All agreed at once to tender Cameron the nomination. He told Cameron it would require four Democratic votes and asked if they could be obtained.3

John Kunkel informed Cameron that Senator Brodhead was making strenuous exertions in his own behalf, hoping that he would be the compromise candidate of the Democratic caucus, but entertaining little hope of a first-hand choice for re-election.4 He (Brodhead) had broken with the Democratic machine of Pennsylvania and had lost favor with Buchanan. As has been seen, Buchanan complained that Brodhead had been one of his warm supporters, but, for some unexplained reason, after he had been elected to the United States Senate he had cast aside those to whom he owed his elevation and lookd to Cameron for direction and leadership. This was before Cameron had left the Democratic Party. Although Brodhead remained with the party he did not regain Buchanan's favor. Kunkel also stated that David Taggart,5 a former opponent, would now support Cameron. He believed that even though the Republicans were the minority party, Cameron could be put in the Senate, with the added admonition "only be sure to secure sufficient Democrats." Judge R. G. White of Wellsboro presumed that the vote of the opposition could easily be united for Cameron but felt that he would encounter difficulty in the Democratic ranks.6

The legislature convened the first week in January. The importance of this session was fully recognized. A correspondent of the Philadelphia Public Ledger wrote from Harrisburg on

January third, on the eve of the assembly:

The first important power entrusted to this Legislature, in which every man in the State ought to feel interested, is the election of a United States Senator. Pennsylvania, just at this time, occupies a controlling position. With a Pennsylvania President, commanding the power of patronage of the general government, it is of the very first importance that one of the first men of the State should represent us in the Senate, who could act as an exponent of the views of the administration, for at least one of the Pennsylvania Senators must from his position, be looked upon as such. There are men in the Democratic party (presuming that a Democrat will be elected) who are fitted to adorn any public position in which they may be placed.⁷

This letter also reflected the strained relations that had developed during the past two years between Senator William Bigler and President-elect Buchanan.

The Democrats had a majority of the legislature, but that majority was too small to give them buoyant confidence of success. They knew of the rumors that Cameron would unite and lead the opposing forces. Just twelve years earlier the Democrats had a substantial majority in the legislature and had anticipated no difficulty in electing their candidate. Cameron had then gained the support of the Whigs and had detached sufficient Democratic votes from that party's nominee to insure his own election. Much of Cameron's planning was now being carried on in a semi-secret manner with the leaders of the opposition groups, and the Democrats had little more than rumor on which to speculate and draw conclusions. Cameron, one of the shrewdest and most sagacious politicians of his day, was active, energetic and resourceful. Would he again be able to build up a majority and defeat the Democrats?

Forney, who had rendered valiant service for Buchanan and the Democrats as chairman of the state committee, was the leading candidate for the Senate. Buchanan was an earnest, perhaps too earnest, advocate of the election of Forney.⁸ His pressure in favor of the latter led critics to charge unwarranted interference by the President-elect in the political activities of Pennsylvania.

On January eighth, the *Pennsylvanian*—of which Forney was formerly editor and joint proprietor and which was now the official Buchanan organ in Pennsylvania—published a long editorial on the coming senatorial election. In high-sounding phrases it urged the members of the legislature to do their duty and elect a fine, upstanding, tried-and-true Democrat. The writer then launched into the following severe diatribe against Cameron:

The papers are full of rumors that Cameron will be the opposition

candidate. We know not, and care not how this will be. Certain it is that no honest man, of any political organization, whether Abolitionist, Know-Nothing, or Democrat, can contemplate without a blush of shame rising to his cheeks, the idea that he belongs to a political organization, weak enough and base enough, for any purpose, to make such a man as Simon Cameron its candidatae for the office of United States Senator from Pennsylvania. He had no party anywhere among the people. His pursuit of the Senatorship by a tortuous course of intrigue and corruption unparalleled in the annals of politics, through a long series of years, is more like the diseased craving of a monomaniac, than an honorable ambition. His triumph would only serve to demonstrate that corruption, duplicity, intrigue, and chicanery were the true passports to honorable distinction. If the opposition politicians wish to eternally disgrace themselves in the eyes of all the honest members of their organization by supporting Cameron, it is their affair, and they deserve to reap the consequences of their folly. But that any Democrat could be so lost to all feelings of self respect, all sense of shame, all pride of character, and so destitute of all true manliness, as to support him in any contingency, we cannot and will not believe.9

Thus Cameron and anyone who might vote for him were condemned and vilified prior to the election by the official Demo-

cratic organ of the state.

It appeared, in the first days of this session of the legislature, that the senatorship was destined to be a free-for-all contest. The house of representatives nominated thirty-four persons for the office.¹⁰ In truth, most of these nominations were merely honorary. Otherwise, the caucuses might have had difficulty in

selecting their nominees.

The Democratic caucus met on January ninth. Colonel John W. Forney was nominated on the first ballot with thirty-five of the sixty votes cast, after which his nomination was made unanimous by resolution. An incident connected with the caucus augured ill for the party. General Henry D. Foster, a member of the legislature from Westmoreland County, had served two terms in the national House of Representatives and had strong ambitions for the senatorship. The fact being ascertained that Forney would be the nominee, eight friends of Foster refused to participate in the caucus. The Harrisburg correspondent of the *Public Ledger* wrote the next day that the failure of these members to participate involved something more serious than mere opposition to Forney. He felt that it had a higher purpose

and was aimed as a blow at Buchanan himself, through whose influence the nomination went to Forney. The bolters urged in justification of their course that it was unwarranted that the President-elect should use his great power and influence in favor of Forney, to the injury of other candidates, who, with a fair field, might have had him at a disadvantage. "It is said," the correspondent declared, "that these bolting members are firm in their purpose to resist Forney's election." Foster came to the support of Forney on the day of the election, but without visible cordiality. The undercurrent of rebellion against the President-elect's interference was strong, and, as will be seen, some mem-

bers cast their votes for Foster anyway.

The Republican and "American" members of the legislature, the supposed Cameron coalition, were smarting under the defeat administered to them in October. They were inclined to attribute that defeat to Forney and generally were disposed to avenge the wrong. Cameron early perceived that disposition and directed his course accordingly. With his exceptional shrewdness as a political manager he believed he could depend upon the opposition's resentment again Forney to support him if he could assure this group of his ability to defeat Forney. The coalition had a majority in the senate, and Cameron had some warm friends in that body, among whom were the presiding officer David Taggart, and Charles B. Penrose of Philadelphia. Penrose was a man of ripe experience in state as well as national affairs, and of great sagacity in politics. He was among those who desired to punish Forney and was quite as earnest in his desire to promote the interests of his friend, General Cameron.¹⁴

The senate, in the control of the groups allied against the Democrats, refused to go into convention with the house for the election of a Senator until the plans of the coalition had been perfected and the success of its candidate ascertained. Cameron had positive assurance from the Democrats William B. Lebo and G. A. Wagonseller, representatives from Schuylkill, and Samuel B. Manear, representative from York that they would vote for him. This information he communicated to Penrose. The Republicans and "Americans" went into caucus on the evening of January twelfth. Penrose shrewdly stated to the body that he had good reason to believe that if they would unite in sup-

port of General Cameron a sufficient number of Democratic votes could be commanded to assure his election. The caucus refused to take any action on the subject without positive information as to the defection of the Democrats. Penrose then proposed that the caucus choose three men in whom they had implicit confidence, and whose discretion could be fully trusted; that these men be conducted to the presence of the three Democratic members who would vote for Cameron, and receive the desired assurance and make report at a later meeting of the caucus. This was agreed to and the caucus adjorned to meet again the next morning.¹⁶

Cameron arranged for Lebo, Wagonseller, and Manear to meet the committee from the caucus in his room at Omit's Hotel. The assurance required was given, and the three Democrats pledged their sacred honor that if the opposition members united in the support of Cameron they would give him their votes and elect him. Their names were not to be divulged before the time of election in the convention. The next morning the committee reported their meeting with the three Democrats and the pledges they had obtained. The caucus, still comewhat distrustful, instead of giving Cameron a forthright nomination for Senator, adopted a resolution that they would give him a united vote on the first ballot, their obligation not to go beyond that period. There were members of the caucus who were positively hostile to Cameron and supported the resolution with reluctance. However, they were convinced that Cameron had severed his connections with the Democratic Party and if elected to the Senate would oppose the administration, and their intensity of feeling against Forney was greater than their hostility to Cameron.¹⁷ The joint convention to elect a Senator for Pennsylvania as-

The joint convention to elect a Senator for Pennsylvania assembled in the chamber of the house of representatives on Tuesday, January thirteenth. Although he wrote a generation after the historic event occurred, Alexander K. McClure left one of

the best accounts of what occurred at this convention:

There was quiet anxiety on the part of the opposition, and sullen apprehension among the Democrats. There were no boisterous demonstrations of any kind. The opposition were hopeful, but not entirely confident, as only three of their number knew where the Democratic votes were to come from, and the Democrats felt that there was some

subtle miasma in the political atmosphere, but they were bewildered in

attempting to locate it. . . .

When the joint convention was called to order the profoundest silence prevailed throughout the vast assemblage, as the hall was crowded to its utmost capacity. When the roll-call began there was no break until nearly half the list had been called. The Democrats generally voted for Forney, but there were a few who gave Foster a complimentary vote, . . . while the opposition members voted solidly for Cameron. When the name of Lebo was reached he startled all the members present, with the exception of the members of the committee who had conferred with the bolting Democrats, by announcing the name of Simon Cameron in distinct tones.

The vote of Lebo came as a thunderclap from an unclouded sky to the Democrats, and one of their leaders arose and attempted to make an impassioned appeal to the Democratic members to cast a united vote for their candidate, but he was speedily called to order and reasonable quiet was finally restored. The opposition members felt confident that the needed number of Democratic votes would come from somewhere, and the Democrats realized that Lebo would not have voted alone for Cameron, and that there must be other Democratic votes yet to come. Maneer's [sic] name was called soon after, and he, in a feeble voice, announced his vote for Cameron. His vote with that of Lebo assured Cameron's election with the united opposition vote and of course the united opposition vote was assured when the defeat of Forney was clearly within their power. There were a few soft hisses, but silence was promptly restored, and the list was called on until nearly the close, when the name of Wagenseller [sic] was announced, and he declared for Cameron in a distinct and defiant tone.

When the calling of the roll closed, J. Lawrence Getz, speaker of the house, who sat beside Speaker Taggart, rose up and attempted to make a most inflammatory speech, but Taggart, who was a man of powerful physical force, took him by the arm and forced him back into his chair, telling him, in terms loud enough for all to hear, not to make a fool of himself. This comic feature of an occasion that was verging close to tragedy, called out the humor of the opposition members, and while the Democrats stormed, the opposition responded in hearty laughter, and in a few minutes Speaker Taggart announced the election of Cameron, and the adjournment of the convention without delay.¹⁸

Donald Cameron, who was standing close to a rear window, hoisted the window as soon as the result was announced, sprang to the pavement a few feet below, rushed to Omit's Hotel, where his father was waiting, and informed him of his election. The three Democrats who voted for Cameron were expelled from

their hotels and were severely ostracized by the Democrats during the remainder of the session of the legislature.¹⁹

The election required but one ballot. Cameron received sixtyseven votes, to fifty-eight for Forney, seven for Foster, and one for William Wilkins. The announcement of the result of the ballot was followed by prolonged applause in the galleries. There was great rejoicing among the Republicans. A salute was fired on Capitol Hill. General Cameron was greeted by his friends with the heartiest congratulations.²⁰ During the next few days he received many telegrams and his mail was heavy with letters of congratulation. These messages came not only from his friends and adherents but also from a number of his political opponents. Several messages were from persons outside Pennsylvania.²¹
The mortification and indignation of the Democrats at the

result of the election were unbounded. The election in itself at almost any other time would not have been viewed as involving such important consequences. Just at this time, however, when the President-elect was about to enter office, when he had expressed his anxiety concerning the election of Colonel Forney,22 plus the fact that the Democrats had a majority in the legislature on joint ballot, the result must be regarded as a severe blow in

advance at the incoming Administration.

The Harrisburg correspondent of the Public Ledger declared that "the election was most adroitly managed on the part of the opposition." He believed that General Cameron was the only man in the state who could have secured the support of the Democrats who bolted to him. Having earlier occupied a prominent place in the Democratic Party, there were many old connections and associations by which men not politically hostile to him could be led to look with favor upon the idea of his triumph. The counties of Schuylkill and York, from which came the Democratic votes to elect him, were supporters of Cameron in the days when he was a Democrat. It is not sufficient to urge hostility to Forney as the sole justification for the action of the bolting Democrats, though Wagonseller did give that as his "reason."23 The nomination of any other person than Forney by the Democratic caucus would probably not have altered the result. By voting with the friends of Foster the bolters could have prevented the election of General Cameron, or by voting determinedly for any other Democrat they could have prevented the election of any person supported by the Republican-American coalition. The correspondent of the *Ledger* concluded that the election, therefore, could not be regarded as a strict Republican victory, but rather a victory of General Cameron over John W. Forney and James Buchanan, the latter having voluntarily put

himself in a position to be defeated.24

The Pennsylvania Telegraph²⁵ of January 20, 1857, carried on the editorial page opinions of the press concerning the election of General Simon Cameron. It devoted several columns to excerpts from numerous papers, primarily Republican and "American," in which the greatest satisfaction was manifest at the defeat of Forney and the election of Cameron. The New York Tribune "rejoiced." Two years earlier when Cameron was new in the party it doubted his sincerity and opposed him. "Since that time he had done much to win the confidence and regard of the Americans and Republicans of the State." The Pittsburgh Chronicle felt that "the rejection of Buchanan's pet, is a significant hint to him that Kansas Must Be Free." The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin declared:

We have never known a more general feeling of exultation in a community than that observed everywhere in our streets this afternoon, when it was announced that Simon Cameron had been elected United States Senator over the Democratic nominee John W. Forney. . . . We have no time to comment on this happy result, but we must express our own satisfaction, as well as that of this entire community, with the course of General Foster and his friends, who had the manliness and courage to resist, not only the dictation of a servile majority in the party caucus, but the dictation also of power in the person of the President elect.

The North American was amazed that the secret management of the affair had been so astonishingly perfect; "How so many persons could be in on it, and yet no one else get wind of it, is a mystery." The Pittsburgh Commercial declared the charges of bribery of Messrs. Lebo, Wagonseller, and Manear obtained no countenance from anybody outside the Democratic Party. Cameron was for many years a conspicuous member of that party and still had many warm personal friends in its ranks. The Democratic members who cast their votes for him for

United States Senator were of this class. The *Miners' Journal* praised the election of Cameron over Forney, holding that the Democratic members who voted for Cameron spurned the ignoble spirit which dictated action at the call of party leaders, and assumed a position in the contest worthy of the highest praise: "We recognize in them representatives who look first at the interests of their State before they consider the demands of petty party drill." It was proposed, at Pinegrove, "to give Mr. Wagonseller a dinner, for standing by the interests of Pennsylvania, in place of voting for a Pro-Slavery candidate and Free-Trader." Concerning charges that these members were bribed to vote as they did, the writer for the *Miners' Journal* believed "that the only bribe offered was the interest of their State."

The editor of the *Pennsylvania Telegraph* declared the Harrisburg *Patriot and Union* to be denouncing the Democrats who refused to vote for Colonel Forney, and bespattering Simon Cameron "with all the blackguard epithets its venal malignity can command." The *Patriot and Union* was profuse in its laudations of Forney, expressing a desire to see him in the President's cabinet, and quoting the New York *Mirror* to the effect that

Forney would be appointed Postmaster General.

The indignation and chagrin of the Democrats at the result of the election were naturally unbounded, and the bolters were denounced without stint. The *Pennsylvanian*, on the day following the election, declared, "Three members elected by the Democratic party and honored by its confidence have earned an immortality of infamy by basely betraying their constituents and their party. . . . They have betrayed the Democracy as Judas betrayed his master." Continuing, the writer referred to Mr. Forney as having been "strickened [sic] down by the shameless treason of three wretches, whose venal hearts are dead to every ennobling sentiment, and who will be remembered hereafter only to be despised."²⁶

Charges of corruption and bribery were made on both sides. Such charges are always difficult to prove. The three Democrats who voted for Cameron stayed in Harrisburg during the remainder of the session of the legislature, suffering under the ostracism of their fellows. They were not re-elected, and, while Manear and Wagonseller dropped from view, Lebo appeared

again and again in friendly relations with Cameron. In 1861 Lebo took H. F. Shoemaker, son of his friend John W. Shoemaker of Schuykill Haven, to Washington to see General Cameron, who in turn obtained from Lincoln an appointment for him as cadet-at-large to Annapolis. Soon after this favor was granted Lebo received appointment, by Cameron's hand, as a Major of the United States Army on the staff of General J. S. McClernand; and young Shoemaker was enabled to join the same force with rank of first lieutenant.²⁷ Thus it may be said, if so considered, Cameron paid his debt to Lebo for services rendered in 1857.

The Democrats also were charged with corrupting members of the legislature. Cameron preserved notes of evidence presented to him of efforts to obtain votes for Forney by bribery, either by money or by offer of place. Included in the evidence are names of the subscription list of those contributing sums of five hundred to one thousand dollars to a fund to be used to influence members of the legislature. New York was said to be ready to pour in one hundred thousand dollars to secure the election of Forney.28 Undoubtedly much of this "evidence" had to do with the elections in the fall rather than directly with the senatorial election in January. Forney, it must be remembered, was chairman of the Democratic State Committee, and huge sums were raised by him for Democratic campaign purposes.

The President pro tempore of the United States Senate presented the credentials of Cameron to that body on January sixteenth,29 and on March fourth he was duly qualified and was administered the oath along with the other new Senators.30 Things were not as placid as this simple recital may indicate. The Democrats were not ready to accept Cameron's election submissively. An old friend of Cameron wrote suggesting a public demonstration of the Cameron supporters against the antagonistic activities of his opponents. Cameron replied thanking him for the consolation contained in his message, but, as was so characteristic of him, said that he did not see that any good could result to the cause in which they were engaged from a public demonstration and therefore preferred not to have it made.31 He wanted to let by-gone unpleasantnesses fade from the

memory as soon as possible rather than to stimulate hostility by openly carrying on a feud. He even refused to accept an invitation to a March fourth celebration in Pennsylvania on the ground that he should be in Washington on that day, the day of Buchanan's inauguration, and feared that being absent without a good excuse might give offense to Buchanan.³² Therefore,

Cameron was present for the inaugural ceremonies.

On March sixth, Bigler, by request, presented the Senate with papers signed by fifty-nine members of the legislature of Pennsylvania questioning the right of his colleague, Cameron, to a seat in that body. The papers were in the form of protests, containing certain points which they asked to be considered as affecting the legality of his election. Bigler asked to have the papers laid on the table until the committees should have been properly organized, at which time he would request the reference of the papers to the Committee on the Judiciary. Cameron arose and said that it was his wish that the matter be investigated as early as possible and as fully as possible, adding: "I hope the Senate will indulge my colleague in having the papers referred to the Committee on the Judiciary at the very moment committees are appointed, and if he does not make such a motion, I shall do so myself."33 On the ninth, the standing committees were appointed and, upon the motion of Bigler, the above-mentioned papers were referred.

Two days later Senator Judah P. Benjamin, from the Committee on the Judiciary, made a report and asked that the committee be discharged from further consideration of the subject of alleged irregularities and illegalities in the election of Cameron. The committee reported that the grounds for the protests were: first, that there was not a concurrent majority of each house in favor of the candidate declared to be elected; second, the senate did not comply with the requirements of the state law by appointing a teller and making a nomination of persons to fill said office, and give notice of such at least one day previous to the meeting of the convention. In addition to these there was a third protest presented by members of the Pennsylvania house of representatives that Cameron's election was procured, "as they are informed and believe," by corrupt and unlawful means, involving certain members of that body. They requested the

United States Senate to order an investigation, not only into the irregularity of the election but also into the charges therein presented in order to afford an opportunity to submit the proof

upon which they rested.

The committee was unanimously of the opinion that of the first two grounds of protest no facts were presented tending in the slightest degree to impair the validity of the election of Cameron. In relation to the third protest—the charge of use of corrupt and unlawful means—the committee declared it could not recommend that the prayer for senatorial investigation be granted, as the allegations were entirely too vague and indefinite. Not a single fact or circumstance was detailed as a basis for the general charge nor was it even alleged that Cameron participated in the use of corrupt means, or had any knowledge of their existence. The committee, under the circumstances, did not consider it consistent with propriety or with the dignity of the Senate to send out a roving commission in search of proofs of fraud in order to deprive one of its members of a seat to which he was prima facia entitled, especially since the parties alleging fraud and corruption were themselves armed with ample powers for investigation. If, on investigation, the charges should be proved and if they believed the character of Cameron so involved that he should not be a Senator, the result could be reported by the members of the Pennsylvania legislature and the Senate could take further action.34

Senator George E. Pugh of Ohio, a member of the committee, submitted a minority report contending that the charges involved the honor of the Senate and ought to be inquired into. Senator Andrew Pickens Butler of South Carolina, also of the committee, thought it the business of the Pennsylvania legislature to purge itself, if corrupt, instead of applying to the United States Senate for "medication." Action on the resolution for discharge of the committee from further consideration of the subject was delayed for two days, chiefly by Bigler. Finally, with reservations, Bigler withdrew his opposition to the resolution and it was adopted.³⁵

Cameron received congratulations from his friends in the Senate and throughout the country. Thurlow Weed wrote that his triumph in Washington was almost as great as his earlier one

in Harrisburg.36

General Cameron entered upon the duties of his second term in the Senate at the same time that Buchanan assumed the duties of President. Cameron had first entered the Senate as Buchanan's successor when the latter had become secretary of state in the administration of President Polk. In both 1845 and 1857 he was elected in the face of Buchanan's opposition. In both instances, he proved a thorn in the side of Buchanan. Although they once had many common interests,³⁷ they were as unlike as day and night, and the wonder is that their friendship was maintained so long. They differed in temperament, in taste, in methods employed, and in the trend of their intellectual forces. Buchanan was studious, conservative, and trained in statesmanship in its severest school. He commanded respect rather than affection from his associates. Cameron was aggressive, and tended to look to the end to be attained rather than the means to be employed. He cherished the warmest attachment for his friends. Buchanan was trained in the Federalist school though he later accepted the principles of the Democrats with sincerity and adhered to the party unfalteringly. He lacked the qualities of keen perception and the prompt action necessary to leadership and so greatly needed before the end of his administration. Cameron, with but few claims to statesmanship, was a consummate politician. He had meager formal education, compared with Buchanan, yet he was a man of broad intellectual force and capable of employing his faculties to the uttermost when the occasion demanded it. He could be patient and conservative, or keen and aggressive as occasion demanded, and when new problems arose which culminated in the Civil War he displayed vastly greater adaptability to new conditions than did Buchanan. Buchanan believed in the resolutions of 1798, known to have come from the pens of Jefferson and Madison, and invested them with a measure of sanctity. Cameron, in his eminently practical way, never paused over traditions and records of the past when confronted by new conditions and new necessities demanding action. He was inclined to be conciliatory and was ready to meet every new problem in a practical way. When the war came he was among the foremost of the governmental officials to declare that slavery must be overthrown.³⁸ Policies which he advocated, and which were used as excuses for ousting him from the Cabinet, were a few months later adopted by the government.

Buchanan's effort to reward Forney in 1857 for his political services by giving him the senatorship failed because of Cameron. The President either could not or would not give Forney another place that he would accept. He was offered the Naval Office in Philadelphia, or the Consulate at Liverpool, both of which he refused on the ground that he was already committed to two old friends of Buchanan for these posts.³⁹ Buchanan had previously agreed that he should have the Washington *Union*, with the fortune that would come from congressional printing,

but Forney's enemies had blocked this move.

In July Forney announced through the press that he would return to journalism, and appealed to his friends to support him in the venture. The Press was established the next month ostensibly to support Buchanan. The President did not aid him with public printing as Forney had expected so the friendship and loyalty was soon replaced by distrust and dissatisfaction. Forney joined forces with the anti-Lecomptonites against the Administration;40 and by 1860 he was on friendly relations with Senator Cameron, had joined the Republican Party, and had resumed his former position as clerk of the House of Representatives. A year later he became secretary of the Senate and continued in that position until 1868. After two decades with the Republican Party Forney returned to the Democrats. In the meantime he had been a supporter of Cameron, and Cameron had retired from the Senate in 1877 and directed the election of his son, James Donald ("Don"), to succeed him.

In the late eighteen-fifties, when Forney broke with the Administration, one of his contentions was that Buchanan's subserviency to the South prevented his appointment. He also declared that the President's southern leanings resulted in refusal to mete out "justice" to Kansas, the point on which alone, Forney said, Pennsylvania had been carried. Forney attributed the South's enmity to him to the fairness of his work when, as clerk of the House of Representatives, he presided during the long struggle for the election of speaker in 1855-1856. In 1857

Cameron observed to an old friend: "There are wonderful 'swaps and changes' in this world as poor Forney will find out." From the above account of Forney's career after his defeat in 1857, it appears that he must have taken a leaf from the book of a

practical politician.

The regular triennial gubernatorial contest in Pennsylvania formally got under way with the meeting of the Democratic State Convention in Harrisburg on March second and third. William F. Packer of Lycoming County was nominated for governor. Ellis Lewis and Nimrod Strickland were nominated for the offices of judge of the supreme court and canal commissioner respectively. A series of resolutions was adopted in which the Democrats pledged themselves to support the wise conservatism of the first Pennsylvania President, endorsed the nominations for the state officers, deprecated the recent election of Cameron to the United States Senate, and complimented Forney on party usefulness.⁴³ The appointment of Judge Jeremiah S. Black of the Pennsylvania supreme court, as United States Attorney-General in Buchanan's Cabinet and the resignation of Judge Ellis Lewis from the court necessitated another session of the Democratic convention. It assembled in Harrisburg on June ninth and nominated for the court James Thompson of Erie County and William Strong of Berks County.⁴⁴
The Republicans and "American" Union State Convention

assembled in Harrisburg late in March. Wilmot was nominated for governor on the second ballot amid great enthusiasm. James Veech and Joseph L. Lewis were selected for the court positions and William Millward for canal commissioner. The convention adopted a series of strong antislavery resolutions, condemning in strong terms the late decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott Case, asserting the power of Congress over the territories, and declaring unwillingness to abridge the rights of any class of citizens. The "Americans" who would not make union with the Republicans held a belated convention in June and nominated Isaac Hazelhurst of Phila-

delphia, to carry their flag for the governorship.46

The campaign was not spectacular. There was very little fanfare. Cameron, in so far as he participated, supported Wilmot and his ticket. Wilmot wrote, near the end of the campaign, thanking him for his expressions of friendship and for his contribution (of two hundred dollars) towards the campaign.⁴⁷

The Pittsburgh Gazette declared that by mid-summer: "The contest in Pennsylvania is narrowed down to a struggle between the friends of Slavery extension and its opponents. Packer represents one principle, and Wilmot the other." Some persons, remembering Wilmot as somewhat lukewarm on protection at an earlier period, raised the tariff issue. He answered the question very satisfactorily. He regretted that the tariff policy could not "be wholly removed from party conflict and placed upon a permanent and reasonable basis." He opposed rates so high that they would result in cutting off revenue but declared he favored "a policy of such discriminations as would afford adequate and ample protection to American interests and American labor." He was not so strong a protectionist as Cameron, but certainly was not a free-trader.

The October election gave the Democrats an unusually large majority. This election, by the way, marked the last time for many years that the Democrats were successful in a state election in Pennsylvania. Packer had a majority of nearly forty-three thousand over Wilmot, and more than fourteen thousand six hundred majority over the combined votes of Wilmot and Hazelhurst. The Democratic candidates for judge and canal commissioner were swept in by majorities of almost equal proportions. They likewise gained control of both branches of the legislature with a total of eighty-nine seats to their opponents' forty-four seats. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Republican, or fusion, vote for governor fell off only thirteen hundred, while the Democratic was reduced forty-two thousand from the votes cast for the candidates of the respective parties for president the previous fall.⁵⁰

The year 1857 is memorable in the political career of Simon Cameron as a year of triumph over his adversaries. He returned to the United States Senate and to an atmosphere pleasing to his temperament, as he often remarked. He continued to exercise leadership in Pennsylvania political affairs, but, from his position of honor and dignity in the Senate, he was largely removed from the hurly- burly of petty political disputes within the state. These matters could be left to his lieutenants.

This year was also memorable as the beginning of a period of great distress. In spite of many evidences of prosperity, the financial state of the country was far from satisfactory. By midsummer complaints of scarcity of money and hard times were general. Before the end of the summer failures of business establishments and banking institutions were rife throughout the country at large. As disaster followed disaster panic swept the country, becoming worse as fall advanced. Late in September the Bank of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia, closed its doors, and soon specie payments were suspended by the banks that were able to remain open. Under the existing laws of Pennsylvania suspension of specie payments would have led to a general forfeiture of bank charters. However, this drastic move was prevented by the prompt action of Governor Pollock. So severe was the crisis that Governor Pollock called a special session of the general assembly to pass measures of relief. 51 He directed the enactment of a law legalizing the suspension of specie payments for an indefinite period.52

Wilmot in the midst of his campaign deplored the financial troubles, which, by the closing of business and manufacturing enterprises, was causing so much suffering among thousands of honest and industrious workers.⁵³ The sound condition of Cameron's Bank of Middletown has already been noted. It weathered the storm. His letters from business and political friends during this period are burdened with the tragedy of depression which extended into all areas of the state and affected all classes.⁵⁴

Returning to a place in the United States Senate, General Cameron did not find it to be a body of quiet dignity, as he had expected from his experiences of a decade earlier. The depression was already taking sever toll of business enterprises and resulting in much misery among the people. Petitions for relief were being sent to Congress as well as to the state legislatures. The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act had been but the first of a series of events, both national and local, that increased agitation on the slavery issue. Problems developed which were fraught with explosive potentialities for the Democratic Party, and for harmonious relations of North and South. Tension ran high on both sides—too high—bursting forth at times in angry charges and even physical violence. Cameron had held the South

in high regard since his first trip to the deep South in 1831. During his first term in the Senate, he had made several warm friends among the Senators from the southern states. Early in his second term he wrote to an old friend in Pennsylvania, who also had experienced pleasant associations with southern Senators, mourning that "the South of today is not the South of Calhoun, Dixon,

Lewis, and their compeers."55

The Kansas question loomed as one of the largest problems which confronted the first session of the thirty-fifth Congress. Popular sovereignty had been reduced to little more than a sham in Kansas, in the matter of voting on the Lecompton Constitution. Governor Robert J. Walker went to Washington in the late fall of 1857, and, because his rejection of fraudulent proslavery votes had given the legislature of Kansas to free-state men, found that he had lost favor with the Administration, and resigned. Buchanan in his Annual Message of December eighth (1857) upheld the work of the Lecompton Convention. 56 Two months later he sent to Congress a copy of the already discredited Lecompton Constitution, and a message recommending the admission of Kansas under that organic act, declaring "Domestic peace will be the happy consequence of its admission."57 Douglas broke with the Administration and denounced with all the vigor at his command this travesty upon popular sovereignty.58Cameron was highly amused at the lack of political sagacity on the part of the President.59

Even before the President submitted the Lecompton Constitution to Congress, resolutions had been offered to the Pennsylvania senate, instructing the Senators from Pennsylvania to resist the admission of Kansas into the Union until its constitution had received the unqualified sanction of a majority of the bona fide residents. Amid much confusion these resolutions were referred to a special committee. The resolutions were opposed to the policy of the President but were in line with the views expressed by Governor Packer ten days earlier in his inaugural address. It was more than a month after the Kansas Resolutions were offered before they were reported back to the senate. The majority of the committee favored the Lecompton Constitution and urged the speedy admission of Kansas under it. A motion to postpone action, in order to allow the minority of the committee to re-

port, was defeated by the united vote of the Democrats. Again confusion practically broke up the meeting. Finally, on March twenty-third, the Pennsylvania senate passed resolutions favoring the Lecompton Constitution by a vote of eighteen to eleven.

Only one Democrat voted in the negative. 61

In the meantime great anti-Lecompton meetings were being held in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg and other places throughout the state. These were addressed not only by Republican leaders but also by some leading Democrats, among them the man who had contributed most in time and service to the election of President Buchanan—John W. Forney.⁶² The sentiment was so strong that a call was issued for the meeting of an Anti-Lecompton State Convention in Harrisburg on July eighth, to nominate persons for state offices. It was proposed to include all parties of the opposition and it was believed the prospects were good for a thorough and successful union.⁶³

Exciting times were had in Congress during the debates on the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution. In the House on February fifth, near the end of a session that lasted until almost six-thirty in the morning, a violent personal altercation occurred between Representatives Lawrence M. Keitt of South Carolina and Galusha A. Grow of Pennsylvania in which the former was the aggressor. Great confusion resulted as members from every part of the House rushed to the scene of conflict. Both men apoligized for their conduct at the next session. 64 Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, a member of the

House, wrote:

We shall be beaten on the admission of Kansas. The northern Democrats do not stand up as they have been counted; and our *mean* Southern men will not stay in their places. Last night we had a battle-royal in the House. Thirty men at least were engaged in the fisticuff. Fortunately no weapons were used. . . . Nobody was hurt, . . . but bad feeling was produced by it. It was the first sectional fight ever had on the floor, I think, and if any weapons had been on hand it would probably have been a bloody one. All things here are tending to bring my mind to the conclusion that the Union cannot or will not last long. 65

The political atmosphere at the Capital was highly charged. A few weeks after this skirmish in the House a controversy developed in the Senate between Cameron and James S. Green of

Missouri, a member of the Committee on Territories. This occurred on March fifteenth and it too came during a long session which did not adjourn until past six o'clock on Tuesday morning. The night had been consumed by innumerable motions to postpone, and to adjourn, on which the yeas and nays were taken. Roll calls were also demanded from time to time to determine whether a quorum were present. The Democrats had held a caucus and agreed upon their course of action on the Kansas question. The opposition had not been informed of this and Cameron felt that they should be given opportunity to confer on the matter. He resented the apparent determination of the administration group to push the debate, declaring that the whole matter was being "carried out in a dictatorial and improper manner." Green directed the course of the bill as brought from the committee and was inclined to be rather arbitrary. Cameron, who seldom offended anyone in the Senate, endeavored to be concilatory in the early part of the debate, but as the night dragged on and the administration members showed determination to force their advantage over the minority he too became controversial. In the heat of debate, he and Green each gave the other the lie. Vice President Breckinridge interfered with decision and prevented a personal encounter. Green declared, however, that "as to any question of veracity between that Senator and myself, in five minutes after the Senate adjourns, we can settle that."66 This threat was later withdrawn by Green and the next day both gentlemen made the usual apologies and explanations before the Senate.67

Preston Brooks' assault on Charles Sumner was fresh in the minds of everyone. Many Northerners felt that the attitude of the Southern members of both Senate and House was becoming more threatening as they heaped personal abuse upon Northern opponents. It was apparently out of this situation that the Chandler-Wade-Cameron compact grew. Zachariah Chandler of Michigan, Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, and Simon Cameron, in order to put an end to the "chronic insolence" (as they termed it) of the comparatively few aggressors from the South, drew up a compact to the effect that in the event of any Republican Senator's receiving gross personal abuse they would make his cause their own and, if need be (in the precise words of the compact)

"carry the quarrel into the coffin." Some years after this event the Senators concerned, as a testimonial of the times and their method of dealing with some of the difficulties besetting them, executed a memorandum in regard to this agreement and placed their signatures to it. This document was for the purpose of showing later generations what it once cost to favor liberty and to express such sentiments in the highest places of official life in the United States. It was the claim of the signers that this arrangement produced a cessation of the irritations which induced them to make the compact, and when it became known that some Northern Senators were ready to fight for sufficient cause the tone of their assailants was at once modified.

On March twenty-third, the bill for the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution passed the Senate by thirtythree to twenty-five. 70 Cameron was paired with Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and therefore his vote was not registered. He was much criticized for this action but explained his position both on the floor of the Senate and in a letter to a friend in such a manner as should have been satisfactory to everyone familiar with the practice of pairing. His views on the Kansas question were known beyond the shadow of speculation through his speeches and letters. He declared that he desired very much to vote on the question against the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution, but was prevented by the severe indisposition of the Senator from Mississippi. Davis was ill but was determined to go to the Senate to vote, against the advice of his physician and in spite of the fears of his family. To prevent him from doing so, a mutual friend went to Cameron with an appeal. It was a stormy day and Cameron's attitude towards the Lecompton Constitution being well known he agreed to the pair, to keep a friend from endangering his life. He asserted that the loss of one vote on each side could in no manner affect the result. There had been long years of friendly intercourse between Cameron and Davis, and Cameron felt that he could not, under the circumstances, refuse.71 It was but an act of courtesy and friendship. He declared that while he had omitted no exertion to defeat the "Lecompton swindle" and he should faithfully and zealously act with his party for the common good of the country, he would not permit himself to be behind his opponents "in the courtesies and civilities which deprive politics of their harshness and invite men of kindly feelings into the service of the state where such courtesies will produce no injury to

the public."72

When the Senate bill was under consideration in the House, William Montgomery, a Pennsylvania Democrat, offered an amendment which provided, among other things, that inasmuch as it was greatly disputed whether the Lecompton Constitution was fairly made and ratified and whether it expressed the will of the people of Kansas, it be resubmitted to the people of that state. This amendment was carried by one hundred twenty *yeas* to one hundred twelve *nays*.⁷³ Twenty-two Democrats and six "Americans" voted with the Republicans for the amendment, while one hundred four Democrats and eight "Americans" voted against it.⁷⁴

The Senate was unwilling to accept the amendment. A conference committee was appointed out of which came the English Compromise, named for William H. English of Indiana. He had voted for the Montgomery amendment and as a member of the conference committee formulated this compromise. It was charged that the English Compromise, providing for a large government land grant to Kansas, was offered as a bribe to induce the people of Kansas to accept the Lecompton Constitution. This measure was presented to both House and Senate and after some days of debate was passed by both on April thirtieth.⁷⁵ Cameron voted against the English Compromise, declaring:

I disapprove of the proposition now before the Senate, much more than I did the original attempt to force on the people of Kansas a constitution which they were unwilling to take. The original bill was a plain proposition, for which men might have voted honestly, without subjecting their motives to censure. This I look upon as a very different affair. This, to my mind, is a trick to impose upon weak men, or to enable corrupt men to make the impression upon their constituents at home that they have been acting honestly.⁷⁶

A. H. Reeder of Pennsylvania, who for a time had been Governor of Kansas Territory, wrote to Cameron that he considered the Administration stupid to pass the English Bill. He believed the Administration's eyes would soon be opened to the fact that it would have been better to have permitted the matter to fall

between the Houses, or even to have carried the Lecompton Constitution pure and simple.⁷⁷ Administration newspapers blazoned the English Compromise as a victory for the President, but when a vote was taken in Kansas on August second, in accordance with the act, eleven thousand three hundred votes were cast against the land proposal of the compromise measure, and less than eighteen hundred for it. Not one of the twenty-eight counties of Kansas gave a majority for the Lecompton Constitution.⁷⁸ It was thus effectively determined that slavery would not exist in Kansas. The Lecompton fight left a breach in the Democratic Party that was fraught with dire consequences in succeeding state and national elections.

If Cameron was but a lukewarm Republican at the time of his election, with no genuine attachment to the principles of the party, as many members of the Republican caucus of January, 1837, believed, his loyalty was strengthened by his experiences in the early months of the next session of Congress. He wrote to a friend in Harrisburg in March, 1858, that the Republican Party was strong in its principles, but misrepresentation of its nature and purposes in the North had lost it much support in that section. Again by misrepresentation the whole South had been arrayed against it, but "three million white non-slaveholders of the South must be taught by our moderation and firmness that we are battling for their rights." He expected to see the Union saved by the Republican Party:

All men all over the Union who live by the labor of their heads or their hands, and who wish to make labor respectable and respected, and who believe that all men are entitled to such stations as their worth and their capacity enables [sic] them to reach will join it.

He declared his belief that no earthly power could prevent this

party from controlling the government after 1860.79

To the same friend, Senator Cameron set forth his attitude towards slavery. He abhorred the institution in every shape, but was not willing to enter upon a crusade to liberate the slaves where they existed under constitutional right. They must not be interfered with there. It would be sufficient for him if he could aid in keeping the blighting influence of slavery from land still free and prevent its toleration in his own state. On this ques-

tion, as on others before Congress in the four years prior to the war between the states, Cameron must be ranked as a conservative Republican. He saw that radical Republican policies would increase and perpetuate sectional strife. He wanted peace between the sections and labored towards concilation.

Difficulties had arisen with the Mormons in the Territory of Utah. The Administration sought authority to raise additional military forces for the purpose of quelling the disturbances. When measures to provide for the organization of volunteer regiments for that object came before the Senate a lengthy debate ensued. The Republicans, generally, raised strong objection to the bill from the fear that the President would employ the army improperly in Kansas in order to carry his policies there. Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire declared that because he was personally in favor of civilization, law, and liberty regulated by law, and apprehensive as to the way these troops might be used, he was "against strengthening the hand of this Executive."

Distrust of the President was shared by most of the Republicans in the Senate. Cameron, however, declared that "when the country is engaged in war I cannot refuse to allow the Administration to have such troops as they think necessary to protect the honor and the interests of the country." In the course of the debates on this measure Cameron declared that he favored the increase as a temporary measure, but that nothing could induce him to add to the permanent standing army of the country. The Army Bill passed forty-one to thirteen. Every "American" voted for the bill as did also the Democrats. Cameron was one of four Republicans who supported it. The others were Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, William H. Seward of New York, and James Harlan of Iowa. The negative vote was entirely Republican. 83

The lowering of the Tariff in 1857 to a level twenty per cent below that of the Walker Tariff of a decade earlier was disheartening to the coal and iron interests of Pennsylvania, but the depression which began with the panic of 1857 was disastrous to these industries. From early manhood, Cameron had been a strong advocate of the interests of working-men. He believed the tariff argument that their welfare could be best preserved

through generous protection of American industry by governmental legislation. American labor, he held, should be protected from competition with the pauper labor of the European countries. This was theory, of course, and it was often hard to prove that tariff rates affected the wages of laborers in protected industries.

As during his first term in the Senate, Cameron's daily correspondence was heavy with letters and petitions from iron-masters, coal operators, and laborers in these industries, imploring favorable action of Congress. He These petitions he presented in great numbers to the Senate, and had them referred to the Committee on Finance. To many of his correspondents he wrote personal letters on the subject. To W. D. Lewis of Philadelphia he expressed his belief that there would be protection for coal and iron after 1860 and expectation that the 1858 October elections in Pennsylvania would have a great effect on Republican Party success in 1860. He

On the occasion of presenting to the Senate one such petition of laboring men engaged in the manufacture of iron in Pennsylvania, he made extended remarks on the subject. These were intended to enlighten the Senators and also to point out to the petitioners an available remedy to correct the situation. He pointed out that the laboring class seemed to think that the Congress of the United States could relieve them of all their troubles. There never had been a time, in the history of the iron business of Pennsylvania, when there was as much real distress among the laboring men. This petition was not a complaint on the part of capitalists. Men of capital and fortune could take care of themselves; labor, poverty, indigence and want always needed sympathy and protection. The laboring people in some of the counties of Pennsylvania, where iron and coal composed almost the sole industries, were entirely idle. These were the persons who complained and looked to Congress to relieve them. Cameron had told them that they had the power in their own hands:

The laboring men of this country are powerful for good always. They do control when they think proper, and I think the time is coming when they will control the politics of the country. I tell them that before they can get proper protection they must change the majority in this Senate,

they must change the majority in the other House of Congress, and above all they must change the occupant of the White House. . . . In place of gentlemen who sneer when we talk about protection, they must send men here who know something of the usefullness of the laboring man.

Hitherto they have not acted as if they cared for their own interests; while they talked about a tariff which would guard their labor from competition with the pauper labor of Europe they would go to the elections under some ward leader and vote for men to represent them here and elsewhere who cared only for party drill, and had no interests above party sucess. This system they must change if they hope for success. I think the laboring men of Pennsylvania, at least, are now beginning to put their shoulders to the wheel, and I believe they will make such a noise in next October, as will alarm the gentlemen all over the country who laugh at them. . . . I have said that these people have the power in their hands-I am speaking to them now-and I wish them to exercise the power they have. I cannot help them, much as I desire to do so, nor can any of their friends here; but when they go to work, as men determined to succeed should do, I have no doubt they will get protection. . . . Let them exercise the power wisely, and they will no longer be without plenty of work and good prices.86

CHAPTER IX

ORIGIN OF THE STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY

Senator Cameron took advantage of every opportunity to urge upon the people of Pennsylvania the necessity of an increase in the tariff rates as the surest means of guarding their industrial interests from the competition of the pauper labor of Europe. The Democratic Party had signally failed to give them the protection that they desired and deserved. It had promised relief but the trend of the tariff under Democratic administrations had been disastrously downward. He declared that before they could get proper protection the majority in each branch of Congress must be changed, also the occupant of the White House. He believed that the laboring men had it within their power to make these changes if they would go to the polls and vote for their own interests. The constant urging of such views as these began to show results before the midyear in 1858.

One Republican leader of Philadelphia wrote: "We are bestirring ourselves in the cause of protection." This writer was chairman of the recently organized Home Protective Union, which was designed to disseminate intelligence upon the workings of the protective, and of the free-trade, policies, and "to urge the people to adopt prompt measures to procure fostering and encouraging legislation." In the name of the committee on organization he extended to Cameron an invitation to visit Philadelphia and participate in a grand mass-meeting on or before June tenth. It was his hope that this demonstration would be followed by similar meetings in other parts of the Union.¹

Another Republican leader of Philadelphia, Henry C. Carey, wrote to Cameron inquiring how Seward stood on protection and declaring Pennsylvania's interest in having a protectionist for the next President. Cameron replied that no man in the Senate was more decidedly the friend of protection than was

Seward. Every Republican Senator knew that the tariff issue must play an important part in the election of 1860. He agreed with Carey that Pennsylvania must support no man for the presidency who was not "known, open and decided for protection." He hoped Carey would see that from Philadelphia and Schuylkill there should be congressmen elected in the October election who would not falter when they came to Washington. He declared Pennsylvania had her destinies in her own hands. She could make Presidents, and if she would make a good one next time she could have her interests protected—but not otherwise.²

Senator Cameron accepted the invitation to attend the massmeeting sponsored by the Home Protective Union. It was held on Tuesday evening, June fifteenth. It was largely attended and was an exceedingly enthusiastic tariff meeting. Henry C. Carey presided and Cameron was one of the principal speakers.³ Gatherings such as this were laying the groundwork for the Republican nominations for state and federal offices. The Republicans were very late in holding conventions and making nominations this year. They were capitalizing on the anti-Administration sentiment generated by the Kansas policy and were whipping up a demand for protection which Democratic policy opposed.

The Buchananites, in a stormy session of the Democratic States Central Committee in January, had succeeded in postponing the state convention to March fourth. It assembled on the designated day in the chamber of the house of representatives. It was as unharmonious as the committee meeting had been. The Democrats were sharply divided between Buchananites and anti-Lecomptonites, with the latter in the minority. John L. Dawson, an Administration man, was chosen president of the convention, and made a lengthy speech defending the Lecompton Constitution. The minority complained of the gag tactics employed against them in the appointment of committees and finally obtained some representation. The resolutions committee presented a very long report fully sustaining the Lecompton Constitution and President Buchanan. The minorty report, presented by William A. Stokes of Westmoreland, declared acceptance of the Lecompton Constitution would be congressional usurpation, and that members of Congress voting

for the Lecompton Constitution would be guilty of moral treason. This report offered as an amendment to the majority report, was voted down by a five-to-one vote, after which the Anti-Lecomptonites refused to vote on the resolutions, permitting them to carry almost unanimously.4 On the night of the second day the convention succeeded in accomplishing the object for which it was called in the nominations of William A. Porter as candidate for judge of the supreme court, and Wesley Frost as candidate for canal commissioner.⁵

Andrew H. Reeder wrote numerous letters to Cameron during the first half of the year concerning party tactics. These letters show considerable reliance on Cameron for names of persons to be put on the state committee. There was some talk among Republicans about selecting some of their candidates from the anti-Lecompton Democrats, in the hope that they would thus effect a political organization in the state, and capitalize on the Democratic defection. Cameron wrote to Reeder on the expediency of this move. Reeder reflected on this but believed the few votes thus to be gained would be at too great a sacrifice of their own party through the dissatisfaction it might cause, declaring: "If they want the candidate they should give us a fair consideration well understood in advance."

Cameron was a more astute politician than Reeder and was able to see the advantages of courting the dissatisfied elements among the Democrats and turning their influence to the benefit of his own party. He continued working with the idea. Dislodged Democrats had carried him to the senatorship twice; why couldn't such Democrats be used to carry his party to success in October? Soon some of the anti-Lecompton Democrats were seeking his advice. Late in May John W. Forney consulted with him on the possibility of the Republicans' and anti-Administration Democrats' reaching a working agreement on a candidate for judge in the coming election.7 A considerable block of Democrats heartily resented the way they had been treated by the Buchananites in the state convention and were ready to take revenge.

Another friend of Cameron, who had been a staunch advocate of pure "Americanism," wrote from Easton that he believed "all signs around here point to complete union of the elements of the opposition to the present administration"; he would now work "for strong and complete union for purposes of routing a rotten party." He was in a great stronghold of the Democrats, and the "American" newspaper would work towards bringing about as thorough a union as possible against them. He believed that Buchanan had fallen into the hands of weak advocates in the persons of J. Glancy Jones of the House and William Bigler of the Senate, and thought the effects of the English Compromise "fraud" would soon react unfavorably to those who advocated it both in Pennsylvania and in the national administration.⁸

A call was issued for a Union State Convention to meet in Harrisburg in July. Most of the delegates had arrived by the evening of the thirteenth and held an informal meeting at Coverly's Hotel, with David Taggart in the chair. The attendance was large. The next day the convention assembled in the hall of the house of representatives. Judge William Jessup served as temporary chairman until A. H. Reeder was made permanent president. On taking the chair, Reeder made a brief address in which he referred to the peculiar condition of public affairs of the country, the desertion by the national administration of the cardinal doctrines of democracy; and urged unity, concord, and harmony on the Union Party. John M. Read of Philadelphia was nominated for judge of the supreme court on the tenth ballot. William E. Frazer of Fayette was nominated for canal commissioner.9 The evidence of appeal to anti-Administration Democrats was witnessed in the nomination of Read. He was an old Democrat who now found Democratic policies no longer acceptable and had refused to support Buchanan in 1856. Shortly after this convention the National Era declared it had cheering accounts of the anti-Buchanan union in Pennsylvania for state and congressional elections in the fall, and reported that the movement seemed to be thorough, enthusiastic and hopeful.10

Cameron contributed much of his time, energy, and money to the object of defeating the Buchanan administration in the October election in Pennsylvania. His desire was to obtain as complete a repudiation as possible in both state and congressional elections. He wrote innumerable letters of encouragement to

leaders and friends throughout the state urging sustained efforts and the obtaining of "rousing" majorities. He himself addressed

a number of meetings during these months.

The result of the October election was one of the greatest reversals ever experienced by political parties in Pennsylvania to that time, though the Democrats were not the victims of so huge an avalanche of adverse votes as claimed by early reports of opposition newspapers. Read won over his Democratic opponent by a majority of nearly twenty-seven thousand and Frazer over Frost by almost the same figure. The Democrats succeeded in retaining control of the senate by only one vote but in the house their number dropped from sixty-eight to thirty-two. In the preceding legislature the Democrats had eighty-nine of the one hundred thirty-three seats in the two branches; in the next they would have only forty-nine. Buchanan had carried the state in 1856 by about one thousand majority while Read of the opposition now carried the state (two years later) by almost twenty-seven thousand.

Cameron had appealed for the election of Republicans to Congress and the result here was more striking than that shown in elections to the state legislature. The 1856 election gave Pennsylvania fifteen Democrats to ten Republicans in the national House. The 1858 election left Pennsylvania with only five Democrats, two of whom were anti-Lecompton, but twenty Republicans. In the thirty-fifth Congress there were ninety-two House Republicans, but in the thirty-sixth there would be one hundred nine, a gain of seventeen.¹³ Thus Pennsylvania accounted for more than half of the gain of the Republicans in

the House of Representatives.

When sufficient returns had been made to indicate overwhelming defeat of the Administration, the New York *Times* pointed out two things of significance in the Pennsylvania vote: first, that it was a condemnation of Buchanan's Kansas policy a repudiation of Lecomptonism; and second, that it was a demand for protection of its industries, which Democratic candidates had ever and again promised, but never granted.¹⁴

The Times Washington correspondent stated that the election returns from Pennsylvania startled the President, who admitted that he had been misled as to the popularity of his Ad-

ministration in the Keystone State.¹⁵ This statement of the President was evidently for public consumption for it certainly was not a full expression of his honest convictions. His private correspondence presents another picture. As early as July he looked forward with despair to the October election. "Things look rather 'blue' in Philadelphia. I entertain little hope of the election of William A. Porter, though I ardently desire it," he wrote to William B. Reed, whom he had recently appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China.¹⁶ Three days after the election he wrote to his niece, Miss Harriet Lane: "We have met the enemy and we are theirs. This I have anticipated for three months and was not taken by surprise ex-

cept as to the extent of our defeat."17

În the Pennsylvania election, Buchanan's greatest grief was over the defeat of J. Glancy Jones the Representative from the eighth congressional district. He was one of the President's chief lieutenants and confidants and also chairman of the important Committee on Ways and Means. Because of his place in the Administration the contest of the opposition for his seat was particularly hard fought. He had won in 1856, for his fourth term, with a majority of more than six thousand, but was defeated by nineteen votes in 1858. His successful opponent was John Schwartz, an anti-Lecompton Democrat. 18 In the abovementioned letter to Miss Lane, Buchanan expressed his deep regret at the defeat of "poor" Jones, and added: "With the blessing of Providence I shall endeavor to raise him up and place him in some position where they cannot reach him." A few days later Jones was offered the post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Austria, which he accepted. He resigned his congressional post to go immediately to his new position. The Evening Bulletin referred to President Buchanan's offer of this place to Jones as a consolation for the loss of the confidence of the Berks County Democracy.¹⁹

Francis P. Blair was in Philadelphia on the day of the election. After returning to his home at Silver Springs, Maryland, he wrote to Cameron congratulating him on the Republican success in Pennsylvania. He reported the importation, or colonization, of seventeen hundred workers in the navy yard for the purpose of voting them for the Administration candidate,

Thomas B. Florence. Blair understood Florence's election was to be contested. He hoped it would be, as this would bring the matter before the representatives of the whole people and would "expose this shocking outrage to the principles of free suffrage in such form as to arouse the public indignation" and might succeed in arresting "this meddling of the Executive with the function of the people."²⁰

Many letters to Cameron during the months of the campaign spoke in very unfavorable terms of the parts that Buchanan and Senator Bigler were playing with reference to the interests of Pennsylvania. The writers showed their opposition to the use of executive pressure to control Pennsylvania elections, and to

the attitude of both on tariff policy.21

A lull usually follows a tempest, and so the political world subsided into an unwonted calm for a period after the fall elections of 1858. Democrats and Republicans²² were both trying to capitalize on what consolation the result might be made to yield. The victors quite naturally were exultant over their sweeping victories. The Pennsylvania Republicans felt sure that they would control the state after 1860. The greatest cloud on the political horizon of the Republicans was the triumph of Douglas in Illinois, in his contest with Lincoln for the senatorship. The unpleasant suspicion developed that, having become a powerful and popular foe of Buchanan, he might spoil their chances for national success in 1860. During succeeding months there was much newspaper speculation on Douglas' becoming the leader of a reorganized Democratic Party, or even the candidate of the Republican Party. To many Republicans popular sovereignty had come to look like a safe principle.

Hannibal Hamlin of Maine was quite enthusiastic about the results in Pennsylvania and the prospects for 1860. He congratulated Cameron on the Republican victory in the Keystone State and added: "You have settled the contest of 1860. We

will then take the Government into our hands."23

Seward was generally conceded leadership among the Republicans. He had receded greatly from his seeming radicalism of 1850 and was the most talked-of Republican candidate for 1860. The contests of 1858 had brought others into prominence and they too received some attention from local conventions and

the press. Cameron naturally shared in this attention, because of the importance of Pennsylvania. Early in the contest, in June of 1858, C. Dawson Coleman wrote: "I see the New York Herald has come out for Simon Cameron for President."²⁴ An admirer in New York wrote in October: "The time has in my opinion arrived when your name should be posted for President."²⁵

The political revolution in Pennsylvania gave the Republicans more than a two-to-one advantage over their opponents in the house of representatives. Naturally there were several deserving Republicans of ability who aspired to the honor of election to the speakership. One such candidate was Alexander K. McClure. Cameron and McClure had differed on many political questions in Pennsylvania in the past and certainly were never on very cordial terms. That Cameron would throw his influence to anyone who could defeat McClure, the latter had heard from some of Cameron's friends. He wrote to Cameron expressing hope that this was not true. He had considered him since 1856 as of his own party and stated that in the past he had not worked against him. He requested of Cameron a candid reply.²⁶ The writer does not have a copy of the reply, but does have Mc-Clure's answer in which he stated that the position indicated by Cameron in his letter of October thirtieth was fully satisfactory. McClure declared that he was unwilling to regard him as pursuing a course of decided hostility to him (McClure) without affording him an opportunity to be heard, and suggested they let the matter pass.27

When the legislature assembled in January, McClure and William C. Lawrence were the leading Republican candidates for the speakership. In the party caucus, on the eve of organization of the legislature, Lawrence was elected as the Republican nominee. On the following day his election over the Democratic nominee was little more than a matter of form. Writing about this incident more than a generation later, McClure declared that until a week before the assembling of the legislature his election as speaker was discussed in the public press as assured without contest. It was then that Lawrence entered the field. On the afternoon of the caucus McClure was called to Omit's Hotel to meet General Cameron, who was going to Washington

that evening. They discussed the nomination and the matter of appointments to committees by the speaker. They differed radically on the matter of moral principles in relation to political activities and methods, as a consequence of which Cameron evidently was greatly displeased. McClure declared that Cameron then, instead of going to Washington, remained in Harrisburg, and threw himself vigorously into the contest. He directed a quiet but thorough canvass of the members with personal invitations to visit him and liberal promises of important positions on committees. He thus accomplished the defeat of McClure and the nomination of Lawrence.²⁹

The year 1859, though not a presidential-election year, was a period of much strife and turmoil in Pennsylvania, particularly among the Democrats. The March convention was controlled by Buchananites, to the exclusion of those opposed to the Administration, or out of favor with it. This led to revolt on their part.

Forney took the lead in the revolt. On March twenty-first the *Press* issued a call for another Democratic State Convention to meet in Harrisburg in mid-April. Among the purposes stated were: to consult on the propriety of adopting measures "to vindicate the name, fame, and principles of the Democratic party," which had been "outraged and insulted" by the convention at the state capital on the sixteenth of March; to resist the high-handed attempt of the federal administration to dictate political creeds to the people; to vindicate Governor Packer from the assault aimed at his administration; and to reassert the principles of popular sovereignty. This call was copied not only by papers in Pennsylvania but by papers in other states interested in the disruption of the Pennsylvania Democratic Party.³⁰

This Democratic State-Rights Convention assembled at the state capital on April thirteenth. It was attended by a large number of people, including many of the strongest men in the ranks of the Pennsylvania Democracy. Forney was appointed chairman of the committee on resolutions. John Hickman, anti-Lecompton Democrat and member of Congress from Philadelphia, delivered a speech of an hour's length which was a denunciation of President Buchanan and his policies. Strong resolutions were adopted emphatically repudiating the federal administration, declaring that it had departed so far from party

principles that no honest Democrat could support it. Other resolutions were adopted which strongly endorsed Governor Packer and Senator Douglas.31 The convention adjourned without nominating a ticket. At a meeting of the State Central Committee in Altoona, some three weeks later, under the chairmanship of Forney, it was decided inexpedient to nominate a state ticket.³² The Cincinnati Commercial concluded that this action probably would mean a union with other branches of the opposition in Pennsylvania.33 This, of course, was what Cameron and other Republican leaders in the state hoped for. They were ready and anxious to feed the flames of discord within Democratic ranks. The "Occasional" Washington correspondent of the Philadelphia Press reported that President Buchanan was greatly displeased by the action of these Democrats in convention at Harrisburg and that he would "pay liberally for scalps."34

Ohio and New York were both interested in Forney's place in Pennsylvania politics and wanted to see him brought into harmony with the opponents of the Administration. The Cincinnati Commercial proposed John Sherman of Ohio for Speaker of the next Congress and Forney for clerk of the House. The New York Herald noted that Forney's name for the clerkship seemed to turn up with every proposed Sewardite for the speakership. It believed, however, that Forney had no intention of seeking such a position. Seward and Cameron, it thought, had intended a more lucrative position for him, if they could perfect a coalition. They desired the printership of the House for the exclusive benefit of the Press, in order that, with a part of the profits resulting therefrom, talent might be purchased for the journal which might make it effective in Pennsylvania in the presidential campaign. It believed the plan was for Seward to control the Black Republicans, Cameron to operate upon the Know-Nothings, and Forney to take care of his own particular associates.35

As the months passed in 1859, the many conflicting ideas and aims among the more aggressive Republicans, the old Know-Nothings, and the anti-Lecompton Democrats were harmonized by postponing differences for future arbitrament and concentrating on the task of defeating the administration. The battle

was thus made hopeless for the Democrats. The party of opposition in Pennsylvania came to be known as the People's Party, a name which it bore for the next few years, when it became practically synonymous with the Republican Party. As a portent to the Democrats of what might happen in October the People's Party won a rather decisive victory in the municipal election in

Philadelphia on May third.³⁶

McClure, who had desired the speakership of the Pennsylvania house of representatives and had been defeated in the Republican caucus in January, in the summer of 1859 sought nomination for state senator. There was much hostile feeling against him in his own party. Dr. W. H. Boyle, one of his fellow townsmen, wrote to Cameron soliciting his aid and counsel. Boyle declared that a determined effort would be made to prevent McClure's nomination and if that failed then further effort would be made to defeat him at the election.³⁷ No evidence appears indicating Cameron's opposition to McClure's election. On the basis of past conduct and record, Cameron, with no particular reason to desire McClure's defeat, would endeavor to smooth out difficulties and bring about harmony, thereby strengthening the party and at the same time establishing friendly obligations to himself. The probability is that something of this sort was done, for in October McClure was elected with a creditable majority.

The opposition newspapers as usual harped upon presidential interference in Pennsylvania elections. Having lost his home state in the last election it was not surprising that Buchanan should have hoped for vindication in 1859, even though it was only a state election. "No one can mistake the object of President Buchanan's visit to Pennsylvania on the eve of the election, insinuated one journal when Buchanan briefly visited Pennsylvania in the early fall. It went further and suggested it was not improbable that he would be able to offer something more substantial than good advice to his friends. The President was known to regard with peculiar horror bribery or any other form of corruption, but he could see no harm in "strengthening the faint-hearted and confirming the doubting by the offer of sundry snug offices." The following week this newspaper printed evidence to support the charges of the earlier issue. 38 Probably

the real trouble, in the eyes of the opposition, was that the President had the opportunity to distribute offices while they had no such means of persuasion. Certainly evidence is abundant that, when they came to power, they were not afflicted

with moral scruples against the practice.

The Democrats of Pennsylvania suffered their second consecutive defeat in 1859. The People's Party carried the state offices by majorities of approximately eighteen thousand. They gained five more seats in the state senate, giving them twenty-one to the Democrats' twelve; and retained better than a two-to-one advantage in the house.³⁹ When it became evident that William B. Mann, the candidate for district attorney, was piling up a considerable majority, a spontaneous desire to celebrate the victory resulted in a torch-light procession to his home in Philadelphia. In this impromptu meeting enthusiasm was unbounded. Cameron, called upon for a speech, congratulated the friends of the district attorney on the victory they had achieved, and deemed the results throughout the state the precursor of a triumph in the presidential contest in 1860.⁴⁰

In a discussion of Republican successes in Pennsylvania one must not overlook the continuing service of Cameron in the United States Senate. During the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth Congresses there were certain policies for which he was everlastingly striving. The policy which he most persistently pursued throughout his whole senatorial career of four terms was that of seeking better conditions for Pennsylvania industry and labor. His panacea for their besetting ills was an increase in the rates of the tariff. He presented literally thousands of petitions, one hundred thirty-six on a single occasion, 41 from the citizens

of his state praying for protection.

He kept the people of Pennsylvania always alert to the necessity of doing something about the tariff. Soon after Congress convened in December of 1859, Cameron wrote to a Philadelphia friend, who was a business man and banker, that the Southerners used fright and intimidation of the weak and timid traders of the North in order to retain control of the Treasury. He felt confident the Northern men were getting tired of their continued attack and would now stand firm. For Pennsylvania to get protection for industry it would be necessary to change the

Administration and the principles which controlled the government. He believed that Pennsylvania had the power in her hands.⁴²

Cameron overlooked no opportunity to keep the tariff issue before the Senate. In a rather long debate on the Civil Appropriations Bill on March 2, 1859, an item to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to re-issue the \$20,000,000 of Treasury notes provided for by an earlier act gave Cameron an opening. He declared it to be, in his judgment, unwise to borrow money without providing the means for its payment. He could not vote for this bill. If it should be accompanied by a section providing for increased revenues he would vote for the bill. The government, he thought, should increase its income by a wise adjustment of the revenue system, rather than ask Congress to allow it to borrow more money. He criticized the attitude of the Southern leaders towards the tariff question and presented statistics to show that they bore considerably less than their proportional part of the tax burden. Seward, in an equally long speech, supported Cameron's contention, declared against borrowing and pointed to the increase of duties on foreign merchandise as the only way to restore the soundness and solvency of the Treasury. Senator Jefferson Davis replied for the South, defending its position and upholding the principle of freetrade.43

Again two weeks before the close of the first session of the thirty-sixth Congress, June fifteenth, Senator Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia, of the Committee on Finance, moved to postpone until December further consideration of the tariff. Senator Bigler, in a speech of more than two hours, came out strongly in opposition to postponement and argued for a change of mode of collection from ad valorem to specific duties. Cameron hailed Bigler's change of sentiment and supplemented his colleague's arguments with another hour's address. Despite their strenuous objections, in an evening session of the same day, in what Bigler described as a thin Senate, Hunter's motion for postponement was carried twenty-five to twenty-three, both Pennsylvania Senators voting in the negative. The tariff question was thus deferred until the next session. It was taken up again in December and finally, near the end of the session, a

tariff bill making some modifications favorable to Pennsylvania was passed. Cameron and Bigler both voted for the bill. Cameron spoke more than a score of times on the tariff issue during this short session.⁴⁵

Governmental waste drew shafts from Cameron many times during the sessions under consideration. He believed that business methods should be applied to government, and waste eliminated. The objects of his particular thrusts were the public printing of the Senate and the administration of the Post Office. Cameron declared that the cost of congressional printing had suddenly increased so much that it was a subject of serious interest to the whole country. He was a printer by trade and knew the business; he had also served on the Senate Committee on Printing from 1845 to 1849. He showed that the whole sum paid for paper, printing, and binding in 1847 was \$64,691.96. This was under the contract system, when the work was given to the lowest bidder. Some time later, at the instance of persons interested in higher prices, the system was changed. Cameron was chairman of the committee when the contract system was inaugurated; he recognized weaknesses, corrected many, and asked for more authority for the chairman, which was refused. He maintained that that system could easily have been carried out. Under the new system, having an appointee to direct the printing and scattering it about to favored individuals, excessive profits were being made. In contrast to the whole sum paid for paper, printing, and binding in 1847, the cost for these services from July 1, 1856, to March 4, 1857, had risen to \$1,258,210.42. He cited figures to prove that the actual cost for the work done was not more than twenty per cent of the price paid for the same. He took every opportunity to curtail the amount of unnecessary Senate printing.46

The Post Office system he once declared was wholly wrong. It encouraged party corruption, and would be better in private hands. He felt that there was a great amount of inexperience and irresponsibility which would not be tolerated in private enterprise. On another occasion in some wrath at the abuse of the franking system he declared that he favored its abolition entirely. On the presentation, by the Post Office officials, of a bill for services for folding of documents which had been sent out, he

protested that it was excessive. He had sent far more than some other members though the expense account against his name was less. He explained that he had paid the cost for someone to fold this material. He thought it was not a legitimate charge against the government since so much was sent for personal

gain.47

The national debt had been increased by fifty-seven millions of dollars in the first three years of the Buchanan administration. Cameron felt that this was because the expenditures of the government had been shamefully increased. This belief plus the failure to obtain tariff reform added to his bitterness towards the Administration. Nevertheless, he had no hesitancy in supporting governmental measures that involved vast sums if they were in line with his ideas of what was good for the country. He spoke frequently on the desirability of building a railroad from the Mississippi to the Pacific. He declared the project was too big for private enterprise alone and said he would vote for government aid.48 He urged government aid also in establishing telegraphic communication with Utah, in subsidizing the Collins Shipping Line for mail transportation to and from Europe, and in promoting many other such works for general improvement of the service to the public. In 1860 he urged congressional action to facilitate construction of more rail connections between northern and southern railroads; the lack of which, he argued, tended to isolate both sections.49

Cameron came from humble but industrious ancestry and this class of folk always received much attention from him. His influence on legislation was always exerted in behalf of obtaining higher wages and better living conditions for low-waged workmen and small-salaried office-holders, generally through increase of tariff rates. He favored the bill to provide homesteads for actual settlers before Congress in 1860. He voted for the Senate Homestead Bill which passed that body forty-four to eight on May 10, 1860. This bill passed the House of Representatives with amendments, which the Senate was unwilling to accept. After the appointment of two conference committees (Cameron and Andrew Johnson served as managers on the part of the Senate, on the second committee) the bill was finally approved by both Houses, only to be vetoed by the President. 52

Free homesteads had to wait until the next Congress, when under a new administration a similar measure became a law.

Successes scored against the Administration continued to bolster Republican confidence of their success in 1860. Preston King of New York declared after the close of the final session of the thirty-fifth Congress that its actions had increased the confidence of Republicans in themselves, in their principles, and in the consistency and strength of their organization; and that the courage of the Democrats was weakening. He felt that there was very strong confidence in the success of the Republican Party in 1860 and that there was no sign that this confidence would produce any such rivalry for the nomination as would prevent hearty unanimity at the election. He noted a general expectancy that Seward would be the candidate; certainly he was the first choice of New York. He also noted that Cameron, who was understood to favor Seward, might be in the field as Pennsylvania's candidate. In addition he mentioned Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio and Edwards Bates of Missouri. 53

Cameron's name continued to be mentioned for the presidency. Ex-senator James Cooper of Pennsylvania, in an interview in Washington on August ninth, said that he thought Cameron could carry Pennsylvania, if nominated. The People's county conventions in some areas of Pennsylvania passed resolutions supporting him.54 Reeder wrote from Allentown pledging friendship in the coming political struggle of 1860.55 From beyond the state came the report that several newspapers in Ohio had endorsed the candidacy of Cameron.⁵⁶ Joseph H. Barrett, editor of the Cincinnati Gazette, a leading Republican journal of the West, wrote to Cameron that, considering his place in the 1860 canvass, he desired to be authoritatively advised on certain points as to Cameron's position. The General turned the letter over to Joseph Casey, editor of the Harrisburg Telegraph, who was warmly devoted to his interests. Casey outlined, in a letter to Barrett, Cameron's position on the issues inquired about.57 Lincoln of Illinois very diplomatically refused to commit himself to Cameron, with a statement which at the same time gave a hint of his own candidacy: "For my single self, I have enlisted for the permanent success of the Republican cause; and for this object I shall labor faithfully in the ranks,

unless, as I think not probable, the judgment of the party shall

assign me a different position."58

In 1859 the opposition won its second consecutive victory over the Democrats of Pennsylvania. This was sufficient notice that the state was debatable ground for the great battle of 1860, and the chances were largely in favor of another victory for the People's Party. The opposition was so earnest in forcing the unity of political action of the various elements, which were not in hearty sympathy with each other, that its leaders were compelled to submerge individual ambitions in favor of success for the whole. As soon as the victory of the People's Party in 1859 became apparent, then a host of candidates were sprung upon the party for the offices of governor of Pennsylvania and United States Senator. There would be no senatorial vacancy, of course, until 1861, when Bigler's term would end.

The People's Party State Convention was held in Harrisburg during the last week in February. By that time three persons, Andrew Gregg Curtin, John Covode, and David Taggart, had acquired leadership as candidates for the nomination for governor. Curtin received the nomination on the third ballot.⁵⁹ The Democrats assembled in convention a week later in Reading. Henry D. Foster, one of six candidates, was nominated by acclamation after three ballots had failed to make a choice.⁶⁰

The Pennsylvania state political canvass was made more complex in 1860 by the national election of the same year. This was evident even in the People's convention in Harrisburg. There was great hostility between Curtin and Cameron. Curtin had sufficient votes pledged before the convention met to insure his nomination. Cameron, who favored Covode, busied himself and won over several Curtin men. When the convention met, securing Cameron's nomination for the presidency was pressed as the first duty of the body, and a resolution for that purpose was offered. This resolution caused an excited discussion but it was carried at the evening session by a vote of eighty-nine to thirty-nine. This order of procedure on the part of the Cameron men was foreshadowed in a letter of Henry K. Strong to Henry C. Carey a month earlier. 61 The question then arose as to how the district delegates should be chosen. M. B. Lowry moved their choice by the respective districts rather than by the convention. This, it was believed, would weaken Cameron. The meeting adjourned before action was taken on the motion.

Cameron needed Curtin support and Curtin needed Cameron support, and for the party's interests a rift must be prevented. A large portion of that night was occupied in the working out of a compromise whereby Cameron would release those men whom he had won from the Curtin ranks and Lowry's motion would be modified to authorize the delegates in the convention from any congressional district to decide for themselves whether they would name persons to be chosen as delegates by the convention, or whether they would refer the choice to the people. Under this arrangement, Judge James T. Hale offered a substitute motion the next morning with the added provision that such delegates be instructed to vote as a unit for Cameron for the presidency so long as his name should remain before the national convention.⁶²

Cameron had some very faithful friends at Harrisburg, as well as some very determined opponents. McClure of the latter group, was selected as chairman of the People's State Central Committee. He discovered that the personnel of the committee contained a majority of Cameron members. McClure charges that they planned at the first meeting of the committee "to assert their omnipotence by appointing an executive committee from the State committee to be practically charged with the control of the campaign, . . . leaving me merely an ornamental chairman." McClure describes with great glee how he and the friends of Curtin tricked the Cameron men so that many were absent from the first committee meeting. He recounts that the carefully laid plans of the Cameron men would have succeeded had not their plan miscarried by a roystering frolic at Cresson's where the committee met, that was as carefully planned as were designs of the Cameron people.

Every friend of Curtin was there, and every one of the opposition was present also the evening before the committee was to meet, the hour being ten o'clock on the following morning. Every Curtin man had been sworn to keep sober, but to join in the general frolic that night at Dr. Jackson's old hospital building, a little distance from the hotel. The programme was carried out with great precision, many of the Curtin men joined in the frolic, and the place overflowed with wine, with a

dozen card tables adding to the interest and entertainment. The result was that just about daylight they broke up to go to bed, but the Curtin men slept in their boots, and at ten o'clock every one of them responded to the roll-call, while more than a score of the others were missing.⁶³

This meeting of only fifteen minutes' duration adjourned to meet at the call of the chairman, and though many very earnest appeals were made by some members of the committee to call another meeting, "it never occurred to the chairman that another meeting of the committee was necessary." It would be no exaggeration to say that McClure's support and advocacy of Cameron's interests were less than half-hearted.

The correspondence of McClure and Curtin with Cameron indicates that they were striving towards harmony of the party throughout the state and within the committee. McClure even expressed the hope that the Chicago Convention would be able to see that Cameron was the only Republican who could carry the Keystone State. Nevertheless, there was a long controversy concerning appointment of certain persons to the state committee who were unfavorable to Cameron and who were eventually appointed over his protests. Russell Errett of Pittsburgh wrote to Cameron after visiting Philadelphia that things were considerably out of sorts. He blamed McClure for the political dissension within the ranks and feared loss of support to other tickets. A "Republican Club" was established in Philadelphia to assist in the state and national campaigns and at its solicitation was aided by Cameron with its organization. This club was in no way connected with the People's State Central Committee, and McClure feared it was a movement aimed at supplanting his committee. After protracted correspondence between Curtin, Cameron, and McClure, the matter of Cameron's connections with the club was seemingly cleared up to McClure's satisfaction.64

CHAPTER X

THE CHICAGO CONVENTION

The Republican National Committee met at the Astor House in New York on December 22, 1859. It considered matters pertaining to party welfare and issued a call for a national convention to meet in Chicago in June of 1860. The leading Republican journals were soon urging that it be held early in May. They argued that the meeting should precede any third party nominations, and carry out a program that would secure a united North. Yielding to these demands, the

date was shifted to May sixteenth.

Long before 1860 there were several candidates in the field. Seward of New York had been one of the leaders of the party since its organization, and for two years was being groomed by Thurlow Weed for the presidential nomination in 1860. There were many favorite sons: Cameron of Pennsylvania, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, Edwards Bates of Missouri, William L. Dayton of New Jersey, John McLean of Ohio, and others who were not expected to draw many votes beyond those of their own states. Abraham Lincoln of Illinois, since 1858, was quietly being pushed in the West by Norman B. Judd and other western champions, but was not widely known in the East before his Cooper Union address in New York City at the end of February, 1860. This address was followed by a number of speeches in New England.

As early as 1855 General William Larimer, Jr., suggested that Cameron could carry Pennsylvania for the presidential nomination.² It has already been noted that Cameron's name was suggested by various individuals and newspapers after he returned to the United States Senate. By 1859 organization was taking shape among his followers to push him as Pennsylvania's candidate. Many individuals outside the state, from Wisconsin, Illinois, Massachusetts, Iowa, and Ohio, wrote encouraging let-

ters. Beyond the state boundaries such papers as the New York *Herald* and the Cincinnati *Gazette*, looked with favor upon Cameron.³

Apparently Lincoln and Cameron had not met before 1860, though Lincoln was a member of the House of Representatives from 1847 to 1849, at which time Cameron was in the Senate. On learning that Lincoln was in Philadelphia on February twenty-fifth, Cameron and Wilmot invited him to call on them at their hotel, The Girard. He wrote the next day from New York that he did not receive their message until just as he was leaving the city. He had barely time to step over to The Girard only to learn that Cameron and Wilmot were not in their rooms. He regretted having missed them and hoped for another

early opportunity to meet them.4

Cameron's organization was perfected to the extent that little difficulty was encounted in obtaining a resolution favoring his nomination by the People's Party State Convention at Harrisburg in February.⁵ His political friends took time by the forelock and within a week after his nomination issued a brief brochure, rehearsing the Senator's career, private and political. It demonstrated his strong hold upon the great masses of the people, and set forth the manifold reasons that existed for regarding him as the only man who could carry Pennsylvania against the candidate of "the miscalled Democracy." The brochure concluded with the hope that "The omnipotent voice of the people will be heard responsive to the nomination of Pennsylvania's choice."

As the Cameron organization began to assume a place of leadership in Pennsylvania politics, particularly during this period just before the Chicago Convention, a great many persons wrote seeking funds with which to buy or start newspapers—presumably in his support. On the back of one such letter Cameron wrote: "How strange it is that so many men are governed by a belief that I am willing to buy them."

In December of 1859, when it had become evident that Cameron would receive the endorsement of Pennsylvania, Russell Errett, a co-publisher of the Pittsburgh *Gazette* and a Cameron worker, drew up a letter setting forth the merits of General Cameron and urging support for his nomination at the coming

national convention. He wrote to Cameron, enclosing a draft of this letter, stating his purpose to circularize the delegates of the various states to the Chicago Convention. Before the convention met, Errett had received a number of replies to his circular, a few of which he sent to Cameron. In his accompanying letter, he called Cameron's attention to the fact that, while the answers were in many cases favorable, the writers

very carefully abstained from pledges of support.9

Cameron had the backing of such Pennsylvania papers as the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, the Pittsburgh Gazette, and the Pennsylvania Telegraph at the state capital, along with a great many smaller papers scattered over the state. There were many independent papers that looked favorably upon his candidacy and an occasional Democratic paper that supported him. Of course, there were also several that opposed him. Some of these were persuaded to cease their attacks even though they would not swing to his support. R. P. King wrote that sometime before the Chicago Convention the Philadelphia Daily News was in the habit of attacking Cameron with slurs and innuendoes. King called upon one of the editors, I. R. Flanigan, and was successful in prevailing upon him to desist.¹⁰

David Wilmot wrote to Joseph Casey, editor of the *Pennsylvania Telegraph*, that he believed with Casey that by a prudent and firm course on the part of the Pennsylvania delegation they might be able to nominate General Cameron, and if he were nominated there would be no doubt of his success. ¹¹ Unfortunately for Cameron, only a part of the delegation was enthusiastically for him. Some preferred McLean, and others Bates, ¹² but all were pledged to the Senator by the Harrisburg

Convention compromise.

Cameron was never as optimistic concerning his nomination as were his friends. He confessed, soon after the Pennsylvania convention, that he had no expectation of being nominated at Chicago. Ten days before the convention, "Occasional," a Washington correspondent of the Chicago Herald, reported that Cameron asserted that "he does not entertain any anxiety about his own success, and is content provided no personal enemy should be nominated over his head." The writer felt that if Cameron could himself go to the field of contest and

manage his own case it would probably be better for his fortunes; as it was, his responsibilities in the Senate would keep him

in Washington.14

Again, in a public address in Harrisburg a week after the Chicago Convention, Cameron expressed himself as having no feelings of personal disappointment at the results in Chicago. 15 He was interested in a demonstration in his favor at Chicago. The greater the demonstration for him the greater would be the prestige and honor for him. He therefore directed his energies, and those of his friends, towards making a good showing in the national convention.

Much was made of the necessity for nominating a candidate acceptable to Pennsylvania for it was felt that the Republicans must carry that state to succeed in 1860. The Cincinnati Gazette pointed out in February that General Cameron had an advantage, on account of his popularity in his home state and the necessity of carrying it. However, the belief was expressed that, with the combined influence now secured there against the Administration, Pennsylvania could be carried by any Republican candidate whose views were not ultra and whose record was not obnoxious. This being the case, and in view of the strong claims of the West and the necessity for weakening Douglas, the Gazette raised the question of the desirability of giving pref-

erence at Chicago to a western Republican.16

Joseph Casey and party left Harrisburg for Chicago on May seventh, to be on hand early in order to confer and mingle with delegates from other states as they arrived, and to circularize them with Cameron material.¹⁷ By the tenth of May, there were more than half a dozen active Cameron men in Chicago, most of them members of the Pennsylvania delegation to the convention. In addition to these there were Illinois friends of Cameron active in his behalf.18 From the Briggs House, Chicago, Casey wrote on the tenth: "We have determined that when Curtin comes we will put the matter squarely to him and his friends, McClure, Mann, Finney, etc.—they must either stand up with us for your nomination honestly and fairly, or take Seward." Casey believed that Cameron could win but doubted if Seward could, and declared that if the party should be willing to pass over Seward and take a man for expediency, principally for the sake of carrying Pennsylvania, they must take Pennsylvania's choice.¹⁹

The correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial declared on the eleventh, that many delegates to the convention had already arrived. The active friends of Bates, Cameron and others were in Chicago, but there were as yet no Seward leaders on the ground. The same writer noted a few days later that Lincoln stock was rising fast and that the New England delegates were rapidly leaving Seward, while some of Seward's friends were beginning to despair.20 Greeley sent a dispatch to the Tribune on the eleventh declaring that Cameron's friends from Pennsylvania were in Chicago in force and were very clamorous. On the sixteenth, Murat Halstead reported to the Cincinnati Commercial that Pennsylvanians were insisting strongly on Cameron as the only man who could carry the state with certainty. They were marching that night with music, rockets and Roman candles. He believed that next to Cameron they were for McLean and then for Lincoln.21

There were friends of Cameron who believed that there would be a strong swing towards him just as soon as his strength was demonstrated in the convention.²² Another friend noted that Cameron and Lincoln stock were rising. He believed that Cameron could succeed, beyond a doubt, if the Pennsylvania delegation would only stand firmly for him. He warned Cameron, however, that there were Judases in the camp, naming William B. Mann in particular and expressing fear that there were others like him.²³

The friends of Elihu B. Washburne kept up a very active correspondence with him during the four months prior to the Chicago Convention. The letters indicate that the writers were interested primarily in principles and chances of success rather than in men. Many were favorable to Seward but skeptical of his ability to win. Many others believed that Lincoln was the only candidate who could defeat Douglas if he should be the candidate of the Democratic Party.²⁴ Norman B. Judd of Chicago, chairman of the State Republican Committee, had been grooming Lincoln and working on detailed party organization in Illinois down into every precinct for almost two years.²⁵ It is

rather significant that Lincoln's name was rarely mentioned by

the Eastern press down to the eve of the convention.26

Cameron's personal choice for the nomination, excepting of course himself, was William H. Seward of New York, whom he recognized as the foremost man in the Republican Party. Another important factor was that the New Yorker held the same views on the tariff as did Cameron.²⁷ From the spring of 1859 Cameron lent his personal support to the candidacy of Seward. He remained steadfast in the face of objections of many of his friends, who strongly doubted the availability of Seward and the wisdom of nominating him.

On March twenty-first, a Philadelphia correspondent of the New York *Times* noted it was currently reported that Cameron was busily engaged in forwarding Seward's interests throughout the interior of the state and remarked that "the adroitness of General Cameron in managing the political wires is proverbial." This coupled with his astuteness among men and his devotion to his friends made Cameron a dangerous opponent.²⁸ Ten days after this was written, Seward was the guest of Cameron at his home in Harrisburg. Together they visited both houses of the legislature.²⁹ In reporting this Harrisburg trip to Thurlow Weed, who was his campaign manager, Seward wrote:

He took me to his house, told me all was right. He was for me, and Pennsylvania would be. It might happen that they would cast the first ballot for him, but he was not in, etc. He brought the whole legislature of both parties to see me, feasted them gloriously, and they were in the main so generous as to embarrass me.³⁰

Preston King thought Seward would be the nominee and believed that Seward himself was confident of it. He believed the Pennsylvania delegation would be chosen unitedly for Cameron and thought that when it became evident he could not get the nomination they would prefer Seward next.³¹ Pershine Smith noted that there was strong opposition to Seward in some quarters of his own state but believed it could be beaten down. He wrote also that Seward was confident of the support of Pennsylvania.³²

After the state convention at Harrisburg had pledged to support Cameron, he felt that he should be sent to Chicago. He

assured Seward that all of the delegates from Philadelphia but one were safe, and that he was quite anxious to meet Thurlow Weed soon. Seward desired very much that Weed should please Cameron. Seward would be delighted if Cameron would go to Chicago, and wanted Weed to see that no blame should fall on him (Seward) if Cameron were not able to go.³³

As the time for the convention drew nearer, more and more opposition to the nomination of Seward became evident. Wilmot wrote to Cameron, in March, that Seward seemed to be gaining and that his nomination would be pressed with zeal and energy. However, he could not feel that Seward was available and believed that Lincoln would make a much stronger candidate. A month later he expressed his belief that Seward could not be elected if nominated.34 During March, April and May, Lyman Trumbull received a large number of letters from constituents and friends in Illinois and Indiana expressing beliefs similar to those of Wilmot, and showing preference for almost any candidate in the field above Seward.35 John A Nichols, a Chicago friend of Cameron, informed him that the general impression in the West was that Seward and Cameron were working together and that the strength of both would be united and cast in the convention for the stronger of the two. He declared he could not believe this to be true, for Cameron must be aware that with Seward as the candidate it would be impossible for the Republicans to carry Illinois.³⁶

The impression gained by Nichols in the West was also current in Washington. "Occasional," a correspondent of the Chi-

cago Herald, wrote from there on May tenth:

The friends of Mr. Seward rely upon Senator Cameron to assist them in putting him in nomination at Chicago on Wednesday next. The latter has been for some time regarded as the principal engineer of the Seward movement outside New York and New England. There is a good deal of shrewdness in this movement of Senator Cameron. Confident that he will receive the unit vote of Pennsylvania himself, and sure that Governor Seward will have a large plurality on the first ballot, he is not without hope that if the favorite of New York shall fail, he may then receive the votes of his friends and become a compromise candidate. I do not think that General Cameron is entirely certain of the success of Mr. Seward, although he seems to have allowed it to be

generally understood that he prefers him to all other candidates, inasmuch as he regards him as the leader of the Republican organization.³⁷

A week before the convention Weed wrote that he would be unable to journey to Washington for a conference with Cameron before going to Chicago. He hoped that Cameron and Seward would put their heads together and let him know the results of their deliberations. He also hoped that Cameron would have a confidential friend in Chicago with whom he could communicate.³⁸

Chicago was crowded with visitors days before the convention opened, and throngs milled about the streets day and night during the three-day session. New York sent the largest number of any state save Illinois, but Pennsylvania was not far behind, the number of Pennsylvanians being estimated by Curtin at twelve hundred, and by others at as high as two thousand.³⁹ The Tremont Hotel, at the corner of Lake and Dearborn Streets, was the general exchange or headquarters where much of the caucusing was done. Thurlow Weed set up Seward headquarters at the Richmond House. The Pennsylvanians were declared to be the noisiest crowd there, but, for want of union,

impotent.

The Republicans had marked up numerous victories over the Democrats since 1856 both in state and national elections. From the Charleston disruption⁴⁰ they received new inspiration and impetus. Former possibility was suddenly changed to strong probability of success in the ensuing presidential election. The delegates were not only quickened with new zeal for their principles but also the growing chances of success spurred them to fresh efforts in behalf of their candidates. Those who had been prominently named represented various localities and were diverse in antecedents. Seward was a former Whig with strong antislavery views; Lincoln, a moderate antislavery Whig; Salmon P. Chase, an antislavery Democrat and one of the successful inspirers and promoters of the new party; Cameron, a former Democratic leader of an influential tariff state; Dayton, a Whig; and Bates, an antislavery Whig.

The movements against Seward developed with remarkable force during the week of the convention. Seward had been in

public life more than two decades during which time he had taken a strong position on many questions and had thus incurred violent opposition which could not now be readily overcome. An important element of the Republican Party in several states had been connected with the "American," or Know-Nothing, Party, and still cherished some of the principles of that party. Some years earlier Seward had been a determined foe of that party and it was now remembered against him. Although he was far more conservative in 1860 than in 1850, the conservative elements of the party tended to remember his radicalism of the earlier date.

Curtin and many of his friends earnestly opposed the nomination of Seward, declaring it would almost certainly result in a Democratic triumph in Pennsylvania in October, and thus also in November. Similarly, Henry S. Lane, the Republican candidate for governor of Indiana, believed that Seward's nomination would lead to a Democratic victory in his state. This opposition produced considerable impression upon Seward's friends in New England and diminished their zeal in his support. Many of the friends of Cameron declared that in no event would Pennsylvania cast her vote for Seward. A newspaper correspondent observed that some of Cameron's friends were still hopeful that he might receive the nomination, and declared that if the Pennsylvania delegation could be held as a unit in his support throughout all of the deliberations of the convention, he would certainly succeed in the end. The correspondent believed, however, that from what he had seen and heard, Cameron would not receive the vote of the whole state delegation even on the first ballot, and that probably it would eventually be given to Lincoln.41

Although the Pennsylvania delegation was sharply divided on its choice of a candidate, after the complimentary vote for Cameron, which was as far as many of the delegation expected to go for him, there was a general desire to avoid factional contests in the delegation because of its possible effect on the contest for governor. Repeated conferences of the delegation were held after its arrival in Chicago. After much maneuvering for advantage of position, and after it had become evident to many that Cameron had little chance of receiving the nomination,

the leaders of the factions agreed that the delegation should decide who among the available candidates should be preferred. The anti-Cameron men, in conference, had already decided to propose to the delegation Cameron as the first choice; Judge John McLean⁴² of Ohio, second; and Lincoln, third. Since McLean stood no more chance than Cameron, the third choice was the only one of moment. When the delegation met to decide this matter Cameron and McLean were made first and second choices, respectively, by common consent, but on the third choice the Cameron leaders urged the selection of Bates. By vote, Lincoln was declared the third choice of the Pennsylvania delegation over Bates by a majority of three.⁴³

Despite all the opposition to Seward from various quarters, it was the opinion of some of the newspaper men, at midnight after the second day, that the opposition could not concentrate on any candidate and that he would certainly be nominated. Greeley telegraphed that opinion to the *Tribune* and Halstead

telegraphed the same to the Cincinnati Commercial.44

The first and second days, Wednesday and Thursday, were taken up with organization, committee reports, and the adoption of a platform. David Wilmot was made temporary chairman, and George Ashmun of Massachusetts, permanent president of the convention. The platform enbodying the principles upon which the Republican Party would seek to win the support of the country in the coming election was adopted "amid a perfect furor of applause." It contained provision for protective tariff though the terms were perhaps not strong enough to suit some Pennsylvanians.⁴⁵ The convention adjourned until the next day.

The hours between adjournment on Thursday and assembly on Friday were among the most eventful in Republican Party history. In that period plans were laid which culminated in the

nomination of Lincoln.

A majority of delegates were favorable to the nomination of Seward until great doubt was raised as to his ability to carry New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana. The leaders felt that to be successful in November at least three of these four states must be carried. The concensus of opinion of the delegates from these doubtful states was that Seward could not

carry even one of them. The Indiana delegates were uninstructed. Illinois had instructed its delegates for Lincoln, New Jersey for Dayton, and Pennsylvania for Cameron. Eight months before the convention the Boston Daily Atlas had noted that these four states could not be considered sure for the Republican candidate in 1860 and declared: "We would be almost willing to let the delegates from those four states nominate the candidate." 47

On Tuesday, on the eve of the convention, a committee from the New England states, headed by John A. Andrew of Massachusetts, visited the delegates from the four doubtful states. It was declared to be the desire of all that the party rather than any particular individual should succeed. While the New Englanders were in favor of Seward, when it was made apparent to them that he could not carry the doubtful states and that some other man could, they were willing to give up Seward and go for the man who could make victory more certain. Andrew declared that unless the delegates from the four doubtful states could agree upon some one candidate, whom they thought could carry these states, then, "we from New England will vote for our choice William H. Seward of New York; but if you will unite upon some one candidate and present his name, we will give him enough votes to place him in nomination." 48

The delegates of the four doubtful states were much impressed with the necessity of uniting upon some one candidate. A subconvention of delegates of these four states met at the Cameron headquarters late Thursday morning, and organized with Andrew H. Reeder in the chair. There was much discussion but no agreement could be reached. Then Thomas Dudley of the New Jersey delegation proposed to Judd of Illinois that the matter should be referred to a committee of three from each state, to be selected by the delegates of the respective states. A motion to this effect was carried, and each state's delegation appointed its committee. The Illinois committee was headed by Judge David Davis; the Indiana committee by Caleb B. Smith; the Pennsylvania committee consisted of David Wilmot, William B. Mann, and Samuel A. Purviance; 49 and on New Jersey's

committee were Thomas H. Dudley, Frederick T. Freyling-

huysen, and Ephraim March.

This committee of twelve met, after the adjournment of the convention on Thursday afternoon, and was in session from six until eleven that evening. Nothing was accomplished until the last hour of their session when it was proposed to ascertain, as far as they could, the votes that each of their three candidates, Lincoln, Cameron, and Dayton, would be able to command in the convention. It was found that Lincoln was the strongest candidate. This fact being ascertained to the satisfaction of all the committee, a member from New Jersey asked the committee from Pennsylvania whether, if New Jersey would give up Dayton and vote for Lincoln, the friends of Cameron would also agree to give their support to Lincoln. The Pennsylvania committee stated that they had no power to bind their codelegates but they would recommend it to them, provided the committees from the other states would make similar recommendations to their delegates. After some discussion, this proposition was agreed to, and Abraham Lincoln, as far as this committee of twelve from these doubtful states was concerned, was agreed upon as the candidate for the presidency. Before the committee adjourned it was agreed to regard their proceedings as confidential except to those who were immediately interested. In consequence of this injunction, very little was known of their action when the delegates assembled in convention on Friday morning.50

After the committee adjourned Thursday night a meeting of the New Jersey delegates friendly to Dayton was called at the Richmond House at one o'clock. They were informed of what had been done by the committee and ratified the action agreeing to vote for Lincoln after a complimentary vote for Dayton.⁵¹ The Pennsylvania delegation did not meet until after the con-

vention had assembled and the balloting had begun.

In the meantime, after midnight of Thursday, David Davis and Leonard Swett went into conference with some of the Cameron men, J. P. Sanderson, Alexander Cummings and perhaps others, in an effort to obtain assurance from the Cameron men that they would support Lincoln. In this conference, it was apparently arranged that after a complimentary vote for

Cameron on the first ballot the Cameron support would be thrown to Lincoln. In return for this it seems to have been agreed by Lincoln's managers that, if he were elected, Cameron should be given a place in the Cabinet.⁵²

Swett, in an account of the negotiations between the Illinois

and the Pennsylvania leaders, said:

The Seward men were laboring with delegates from that State [Pennsylvania], and so were the friends of Mr. Lincoln, and both were hopeful; but in the small hours of Friday morning, in a room of the Tremont House, two of Mr. Lincoln's friends and two of Mr. Cameron's being present, our arguments prevailed, and the Cameron men agreed to come to us on the second ballot. This they did right nobly and gave us forty-eight votes.⁵⁸

Neither Cameron nor Lincoln was in Chicago during the meeting of the convention. Any bargain that was made was consummated by their friends without the direct knowledge of either, but was of distinct advantage to both. Without absolute proof the probabilities of the bargain are yet so strong as to be almost conclusive. Lincoln's friends acted in direct violation of his instruction not to bind him. Cameron's friends, knowing his preference for Seward but believing they foresaw the inability of Seward to command sufficient votes for the nomination, decided to use their vote in such a way as to gain advantage for their leader.

On Friday morning the cry of want of availability, which had been pressed with vigor for some days, took on a more definite form with reports that the Republican candidates for governor in some of the doubtful states were threatening to withdraw in the event of Seward's nomination. The Chicago *Press and Tribune* contained a last appeal to the convention not to nominate Seward.⁵⁴

When the convention was called to order, at ten o'clock, the Wigwam was crowded to capacity and tens of thousands were on the outside, all in a high state of excitement. Everybody within the building gave breathless attention to the proceedings. Soon attention was turned to the choosing of candidates, which was done merely by presenting the names without the nominating speeches so familiar in a later day. William M. Evarts of

New York nominated Seward; Norman B. Judd of Illinois, Lincoln; Thomas H. Dudley of New Jersey, Dayton; Andrew H. Reeder of Pennsylvania, Cameron; D. X. Cartter of Ohio, Chase; Francis (Frank) P. Blair, Jr., of Missouri, Bates. These nominations were in turn seconded by other supporters. The wild cheering, particularly for Seward and for Lincoln, was almost deafening. It was more intense for the latter, whose managers had succeeded, by a ruse, in getting a greater number of Lincoln followers into the hall. The tremendous applause for Seward and Lincoln seemed to indicate that the choice lay between them.

When the cheering at length subsided, the chairman announced that balloting would begin. The first ballot gave complimentary votes to the numerous favorite sons and showed a distinct popular preference for Seward and Lincoln. Seward received one hundred seventy-three and one-half votes; Lincoln, one hundred two; Cameron, fifty and one-half; Chase, forty-nine; and Bates, forty-eight; while forty-two were scattered. Cameron did not receive the united support of Pennsylvania, which cast fifty-four votes. Forty-seven and one-half votes came from Pennsylvania, one from Virginia, one from Iowa, and one from Nebraska. On the first ballot Pennsylvania gave Lincoln four votes, Seward one and one-half, and McLean one.

On the second roll call, Pennsylvania was not in readiness when the state was called as her delegates had retired for consultation. The frequent retirement of the Pennsylvania group for consultation became one of the jokes of the convention.⁵⁷ If Pennsylvania was to act with decision for Lincoln, now was the time to do so. Judge S. Newton Pettis, one of the strong supporters of Cameron, disregarding the previous action of the Pennsylvania caucus whereby McLean had been designated as the delegation's second choice, moved that on the second ballot the vote of Pennsylvania be cast solidly for Lincoln.⁵⁸ Not all were willing to go for Lincoln, but Pennsylvania's second ballot was cast forty-eight for Lincoln, two and one-half for Seward, two and one-half for McLean, and one for Cameron. The second roll call gave Seward one hundred eighty-four and one-half votes and Lincoln one hundred eighty-one. The whole

number of votes cast was four hundred sixty-five. The number necessary for a choice was two hundred thirty-three. Thus Seward was within forty-eight and one-half votes of the nomination. The break for Lincoln, however, told a story; Seward on the second ballot had gained but eleven votes while Lincoln

had gained seventy-nine.59

The third ballot showed more shifts to Lincoln, giving him two hundred thirty-one and one-half votes. Pennsylvania this time gave him fifty-two votes and McLean two. Seward's total dropped to one hundred eighty. Lincoln lacked but one and one-half votes of the number sufficient for nomination. Before the ballot was closed D. K. Cartter, chairman of the Ohio delegation, gained the attention of the presiding officer and then of everyone else. He announced the change of four of Ohio's votes from Chase to Lincoln. Many other changes were subsequently announced, until Lincoln had three hundred fifty-four votes. By this time bedlam had broken loose within the Wigwam and soon spread to the crowded streets without. When a measure of silence had been restored and the vote declared, Evarts, spokesman of the New York delegation, mounted the rostrum and moved that the nomination of Lincoln be made unanimous.60 This nomination was, as it has been declared, one of the very excellent examples of the triumph of availability and of party expediency over prominence and personal popularity.61

After the dinner recess, it required but a short session to select a candidate for vice president. Cassius M. Clay of Kentucky and Hannibal Hamlin of Maine were the most prominent contenders. Clay was perhaps more popular with the crowd, but Hamlin was more available from the viewpoint of geography and past political affiliations. Hamlin was nominated on the

second ballot62

On the day after the close of the Chicago Convention, the Philadelphia *Press* published a special dispatch from Washington stating that the Seward men there loudly intimated that Colonel Curtin and his friends had aided in giving the vote that put Lincoln on the track for the presidency.⁶³ There was no suggestion of blame placed upon the Cameron men for Seward's defeat.

Dr. John S. Bobbs, a member of the Indiana delegation and a

friend of Cameron, wrote that the latter had many friends in the Indiana delegation and blamed the defection within the Pennsylvania group for the failure of Indiana to show strength for Cameron. He declared that "we were as much mortified as astonished at the impromptu stampede of the Pennsylvania delegation from you to Mr. Lincoln." The *Press* correspondent in Chicago declared: "It was generally admitted that had Pennsylvania come out here with a candidate and steadfastly adhered to him, the nomination would have been yielded to her." 65

The Pennsylvania Telegraph carried the names of the candidates nominated at Chicago at its masthead on May twenty-first. The editor praised General Cameron as the first choice of the people of Pennsylvania and expressed the belief that he could have been nominated if the Pennsylvania delegation had presented a united front. He gave vent to a blast of wrath against certain Philadelphia politicians, whose path Cameron had crossed in his long political career, whom he charged with the use of foul and disreputable means to encompass the defeat of the choice of the People's Party of Pennsylvania. The editor further declared that Seward had many warm and sincere friends in the Pennsylvania delegation. Nevertheless it was conceded that he could not carry the state; consequently Lincoln was heartily supported by the friends of Cameron, and with their aid he received the nomination.⁶⁶

Ten days after the convention adjourned, Russell Errett wrote to Cameron from Pittsburgh. He too felt great resentment against William B. Mann and those under his influence whose work destroyed Cameron's chances from the start. He declared that some New York men blamed Cameron for Lincoln's nomination. Errett admitted that it was the work of the Pennsylvania delegation but not of Cameron's real friends. The men, he said, who represented Cameron, and had a right to speak for him, were opposed to it.⁶⁷ It seems from the accounts of Errett, Casey, and McClure, all of whom were at the Chicago Convention, that even the Cameron men were not always working in harmony.

Harrisburg was the scene of a great Republican political meeting on Friday night, May twenty-first. The Chicago Con-

vention had nominated candidates a week earlier and this was Pennsylvania's grand ratification meeting. Cameron came from Washington and was made chairman of the meeting. He delivered the principal speech of the evening. After some passing remarks on his own candidacy, he was reported to have asserted that:

He had hoped that the person fixed upon would be the favorite son of New York, who was an able and zealous advocate of all measures for the protection and encouragement of free white labor, while representing a State [New York] whose prosperity mainly depends upon the commerce of her metropolis, he had the foresight which enabled him to remember that the coal and iron of Pennsylvania and the agriculture products of the other States must be combined in order that their full effect and force might be brought to bear upon the great progressive interests of his own.

The first third of Cameron's address was devoted to flattering allusions to William H. Seward, and to explaining why he had favored Seward for the nomination. Although some had doubted his availability, Cameron never had. Following these complimentary remarks on Seward, he gave a most emphatic endorsement of the convention's choice of Lincoln and Hamlin. Whether or not it was a studied oversight, he failed to mention Andrew G. Curtin, Pennsylvania's candidate for governor. However, after more speeches, interspersed with music, resolutions were adopted for Lincoln, Hamlin, and Curtin.⁶⁸

McClure complimented Cameron's Harrisburg speech but felt that the Senator's partiality for Seward made him underestimate the Pennsylvania prejudice against that leader. McClure also thought that Cameron's political foes within the state ranks must be pretty thoroughly silenced "by the magnanimity and forbearance of your friends at Chicago, and the cordial manner in which they and you have led off in support of the ticket." Wilmot, later in the summer, endeavored to explain to Cameron how the feeling of the unavailability of Seward grew at the convention and expressed his belief that Cameron would have acted as the Pennsylvania delegation did if he had been present. Since it was the votes of Cameron's friends that nominated Lincoln, Wilmot felt that Lincoln would treat Cameron

and his friends well.⁷⁰ In a letter written to Trumbull soon after the nomination, Lincoln asked him to give his respects to the Republican Senators; "and especially to Mr. Hamlin, Mr. Seward, General Cameron, and Mr. Wade."⁷¹

CHAPTER XI

1860 ELECTIONS, SHORT SESSION, CABINET

The October contest in Pennsylvania was looked upon as the pivot of the November struggle. Republican politicians declared that Pennsylvania had been lost in 1856 only because the Democrats expended thousands of dollars more than the Republicans were able to raise. They were determined that this would not be the case in 1860. From the beginning of the campaign the Pennsylvania State Central Committee worked New York particularly, for funds, and did not return emptyhanded. J. P. Sanderson, one of Cameron's ardent supporters, became disgusted with the actions of some of those responsible for the campaign. On October first, he declared that McClure was in New York begging for money and others were soliciting by mail, adding: "I fear the whole crew are more active in getting money for themselves than they are in securing success at the election."2 That Pennsylvania was not so desperately in need of funds is evidenced by the fact that Cameron and others of the state were contributing considerable sums through the national committee to aid in the election in Illinois.3

The State Central Committee was active in bringing outstanding political speakers to Pennsylvania to aid in the campaign. Carl Schurz, a member of the Republican National Committee from Wisconsin, was one so employed. McClure urged him to give all the time possible to Pennsylvania. "There is some danger in Pennsylvania," he wrote. "We can afford to lose Indiana in October but the loss of Pennsylvania would be a death blow to Lincoln." Schurz agreed to spend most of September there and to devote special attention to the German portion of the population. The New York Herald quoted one of its "intelligent" Philadelphia correspondents as saying that both Curtin and General Cameron recently had admitted that "if it were not for the Presidential contest, in the immediate rear of our

Governor's election, Foster would beat our man by twenty thousand."5

The tariff issue played a great part in the 1860 elections in Pennsylvania, both state and national. The Democrats had carried the state in the presidential election of 1856, and the one for the governorship in 1857. The country was then in a state of general prosperity which the Democrats boastingly ascribed to the well-defined and long-continued policies of their party. The financial distress of 1857 followed close upon the heels of the election of that year, and from that time the Democratic Party was embarrassed in Pennsylvania. With a President of their own choice, with both branches of Congress and all departments of the government under their control, and with a tariff of their own making, a serious disaster had come upon the country. The promises of their leaders failed to materialize. The Republicans in Pennsylvania saw their advantage and pressed it by renewed and urgent demands for a protective tariff. They succeeded in obtaining recognition of the protective system in the Chicago platform in 1860, and during the campaign Curtin gave a greater portion of his time to the discussion of the tariff and financial issues than to all others combined. The majority of the voters of Pennsylvania were convinced that the Republican Party would espouse and maintain the cause of protection as against the free-trade tendencies of the Democratic Party.⁶

The election in Pennsylvania, on October ninth, was a glorious success for the People's Party. Curtin was swept into the governorship over his Democratic opponent, Henry D. Foster, with a majority exceeding thirty-two thousand. The People's Party also increased its majorities in both houses of the legislature. In the senate it obtained twenty-seven seats to the Democrats' six, and in the house seventy-one to its opponents' twenty-nine. This gave the Republicans ninety-eight to thirty-five on joint ballot. Since this group would elect Pennsylvania's Senators it insured two Republican Senators after March fourth. The election had returned only five Democratic members of Pennsylvania's delegation of twenty-five in the national House of Representatives. E. Pershine Smith wrote to Henry C. Carey of Philadelphia that the state's victory was unquestionably of great value to the Republicans in New York and elsewhere.

"It makes that easier which would otherwise have been not doubtful but difficult."9

Curtin had been elected with the support of Cameron men. It became, therefore, the concern of Cameron that in the formation of Curtin's cabinet there should be some recognition of his element of the party. There were many prominent Curtin men who were being pressed vigorously for cabinet positions. Cameron had many friends who had sincerely supported Curtin, and they earnestly appealed to the Governor-elect for recognition of Cameron's friends in the state administration as a stroke for party harmony. A compromise was arranged whereby Samuel A. Purviance, former congressman and long-time friend and supporter of Cameron, should become attorney-general under Governor Curtin.¹⁰

During the course of the campaign the friendly feeling for Cameron, at the Lincoln headquarters in Springfield, had been expressed from time to time; and frequently some little service had been requested or information on the progress in Pennsylvania had been asked. In June it had been suggested that some of the newspapers in Philadelphia should be courted for better relations to the Republican campaign. Leaders at the Lincoln headquarters had asked that the attention of General Cameron

and other Pennsylvanians be directed to the matter.11

Not until August first did Cameron write to Lincoln his congratulations upon the nomination. He then explained that he had waited until he could form a positive opinion of the election in Pennsylvania. He now felt that Lincoln would get the state beyond the shadow of a doubt, and his friends could occupy their time in making Illinois and Indiana safe. Cameron stated that his friends were pleased with Lincoln's tariff attitude while a member of Congress. Lincoln had sent, for Cameron's examination, his personal notes of congressional speeches on the tariff issue. Cameron expressed faith in Lincoln's good intentions to stand by Pennsylvania's interests particularly concerning her coal and iron. Beyond that they had no desires. 12 Lincoln replied that he was glad to hear the good news from Pennsylvania "from a reliable source." Judge Davis, he said, would call upon Cameron in a few days. He instructed that nothing about the tariff speeches must get into the newspapers. 13 The leaders of the People's Party did not relax their efforts after they had carried Pennsylvania in October by a large majority, but determined to make an even better showing in the national contest in November. Their efforts were satisfactorily rewarded.

As Lincoln and his friends in Springfield awaited news of the election returns, telegrams began coming in from various parts of the country. These reports on the evening of election day showed the trend. A dispatch from Pittsburgh announced, "Allegheny County 10,000 majority for Lincoln;" another from Philadelphia followed, "15,000 plurality, and 5,000 majority over all." A feeling of surprise and pleasure spread over the group. Lincoln remarked that this was far better than he had expected. The heavy swing of Pennsylvania was confirmed about midnight by the following brief but pertinent dispatch from Cameron: "Hon. A. Lincoln: Pennsylvania, 70,000 for you. New York same, Glory enough. S. Cameron." The result of the tabulation in Pennsylvania showed Lincoln with a majority of almost sixty thousand. Although he polled but forty per cent of the national vote it was distributed in such manner as to give him one hundred eighty electoral votes to one hundred twenty-three for his three opponents. Lincoln's popular vote exceeded that of Douglas, his nearest competitor, by nearly five hundred thousand. In reality it was not so large, because by a fusion arrangement, most of the Democratic votes of Pennsylvania were counted for Breckinridge. The Republicans had elected their candidate for the presidency in their second national contest.

Pennsylvania was due to elect a Senator to succeed Bigler, whose term would expire on March fourth; and, if Cameron went into Lincoln's Cabinet, would also elect one to fill out his remaining two years. There were many aspirants, including Wilmot, Stevens, Edgar Cowan, McClure, Reeder, and J. K. Moorhead. Some of these, such as Wilmot and Moorhead, actively appealed to Cameron for his aid and support. Reeder and Moorhead both expressed willingness to be set aside without prejudice to Cameron if doing so would advance Cameron's interests. Reeder thought that Wilmot and Cowan would make good men for the two places but feared both would want the long

term. Others kept Cameron informed of the progress of the campaign and suggested compromises between Cameron candidates and the possibility of proper concessions on the sides of both the Cameron and the Curtin factions in order to preserve peace and harmony. Cowan was favored by the Curtin faction but it was believed that he could be handled by Cameron, as he was very favorable to the appointment of the latter to Lincoln's Cabinet. Some suggested the postponement of the choice of Senators until Cameron's appointment should be assured and both Senators could be elected at the same time, feeling that this would facilitate compromise between the Republican factions.¹⁶

Shortly before the election the press declared that appearances indicated the nomination of Cowan with Wilmot as his strongest opponent. A project was discussed in Republican political circles to appoint a committee of friends to reconcile the interests of the two, and it was recommended that one of the parties take the long senatorial term and the other the vacancy occasioned by General Cameron's expected resignation.¹⁷ The party caucus, on January seventh, nominated Cowan on the sixth ballot with fifty-eight votes to thirty-eight for Wilmot, and two for a third candidate.¹⁸ The election took place the next day, with the expected result. Edgar Cowan was elected over his Democratic opponent, Henry D. Foster, by what turned out to be a strictly party vote of ninety-eight to thirty-five.¹⁹

- J. P. Sanderson had a two-hour interview with Cowan, very soon after his election, in the interest of Cameron. Cowan expressed himself as highly pleased with Cameron's behavior and said that he would cordially and fully co-operate with him. He would write to Lincoln at once and go to Illinois to see him later; he preferred to go quietly without the public's knowledge. Sanderson assured Cameron that he had a man (Cowan) in the Senate who would be right and who was anxious to work with him.²⁰
- B. Rush Petrikin travelled by train with Wilmot two days after the election. He learned that Wilmot had at first felt that Cameron was responsible for his defeat in the caucus, but, after reflection, had come to the conclusion that McClure had been

false and treacherous to his interests. Though Cameron's opponents had been working on Wilmot, they had failed to win him to their side. He was of course hurt by the result, but Petrikin thought that Wilmot would now be willing to succeed Cameron for the short term.²¹

Cameron's resignation upon appointment as Secretary of War opened the way for the election of another Senator. This initiated a scurry for his seat with numerous letters to him seeking support for one candidate or another. On March twelfth the house nominated thirty-one persons as candidates to fill the vacancy, including Wilmot, Thaddeus Stevens, and Thomas Williams. Wilmot received the Republican caucus nomination, and was, in the joint session, an easy victor over William Welsh, his Democratic opponent. The vote stood ninety-five to thirty-four, with two votes scattered—the vote was almost the same as had been the vote on the senatorial election in January.²²

Before the thirty-sixth Congress came together for its second session, the country had passed through one of the most exciting presidential contests in its history. Republicans, though victorious, had gained only forty per cent of the popular vote, and less than two per cent of that came from the South. Long before the election threats of secession, in the event of Republican success, had been made. Congress assembled one month after this presidential election and two weeks later delegates of South Carolina met in convention. This last session of Congress under Buchanan faced one of the great crises in the nation's history, a crisis in which sincere but ineffectual efforts were made to prevent the disruption of the Union.

The President's message on the state of the Union²³ hardly made the task of Congress easier. It contained strong unionism but it also accepted secession; and, while declaring it to be unconstitutional, offered very little resistance to the idea. It lacked the forcefulness of a Jackson message in a time of such national crisis. It was the misfortune of President Buchanan to be called upon to act in an emergency which demanded will-power, fortitude, and moral courage. One can, of course, only speculate on what might have been the result had he acted differently.

One of the problems of the last Congress had been the application of Kansas for admission to the Union. No satisfactory

solution had been found. In the meantime Kansas had formulated a new constitution and was again seeking admission. Reeder, a former Governor of Kansas Territory and a strong opponent of the administration's efforts to force the Lecompton Constitution upon Kansas, continued his opposition to the Administration. While the new bill to admit Kansas was before Congress for consideration he wrote to Cameron from Harrisburg that "Our friends here all say prevent the passage of the Kansas admission by all means during Buchanan's administration." He argued that the party could not afford to give Buchanan the patronage which this would lose to the Republicans and that Kansas could not afford to have a judge for life of the Taney stamp. He urged: "This is important. Do not neglect it."24 Both Cameron and Bigler, however, felt that the interest of the country and of Kansas were superior to such party considerations and voted for the bill which passed the Senate on January twenty-first by a vote of thirty-six to sixteen. This was after some Senators had already withdrawn with their states. All of the negative votes came from slave-holding states, though two Senators from slave-holding states, John J. Crittenden of Kentucky and Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, voted for the bill . 25

Crittenden, on December eighteenth, introduced into the Senate a plan of compromise between the North and the South.²⁶ The heart of the proposal was the first article, which provided that: north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, the line of the old Missouri Compromise, in all territory then held or thereafter acquired, slavery was to be prohibited; south of that line slaves were to be protected as property and not interfered with by Congress. This proposal was the pivot around which, in this session of Congress, revolved discussions concerning saving the Union by compromise.

Cameron strongly opposed secession but believed that the Crittenden proposals, if amended so as not to extend to territory hereafter acquired and to remove from them the features which proposed to incorporate the doctrine of the Dred Scott decision, might be a satisfactory basis for compromise on both sides. In other words, he was willing that the Missouri Compromise line be restored and extended. The repeal of that measure had led

to the organization of the Republican Party. By that issue it had gained its strength and secured its victory. "If now," declared he, "our Union loving brethren of the slave border States shall be willing to unite with us in its restoration, and accept that as the basis of settlement of existing difficulties, why should we hesitate thus to meet them?" He declared that there were many fine and strong Union-loving men in the South. He was willing to make any reasonable concession, not involving a vital principle, to save the country. He invoked a mutual spirit of union and conciliation.²⁷

On January twenty-first Senator Bigler, a Democrat elected in 1856, made a rather long speech proposing an amendment to the Crittenden compromise resolutions. He used the occasion to give a survey of the difficulties between northern and southern sections of the country, declaring that "the fundamental cause of the imperiled condition of the country is the institution of African servitude, or rather the unnecessary hostility to that institution on the part of those who have no connection with it." He acknowledged the justice of the complaints of the southern states to a considerable extent, but deprecated the remedy they pursued. He said he was prepared to resist it by all proper and peaceful means in his power. Secession, in his opinion, was the worst possible remedy for the evils complained of by the southern states, and coercion the maddest of all remedies suggested for secession. He pled for the adoption of the resolutions of Crittenden, by the vote of all parties in Congress, as an assurance of reunion and continued union.28

Cameron gained the floor a few minutes after Bigler had completed his appeal. He agreed heartily with the sentiments expressed by his colleague. In the brief discussion which followed, his ideas on the matter under consideration were rather clearly set forth.²⁹ He was chagrined that out of the whole Senate of sixty-six members, there were not a dozen men at any one time listening to the speech made by Bigler, the representative of one of the greatest states in the Union, as he offered the olive branch of peace. Certainly after seeing that demonstration he would not make a speech. He desired to say that the great state of Pennsylvania—certainly a large majority of its people—would do anything consistent with honor to save the

Union. Daily he received innumerable letters and petitions signed by thousands asking him to do something. He here announced that anything he could do by his vote as a Senator he would do, to prevent the separation of the South from the North, or the North from the South. Senator Willard Saulsbury of Delaware, a Democratic member, thought that the words that had just fallen from the lips of Senator Cameron should be cherished, rather than met with opposition, and declared: "I think he has manifested a spirit of patriotism and devotion to his country and to the Union of these States that we all may well imitate." To this sentiment Crittenden agreed. Coercion, Cameron declared, was a bad remedy, the last remedy to which he would resort, and he didn't know that he should ever resort to it.

Senator James M. Mason of Virginia entered the discussion with an effort to show that the North talked one way and acted another. Cameron declared that the only difference between himself and the distinguished Senator from Virginia was that the latter seemed to seek some excuse to get out of the Union while he desired to preserve it by any sacrifice of feeling. Mason retorted that what he wanted was not an excuse for leaving the Union but a reason for remaining in it. There was only one thing left for the South-dissolution of the Union-and he proceeded to tell what the results would be. Cameron deplored Mason's charging of the North with treason and a desire for bloodshed and war. He declared, perhaps too optimistically: "We will give up not only our prejudices, but our feelings; and, as I said before, even a portion of our principles on this subject of slavery, to gratify the South." He believed the wrongs done to the South were largely imaginary, and invited the Southerners to bring forth any scheme or formula upon which they would call this question settled. The North would come in and sustain it. He wanted to placate the South:

Tell us what you want; tell us what your wrongs are; and then ask us to redress them. You cannot drive us to madness by bullying us; because we are your equals. We do not undertake coercion, nor war, because we believe you are as brave as we are; but if you want this Union preserved, let us know wherein we have done wrong, and we will try to correct it.

Senator Saulsbury again approved Cameron's remarks, declaring that if the Senators of both sides of the chamber would imitate the very laudable spirit manifested by the Senator from Pennsylvania certainly the government would suffer no detriment. On the contrary, he believed that great good might result "to our common country." He looked upon it as an omen of good.³⁰

All through the opening weeks of this exciting short session or Congress, Cameron had been receiving letters praising his policies as Senator. An occasional letter came even from a member of the opposing party, as that from Benjamin Champness, who wrote that he believed there was a general feeling of confidence in the ranks of the Democratic Party in Cameron's ability and fidelity to the Constitution, and devotion to the in-

terests of the Union "and to our own state."31

No action of Cameron in the Senate prior to the Civil War stirred people so deeply and brought forth so much comment as his stand for conciliation taken on the Crittenden proposals. In Pennsylvania, outside of abolitionist circles, the comment was almost entirely favorable.32 J. H. Benjamin and others telegraphed from Harrisburg: "People here all delighted with the noble stand you have taken in the Senate in favor of a settlement of our national difficulties."³³ Similar sentiments were expressed as coming from people "of every political stripe" in a letter from General D. K. Jackson.³⁴ William M. Piatt wrote from Tuckhannock: "Your course is highly applauded by all the Union and true men in this section. . . . We want more such men." 35 From Pittsburgh, George Washington Cass, an engineer and railroad executive, wrote, "I wish to God you were the President elect instead of Lincoln. Your course yesterday in the Senate shows you to be a patriot, more than a politician."36 Samuel Colver, who had spent two months travelling in southwestern Pennsylvania and western Virginia, reported that Cameron's course had received great applause in these areas, especially in the latter. The people of western Virginia believed that war would inevitably follow secession and thought their chances better in the Union than out of it.37

Equally complimentary sentiments were expressed to Cameron by people outside Pennsylvania, from both northern and

southern states. Saterlee Clark wrote from Wisconsin: "I opposed the election of Lincoln, . . but if he will adopt the course you have marked out for yourself he will be entitled to the support of every loyal citizen of the country."38 Richard Mc-Crea of Richmond, Virginia, declared: "As a lover of the Union I was rejoiced at the amicable and conciliatory temper of your late observations in the Senate." He sent a fifteen-page letter, on foolscap, offering a plan of saving the Union, for Cameron's consideration.³⁹ John D. Kellogg of New York, described a great "Union Democratic Convention" at Albany where many Republicans were seated with the welcome of the Democrats. The absorbing objective was to save the Union. The convention unanimously passed a resolution "thanking you for your patriotic effort in the Senate in behalf of an honorable adjustment of the present difficulties." The writer invited attention to this as "the highest mark of confidence and respect which the people here could pay to your well merited efforts."40 Other letters of similar tenor were received from Tennessee and Missouri.

Cameron's stand on the matter of compromise in 1861 was unique, as he was a Republican. George Fort Milton argues that the "Needless War" came because there were too few leaders, both Northern and Southern, who saw the wisdom of following Douglas and Crittenden. ⁴¹ Cameron, by his stand in the Senate in January of 1861, qualified as one of the type needed

on the "Eve of Conflict" to prevent the war.

In contrast to the above expressions favorable to compromise there were also some in Pennsylvania who urged upon Cameron "no compromise" and strong adherence to the Chicago platform. Some wanted a strong policy of the government against "unjust" criticism, domination, and bullying by the minority of the lower South. Others felt that the loss of the South would be no calamity for the North, but that the North should endeavor by concessions to hold Kentucky, Virginia and Maryland in the Union. Reeder reported that the fighting sentiment in the region of Allentown was mounting, with special antagonism directed against the city of Charleston. This was a local reaction to the firing on the Star of the West two days earlier in the Charleston harbor, when she was carrying re-

enforcements to Fort Sumter. With the spread of ill rumors, D. J. Hoober of Philadelphia urged Cameron to call a caucus of the Republicans in Congress and demand that measures be taken to protect the Capital against the Southern traitors. ⁴⁵ Brigadier-General William F. Small of the Washington Guards, Philadelphia, tendered the services of a brigade of volunteer infantry, suggesting that "in the present unhappy and precarious condition of public affairs, they could be employed to garrison arsenals, naval stations, and forts and thus relieve the regular troops and place them at the disposal of the President for duty elsewhere."

An incident, which helps to reveal a warm feeling on the part of Senator Cameron for the South and some of her leaders, occurred on January twenty-first. The state of Mississippi seceded from the Union on the ninth of January, but her Senators lingered in Washington until the twenty-first before withdrawing from the Senate. On that day Jefferson Davis took leave in a speech of remarkable gravity and brevity. The speech contained a brief historical vindication of the South, and then concluded with an appropriate and dignified inspiration in an appeal to Providence for peaceful relations between North and South. In the closing remarks of his speech he showed an unbounded generosity, begging pardon of all whom he had ever offended, and, directing his attention to the Senators from the North, declared that he carried away no hostile feelings, and sincerely apologized for whatever personal displeasure had ever been occasioned in debate.47

It was a solemn occasion, this breaking of old ties under such circumstances. It is quite strange that, after such a noble expression of personal friendliness on the part of Davis, only two Republican Senators approached him and bade him farewell. They were John P. Hale of New Hampshire and Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania.⁴⁸ After brief conversation befitting the serious occasion and the possibility of war between North and South, Davis in a spirit of levity turned to Cameron with the remark: "Cameron, I am going to make my headquarters in your house on the Susquehanna." To this Cameron replied, in the same vein: "Not before I plant corn in the public square in Savannah."

A rising tide of indignation against the Buchanan administration became quite apparent during the two months following the 1860 elections. This was noted in such leading newspapers as the New York Times and the Chicago Press and Tribune. It was also observed in the letters to Cameron, some of which are cited above, and in the correspondence of Horace White of Chicago with Lyman Trumbull⁵⁰ of the Senate and Elihu B. Washburne⁵¹ of the House of Representatives. Demands were being made for the impeachment of Buchanan and of his secretary of war, John B. Floyd of Virginia. The resignation of Floyd and transfer of Joseph Holt to the War Department oc-curred at the end of January. This with other changes in the Cabinet brought a stiffening of administrative policy and a softening of feeling towards the President. It should be remembered that his final Annual Message had firm unionism in it, though it contained no indication that he had any plan to move against secession if it came. Buchanan did not commit the government to a recognition of secession, and he was able to hold eight of the fifteen slave states in the Union until the end of his administration. 52 After this the new administration might try its skill at solving the most difficult problem to confront the nation since its inception three-quarters of a century earlier.

Very little was said, or known, of any bargain between Lincoln's managers and the Cameron men, concerning a Cabinet position, until some weeks after the election. The Chicago correspondent of the Philadelphia Press wrote, the day after the convention, of a rumor that the vote of Pennsylvania was counted upon because of the conciliation of Cameron by the assurance that he would be made secretary of the treasury.⁵³ Friends wrote to Cameron from various parts of the country expressing hope that he would have a prominent place in Lincoln's administration or declaring that his course in the convention entitled him to any position for himself or his friends that he might ask in the event of success at the polls.⁵⁴ Cameron in conference with Wilmot, in Harrisburg, expressed his resolution not to exchange his senatorship for a subordinate place in the Administration. Wilmot later wrote to him urging that he should reconsider this expressed determination. He felt that Lincoln, "in justice to himself, to you, and to the men who nominated

him, ought to tender you the Secretaryship of the Treasury." Wilmot hoped he would accept it, and thought he should at least have the opportunity to decline, even if his determination were fixed. 55 McClure declares that Lincoln had no knowledge of the Davis agreement with the Cameron men until after the election when he came to make up his Cabinet, and had not been advised of it even at the time when he asked Cameron to come to Springfield and gave him a written tender of a position either as secretary of the treasury or as secretary of war. 56 On November twenty-seventh Lincoln wrote to Hamlin: "I deem it proper to advise you that I also find letters here from very strong and unexpected quarters in Pennsylvania, urging the appointment of General Cameron to a place in the Cabinet." 57

At Cameron's suggestion, B. Rush Petrikin, early in December, visited Wilmot, who wanted to become United States Senator, and worked out with him an agreement for mutual aid to obtain the office of Secretary of War for Cameron and the senatorship for Wilmot, the patronage to be divided. Petrikin declared that Wilmot was "less mercenary and more reliable than anyone of our numerous host."58 Cameron apparently did not desire such a definite agreement with Wilmot as was presented to him by Petrikin, but expressed a desire to do whatever he could for Wilmot, for whom he had high regard. There was no one he would rather see in the Senate but he could not make himself a party to such an agreement. "It would ruin his [Wilmot's] chances and disgrace me." Cameron said that nearly all the candidates had offered him the same terms, including Mc-Clure. To all he had given but one reply, that he could not interfere, except that in his reply to McClure he had sent a harsher message. McClure was accused of intriguing with all the candidates. Cameron declared that he would make no bargains about any place for himself.59 From this letter, and from another received from Edgar Cowan a few days later, it appears that Cameron was not particularly anxious at that time to go into the Cabinet and was not encouraging his friends to put forth efforts for him.60 However, letters written by both Lincoln and Hamlin indicate that Cameron was being pressed upon the President-elect for a place in the Cabinet.⁶¹

On December twenty-sixth Leonard Swett telegraphed to

"Simon Cameron or Joseph Casey": "It is important I should see Cameron immediately." Apparently unable to go to Harrisburg as he had intended doing, he again telegraphed that he was sending a letter. ⁶² In his letter which arrived a few days later, Swett said that he had held an interview with Lincoln in Springfield, the previous week, when Lincoln had requested him to invite Cameron to visit him as soon as he could conveniently do so. ⁶³

Cameron departed for Illinois almost immediately. Arriving at Springfield on December thirtieth, he was in conference with Lincoln much of that day and the next.⁶⁴ When he took his departure on the thirty-first Lincoln handed him the following letter:

I think fit to notify you now, that by your permission, I shall, at the proper time nominate you to the U. S. Senate, for confirmation as Secretary of the Treasury, or as Secretary of War—which of the two, I have not yet definitely decided. Please answer at your earliest convenience.⁶⁵

The Philadelphia *Press* on January second, carried notice of a dispatch from Springfield from "reliable authority," saying that General Cameron would have a seat in Lincoln's Cabinet. The writer commented that this selection was a step in the right direction to safeguard the tariff interests of Pennsylvania. 66 There was no indication in Lincoln's letter to Cameron of a desire on his part that the offer should be kept secret, and Cameron on his return to Pennsylvania gave out news of the offer.

There was a volcanic eruption in Pennsylvania and in some other states, a vehement protest from the anti-Cameron men. The bitter hostility found expression through the Curtin faction, which was almost as potent as the Cameron followers. As the emissary of the Curtin group, Colonel McClure hastened to Springfield to register a protest against the appointment. ⁶⁷ The protest must have been of a strong character for on January third Lincoln addressed another letter to Cameron marked "Private" declaring rather abruptly:

Since seeing you things have developed which make it impossible for me to take you into the Cabinet. You will say this comes from an interview with McClure; and this is partly, but not wholly, true. The more potent matter is wholly outside Pennsylvania; and yet I am not at liberty to specify it. Enough that it appears to me to be sufficient. And now I suggest that you write me declining the appointment, in which case I do not object to its being known that it was tendered you. Better do this at once, before things so change that you cannot honorably decline, and I be compelled to openly recall the tender. No person living knows or has an intimation that I write this letter. Yours truly, A. Lincoln. P.S. Telegraph me instantly on receipt of this saying "All right." A. L.⁶⁸

By the time this letter reached Cameron, McClure had returned to Pennsylvania and had given out a statement in which he asserted positively that no Cabinet appointment for Pennsylvania had been absolutely determined upon. ⁶⁹ The matter was put in such a way as to cast doubt upon earlier statements that Cameron had received an offer. Cameron's friends rallied to his support with declarations that they had seen the promise of the

appointment over Lincoln's signature.70

Instead of sending the expected telegram, Cameron preferred to face the possible alternative of having Lincoln openly withdraw the offer. Lincoln was greatly embarrassed by the situation. Evidently the offer had been made somewhat prematurely, and Lincoln hoped to save embarrassment on both sides by the earliest and easiest possible rectification of his mistake. The situation appeared rather dark for Cameron, but he was never one to back down from a political contest or situation because the odds appeared to be strongly against him. It was at such times that his power and influence as a political strategist showed up most clearly.

The gauge of battle was set and the challenge offered by his political enemies. Whatever his prior feeling with reference to a Cabinet office, he could not permit this challenge of his opponents to remain unanswered nor could he back out by way of declining the proffered Cabinet seat—that would mean their victory and his defeat. He determined to throw all his resources into action. Against the charges that were being brought to Lincoln's attention, there began to pour in upon Springfield floods of telegrams, letters, and petitions—testimonials for Cameron that dealt with phases of his life from apprenticeship in the printing trade on through his business and political career.⁷¹

From early in January until mid-February, when Lincoln departed for Washington, Springfield was seldom without visiting pro-Cameron emissaries. In the early stages of the contest, after McClure's return from Springfield, Cameron called J. P. Sanderson to Washington for a conference. A few days later Sanderson and Edgar Cowan, Senator-elect of Pennsylvania, arrived in Springfield to press the appointment of Cameron.⁷²

After this conference Lincoln again wrote to Cameron, this

time in a more cordial and friendly tone:

At the suggestion of Mr. Sanderson, and with hearty goodwill besides, I herewith send you a letter dated January 3—the same in date as the last you received from me. I thought best to give it that date, as it is in some sort to take the place of that letter. I learn, both by a letter from Mr. Swett and from Mr. Sanderson, that your feelings were wounded by the terms of my letter really of the 3d. I wrote that letter under great anxiety and perhaps I was not so guarded in its terms as I should have been; but I beg you to be assured I intended no offense. My great object was to have you act quickly, if possible before the matter should be complicated with the Pennsylvania senatorial election. Destroy the offensive letter, or return it to me.

I say to you now I have not doubted that you would perform the duties of a department ably and faithfully. Nor have I for a moment intended to ostracise your friends. If I should make a cabinet appointment for Pennsylvania before I reach Washington, I will not do so without consulting you, and giving all the weight to your views and wishes

which I consistently can. This I have always intended.⁷³

With this explanation Lincoln enclosed a formal letter predated January third, which could be shown or published. It was to serve as a substitute for the letter he had actually written on the earlier date. The enclosure stated:

When you were here, about the last of December, I handed you a letter saying I should at the proper time nominate you to the Senate for a place in the cabinet. It is due to you and to truth for me to say you were here by my invitation, and not upon any suggestion of your own. You have not as yet signified to me whether you would accept the appointment, and with much pain I now say to you that you will relieve me from great embarrassment by allowing me to recall the offer. This springs from an unexpected complication, and not from any change of my view as to the ability or faithfulness with which you would discharge the duties of the place. I now think I will not definitely fix upon any appointment for Pennsylvania until I reach Washington.⁷⁴

Much of Pennsylvania opinion that was favorable to the selection of Cameron pressed for his appointment to the Treasury Department and revealed a strong desire for a protective tariff policy. Pennsylvanians wanted a change in the tariff policy of the government and the feeling was prevalent that Cameron as secretary of the treasury would strengthen the protectionists against the "free-traders." Also, he was regarded as a conservative and a conciliator, therefore, a good man to be numbered among the President's advisors in this time of rising crisis.⁷⁵

This contest made good news-copy and the press took full advantage of the opportunity to air the claims and counterclaims on both sides. The Philadelphia *Inquirer*, one of the less partisan newspapers, expressed a feeling that the working and development of Pennsylvania's vast deposits of mineral wealth would depend upon the degree of friendliness of government policy. That policy might be largely guided and directed through the Treasury Department in its revenue course. It was known that the financial views of Cameron were in line with the best interests of the state, and therefore the *Inquirer* lent its

support to his appointment.76

The Pennsylvania Telegraph devoted a column to the editorial reaction throughout the state. Among those editors favoring Cameron were several representatives of the Democratic press who, like the editor of the Sunbury American, declared: "The appointment of General Cameron to the office of Secretary of the Treasury, is one of the greatest importance to Pennsylvania. In financial ability the General is acknowledged to be one of the ablest men in the State." Two other Democratic papers, the Columbia County Democrat and the Philadelphia Record came out unequivocally for General Cameron for the Treasury Department. The New York Tribune made comparatively few comments on Cabinet possibilities, but the rumors of Cameron's selection for either the Treasury or War Department elicited poorly disguised disapproval. The charges made against Cameron were vague and very

The charges made against Cameron were vague and very general, rather than specific in nature. James H. Van Alen sent Lincoln "extracts" from congressional documents in relation to Cameron's action as commissioner to settle the Claims of the Winnebago Indians.⁸⁰ Gustave Koerner declared to Lincoln on

January sixth that "Cameron cannot be trusted; he has the reputation of being a tricky and corrupt politician." McClure in an account of his visit to Springfield and interview with Lincoln wrote:

I took no affidavits with me, nor were any specific charges made against him [Cameron] by me, or by any of the letters I bore; but they all sustained me in the allegation, that the appointment would disgrace the administration and the country, because of the notorious incompetency and public and private villany of the candidate.⁸²

Lyman Trumbull wrote on January third and tenth, opposing the appointment, asserting that Cameron "is very generally regarded as a trading, unscrupulous politician. . . . totally unfit for the Treasury Department." At the end of his answer to Trumbull's first letter Lincoln said: "I may mention before closing that besides the very fixed opposition to General C [ameron] he is more amply recommended for a place in the

Cabinet than any other man."84

Lincoln was in an awkward predicament, which he had enhanced by his own course. He wanted to be fair to those who were making charges against Cameron, but he felt that Cameron should have an opportunity to vindicate himself.⁸⁵ He wanted the support of the Keystone State in the national emergency, and Cameron was its leading link in business and politics. The charges against him reflected seriously upon his personal and political character, but when Lincoln endeavored to sift them, he could find nothing but hearsay and defensive excuses that referred to one matter or another that had been discussed at some time in anonymous newspaper articles.⁸⁶

Lincoln asked for documentary evidence of the correctness of the charges made against Cameron. He wrote to McClure, after his flying visit to Springfield to denounce Cameron, stating that if he would make specific charges against Cameron and produce proof, he (Lincoln) would dismiss consideration of Cameron for a Cabinet position. McClure replied, declining to do so.⁸⁷ The enemies of the Senator, in general, refused to prefer charges against him in writing and submit proof. Lincoln declared on several occasions in February, 1861, that if Pennsylvania were to be represented in the Cabinet it would be by

Cameron, and no one else.88 He determined, in the face of the circumstances, to withhold announcement of Cabinet appointments until after he arrived in Washington. Pennsylvania was convulsed by the struggle for and against Cameron for about two months.

David Davis wrote to Cameron from Bloomington, Illinois, on February eighth: "I have faith that everything will be right. Am in good spirits on that point. . . . Keep the spirits of your friends up. Don't relax effort until the end." Davis accompanied the Lincoln party on the rather circuitous journey to Washington. It had been arranged that Lincoln should make several stops and address various groups along the way. After the presidential entourage had visited Pittsburgh, John N. Purviance wrote to Cameron: "Your friends are much encouraged with the prospects that you will go into the Cabinet. Judge Davis of Illinois talks plainly and encouragingly."90

James Milliken, an ironmaster of Philadelphia, and other friends of Cameron were working on Governor Curtin and McClure in an effort to obtain withdrawal of their opposition to Cameron's appointment. They wanted to arrange for an interview with Lincoln, when he should be in Philadelphia, at which time the announcement of withdrawal of opposition could be made and it was hoped Lincoln would then confirm Cameron's appointment.⁹¹ Things worked out very much as Milliken had planned. Lincoln arrived in Philadelphia on Thursday, February twenty-first. The interview was arranged. Milli-ken explained to Lincoln that he was authorized to speak for Governor Curtin, McClure, and the members of the state administration, and say that all opposition to Cameron's appointment had been withdrawn and that his appointment was even desired; that he (Milliken) represented the iron and coal men of Pennsylvania, with very few exceptions, and they desired Cameron's appointment. Martin McMichael was there to speak for the press. Lincoln spoke frankly and declared that the announcement relieved him greatly. He was not, however, prepared to decide the matter until he should reach Washington.⁹²

The New York Times carried an item under Washington

date-line, February twenty-fifth, which stated:

Probably in the history of political contest, no fight more bitter than that waged by the friends and enemies of Mr. Cameron is recorded. The result is that, finding opposition futile, the opponents of the appointee formally withdrew their charges, and today it is a settled point that Pennsylvania is to be represented in the Cabinet by Mr. Cameron.⁹³

The writer went on to say that the fight would still be waged as to the position he would occupy. His friends demanded for him the Treasury Department, while his enemies said the only place he should even dare to accept was the War Department. Cameron preferred the former but here encountered such violent demonstrations by the friends of Chase as would have made

a less determined person shrink.

In Washington the President-elect invited Cameron for conference on the evening of February twenty-eighth, and another interview was arranged for the morning of March first. The matter of appointment to the Cabinet was thoroughly discussed. Cameron was reluctant to accept any department other than the treasury. However, Congress had recently passed a tariff bill making tariff modifications favorable to Pennsylvania, 94 and it was no longer felt to be so urgent that a Pennsylvanian should occupy the treasury post. The outcome of these conferences was that Cameron upon Lincoln's urgent request agreed to accept appointment as secretary of war. 95

Whatever may have been the influences for and against him, whatever there may have been of truth or fallacy in the opprobrium heaped upon him, President Lincoln on March fifth nominated Simon Cameron to be secretary of war and the Senate promptly confirmed the nomination. Secretary Joseph Holt remained in the War Office during the remainder of the week while Cameron made a brief visit to Pennsylvania to clear up personal affairs. On Monday, March eleventh, he qualified for his place and took the oath of office as secretary of war.⁹⁶

The view is not acceptable that Cameron's appointment was altogether the result of a bargain made in Chicago between Lincoln's managers and the Cameron delegates. At any rate, Lincoln certainly would not have made the appointment if the charges made against Cameron had been proven. He acted with entire sincerity, though clumsily, in this contest over the appointment, while at the same time being influenced by the de-

sire to reconcile party differences. Had there been no bargain in Chicago the appointment of Cameron was in line with Lin-

coln's policy of placating the disappointed candidates.


The appointment, when made, met with general approval except among Cameron's most determined opponents. Pennsylvania opposition had been withdrawn before his appointment. The Weed-Seward forces in New York had supported Cameron. R. B. Spink of Wooster, Ohio, wrote a few days after the appointment that there was but one paper in the whole of Ohio so far as he could ascertain that showed the least disposition towards opposing him. He referred to the Cincinnati Commercial, which he characterized as "not a very good Republican sheet, rather inclined to be factious." ⁹⁷


Senator Cameron took to the war department a rich background of private and public experience. During the preceding years he had demonstrated his business acumen, organizing ability, and administrative capacity. A. H. Meneely, writing of Cameron in *The War Department*, 1861, says of him:

He was energetic, persevering and had proven himself a shrewd manipulator of men. None understood better the value of patronage wisely distributed and none was a greater master at the game. Lincoln needed the public support as no President before him ever did; patronage was one means of procuring and holding it and Cameron was a handy accomplice for such work. His eminently common-sense, practical ways doubtless were often relied upon in political matters during his brief incumbency of the War Department and as the war progressed. It was to Cameron that Lincoln turned when the political situation was critical in 1864, and a fair share of the credit for Lincoln's victory belongs to the man from Donegal Springs.⁹⁸

Cameron resigned the office of secretary of war in January, 1862, and went to Europe as United States Minister to Russia. He was not pleased with this office and consequently returned to the United States within the year. From 1863 to 1867, when he was re-elected to the Senate, he took an active part in the politics of Pennsylvania, working to perfect the organization of the Republican Party, thus aiding it soon to overcome all opposition. In the meantime, he was a frequent visitor in Washington and was accepted at the White House as a sort of citizencounselor. When intrigues developed among the Cabinet mem-

bers looking towards the displacement of Lincoln at the next election, Cameron directed the preparation of an address praising the President's first administration and declaring that his renomination and re-election were essential to the success of the war for the Union. This paper was signed by the Union Party members of both branches of the legislature of Pennsylvania. In this form it was presented to President Lincoln and telegraphed to the country at large. Its publication accomplished all that Cameron had anticipated. Within a few weeks the Union Party in most of the other states hastened to declare for Lincoln's renomination. When the national convention of the Union Party assembled in June, Lincoln received the votes of every state except Missouri. Its votes were cast, in accordance with instructions, for General U.S. Grant. The nomination was then made unanimous. In the elections that fall the Union Party won an overwhelming victory over the Democrats led by George B. McClellan.99





CHAPTER I

¹Alexander Kelley McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania (Phil-

adelphia, 1905), I, 98.

² Lincoln to Cameron, Washington, January 11, 1862, John G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln—Complete Works* (New York, 1894), II, 114.

³ McClure, op. cit., I, 436.

⁴ E. T. Welles, ed., Diary of Gideon Welles (New York, 1911), III, 479, December 9, 1868.

⁵ Thaddeus Stevens and Samuel Kaufman, quoted in J. A. Woodburn,

Life of Thaddeus Stevens (Indianapolis, 1913), 600.

⁶ Alexander MacKenzie, History of the Camerons (Inverness, 1884),

⁷ William H. Egle, ed., Provincial Papers: Proprietary and State Tax Lists of Lancaster County (1782), *Pennsylvania Archives*, Third Series

(Harrisburg, 1897), XVII, 857.

⁸ General Cameron stopped in London for several days while on his way to Russia in 1862. At that time John Bigelow, Consul-general at Paris, wrote to Secretary William H. Seward (from Paris, May 29, 1862) that Cameron was "searching for proofs of his descent from Lochiel and with considerable success. I saw a note from McDonald of the Times, who has written a book about the clans of Scotland and who states, after a brief interview, that the family likeness is obvious." Before the task was completed, however, Cameron abandoned London and his genealogical researches and continued on his journey. John Bigelow, Retrospections of An Active Life (New York, 1909), I, 493.

⁹ The original copy of this indenture is in the Simon Cameron Papers, Library of Congress. Simon's term of indenture was to be three years and ten months, for which he was to receive his keep and \$20 per year for clothing. The Simon Cameron Papers will hereafter be cited as Cameron Papers, and, except when otherwise indicated, will refer to

the collection in the Library of Congress.

¹⁰ Biographical data gathered from: Charles Hale and William A. Wheeler, A Brief Biographical Dictionary (New York, 1866); Luther Reily Kelker, History of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (New York, 1907), III, 1-5; Franklin Ellis and Samuel Evans, History of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania (1883); A. Howard Meneely, "Simon Cameron," Dictionary of American Biography; Hiram H. Shenk, ed., Encyclopedia of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1932), 84; Edward B. Moore, Glances at the Life and Public Services of Gen. Simon Cameron (Harrisburg, n.d.);

A. Howard Meneely, The War Department, 1861 (New York, 1928), 74-84; Simon Cameron Papers, miscellaneous material now in the hands of sundry members of the Cameron family; Benson J. Lossing, "An Autograph of Simon Cameron," [n.d.], original bound manuscript now in the possession of James M. Cameron, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; personal correspondence with Col. Henry W. Shoemaker, State Archivist, Pennsylvania State Library, Harrisburg. Ralph Beaver Strassburger and William John Hinke, Pennsylvania German Pioneers, 9-10. In this latter work Hans Michel Pfautz's signature appears on a facsimile of the passenger list of the ship William and Sarah, William Hill, Commander, from Rotterdam, signed in the presence of the Governor and Council on September 21, 1727.

¹¹ W. W. H. Davis, History of Bucks County, Pennsylvania (Doyles-

town, 1876), 816-817.

¹² See issues of the *Pennsylvania Intelligencer*, January 26 to February 27, 1821.

13 Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years (New York, 1939), I, 148.

¹⁴ Pennsylvania Intelligencer, May 31, 1822.

¹⁵ Items appear in the *Pennsylvania Reporter* during 1830 over the signature of Cameron as Adjutant General.

¹⁶ Pennsylvania Intelligencer, November 25, December 6, 1825.

¹⁷ Pennsylvania Reporter, November 30, 1827. Despite Cameron's announced consolidation of the *Intelligencer* with the *Reporter*, the *Intelligencer* continued to be published by John S. Wiestling and exhibited even greater hostility to General Jackson, calling him a "monarchist and despot" and likening him to Caesar in all the evils committed by the Roman militarist. August 26, September 23, 1828.

¹⁸ A silent partner of Stambaugh of the Harrisburg Reporter until March, 1829, Annotated Catalogue of Newspaper Files, Pennsylvania State Library, Harrisburg, 234; and in 1845 sold his one-fourth partnership interest in the Washington Union, letter of Wm. A. Harris (M. C. from Virginia) to John C. Calhoun, July 11, 1845, American His-

torical Association, Annual Report, 1800, II, 1042.

¹⁹ Cited by Meneely, 75.

²⁰ Kelker, op. cit., 311.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 310. ²² *Ibid.*, 311-312.

²³ William H. Egle, ed., *Biographical Encyclopedia of Dauphin County*, ²²⁰; Cameron to L. S. Coryell, Harrisburg, February ¹², ¹⁸²⁸, Coryell Papers, II, ²¹, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; files of *Pennsylvania Reporter*,

1828.

²⁴ Cameron to L. S. Coryell, Harrisburg, February 12, March 1, 1828,

Coryell Papers, II, 20, 21.

²⁵ Pennsylvania Reporter. Advertisement of Mish, Cameron and Company appearing in January, 1829, and continuing for some months, an-

nouncing the arrival for sale of canal shovels, etc. Papers of Mish, Cam-

eron and Company are among the Cameron Papers.

²⁶ Joshua Stoddard Johnston Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa. This is a collection of letters, April 1830-May 1832, written to Johnston by W. W. Hoffman, C. Watts, Thomas Curry, Samuel Livermore, and J. Linton. Joshua Stoddard Johnston was a United States Senator from Louisiana, greatly interested in the internal improvement projects of his native state and a stock-holder in the New Orleans Canal and Banking Company.

²⁷ Cameron to Governor Shulze, New Orleans, Louisiana, November 28, 1831, Cameron Papers, Society Collection Mss., Hist. Soc. of Pa.

28 March 17, 1829.

²⁹ Pennsylvania Reporter, July 13, 1832.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, November 8, 1833.

³¹ Certificate of deposit in Bank of Middletown by A. Mahon, Esq., State Treasurer, October 31, 1833, Mss. Section, Collection C, Simon Cameron Papers, Archives Division of Pennsylvania State Library.

32 Buchanan to Hon. Horatio King, Wheatland, July 14, 1866, Bu-

chanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³³ The Âutograph Collection of Simon Gratz, Hist. Soc. of Pa., contains a number of scattered letters of Simon Cameron to Simon, Edward, and David Gratz. They relate to banking and business conditions. The Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa., have a great number of Cameron letters, and the Harris Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa., contain a number of letters written by numerous persons to Cameron as well as some Cameron letters to George W. Harris. A great number of the letters in each of the collections deal with banking and business conditions in the late 1830s and early 1840s.

34 Cameron to Simon Gratz, Harrisburg, February 8, 1838, Auto-

graph Collection of Simon Gratz, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

35 Idem to idem, Harrisburg, February 12, 1838, Gratz Collection.

³⁶ December 28, 1837, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁷ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, February 4, March 20, August 13, 1834, and March 22, 1835, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Bu-

chanan to Cameron, Lancaster, August 16, 1834, Cameron Papers.

³⁸ Cameron with committee to Nicholas Biddle, President United States Bank, September 21, 1836, Etting Papers, Administrations, IV, 86. A note affixed to this letter reads—"declined—27." Biddle and Cameron had no love for each other, since Cameron had applauded Jackson's action which led to the destroying of the Second United States Bank. When Biddle was elected president of the Sunbury and Erie Railroad on December 4, 1837, Cameron wrote to Buchanan the next day: "Another *monster* broken loose." Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁹ Moore, Glances at the Life and Public Services of General Simon Cameron, 9-10. Mr. Cameron related this incident, with but slight variation from the above, at a banquet in his honor at Harrisburg on May 3,

1862, just a few days before he departed for St. Petersburg, as United

States Minister to Russia. Pennsylvania Telegraph, May 5, 1862.

⁴⁰ Cameron to C. Howard, Middletown and Harrisburg, March 13, 16, 19, 30, December 26, 1836, Autograph Collection, Simon Cameron, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

41 Cameron to Simon Gratz, Middletown, June 29, 1837, Gratz Col-

lection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

42 Meneely, op. cit., 76; Egle, ed., Biographical Encyclopedia of Dau-

phin County, 221.

⁴³ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, March 20, 1834, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Cameron to Coryell, Middletown, June 2, 14, 1838, Coryell Papers, III, 68, 70, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁴⁴ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, November 23, 1837, and Prairie du Chien, September 22, 1838, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

- ⁴⁵ Cameron to Simon Gratz, Middletown, December 11, 1835, Gratz Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, May 20, 1835, May 18, 1836, December 29, 1836, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.
- ⁴⁶ New York *Herald*, March 4, 1861; New York *Times*, June 3, 1878, June 27, 1889.

CHAPTER II

¹ Marguerite G. Bartlett, The Chief Phases of Pennsylvania Politics in the Jacksonian Period (Allentown, 1919), Chapter I.

² Edward Channing, A History of the United States (New York,

1905-1936), V, 371.

³ March 12, 1824, Cameron at this time editor.

⁴ Herman Hailperin, "Pro-Jackson Sentiment in Pennsylvania, 1820-1828," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, L, 200.

⁵ Pennsylvania Intelligencer, March 12, 1824.

⁶ Niles' Register, Baltimore, XXVI (March 13, 1824), 19-20, presents a good succinct account of this convention; Pennsylvania Intelligencer, March 5, 1824.

⁷ Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897

(Boston, 1898), 136, 144.

⁸ Harrisburg Chronicle, January 15, 1827. Proposed by a Col. Ryon on January 9.

⁹ February 22, October 10, 1828.

¹⁰ August 25, 1828. It is true that the Congress which passed this act had a majority of Jackson adherents in both houses. However, the paper failed to note the fact that the Jackson men of the South were not as interested in tariff as were the Pennsylvanians.

¹¹ Cameron to Buchanan, Harrisburg, February 4, 1829, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

¹² Cameron to Col. Robert Bethel, Harrisburg, February 16, 1830, Ferdinand J. Dreer Collection, III, 76, Hist. Soc. of Pa., a letter marked

Private, shows very well Cameron's familiarity with what was going on politically in Pennsylvania.

¹³ Cameron to Shulze, New Orleans, November 28, 1831, Cameron

Papers, Society Collection Mss., Hist. Soc. of Pa.

¹⁴ Pennsylvania Reporter, March 9, 1832; Niles' Register, XLII (March 24, 1832), 72.

¹⁵ Cameron to John A. Dix, Middletown, July 17, 1833, Van Buren

Papers, XVIII, Library of Congress.

¹⁶ James D. Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents

1789-1897 (Washington, 1897), II, 448.

¹⁷ Meneely, op. cit., 76-77; Stanwood, op. cit., 153-154; Niles' Register, XXXVIII (April 24, 1830), 169-170, XL (April 16, 1831), 126-127; Pennsylvania Reporter, Harrisburg, April 23, 1830.

¹⁸ Carl Sandburg, op. cit., I, 148.

¹⁹ The Antimasonic convention met at Baltimore in September, and that of the National Republicans in the same city in December, 1831.

²⁰ Ante., o.

²¹ Niles' Register, XLII (May 26, 1832), 234-235; Pennsylvania Re-

porter, May 25, 1832.

²² The Pennsylvania legislature in both houses unanimously passed a resolution urging their Representatives and Senators at Washington to endeavor to obtain a renewal of the Charter of the Bank of the United States. Bartlett, op. cit., 41. That Jackson was able to carry Pennsylvania in 1832 by a substantial majority over Clay, in spite of the veto of the bill to re-charter the bank, was due, Bartlett feels, to sheer popularity and the impulse of party loyalty. *Ibid.*, 44.

23 Pennsylvania Reporter, March 9, 1832; Niles' Register, XLII (March

10, March 24, 1832), 24, 72.

²⁴ Editorial from the Argus quoted in Pennsylvania Reporter, July 6, 1832. This editor had not caught the trend, but Cameron had. Possibly the masses of Jackson men had never given any thought to the Bank until after Jackson vetoed it. Up to that time they simply followed Pennsylvania leaders who favored the Bank.

²⁵ Stanwood, op. cit., 164.

²⁶ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, December 29, 1836, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

²⁷ Cameron to Van Buren, Middletown, December 5, 1832, Van

Buren Papers, Library to Congress.

²⁸ Egle, *Biographical Encyclopedia*, ²²¹. Among the Simon Cameron Papers in the Library of Congress is a program of the graduating exercises at West Point for June, ¹⁸³². Simon Cameron's name appears among the names of the members of the Board of Visitors. Major-General Winfield Scott was President of the Board.

²⁹ John Bassett Moore, *The Works of James Buchanan* (Philadelphia, 1908), II, 173 ff., correspondence with John Eaton, Roger B. Taney, Edward Livingston, and President Jackson.

³⁰ Cameron to Buchanan, Harrisburg, December 4 and 7, 1833, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa. Both of these letters are burned around edges.

³¹ Id. to id., Middletown, February 4, March 3 and 20, and Senate Chamber, Harrisburg, March 22, 1834, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc of Pa.

³² Cameron to Benj. J. Bonsall, Philadelphia, June 26, 1834, Dreer Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa. Cameron shows himself perfectly capable of catering to the views of those of the opposition in order to further his own purposes.

33 Cameron to W. Donaldson, Esq., Middletown, June 28, 1834,

Cameron Papers.

34 Buchanan to General Jackson, Lancaster, January 18, 1834, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁵ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, March 3 and 20, 1834, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁶ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, December 3, 1834, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁷ George Ticknor Curtis, *Life of James Buchanan* (New York, 1883), I, 227-228; *Niles' Register*, XLII (December 13, 1834), 237.

³⁸ Cameron to Van Buren, Harrisburg, December 6, 1834, Van Buren Papers, XX, Library of Congress.

³⁹ Meneely, op. cit., 77-78.

⁴⁰ Cameron to Bonsall, Middletown, December 14, 1834, Dreer Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁴¹ Buchanan to General Jackson, Lancaster, July 15, 1834, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁴² Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, August 13, 1834, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa. Cameron excluded Governor Wolf from the list of dignitaries who supported him.

43 Cameron to Bonsall, Middletown, November 20, 1834, Dreer Col-

lection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

44 Bartlett, op. cit., 82 ff.

⁴⁵ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, December 17 and 28, 1834, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁴⁶ H. A. Muhlenberg to Cameron, Washington, December 28, 1834, Cameron Papers.

⁴⁷ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, January 9, 1835, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁴⁸ David Petrikin to Van Buren, Danville, Pennsylvania, February 11,

1835, Van Buren Papers, XXI, Library of Congress.

49 American Sentinel [administration], Philadelphia, March 9, 1835, and the Pennsylvanian [anti-administration], March 14, 1835, articles on the convention reprinted in Niles' Register, XLVIII (March 14, 1835), 20-21.

⁵⁰ Cameron to Buchanan, n. p., March 22, 1835, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵¹ Niles' Register, XLVIII (May 16, 1835), 190.

⁵² Buchanan to Van Buren, Lancaster, May 21, 1835, Van Buren Papers, XXI, Library of Congress; also found in Moore, *Works of James Buchanan*, II, 442-443.

⁵³ Wayland Fuller Dunaway, A History of Pennsylvania (New York, 1935), 447-448. The vote was Ritner, 94,023; Wolf, 65,805; and Muhlen-

berg, 40,586.

⁵⁴ Charles McCarthy, "The Antimasonic Party," American Historical Association, *Annual Report*, 1902, I, 440-441.

55 Ibid., 469.

- ⁵⁶ Cameron to Buchanan, n. p., May 20, 1835, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.
 - ⁵⁷ Niles' Register, XLVIII (May 30, 1835), 226-229.

⁵⁸ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, May 18, 22, 1836, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵⁹ American Sentinel, November 21, 1836. Almost every issue from the day following the election, November 5, carries partial returns on the Pennsylvania vote.

60 Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, February 14, 1837, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁶¹ Cameron and Ovid F. Johnson to Van Buren, Harrisburg, February 24, 1837, Van Buren Papers, XXVI, Library of Congress.

62 Buchanan to Van Buren, Senate Chamber, February 28, 1837,

Moore, Works of James Buchanan, III, 246-247.

63 Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, November 23, 1837, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁶⁴ Id. to id., Middletown, November 23, December 28, 1837, and Harrisburg, March 5, 1838, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa. The "P" refers to David R. Porter.

⁶⁵ Id. to id., Middletown, March 22, 28, June 4, 1838, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Cameron to Coryell, Middletown, June 2, 14, 1838,

Coryell Papers, III, 68, 70, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

66 William H. Egle, History of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1883), 249-250; McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 47-56; McCarthy, op. cit., 495-501; Burton Alva Konkle, Life and Speeches of Thomas Williams (Philadelphia, 1905), I, 108-119.

67 Albert Gallatin Riddle, Recollections of War Times (New York, 1895), 179. Riddle, as well as other historians, has undoubtedly made too much of the "feud" between Cameron and Stevens. The author has interviewed W. Frank Gorrecht, of Lancaster, who has been for almost a half-century a newspaper editor and publisher. In his youth, Gorrecht knew personally both Cameron and Stevens. Gorrecht claims that while the two men were supposed generally not to be on speaking relations they made a practice of meeting in the back room of the business establishment of a mutual friend for political conferences. Gorrecht worked at this establishment and saw the coming and

going of Cameron and Stevens and heard a part of their conversations. It must be remembered that in 1838 they belonged to opposing parties. In 1856 Stevens worked in the interest of Cameron for the senatorial election. *Post* 159. In 1862 when Cameron was appointed Minister to Russia Stevens is said to have remarked that Cameron understood the problems of the war between the states better than any man of the administration and that he had been "exiled to Siberia."

68 Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, December 5 and 28, 1837, Bu-

chanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

69 ld. to id., Middletown, December 28, 1837, June 26, 1838, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

^{†0} Id. to id., Middletown, July 5, 1838, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

Number 229, 2, J. R. Poinsett to Cameron, War Department, July 21, 1838, and C. A. Harris to Cameron, Office of Indian Affairs, July 26, 1838. This document of one hundred twelve pages consists of the material submitted by the War Department and Office of Indian Affairs to the House of Representatives in obedience to the House resolution of February 19, 1839, requiring information in relation to the execution of the treaty of the first of November, 1837, with the Winnebago Indians. Further reference to this document will be listed as Exec. Doc. No. 229.

72 Cameron to Coryell, Middletown, July 23, August 1, 1838, Coryell

Papers, III, 74, 75, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

^{†3} Exec. Doc. No. 229, 2.

⁷⁴ Cameron to Buchanan, Prairie du Chien, September 22, 1838, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

75 Exec. Doc. No. 229, 4-6.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 7-8, 13.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 46-48.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 58-65.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 65-79, 95-105.

⁸⁰ Cameron had written to Buchanan from Prairie du Chien on September 22, 1838, in glowing terms of the great West with richer soil than anything the Pennsylvania farmers dreamed of. He stated that a few thousand acres at present prices would soon make a handsome fortune, and that he had bought some and would buy more. He added that he was in "treaty" for the only bank in the Territory of Iowa. It looked like a handsome speculation and he would probably go into it. Cameron seems always to have been on the scent of chances to engage in profitable business ventures.

81 Exec. Doc. No. 229, 79-95.

⁸² Major E. A. Hitchcock stated, Hitchcock to Crawford, St. Louis, November 6, 1838, *Exec. Doc.* No. 229, 7, that Philadelphia bank notes were used to purchase the half-breed claims, while General Joseph M. Street stated, statement, n. p., n. d., *Exec. Doc.* No. 229, 57, and Street

to Hitchcock, Prairie du Chien, January 8, 1839, Exec. Doc. No. 229, 64, that the money paid out was notes of the Middletown bank, of which General Cameron was cashier; and that no other bank notes were flush about Prairie du Chien at that time except miserable, depreciated paper of Wisconsin.

83 Ida M. Street, "The Simon Cameron Indian Commission of 1838,"

Annals of Iowa, VII, Third Series (1905), 115-139, 172-195.

84 One of the best examples of how far these stories strayed from the documentary-supported facts is found in Rudolph Blankenburg's "Forty Years in the Wilderness; or Masters and Rulers," The Arena, XXXIII (January, 1905), 3-4. "His [Cameron's] first leap into notoriety came through a shady transaction occurring during the administration of Van Buren in which he was the authorized Government agent to pay the Winnebago Indians a large sum of money in consideration of their release of certain lands to the United States. Cameron was at the time President of a bank in Middletown, Pa., and it was charged that he deposited the specie intrusted to him for the discharge of debts of the Indians, in his own bank, taking with him the equivalent of the amount in new bank-bills. He is also said to have equipped himself with a large stock of beads, gewgaws and cheap finery of the sort that would be likely to strike the fancy of the aborigines. After having first induced the Indians to accept his new Middletown bank notes, which they regarded as the prettiest money they ever saw, in payment of their claims against the Government, he proceeded to sell the cheap stock in trade to his easy dupes to an amount sufficient to cover nearly the entire payment he had made to them. He had left the specie in his own bank before starting on his mission, and he brought back nearly all the paper notes which represented the amount. Whether the story was exaggerated or not, it won for him the derisive title the 'Old Winnebago,' which clung to him for a generation." Here Mr. Blankenburg with an "it is charged" launched into a scurrilous story, rather current in his day, the facts of which are disproved by even a cursory examination of the documents. This article by Blankenburg is rather long and covers other periods of Cameron's life. He handles the facts as lightly and with as little regard for the truth in these other periods as in the one just quoted.

85 Cameron to Simon Gratz, Middletown, December 11, 1838, Grantz

Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁸⁶ Written communication of ten Indian chiefs in reply to a speech to them by Commissioner Fleming explaining his purpose in calling them together, September 26, 1839, Prairie du Chien, File F 156, Records of Interior Department, National Archives.

87 Nicholas Boilvin to Cameron, Prairie du Chien, September 30, 1839, St. Louis, October 22, December 20, 1839; Saterlee Clark to Cameron, Prairie du Chien, October 12, 1839; Judge J. H. Lockwood to

Cameron, St. Louis, October 24, 1839, Cameron Papers.

⁸⁸ Judge J. H. Lockwood to Cameron, St. Louis, October 24, 1839, Cameron Papers.

89 George M. Brooks to D. M. Brodhead, Prairie du Chien, May 22,

1839, Cameron Papers.

⁹⁰ George M. Brooks to Cameron, Fort Crawford, August 14, 1839, Cameron Papers.

91 John Fleming, Jr., to Cameron, New York, December 5, 1839,

Cameron Papers.

92 Cameron to Buchanan, Lancaster, December 10, 1839, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

93 John Fleming, Jr., Report on the Winnebago Claims Settlements, January n. d., 1840, Prairie du Chien, File F 156, Record of Interior Department, National Archives.

94 John Fleming, Jr., to Cameron, Washington, March 7, 1840, Cam-

eron Papers.

⁹⁵ James Cooper to Cameron, Washington, May 15, 1840, Cameron Papers.

⁹⁶ Contest for United States senatorship, 1855, post, 139.

⁹⁷ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, April 22, 1839, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁹⁸ Meneely, op. cit., 79.

CHAPTER III

¹ Ante, 10-11. See also footnote 33, 249.

² Dunaway, op. cit., 464-467. The Bank of Middletown co-operated

with the state to the fullest extent in the matter of relief notes.

³ The Protector (Harrisburg), February 22, 1842, quoted in Asa Earl Martin and Hiram Herr Shenk, eds., Pennsylvania History Told by Contemporaries (New York, 1925), 420-422, presents an article by an anonymous author summarizing the resources and credit of Pennsylvania.

⁴ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, February 14, 1837, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵ Id. to id., Middletown, May 27, 1839, and Philadelphia, May 28, 1839, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa. Forney at that period was a Demo-

cratic editor and an ardent supporter of Buchanan.

⁶ Id. to id., Middletown, May 15, 1844, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa. The author quotes here at some length not only to show Cameron's sensing of reserve toward him on the part of Buchanan, but also to show how loyal was his devotion to Buchanan. It will be seen how, during the next year, they parted political company and were at times in the 'fifties bitter political opponents.

⁷ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, January 14, 1842, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

[§] Id. to id., Middletown, February 21, 1842, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁹ Id to id., Middletown, March 5, 1842, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

10 Id. to id., Middletown, March 9, 1842, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc.

of Pa

¹¹ Pennsylvania Reporter, Harrisburg, October 21, 1842.

On joint ballot	Democrats	Whigs,
Senate	19	14
House	60	40
	79	54

October 14 1842 Ruchenen

¹² Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, October 14, 1842, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

¹³ Pennsylvania Reporter, Harrisburg, January 10, 1843.

14 Stanwood, op. cit., 206.

¹⁵ Cameron to Buchanan, Harrisburg, January ²³, ¹⁸⁴⁴, Buchanan

Papers Hist. Soc. of Pa.

¹⁶ Washington Globe, February 5, 1844, and reprinted by Niles' Register, LXV (February 14, 1844), 392-393. A somewhat similar letter had been written by Johnson to Col. Seth Salisbury, White Sulphur, Kentucky, January 20, 1844, quoted in Niles' Register, LXVI (March 9, 1844), 23-24.

¹⁷ Richard M. Johnson to Cameron, White Sulphur, Kentucky, February 9, 1844, quoted in the *Globe*, March 6, 1844, and in *Niles' Register*, LXVI (March 9, 1844), 24; a part of this letter, but without date, is also quoted in Leland W. Meyer, *The Life and Times of Colonel Rich-*

ard M. Johnson of Kentucky (New York, 1932), 462.

¹⁸ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, January 21, 1844, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

¹⁹ Muhlenberg had the united support of his party and his election was assured, but in the midst of the campaign on August twelfth, he died from a stroke of apoplexy. Frances R. Shunk of Pittsburgh was then chosen to continue the campaign as the Democratic standard-bearer.

²⁰ American Sentinel (Philadelphia), March 9, 1844.

²¹ Niles' Register, LXVI (May 4, 1844), 153-157.

²²Stanwood, op. cit., 209-211.

23 Moore, Works of James Buchanan, V, 437-439.

²⁴ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, May 15, 1844, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

²⁵ Buchanan to Mrs. James J. Roosevelt, Washington, May 13, 1844, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, Works of James Buchanan, VI, 1-3.

²⁶ Buchanan to Henry D. Foster and Benjamin H. Brewster, Washington, May 25, 1844, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, Works of James Buchanan, VI, 4.

²⁷ Benjamin F. Butler to Van Buren, Baltimore, May 27, 1844, Van

Buren Papers, L, Library of Congress.

²⁸ Niles' Register, LXVI (June 1, 1844), 211-216; Stanwood, op. cit., 211-212.

²⁹ I. L. O'Sullivan to Van Buren, Baltimore, May 27, 28, 1844, Van Buren Papers, L. Library of Congress.

30 National Intelligencer, May 29, 1844; Niles' Register, LXVI (June

1, 1844), 211-216; Stanwood, op. cit., 212.

31 National Intelligencer, May 30, 1844.

³² Silas Wright to B. F. Butler, Washington, May 29, 1844, in Jabez D. Hammond, *Life and Times of Silas Wright* (Syracuse, 1848), 471-472. The magnetic telegraph, a new invention, with a line from Baltimore to Washington, had been put into use just as this convention opened.

33 Niles Register, LXVI (June 1, 1844), 211, 216-218.

34 William E. Dodd, Jefferson Davis (Philadelphia, 1907), 63.

³⁵ Benjamin F. Butler to Van Buren, New York, May 31, 1844, Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress.

³⁶ Polk Papers, Library of Congress, for May, 1844.

³⁷ Stanwood, op. cit., 199-201, 215-216.

38 Niles' Register, LXVI (May 4, 1844), 146-148.

³⁹ Stanwood, *op. cit.*, 220-221.

⁴⁰ Ante, 47. See also footnote 21, 257.

⁴¹ Henry Clay to Thomas M. Peters and John M. Jackson, Ashland, July 27, 1844, Niles' Register, LXVI (August 31, 1844), 439, copied from the North Alabamian, August 16, 1844. He declared that "far from having any personal objections to the annexation of Texas, I should be glad to see it, without dishonor—without war, with the common consent of the Union, and upon just and fair terms." In his Raleigh letter he had made a point of the slavery issue, and the fact that because of it a considerable and respectable portion of the confederacy was opposed to admission of Texas. In the new letter he declared: "the subject of slavery ought not to affect the question one way or the other. . . . It would be unwise to refuse a permanent acquisition, which will exist as long as the globe remains, on account of a temporary institution."

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, Buchanan, VI, 70, 72-74.

⁴³ James K. Polk to John K. Kane, Columbia, Tennessee, June 19,

1844, Niles' Register, LXVI (July 6, 1844), 295.

⁴⁴ Robert J. Walker to Polk, Baltimore, May 20, 1844, Polk Papers, Library of Congress, and quoted in Justin H. Smith, *The Annexation of Texas* (New York, 1911), 314.

⁴⁵ Eugene Irwin McCormac, James K. Polk (Berkeley, 1922), 665. ⁴⁶ Carl Schurz, Life of Henry Clay (New York, 1899), II, 257.

⁴⁷ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, July 2, 1844, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

48 Ibid.

⁴⁹ Id. to id., Middletown, July 21, 1844, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵⁰ Buchanan to Polk, Lancaster, September 23, 1844, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵¹ H. A. Muhlenberg to J. K. Polk, Reading, August 6, 1844, Cameron

Papers.

⁵² Cameron to Polk, October 18, 1844, Polk Papers, Library of Congress.

53 McCormac, op. cit., 278.

54 Quoted in Justin H. Smith, op. cit., 314.

55 Buchanan to ______, Lancaster, September 6, 1844, Buchanan

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, Buchanan, VI, 70.

⁵⁶ Niles' Register, LXVII (November 23, 1844), 181. The official Pennsylvania vote stood: Polk, 167,245; Clay, 160,863; Birney, 3,133.

⁵⁷ Buchanan to Shunk, Harrisburg, August 14, and Lancaster, August 15, 1844, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore *Buchanan*, VI, 66-69.
 ⁵⁸ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, September 5, 1844, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵⁹ Niles' Register, LXVII (November 2, 1844), 131.

60 Buchanan to Polk, Lancaster, November 4, 1844, Buchanan Papers,

Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore Buchanan, VI, 72-74.

⁶¹ Polk to Buchanan, Washington, February 17, 1845, and Buchanan to Polk, Washington, February 18, 1845, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, *Buchanan*, VI, 110-112.

62 Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, December 7, 1844, Buchanan

Papers, Library of Congress.

63 Id. to id., Philadelphia, January 23, 1845, Buchanan Papers, Library

of Congress.

64 Id. to id., Harrisburg, February 8, 1845, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa. In another letter, id. to id., Middletown, February 26, 1845, Buchanan Papers, Library of Congress, Cameron, noting that it was taken for granted at Harrisburg that Buchanan would leave the Senate for the cabinet, declared: "The feeling in regard to it among your friends is one of mingled pride and regret. Every sensible man says you do right, while they all think the Senate will need your experience and talents to retain its present high character. Your opponents of the Whig party, all, in speaking of you now, express gratification that Penn. has one man, whom the whole nation seems willing to call to the second place in Government, without a word of complaint. Those few in our ranks who have been your enemies are struck dumb by the general burst of approbation. My vanity is raised because it proves what I have always said, that we shall yet have our state pride so deeply fixed that you will be looked upon as common property."

65 Parts of Woodward's letter to the Native Americans on the subject of tariff are quoted in Niles' Register, LXVIII (June 28, 1845), 263.

66 Pennsylvania Telegraph (Harrisburg), March 15, 1845; Niles' Register, LXVIII (March 22, 1845), 32.

67 McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 96.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 94.

⁶⁹ The Order of United Americans became known as the Know Nothing Order. Upon entering the political field the party became known as the Native American, or American, Party, though the Know-

Nothing label still clung to them.

⁷⁰ The Cameron Papers contain these letters of inquiry from the Native Americans and from the Whigs, with copies of Cameron's replies, to the Native Americans on March 12, 1845, and to the Whigs on March 13, 1845; Niles' Register, LXVIII (June 28, 1845), 264-265, gives the Whig letter with General Cameron's reply.

71 James Cooper and John Banks ranked third and fourth on early ballots with also several scattered votes for other candidates. *Pennsyl*-

vania Telegraph, March 15, 1845.

72 Pennsylvania Telegraph, March 15, 1845.

73 Quoted in Niles' Register, LXVIII, May 3, 1845.

⁷⁴ Ante, 58. See also footnote 64, 259.

75 Cameron to Buchanan, Harrisburg, March 13, 1845, Cameron Pa-

pers.

⁷⁶ Lewis S. Coryell to John C. Calhoun, Washington, April 6, 1845, Correspondence Addressed to John C. Calhoun 1837-1849, edited by Chauncey S. Boucher and Robert P. Brooks, American Historical Association Annual Report, 1929, 292.

77 John W. Forney to Morton McMichael, Lancaster, March 14, 1845,

John W. Forney Papers, Library of Congress.

78 Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, March 27, 1845, Buchanan

Papers, Library of Congress.

⁷⁹ Niles' Register, LXVIII (June 28, 1845), 262-265, published the "Address to the Democracy of Pennsylvania" and the major part of the correspondence, with Dallas and Buchanan. Buchanan's letter may be found in Moore, *Buchanan*, VI, 137-139. The *Democratic Union*, June 25, 1845, published the replies of both Buchanan and Dallas.

CHAPTER IV

¹ Milo M. Quaife, ed., "The Diary of James K. Polk" (Chicago,

1910), April 25, 1846, I, 357.

² St. George L. Sioussat, ed., "Papers of Major John P. Heiss of Nashville," *Tennessee Historical Magazine*, II, nos. 2, 3 (June, September, 1916), 137-147; 208-230. Dr. Sioussat presents in his introduction, supplementary to the letters, a keen analysis of the transactions which led to the establishment of the *Union. Niles' Register*, LXVIII (May 10, 1845), 153, announces the establishment of the *Union* as the official organ of the Polk administration, and quotes the *Globe* announcement

of the transfer of that establishment to Messrs. Ritchie and Heiss. The first number of the *Union* appeared on May 1, 1845.

³ Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years View (New York, 1856), II,

650-651.

⁴ Francis W. Pickens to John C. Calhoun, Edgewood, September 9, 1844, J. Franklin Jamison, ed., Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1899, II, 968-969.

⁵ John Tyler to Thomas Ritchie, Sherwood Forest, January 9, 1851, Lyon Gardiner Tyler, *The Letters and Times of the Tylers* (Richmond, 1885), II, 409-411; this letter was published in the *Union*, January 15, 1851.

⁶ Diary, April 25, 1846, I, 356-359.

William E. Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics (New York, 1933), I, 178-179. Donelson again refused when a few weeks later Polk almost begged him to accept associate editorship with Ritchie on the new paper, and promised him that a business partner would advance all of the money, leaving him and Ritchie to pay nothing; that he would get the printing of Congress which in a short time would make a fortune for him. James K. Polk to A. J. Donelson, Washington, March 28, 1845, St. George L. Sioussat, "The Letters of James K. Polk to Andrew J. Donelson, 1843-1848," Tennessee Historical Magazine, III (March, 1917), 62-64.

⁸ Benton, op. cit., 651-655.

9 Tyler, op. cit., 409-411.

¹⁰ Union, January 15, 1851, and quoted in Sioussat, "Papers of Major John P. Heiss . . . , "Tennessee Historical Magazine, II, 212.

¹¹ Globe, December 31, 1850; Union, January 2, 1851.

¹² Sioussat, "Papers of Major John P, Heiss . . . ," loc. cit., II, 212-213; Blair to Jackson, April 17, 1845, Jackson Papers, Library of Congress.

13 William A. Harris to John C. Calhoun, Washington, July 11, 1845,

Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, loc. cit., II, 1042.

¹⁴ Cameron to Coryell, Middletown, March 31, April 12, 1845, Coryell Papers, IV, 28, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

¹⁵ Sioussat, "Papers of Major John P. Heiss . . . ," loc. cit., II, 221.

16 Ibid., 221-222.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 213; *Globe*, December 31, 1850.

¹⁸ Benton, op. cit., 655.

¹⁹ Buchanan to Horatio King, Wheatland, July 14, 1866, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, *Buchanan*, XI, 420-421.

²⁰ Blair to Cameron, Silver Springs, August 27, 1856, Cameron Papers.

²¹ Senate Journal, 28 Cong., 2 Sess., Appendix, 285-287.

²² Pennsylvania Telegraph (weekly), July 16, 1845; Harrisburg Democratic Union (weekly), July 16, 1845.

²³ McClure, op. cit., I, 98-99.

²⁴ Cameron to Buchanan, Harrisburg, March 13, 1845, Cameron Papers.
 ²⁵ James Daniel Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Pa-

pers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1897), IV, 385-416; Congressional Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 4-11.

²⁶ Diary, December 2, 1845, I, 110-111. Cameron's charge, however, that the people of Pennsylvania had been deceived by the Kane letter, did not come with good grace from his lips, for if deception had been employed, he himself had been one of the chief offenders. See ante, 54-55.

27 Richardson, op. cit., IV, 378-379.

28 Ibid., 403-406.

²⁹ Walker, a Senator from Mississippi when the 1842 tariff was passed, had bitterly opposed it. He was opposed to the doctrine of protection, believing that protective duties bore unjustly and severely upon the agricultural section with which he was identified. He came to his new office with a determination to overthrow the 1842 Act which he had been unable to defeat in the Senate. Blaine, writing about him forty years later, considered Walker "a man of great originality, somewhat speculative in his views, and willing to experiment on questions of revenue to the point of rashness." James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress (Norwich, 1884), I, 194.

³⁰ Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 8-13.

³¹ On July 29, 1846, the day the Walker Tariff was passed by Congress, Buchanan wrote confidentially to John W. Forney, editor of the Pennsylvanian, of his great dissatisfaction with this Tariff Act, of his preference for the Tariff of 1842, and of his belief that the new Act would "operate more prejudicially on Pennsylvania than any other State." Moore, Buchanan, VII, 43-45. Similar sentiments were expressed in his letter to Henry D. Foster on November 19, 1846, Moore, Buchanan, VII, 117.

32 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 670.

33 Ibid., 991. The Harrisburg Democratic Union, January 21, 1846, commenting on the unanimous adoption of this resolution in the senate of Pennsylvania where it was introduced, says that it is "another evidence that Pennsylvania is determined to adhere to that policy which has ever advanced her great interests, developed her resources, and given employment to a large class of her citizens. In Pennsylvania the tariff has never been a party question. Pennsylvania supported the tariff acts of 1816, 1824, and 1828, and opposed the compromise act of 1883."

34 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., i Sess. 1053. Niles' Register, LXX (July 11, 1846), 290, presents an analysis of the House of Representatives vote by both states and parties. Also is reprinted an article from the Baltimore Patriot of July seventh on the possibilities of the House tariff bill passing the Senate. This article analyzes the vote on reference of the bill to the committee on finance, which is regarded as a test vote, and speculates on what attitude Vice President Dallas would take if he were called

upon to vote on the measure.

35 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1045, 1049-1053, Appendix, 767-771.

³⁶ Charles Buxton Going, *David Wilmot* (New York, 1924), 84-93. When the bill came back from the Senate with an amendment Wilmot voted that the bill and amendment be laid on the table. This failed and he later voted against concurring in the amendment of the Senate and was again in the minority. *Cong. Globe*, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1165.

³⁷ Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1081.

38 Ibid., 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1132.

³⁹ Ibid., 29 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 1130-1137.

40 *Ibid.*, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1144-1145, 1149-1155.

⁴¹ Ibid., 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1143-1144, 1151-1155, Appendix, 1152-1154.

42 Ibid., 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1156.

⁴³ Philadelphia American Sentinel, July 30, 1846; Harrisburg Argus, quoted in Niles' Register, LXX (August 29, 1846), 405. The Pittsburgh Chronicle, quoted in the American Sentinel, July 30, 1846, declared that "the people of Pittsburgh, of all classes and of whatever politics, are favorable to the Tariff, and with one voice protest the recent action

of Congress on the Tariff."

- 44 Cong. Globe, 1157-1158; McCormac, James K. Polk, 675-677. It is to be noted that Vice President Dallas did not vote on the final passage of the Tariff Act of 1846. Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, I, 195; McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 100; Cloud Moore Fuess, Daniel Webster (Boston, 1930), II, 165; Roy F. Nichols, "George Mifflin Dallas," Dictionary of American Biography, V, 39; and others report that the Tariff Act of 1846 was carried in the Senate by the casting vote of Mr. Dallas. An examination of the Congressional Globe, and the Senate Journal for July 28, 1846, reveals that twice on that day during debates on the tariff bill the Senate was locked with a tie vote: first, on the motion to commit the bill to a special committee with instructions to modify it; and second, on the question of ordering the bill to a third reading. In the first case Vice President Dallas voted in the negative and in the second case he voted in the affirmative. In the vote on the bill following the third reading twenty-eight Senators voted in the affirmative and twenty-seven voted in the negative. Therefore Mr. Dallas did not cast the deciding vote.
- ⁴⁵ Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1164-1166. Representatives Robert C. Winthrop (Massachusetts), George Rathbun (New York), and James Thompson (Pennsylvania) led in the use of obstructionist tactics.

46 Diary, July 30, 1846, II, 55-56.

⁴⁷ George Minot, ed., The Statutes at Large and Treaties of the United States of America (Boston, 1851), IX, 42-49.

48 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 128-130.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 30 Cong., I Sess., 508; 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 432. The Pennsylvania Telegraph, the Philadelphia Public Ledger, and other Pennsylvania newspapers contain many notices of petitions for modification of the tariff submitted by Senator Cameron in the United States Senate.

⁵⁰ F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (New York, 1905), 6th edition, 121-122.

⁵¹ Philadelphia North American and United States Gazette, August

16, 1847.

⁵² Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, Chronicle, August 21, 1847.

⁵⁸ Joseph Schafer, A History of the Pacific Northwest (New York, 1918), 173-185; "British Attitude toward the Oregon Question," American Historical Review, XVI (January, 1911), 273-299.

54 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 4.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 716-717, 720-721; Statutes at Large, IX, 109-110.

⁵⁶ Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 717.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 29 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 1168-1178.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 1060-1063. ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 1061,1078. ⁶⁰ *Diary*, January 3, 1846, I, 152-153.

⁶¹ Cameron to Buchanan, n. p., December 25, 1845, Buchanan Papers, Library of Congress. An earlier letter, *id* to *id*., Middletown, February 4, 1845, Buchanan Papers, Library of Congress, indicates that both Buchanan and John M. Read were interested in obtaining appointment to the Supreme Court.

62 Diary, December 24, 25, 1845, I, 137, 144.

63 Ibid., January 22, 1846, 183-186; Niles' Register, LXIX (January 31, 1846), 342. In the course of the period when the Senate was considering the nomination of Judge Woodward, some rather unkind remarks were applied to the President by Cameron which tended to widen the barrier that had developed between them. Polk's Diary, January 28, 29, February 11, 1846, I, 198-203, 215-218.

64 Diary, August 1, 3, 1846, II, 61-62. The author finds no evidence to support Blaine's contention (Thirty Years in Congress, I, 196) that Cameron forced the President to nominate Judge Grier, or to confirm McClure's implication (Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 99) that Buchanan supported Woodward's nomination, but rather evidence to

the contrary.

65 Diary, January 3, February 11, 1846, I, 151-152, 218-221.

66 *Ibid*, May 25, 27, 1846, I, 426, 430. 67 *Ibid*., May 28, 29, 1846, I, 435, 537. 68 *Ibid*., June 13, 1846, I, 468-469. 69 *Ibid*., June 24, 1846, I, 485-486.

70 Cameron to H. Simpson, Washington, January 11, 1847, Gratz Col-

lection, Hist. Soc. of Pa., Case 2, Box 24.

⁷¹ Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 1936), 236; Justin H. Smith, The Annexation of Texas (New York, 1911), 7, 19; George Pierce Garrison, Westward Extension (New York, 1906), 101-105, volume XVII of The American Nation, edited by Albert B. Hart.

72 Polk's Diary, May 9, 1846, I, 384-386.

⁷³ Richardson, op. cit., IV, 437-443.

74 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 791-804; Statutes at Large, IX, 9-10.

⁷⁵ Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 797, 803-804. ⁷⁶ Ibid., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 95.

77 *Ibid.*, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1217.

78 lbid., 1218.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1220-1221.

80 Ibid., 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 425.

81 Ibid., 555-556.

82 Ibid., 573.

83 *Ibid.*, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 551. 84 *Ibid.*, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 551.

85 Polk's Diary, April 15, 1847, II, 477-478.

86 Ibid., February 23, 28, 1848, III, 352, 364-365. 87 Senate Journal, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 644.

88 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 171.

89 Harrisburg Argus, quoted in Lewisburg Chronicle, August 28, 1847.

90 New York Tribune, December 11, 1847.

⁹¹ William Brua Cameron to Buchanan, Philadelphia, March 17, 25, April 5, 10, 1847, Buchanan Papers, Library of Congress.

⁹² Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, April 10, 1847, Buchanan

Papers, Library of Congress.

⁹³ Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 653.

94 Ibid., 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 60.

95 Philadelphia Public Ledger, March 6, 1849.

96 Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 687.

⁹⁷ Pennsylvania Telegraph, March 10, 1849. Senator Foote was known as a Southern Hotspur. He nearly came to blows with other Senators during the next session, and his conduct, because of deliberately drawing a loaded pistol from his pocket and cocking it in an altercation with Senator Thomas H. Benton, was the subject of senatorial investigation. New York *Tribune*, April 18, 19, 20, August 3, 1850.

CHAPTER V

¹ Demcratic Union, July 9, 1845.

² Niles' Register, LXIX (November 1, 1845), 135. ³ Niles' Register, LXIX (October 11, 1845), 96.

4 Ante, 13-14.

⁵ Niles' Register, LXX (May 2, June 6, 1846), 144, 213-214. By the fall of 1848 the plans for a continuous railroad from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh had materialized under the name of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and construction was in progress. An account of the route followed from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh, with grades, tunnels, and distances between points, is set forth in an article in Niles' Register, LXXIV (November 29, 1848), 345. Three and a half years later the Pennsylvania

legislature authorized the issuance of \$5,000,000 of state bonds for the furtherance of the project for railroad connections between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. The New York *Tribune*, May 5, 1852, while recognizing this competition with New York's already completed lines by way of the Lakes, congratulated Philadelphians on waking up to the possibilities for extensive trade with the West.

⁶ Niles' Register, LXXI (October 24, November 7, 1846), 121, 150;

Biographical Directory of American Congresses, 1774-1927, 217.

⁷ Going, op. cit., 150-151.

8 lbid., 154-155.

⁹ Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., 1165.

10 Cameron to Buchanan, n. p., October 20, 1846, Buchanan Papers,

Library of Congress.

¹¹ Buchanan to Henry D. Foster, Washington, November 19, 1846, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, *Buchanan*, VII, 117-118.

12 Niles' Register, LXXII (March 13, 1847), 20; Biographical Directory

of American Congresses, 1774-1927, 196, 203, 1139.

¹³ Buchanan to Charles Kessler *et al.*, Washington, August ²⁵, ¹⁸⁴⁷, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, *Buchanan*, VII, ³⁸⁵⁻³⁸⁷; also published in the *Pennsylvanian*, August ³⁰, ¹⁸⁴⁷.

¹⁴ Niles' Register, LXXIII (September 18, 1847), 45.

¹⁵ Buchanan to Charles Kessler *et al.*, Washington, August ²⁵, ¹⁸⁴⁷, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, *Buchanan*, VII, ³⁸⁵⁻³⁸⁶.

¹⁶ Dunaway, op. cit., 469.

¹⁷ Harrisburg *Telegraph*, November 2, 1847; New York *Tribune*, November 4, 1847.

18 Union, October 16, 1847; Niles' Register, LXXIII (October 23,

1847), 128.

¹⁹ Cameron to Buchanan, Middletown, October 28, 1847, Cameron Papers.

²⁰ "P. V." to Horace Greeley, Westchester, Pennsylvania, October

21, 1847, New York *Tribune*, October 25, 1847.

²¹ Pennsylvania Archives, Fourth Series, Papers of the Governors

(Harrisburg, 1902), VII, 275-276.

²² Cameron to Buchanan, Washington, July 7, 1848, Buchanan Papers, Library of Congress. Cameron was confined to his room by illness when he wrote this letter. His reference to Wright is to Silas Wright of New York, who refused the Democratic nomination for vice president in 1844 and successfully campaigned for the office of Governor of New York that summer and fall.

²³ George Plitt to Buchanan, Philadelphia, July 11, 1848, Buchanan

Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁴ New York *Tribune*, July 21, 1848; *Niles' Register*, LXXIV (August 2, 1848), 69.

²⁵ Pennsylvania Archives, Papers of the Governors, VII, 283-285.

²⁶ Niles' Register, LXXIV (September 6, 1848), 152.

²⁷ Public Ledger, October 25, 1848; National Era, October 19, November 2, 1848; Niles' Register, LXXIV (November 1, 1848), 276, presents the official vote tabulated by counties.

28 Pennsylvania Archives, Papers of the Governors, VII, 280; Dun-

away, op. cit., 471-473.

²⁹ Public Ledger, October 13, 1848.

30 Niles' Register, LXXII (April 24, 1847), 128.

³¹ Philadelphia *Inquirer*, quoted in *Niles' Register*, LXXII (April 17, 1847), 97.

32 James Cameron to Simon Cameron, New Orleans, April 1, 1847,

Cameron Papers.

³³ Niles' Register, LXXIII, (September 25, 1847), 62.

34 Ibid. (October 23, 1847), 126-127.

³⁵ Cameron to B. Parke, Washington, January 6, 1848, Harris Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

36 Ibid.

³⁷ Union, February 14, 1848.

38 Niles' Register, LXXIV (August 2, 1848), 72.

³⁹ Cameron to Buchanan, Baltimore, May 22, 23, 24, 1848, Cameron Papers; *id.* to *id.*, Middletown, May 27, 1848, Buchanan Papers, Library of Congress. Two sets of delegates came from New York, both seeking admission. The convention received both, alloting to each delegate a half-vote. Neither delegation voted in the convention. The "Hunkers" stayed, but the "Barnburners" left the convention.

40 National Era, May 25, June 1, 1848; New York Tribune, May 26,

1848.

⁴¹ National Era, June 15, 1848; New York Tribune, June 9, 1848. A majority was sufficient to nominate in the Whig convention.

42 Niles' Register, LXXIV (July 5, August 16, 1848), 8, 109-110.

43 Stanwood, op. cit., 232.

44 William O. Lynch, "Zachary Taylor as President," Journal of

Southern History, IV (August, 1938), 282.

⁴⁵ Stanwood, *op. cit.*, 223, 243. Taylor and Cass received an equal number of electoral votes outside of Pennsylvania. Van Buren and Cass ran about even in New York. The Whig vote in New York was but slightly below that of 1844.

46 Ibid., op. cit., 243.

⁴⁷ Public Ledger, November 22, 1848; Niles' Register, LXXIV (November 22, 1848), 333.

⁴⁸ National Era, December 14, 1848, presents the official vote of Pennsylvania by counties.

⁴⁹ New York *Tribune*, November 8, 1848.

⁵⁰ Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 1133.

⁵¹ Pennsylvania Telegraph, November 21, 1848. The writer of this article seems to have overlooked the election of 1796, when Pennsylvan-

ia's vote was registered for Thomas Jefferson, and the election of 1824, when her vote was registered for Andrew Jackson.

⁵² Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 18-19.

⁵³ James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress (Norwich, 1884), I, 194.

⁵⁴ Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 18-19.

⁵⁵ James Campbell to William Bigler, January 28, 1849, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵⁶ Cited in Pennsylvania Telegraph, December 5, 1848.

⁵⁷ Public Ledger, January 6, 1849.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, January 10, 1849.

⁵⁹ Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 Sess., 231.

60 Buchanan to Wm. M. Meredith, Washington, June 12, September 25, 1848; Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 87, 202; Curtis, op. cit., II, 1-5.

¹⁶ Curtis, op. cit., II, 5.

CHAPTER VI

¹ Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., 171, 428.

² Fletcher M. Green, "Duff Green: Industrial Promoter," *Journal of Southern History*, II (February, 1936), 4. This was the same General Duff Green who figured so prominently as editor of the *United States Telegraph* in the Jackson period.

³ James Cameron to Simon Cameron, New Orleans, April 1, 1847,

Cameron Papers.

- ⁴ The will, dated September 21, 1849, is among the Cameron Papers. James, a Colonel of the 79th Regiment, New York Volunteers, known as "The New York Highlanders," was killed July 21, 1861, at the Battle of Bull Run.
- ⁵ Cameron to Thomas Elder, n. p., February 22, 1848, Gratz Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.
- ⁶ Thomas Elder to Cameron, Harrisburg, February 24, 1848, Gratz Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁷ Cameron Papers, for the period 1852-1856.

⁸ The Autograph Collection of Simon Gratz, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, contains much correspondence of Cameron and the Gratz brothers, Edward and David, which illustrates Cameron's problems with his board in the making of loans to friends. Examining especially the decade 1842 to 1852 we find that in October of 1842 Cameron's board demanded a mortgage to cover the loans to Gratz as security for the bank. After more than a year of negotigations the mortgage was granted. Later the board exerted pressure for reduction of the principal, while Gratz seems to have had difficulty in paying even the interest. In November Cameron wrote to Edward Gratz that he regretted that proceedings had been taken against his brother David; this was done entirely without his authority and he had asked that they be stopped immediately. There is no indication in this series of letters as to the

settlement of this difficulty. However, both Edward and David continued to seek loans from Cameron's Bank of Middletown. They were put off for some years, but in the early 1850s some further short-term loans were made to them.

⁹ From notes taken on interviews with Mrs. W. H. Bradley (Eliza McCormick Cameron), Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, granddaughter of Simon and daughter of J. Donald Cameron. Mrs. Bradley has a vast store of information on the Cameron family; she graciously answered many questions, clarifying several problems and providing information which otherwise might have remained obscure.

¹⁰ Harris Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa., for the years 1855-1857.

¹¹ Cameron Papers for 1853.

¹² Philadelphia *Inquirer*, March 5, 1861.

¹³ John Bingham to Cameron, Philadelphia, January 13, 1854, Cameron Papers.

¹⁴ Cameron to L. S. Coryell, Lochiel, August 26, September 18, 1857,

Coryell Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

¹⁵ Henry McCormick to Cameron, Harrisburg, June 5, 1858, Cameron

Papers. This is one of the several letters of similar tenor.

- ¹⁶ New York *Tribune*, October 12, 1850. The Democrats had a majority of one in the senate and twenty in the house, thus a majority of twenty-one over the Whigs when the legislature met jointly in convention.
- ¹⁷ George P. Hamilton to William Bigler, Pittsburgh, September 1, 1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

18 E. A. Penniman to William Bigler, Philadelphia, September 3,

1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

19 Id. to id., Harrisburg, January 5, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.
 20 William J. Hemphill to William Bigler, Harrisburg, January 6, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

²¹ New York *Tribune*, January 15, 1851.

²² E. A. Penniman to William Bigler, Harrisburg, January 11, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

²³ New York *Tribune*, January 14, 1851.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, January 15, 1851. Governor William F. Johnston had declined the nomination which was tendered to him by the caucus of the Whig members of the legislature. The election was decided on the first ballot. Brodhead received seventy-six votes while the Whigs scattered their votes in a complimentary fashion among more than a dozen of their prominent leaders. New York *Tribune*, January 16, 1851.

²⁵ Samuel S. Bigler to William Bigler, Harrisburg, June 17, 1850,

Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

²⁶ George Sanderson to William Bigler, Lancaster, August 20, 1850, and A. Boyd Hamilton to Bigler, Clearfield, June 26, 1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

²⁷ J. Glancy Jones to William Bigler, Reading, June 24, 1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

²⁸ Stephen Weston to William Bigler, Northumberland, August 29,

1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

²⁹ Thomas Tyler to William Bigler, Philadelphia, January 30, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁰ G. R. Long to William Bigler, Halifax, February 18, 1850, Bigler

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

31 A. Ebough to William Bigler, York, January 28, 1851, Bigler Papers,

Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³² G. R. Long to William Bigler, Halifax, February 18, 1850, and James Campbell to William Bigler, Philadelphia, February 5, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

33 F. W. Hughes to William Bigler, Pottsville, August 25, 1850, Bigler

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁴ Samuel S. Bigler to William Bigler, Harrisburg, June 17, 1850,

Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁵ William Dock to William Bigler, Harrisburg, August 30, 1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁶ Id. to id., Harrisburg, September 4, 1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc.

of Pa.

³⁷ Samuel S. Bigler to William Bigler, Harrisburg, June 7, 1850, and George Sanderson to William Bigler, Lancaster, August 20, 1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³⁸ New York *Tribune*, June 5, 6, 7, 1851.

³⁹ June 7, 1851.

⁴⁰ New York *Tribune*, June 25, 26, 1851. Washington *Union*, June 27, 1851, presented a summary of the proceedings of this convention from the Democratic angle.

41 New York Tribune, June 7, 1851; Cincinnati Gazette, June 10, 1851.

⁴² New York *Tribune*, November 1, 1851. John W. Forney in confidence had joyfully telegraphed the Washington *Union* the day following the election, "We have swept the State by over fifteen thousand." *Union*, October 16, 1851.

⁴³ James Buchanan to William Bigler, Wheatland, October 18, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

44 Tribune Almanac for 1852, 40.

⁴⁵ Cameron to William Bigler, Middletown, October 18, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

 $^{\bar{4}6}$ Ibid.

- ⁴⁷ *Id* to *id*., Philadelphia, November 22, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.
- ⁴⁸ James Burnside to William Bigler, n. p., December 27, 1851, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁴⁹ Dunaway, op. cit., 477-478.

50 Buchanan to Jefferson Davis, Wheatland, March 16, 1850, Buchanan

to William R. King, Wheatland, March 20, 1850, Buchanan to Rev. Jeremiah Schindel, Wheatland, October 28, 1951, and William R. King to Buchanan, Washington, March 20, 1850, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa. These letters are printed in Moore, *Buchanan*, VIII, 372-376.

51 Cameron to Col. Reah Frazer, Middletown, March 19, 1851, Auto-

graph Collection, Simon Cameron, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

52 Jefferson Davis to Buchanan, Senate Chamber, March 15, 1850, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Rowland Dunbar, Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist (Jackson, Miss., 1923), I, 318-319; Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 371-372. As a matter of fact, Buchanan wrote to Davis at this time, March 16, repudiating the report that he had recoiled from the proposition to extend the Missouri Compromise line, and declared, "I am committed for the Missouri Compromise; and that committal shall stand." Two months later he wrote to both Senator King and Senator Henry S. Foote of Mississippi, arguing for extension of the Missouri Compromise. Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 383-388.

⁵³ George Sanderson to Bigler, Lancaster, August 20, 1850, and J. Glancy Jones to Bigler, Reading, August 21, 1850, Bigler Papers, Hist.

Soc. of Pa.

⁵⁴ George P. Hamilton to William Bigler, Pittsburgh, September 1, 1850, Bigler Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

55 A. B. Cummings to Bigler, Philadelphia, January 5, 1851, Bigler

Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵⁶ Luther Kidder to Buchanan, Wilkes-Barre, May 11, 1851, Buchanan Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; Moore, *Buchanan*, VIII, 416.

⁵⁷ Buchanan to Kidder, n. p., May 16, 1851, Buchanan Papers, Hist.

Soc. of Pa.; Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 417.

⁵⁸ New York *Tribune*, June 3, 1851. ⁵⁹ Cincinnati *Gazette*, June 6, 1851.

60 New York Tribune, June 3, 5, 6, 24, 1851.

61 Ibid., July 2, 1851.

- 62 Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 443-446.
 63 New York Tribune, July 25, 1851.
- ⁶⁴ Buchanan to Rev. Jeremiah Schindel, Wheatland, October 28, 1851, Society Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

65 Buchanan to Cave Johnson, Wheatland, December 22, 1851, March

30, 1852, Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 428-430, 447-449.

⁶⁶ James Collan to Cameron, Pittsburgh, December 31, 1853, Cameron Papers.

67 John C. Dunn to Cameron, Pittsburgh, December 22, 1853, February 18, 1854, February 17, 1855, Cameron Papers.

⁶⁸ New York *Tribune*, February 6, 1852.

69 Ibid., March 5, 1852.

70 The 6th, 13th, 14th, and 16th Congressional Districts.

71 New York Tribune, March 6, 1852.

72 Ibid.

⁷³ Stanwood, op. cit., 246-247.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, ²⁴⁷; New York *Tribune*, June ¹⁹, ¹⁸⁵². The letter read before the convention was written by Scott to W. S. Archer on Tuesday night, June ¹⁵, just before the opening of the convention. Scott declared he had decided to write nothing to the convention or to any individual member before nomination, and if nominated would express in his acceptance his views on the compromise measures.

75 New York Tribune, June 3, 4, 1852.

⁷⁶ June 2, 1852.

77 Buchanan to David R. Porter, Wheatland, June 4, 1852, Moore,

Buchanan, VIII, 451-452.

⁷⁸ Pierce, 282; Cass, 2; Buchanan, 2; and six dissenting votes, all from Ohio. Cincinnati *Gazette*, June 7, 1852; New York *Tribune*, June 7, 1852. The latter gives a tally of the votes on all 40 ballots.

⁷⁹ Scott, 159; Fillmore, 112; and Webster, 21. Cincinnati Gazette, June 19-22, 1852; New York Tribune, June 17-22, 1852. The latter gives

a tally of votes through 53 ballots.

80 Stanwood, op. cit., 249, 252.

81 Curtis, Buchanan, II, 35.

82 New York Tribune, August 27, 1852.

83 Cameron to Lewis S. Coryell, Middletown, October 7, 1852, Coryell

Papers, IV, 108, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁸⁴ Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, quoted in the National Era, October 28, 1852. This prophecy was fulfilled when in November the Pennsylvania vote exceeded the vote of 1844 by almost fifty-five thousand.

85 William O. Lynch, "Anti-Slavery Tendencies of the Democratic Party in the Northwest from the Election of General Taylor to the Crisis of 1850," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XI, (December, 1924), 331.

86 Stanwood, op. cit., 256-257.

87 Evening Bulletin records the tally of Pennsylvania votes by counties, and is quoted in the New York *Tribune*, November 15, 1852; Washington *Union*, November 21, 1852; National Era, November 25, 1852.

88 Franklin Pierce to Buchanan, Concord, N. H., December 7, 1852,

Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 492-493.

89 Buchanan to Pierce, Wheatland, December 11, 1852, Moore, Buchanan, VIII, 493-499.

90 Ante, 126-127.

91 Cincinnati Gazette, March 8, 1853.

CHAPTER VII

¹ Cameron to President Franklin Pierce, n. p., May 27, 1853, Cameron Papers.

² Buchanan to James Campbell, Wheatland, April 22, 1853, Cameron

Papers. This letter is marked "private and confidential."

³ The New York Express, quoted in the Cincinnati Gazette, July 3,

1854. Campbell, in denying Buchanan's responsibility for his appointment, asserted that an arrangement had been made between himself and General Pierce before his election, by virtue of which he was to secure for General Pierce the Catholic vote of Pennsylvania and receive in return a seat in the Cabinet. Parker declared himself ready to make affidavit to this statement of Campbell if it be disputed.

⁴ Cameron to L. S. Coryell, Middletown, February 19, 1853, Coryell

Papers, V, 15, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵ Francis J. Grund to Cameron, Washington, February 25, March 22, 1854, Cameron Papers.

⁶ E. B. Chase to Cameron, Montrose, November 7, 1854, Cameron

Papers.

¹Reah Frazer to Cameron, Lancaster, December 31, 1853, Cameron

Papers.

⁸ William Strong to Cameron, n. p., December 31, 1853, Henry A. Muhlenberg to Cameron, Reading, November 25, 1854, Cameron Papers.

⁹ L. Kidder to Cameron, Wilkes-Barre, February 1, 1854, Cameron

Papers.

10 Jeremiah S. Black to Cameron, n. p., February 20, 1854, Cameron

Papers.

¹¹ David Wilmot to Cameron, n. p., n. d. (endorsed by Cameron, February, 1854), and Towanda, February 28, 1854, Cameron Papers.

¹² Washington Union, March 9, 1854.

¹³ *Ibid.*, March 16, 1854. ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, June 23, 1854.

¹⁵ Cong. Globe, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 532, 1254.

¹⁶ Union, May 28, 1854, quoted extensively from the Philadelphia Argus and the Pennsylvanian, both of which applauded "with characteristic boldness and promptitude" the action of the Pennsylvania Democrats in Congress in supporting the Nebraska bill.

¹⁷ Cincinnati Gazette, June 9, 1854.

¹⁸ George W. Bowman to Cameron, Bedford, June 13, 1854, Judge James Thompson to Cameron, Erie, June 15, 1854, Cameron Papers.

¹⁹ Pittsburgh Gazette (Whig), August 21 1854, and Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, September 1, 1854; National Era, September 7, 1854.
 ²⁰ William Bigler to Cameron, Clearfield, July 10, 1854, Cameron

Papers.

²¹ James Thompson to Cameron, Erie, June 15, 1854, Cameron Papers. ²² Isaac W. Hugus to Cameron, Bedford, September 6, 13, 1854, Cameron Papers. Hugus was the Democratic candidate for the state senate in a Whig district. When the money he requested of Cameron was not sent he wrote that he hoped Cameron had no doubt of his integ-

rity to use the money as he had designated.

23 Whig Almanac for 1855, 57. Pollock, 204,008; Bigler, 167,001.

²⁴ National Era, October 26, 1854; Cincinnati Gazette, November 17,

1854, April 17, 1855. Of these twenty-five congressmen only four were

Nebraska men while twenty-one were anti-Nebraska.

²⁵ Whig Almanac for 1855, 57. Black won the judgeship by a plurality, for the "American" candidate's vote of 120,576 plus the vote of the Whig candidate, 78,571, exceeded Black's vote by thirty-two thousand. Mott's large majority was due to his having received the support of both the Democrats and the "Americans."

²⁶ Whig Almanac for 1854, 55; Whig Almanac for 1855, 57. Alexander K. McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War Times (Philadelphia, 1892), 149, expresses belief that the "Americans" really carried an overwhelming majority of the members of the legislature, embracing nominees of both parties. Because of the secrecy of the working of this party at the time it is perhaps impossible to obtain data that is thoroughly reliable. The figures used are those reported by the Whig Almanac. As a matter of fact, when a caucus of "American" members of the legislature was called on February 9, 1855, for the purpose of nominating a candidate for United States Senator, it numbered 91 of the 130 members of the legislature.

²⁷ Quoted in National Era, November 9, 1854.

²⁸ E. B. Chase to Cameron, Montrose, November 7, 1854. Cameron Papers.

²⁹ George Rahn to Benjamin Christ, Philadelphia, November 4, 1854,

Cameron Papers.

³⁰ Charles Frailey to Cameron, Owingsburg, November 6, 1854, Cameron Papers.

³¹ Cameron to L. S. Coryell, Harrisburg, December 25, 1854, Coryell

Papers, V. 30, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

^{\$\frac{3}{2}\$} Cooper had been in feeble health while in the Senate and could not participate in the debates as he desired. His health and his failure to take as decided an antislavery stand as his constituents expected of him practically removed him from consideration for re-election.

33 Cameron to James Cooper, Harrisburg, January 30, 1855, Cameron

Papers

³⁴ James Cooper to Cameron, Washington, January 31, 1855, Cameron Papers.

³⁵ J. K. Kane to Cameron, Philadelphia, January 30, 1855, Cameron

Papers.

³⁶ John M. Kirkpatrick to Cameron, Harrisburg, February 9, 1855,

Cameron Papers.

³⁷ A copy of Cameron's reply to the Kirkpatrick letter is preserved in the Cameron Papers, Library of Congress. This letter was printed in the Cincinnati *Gazette*, January 26, 1857, though the date was erroneously given as 1856.

38 Printed report of the caucus of the "American" members of the

legislature filed with the Cameron Papers.

39 Unfortunately the writer has been unable to identify this clipping

as to paper or date. The clipping is among Cameron's papers of March, 1855. The content of the clipping unmistakably refers to the events of February, 1855.

40 McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 387.

⁴¹ National Era, February 15, 1855.

42 Cincinnati Gazette, February 11, 1855.

43 A copy of this circular of February 12, 1855, is with the Cameron Papers, and another copy in the Miscellaneous Collection of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

44 New York Times, February 13, 1855.

45 Keystone, February 21, 1855.

⁴⁶ Going, op. cit., 467-468. Wilmot's correspondence favorable to Cameron's candidacy for the senatorship was in February, 1854 (ante, 135). Subsequently Wilmot's district took the lead in the state in the Democratic reversal. His district gave Pierce a majority of 2500 in 1852 and in 1854 gave Pollock a majority of more than 4000. This demonstration of revolt against the Democratic machine was widely attributed to Wilmot's influence and to the intensity with which he had urged the issue upon his constituents. Leading newspapers of the district immediataely launched a campaign for Wilmot's election to the Senate. He looked with favor upon the movement but would not push any advantage he had for fear of appearing as a selfish and ambitious aspirant for the place. Going, op. cit., 465-466.

⁴⁷ John C. Dunn to Cameron, Pittsburgh, February 17, 1855, Cameron

Papers.

⁴⁸ K. Pritchett to Cameron, Washington, February 22, 1855, Cameron Papers.

⁴⁹ National Era, March 1, 1855.

50 New York Times, February 26, 1855.

⁵¹ Ibid., February 27, 1855; National Era, March 1, 1855.

⁵² Keystone, March 7, 1855; New York *Times*, February 28, 1855. ⁵³ Keystone, March 7, 1855; New York *Times*, February 28, 1855;

⁵³ Keystone, March 7, 1855; New York Times, February 28, 1855; National Era, March 8, 1855.

⁵⁴ William Larimer, Jr. to Cameron, Pittsburgh, March 10, 1855, Cameron Papers.

55 New York Times, March 9, 1855.

⁵⁶ Cameron to James Veech, Harrisburg, April 28, 1855, Cameron Papers. Veech had polled a few scattered votes during the recent balloting for the senatorship.

⁵⁷ L. A. Makey to Cameron, Lock Haven, September 12, 1855, Cam-

eron Papers.

⁵⁸ J. W. Coke to Cameron, Pottsville, September 28, 1855, Cameron Papers.

⁵⁹ H. E. Muhlenberg to Cameron, Lancaster, October 1, 1855, Cameron Papers.

⁶⁰ Henry B. Hoffman to Cameron, Lykens Tp., May 30, 1855, Cameron Papers.

61 Cincinnati Gazette, April 9, 1855.

⁶² New York *Times*, June 9, 1855, devoted more than a page to the printing of the speeches at the banquet.

63 Cincinnati Gazette, July 7, 1855.

⁶⁴ National Era, February 28, 1856. Reported from speeches of W. F. Johnston and James H. Campbell, in a convention of the order held

in Cincinnati on February 18, 1856.

65 Gaillard Hunt, Israel, Elibu, and Cadwallader Washburne (New York, 1925), 31-35; Henry Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America (Boston, 1874), II, 410-411; Francis Curtis, The Republican Party (New York, 1904), I, 179; James A. Woodburn, Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States, Third Edition (New York, 1924), 97.

66 Gordon S. P. Kleeberg, The Formation of the Republican Party

as a National Organization (New York, 1911), 13-22.

⁶⁷ Quoted in National Era, July 12, 1855.

⁶⁸ The Democrats of Pennsylvania were in convention at Harrisburg on July 5, to nominate a canal commissioner. The two wings of the party disagreed as to support of the national administration's policy.

⁶⁹ Quoted in National Era, July 19, 1855.

⁷⁰ National Era, August 16, 1855.

⁷¹ Ibid., September 13, 20, 1855; Pittsburg Gazette, September 6, 1855.
⁷² Alexander K. McClure, Our Presidents and How We Make Them

(New York, 1900), 136.

73 National Era, October 4, 1855.
74 Tribune Almanac for 1856, 55.

75 Tribune Almanac for 1855, 57; Tribune Almanac for 1856, 55.

76 Keystone, January 16, 1856.

77 Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., 302.

⁷⁸ Cameron Papers, 1854-1856.

⁷⁹ The "American" Party in the elections of 1854 and 1855 had elected forty-three members to the national House of Representatives, and nine governors of northern states. The party, acting with a measure of secrecy, fearfully aggravataed the political confusion and bewilderment of the times.

⁸⁰ Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions, including Proceedings of the antecedent National Convention held at

Pittsburgh (Minneapolis, 1893), 7.

81 Kleeberg, op. cit., 34; George W. Julian, "The First Republican National Convention," American Historical Review, IV (January, 1899), 313-322, provides an account of the convention by one of the leading participants; National Era, February 28, 1856, carries a seven-column report of the two days' session.

82 Stanwood, op. cit., 261-264; National Era, March 6, 1856; Cincinnati Gazette, February 25, 26, 1856.

83 National Era, June 19, 1856.

84 Stanwood, op. cit., 265-269; Cincinnati Gazette, June 3-7, 1856; National Era, June 5, 12, 1856. Both papers carry the votes by states on the various ballots.

85 Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions, 15, 53-59; Cincinnati Gazette, June 19, 1856. The Gazette printed a four-column account of this second day's proceedings taken from the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin.

86 Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions,

61-66.

⁸⁷ Allan Nevins, Fremont, The West's Greatest Adventurer (New York, 1928), II, 488, citing Fremont's Manuscript Memoirs.

88 Thurlow Weed to Cameron, n. p., November 12, 1856, Cameron

Papers.

⁸⁹ Stanwood, op. cit., 266-269.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 271-273; Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions, 43-45.

⁹¹ Stanwood, op. cit., 275.

92 Item in the Cincinnati Gazette, June 25, 1856.

⁹³ National Intelligencer, March 21, 1856, cited in Andrew Wallace Crandall, Early History of the Republican Party (Boston, 1930), 262, 263.

94 New York Tribune, March 27, 1856, cited in Crandall, op. cit., 263.
95 Ruhl Jacob Bartlett, John C. Fremont and the Republican Party

(Columbus, 1930), 62-65; Crandall, op. cit., 263-264.

⁹⁶ Russell Errett to S. P. Chase, Pittsburgh, August 2, 1856, cited in Going, op. cit., 493.

97 Thurlow Weed to Cameron, Washington, August 15, 1856, Cameron

Papers.

98 Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics, I, 369.

⁹⁹ F. P. Blair to Cameron, Silver Springs, September 10, 1856, Cameron Papers.

100 Crandall, op. cit., 265, 268.

101 John W. Forney to George N. Sanders, Philadelphia, October 13,

1856, George N. Sanders Papers, Library of Congress.

102 Two days after the election, when reports from some areas seemed to forecast a Republican victory, Judge Timothy Ives, of Coudersport, reported to Cameron that his county had carried by at least four hundred and some believed the state had gone Republican. He declared, "If that be true, what can prevent you from going to the United States Senate?" He was ready to work to that end. Timothy Ives to Cameron, Coudersport, Pa., October 16, 1856, Cameron Papers.

103 Crandall, op. cit., 269; Tribune Almanac for 1857, 48-49; Philadelphia North American, quoted in Cincinnati Gazette, October 30, 1856.

104 E. D. Morgan to Gideon Welles, October 22, 1856, Welles Mss., cited in Bartlett, Fremont, 64.

¹⁰⁵ Alexander K. McClure, Recollections of Half a Century (Salem,

1902), 45-46.

106 Ibid., 45.

¹⁰⁷ Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, reprinted in the Cincinnati Gazette, October 25, 1856; National Era, October 30, 1856.

108 Cincinnati Gazette, October 22, 1856, reported from Philadelphia

by telegraph; Crandall, op cit., 278.

109 E. D. Morgan to Gideon Welles, October 27, 1856, Welles Mss., cited in Bartlett, Fremont, 65.

¹¹⁰ Cincinnati Gazette, November 15, 1856; National Era, November

27, 1856.

111 Election returns are from the Tribune Almanac for 1857, 48. The Northwest was divided politically much as was Pennsylvania. The Democrats were reduced to a minority in four of the states. They carried Indiana by a majority and Illinois with a substantial plurality. Stanwood, op. cit., 276; Roscoe Carlyle Buley, "The Political Balance in the Old Northwest, 1820-1860," Studies in American History Inscribed to James Albert Woodburn (Bloomington, 1926), 449.

112 Russell Errett, "The Republican National Conventions of 1856

and 1860," Magazine of Western History, X (July, 1889), 264.

¹¹³ Crandall, op. cit., 277-278; correspondence of Charles Gibbons, chairman of the Republican State Committee, and J. P. Sanderson, published in Cincinnati Gazette, October 25, 1856, and in the National Era, October 20, 1856.

114 Cameron to Weed, November 9, 1856, Weed Papers, University of Rochester, quoted in Allan Nevins, Fremont, Pathmarker of the West (New York, 1939), 454. Cameron was not far off in his indictment of

Whigs as campaign managers. However, Weed was a Whig.

115 Weed to Cameron, n. p., November 12, 1856, Cameron Papers. 116 Buchanan to Nahum Capen (of Boston), Wheatland, August 27, 1856, Moore, Buchanan, X, 88-89.

CHAPTER VIII

¹ Footnote 102, 277.

² Wilmot to Cameron, Towanda, November n. d., 1857, Cameron Papers.

³ Thaddeus Stevens to Cameron, Lancaster, November 30, 1856, Cam-

eron Papers. Actually three Democratic votes were sufficient.

⁴ John Kunkel to Cameron, Washington, December 15, 1856, Cameron

Papers. ⁵ Taggart had been one of the most violent opponents of Cameron two years earlier when Cameron was seeking the senatorship. He had written some of the most defamatory paragraphs against Cameron issued to the public by a number of senators and representatives of the

Pennsylvania legislature. Cameron took summary vengeance upon him. Taggart was solicitor for the Northumberland Bank and his father was the responsible head of the bank. The family largely depended upon the income from the bank for its livelihood. Cameron arranged with his brother, William Cameron of Lewisburg, a large stockholder in the Northumberland Bank, quietly to purchase more stock. He succeeded in obtaining a majority of the stock with the result that at the next election the Taggart family was removed and the friends of Cameron put in their places. Taggart soon realized that Cameron was a dangerous man for him to quarrel with, and after some months made satisfactory terms with him. He was president of the senate and presided over the convention which elected Cameron to the United States Senate in January, 1857, at which time he was an earnest supporter of Cameron. Cameron was not forgetful of Taggart's services. In 1861, as the army was enlarged, he appointed Senator Taggart paymaster of the regular army. This gave Taggart a life office. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 270-271.

⁶ R. G. White to Cameron, Wellsboro, December 6, 1856, Cameron

Papers.

⁷ Philadelphia Public Ledger, January 5, 1857.

⁸ Buchanan to Henry S. Mott, Wheatland, January 7, 1857, National Era, February 22, 1857.

⁹ Pennsylvanian, January 8, 1857.

10 Pennsylvania Telegraph, January 9, 1857.

¹¹ Public Ledger, January 10, 1857. The remaining 25 votes were cast as follows: John Robbins, 21; H. B. Wright, 3; C. A. Block, 1.

¹² *Ibid.*, January 12, 1857.

¹³ McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 266-267.

¹⁴ Ibid., 267-268.

¹⁵ Public Ledger, January 15, 1857.

¹⁶ McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 268; Cincinnati Gazette, January 13, 1857; National Era, January 15, 1857. The account of the arrangement for a meeting of three representatives of the caucus with the three Democrats is McClure's version. The writer has found no evidence which either refutes or corroborates McClure's account. The newspapers note the excitement in the caucus on the evening of January twlfth and its adjournment, without arriving at a nomination, to meet again the next morning.

¹⁷ McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 268-269.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 270-273. Wagonseller's vote also was required, otherwise Cameron would not have had a majority.

19 Ibid., I, 273.

²⁰ Public Ledger, January 14, 1857; Cincinnati Gazette, January 14, 1857.

²¹ Telegrams and letters filed in the Cameron Papers.

²² Buchanan to Henry S. Mott, Wheatland, January 7, 1857, National Era, February 22, 1857.

National Era, February 22, 1857.
 Public Ledger, January 15, 1857.

²⁵ Pennsylvania Telegraph, January 27, 1857.

²⁶ Pennsylvanian, January 14, 1857.

- ²⁷ From notes of Colonel Henry Wharton Shoemaker, Archivist, Pennsylvania State Library. Colonel James W. Quiggle, the maternal grandfather of Colonel Shoemaker, had been won to Cameron's support in his contest with Buckalew in 1855. Cameron remembered these services and later aided not only Col. Quiggle but also his son, J. C. Quiggle, in obtaining several foreign appointments. Col. James W. Quiggle was the recipient of favors also from Buchanan. In April, 1859, he was appointed to the consulate at Antwrep. Quiggle was not a strong Buchanan man at the time and because of this and similar appointments from Pennsylvania Buchanan was charged with excessive distribution of patronage to Pennsylvania in buying up his enemies. Cincinnati Commercial, April ²³, 1859.
- ²⁸ Cameron Papers for April and August, 1857. New York contributed funds for use in Pennsylvania in the fall campaign. The writer has no evidence of New York's contributing money especially to secure the election of Forney to the United States Senate.

²⁹ Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., 344.

30 Ibid., Appendix, 371.

- ³¹ Cameron to Henry Simpson, Lochiel, January 20, 1857, Gratz Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.
- ³² Cameron to W. D. Lewis, n. p., February 27, 1857, Cameron Papers.

³³ Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., Appendix, 383.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., *Appendix*, 387.

35 Ibid., 34 Cong., 3 Sess., Appendix, 387-391.

³⁶ Thurlow Weed to Cameron, Albany, March 15, 1857, Cameron Papers.

³⁷ Ante, 125.

38 McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 274-275.

³⁹ Buchanan to Forney, Wheatland, February 28, 1857, and Forney

to Buchanan, n. p., March 6, 1857, Moore, Buchanan, X, 104.

⁴⁰ National Era, February 18, March 11, 1858; and New York Times, March 25, 1858, take note of anti-administration activities of Forney, in various parts of Pennsylvania, particularly on the Kansas question. Buchanan had earlier witnessed with distress the defection and wrote to a friend, "I mourn over Forney." Buchanan to J. B. Baker, Washington, January 11, 1858, Moore, Buchanan, X, 177.

41 Crandall, op. cit., 281, and footnote 35; Roy F. Nichols, "John

Wien Forney," Dictionary of American Biography.

⁴² Cameron to L. S. Coryell, Washington, December 15, 1857, Coryell Papers, VI, 61, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁴³ National Era, March 12, 1857. ⁴⁴ New York *Times*, June 10, 1857.

45 National Era, April 2, 1857.

46 lbid., June 11, 1857.

⁴⁷ Wilmot to Cameron, n. p., September 6, 1857, Cameron Papers.

48 Quoted in National Era, July 16, 1857.

49 Wilmot to David S. Brown, Harrisburg, September 28, 1857, New

York Times, October 2, 1857.

⁵⁰ Tribune Almanac for 1858, 53; National Era, November 5, 1857, printed the official totals for governor as taken from the Harrisburg Telegraph.

⁵¹ Public Ledger, October 1, 1857.

⁵² Dunaway, op. cit., 482-483.

⁵³ Wilmot to David S. Brown, Harrisburg, September 28, 1857, New York *Times*, October 2, 1857.

⁵⁴ Cameron Papers, August, 1857, following.

⁵⁵ Cameron to L. S. Coryell, Washington, February 11, 1858, Coryell Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

⁵⁶ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, V, 449-454.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 471-481; *Cong. Globe*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 533-535.

⁵⁸ Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 14-18. This is the first of many speeches of Douglas in Congress against the Lecomption "fraud."

⁵⁹ Cameron to L. S. Coryell, Washington, February 26, 1858, Autograph Collection, Simon Cameron, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

New York *Times*, January 29, 1858.
 Ibid., February 25, and March 24, 1858.

⁶² Ibid., March 24, 1858; National Era, February 18, and March 11, 1858.

63 National Era, June 3, 1858.

64 Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 603, 623.

65 Richard Malcolm Johnston and William Hand Browne, Life of

Alexander H. Stephens (Philadelphia, 1878), 329-330.

66 Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 109-110. The report of the March fifteenth debate on the Kansas question occupies fifty pages of the Congressional Globe.

67 Ibid., 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1133-1134.

⁶⁸ Wilmer C. Harris, The Public Life of Zachariah Chandler, 1851-1875 (Lansing, 1917), 48; Joseph Warren Keifer, Slavery and the Four Years War (New York, 1900), I, 100; Albert Gallatin Riddle, Life of Benjamin F. Wade (Cleveland, 1866), 214.

⁶⁹ Riddle, Life of Benjamin F. Wade, 215-216, presents the Wade copy

of this memorandum.

⁷⁰ Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1264-1265. The twenty-five votes against the bill included nineteen Republicans, their total membership

except Cameron; four Democrats, Daniel C. Broderick of California, George E. Pugh of Ohio, Stephen A. Douglas and Charles E. Stuart of Michigan; and two Native Americans, John Bell of Tennessee and John C. Crittenden of Kentucky.

71 lbid., 1258; Cameron to George Bergner, Washington, March 28,

1858, Cameron Papers.

⁷² Cameron to George Bergner, Washington, March 28, 1858, Cameron Papers.

⁷³ Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1436-1437.

74 New York Times, April 2, 1858; House Journal, 35 Cong., 1 Sess.,

579-580.

⁷⁵Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1899, 1905-1906. With the exception of Senator Pugh, who voted for the English Compromise, all the Senators who opposed the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution (footnote 70, 281-282) also opposed the English Compromise.

76 Ibid., 1898.

⁷⁷ A. H. Reeder to Cameron, n. p., April 30, 1858, Cameron Papers.

⁷⁸ Daniel W. Wilder, *The Annals of Kansas* (Topeka, 1875), 186-188.
⁷⁹ Cameron to George Bergner, Washington, March 28, 1858, Cameron

Papers.

80 Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1431. Italics not in text.

81 *Ibid.*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1431.

82 *Ibid.*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 678. 83 *Ibid.*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1443.

84 Ante, 113-114.

85 Cameron to W. D. Lewis, Washington, May 20, 1858, Cameron

Papers.

⁸⁶ Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 2563. The Cameron Papers contain a memorandum of notes of remarks he made to a group that presented one of these petitions to him in January. He offered nothing more to laborers except such as would come through a Republican victory and a protective tariff.

CHAPTER IX

¹ John W. O'Neile to Cameron, Philadelphia, May 13, 1858, Cameron Papers.

¹Cameron to H. C. Carey, Washington, June 3, 1858, Edward Carey

Gardiner Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³ New York *Times*, June 16, 1858. The other speakers included Senators Jacob Collamer of Vermont and James F. Simmons of Rhode Island; Messrs. Humphrey Marshall of Kentucky, and John Covode and Edward Jay Morris of Pennsylvania, all members of the House of Representatives; and Richard W. Thompson of Indiana, formerly a member of the House of Representatives.

4 Ibid., March 5, 6, 1858.

⁵ Ibid., March 8, 1858.

⁶ A. H. Reeder to Cameron, Allentown, April 30, 1858, Cameron Papers.

J. W. Forney to Cameron, n. p., May 25, 1858, Cameron Papers.

⁸ B. F. Stem to Cameron, Easton, May 31, 1858, Cameron Papers.

⁹ Cincinnati Gazette, July 14, 15, 1858; New York Times, July 15, 1858.

¹⁰ National Era, July 29, 1858. ¹¹ Ibid., October 21, 1858, cites Forney's newspaper, the Philadelphia Press, as claiming Pennsylvania carried by 60,000 opposition majority.

12 Tribune Almanac for 1858, 53; Tribune Almanac for 1859, 52-53.

¹³ Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 2; 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 1.

14 New York Times, October 14, 1858.

15 Ibid., October 14, 1858.

¹⁶ Buchanan to Wm. B. Reed, Bedford Springs, July 31, 1858, Moore, Buchanan, X, 225.

¹⁷ Buchanan to Harriet Lane, Washington, October 15, 1858, Moore,

Buchanan, X, 229.

¹⁸ Tribune Almanac for 1859, 52. In presenting notice of his death to the Senate, on June 21, 1860, Cameron declared Schwartz had been a Democrat all his life. He was an ardent supporter of Buchanan in 1856 and up to the advent of the Lecompton fight in Congress. Though he was never in political life and constantly had refused public station he was persuaded to run in opposition to Jones, the Administration Lecompton candidate, and won the contest. Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 3214.

¹⁹ Cited in New York Times, October 19, 1858.

²⁰ F. P. Blair to Cameron, Silver Springs, October 20, 1858, Cameron Papers. Florence had received 6823 votes, John W. Ryan (Union) 6492, and G. W. Nebinger (anti-Lecompton Democrat) 2442. Florence was elected with a plurality of 331 votes over Ryan. His vote was 2111 less than the combined vote for Ryan and Nebinger. In 1856 he had been elected with a majority of 2220. *Tribune Almanac for 1857*, 48; *Tribune Almanac for 1859*, 52; New York *Times*, October 12, 14, 1858.

²¹ Cameron Papers, 1858.

²² In 1858, the coalition opposing the Democratic Party called itself the Union Party, this term temporarily taking the place of the People's Party. In the early stages of the evolution of the Republican Party several states used the term People's Party for their organizations.

²³ Hannibal Hamlin to Cameron, Hampden, November 4, 1858, Cam-

eron Papers.

²⁴ G. Dawson Coleman to Cameron, n. p., June 10, 1858, Cameron Papers.

²⁵ Alex Hay to Cameron, New York, October 29, 1858, Cameron

Papers.

²⁶ A. K. McClure to Cameron, Chambersburg, October 29, 1858, Cameron Papers.

²⁷ Id. to id., Chambersburg, November 1, 1858, Cameron Papers.

28 New York Times, January 4, 5, 1859.

²⁹ McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 345-348.

³⁰ New York *Times*, March 22, 1859; Cincinnati *Gazette*, March 22, 859.

31 New York Times, April 13, 1859; Cincinnati Gazette, April 14, 15,

1859.

32 New York Times, May 5, 1859.

33 Cincinnati Commercial, May 5, 1859.

³⁴ The *Press* article was quoted in the Cincinnati Commercial, April 20, 1859.

35 Cincinnati Commercial, July 2, 1859.

³⁶ National Era, May 12, 1859. The same name, People's Party, was used in Indiana by the party that became the Republican Party in 1858.

³⁷ W. H. Boyle to Cameron, Chambersburg, July 21, 1859, Cameron

Papers.

³⁸ National Era, October 13, 20, 1859.

³⁹ Tribune Almanac for 1860, 50; Cincinnati Commercial, October 27, 1859.

40 Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, quoted in the New York Times,

October 13, 1859.

41 Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 168.

⁴² Cameron to W. D. Lewis, Washington, December 14, 1859, Cameron Papers.

⁴³ Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 1556-1569.

⁴⁴ On January 24, 1860, Cameron had presented resolutions from the legislature of Pennsylvania instructing its Senators and requesting its Representatives in Congress to endeavor to procure such a modification of the revenue laws as would change the mode of collection on

their great staples from ad valorem to speific duties.

⁴⁵ Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 3009-3027. The Pennsylvania Telegraph, February 21, 1861, sincerely congratulated General Cameron on his success, as he had been the main advocate of the bill in the Senate. The next day, the Lincoln party, on the way to Washington, was in Harrisburg. It was a day of celebration. In the huge parade of the day there were among the flags, in the procession, some complimenting Senator Cameron, bearing such inscriptions as "The Tariff Bill Passed. Honor to Simon Cameron" and "Cameron and the Tariff of 1861." These compliments, declared the Pennsylvania Telegraph, February 22, 1861, "were eminently due to General Cameron, who has been the steadfast friend of the Protective policy, and did more than any other Senator, perhaps, to secure the passage of the Tariff bill."

46 Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1021, 2634; 2 Sess., 1461, 1658; 36

Cong., 1 Sess., 711, 3059-3061.

47 Ibid., 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 1296-1298, 1459; 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 711.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 378, 630. ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 2588.

50 Pennsylvania Telegraph, January 28, 1861. This item is based on a

speech of General Cameron to a group of workingmen who serenaded him in Philadelphia, January 26, 1861.

⁵¹ Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 2043.

⁵² Ibid., 3159. President Buchanan received this Homestead Bill on June 20, 1860, and returned it to the Senate with his veto message two days later, Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, V, 608-614; Moore, Buchanan, X, 443-451.

⁵³ Preston King to Bigelow, Ogdensburg, April 11, 1859, in Bigelow,

op. cit., I, 224-226.

54 New York Times, August 30, 1859; Cincinnati Commercial, August

11, 30, 1859.

⁵⁵ A. H. Reeder to Cameron, Allentown, November 22, 1859, Cameron Papers.

⁵⁶ C. T. Sherman to ———, Mansfield, Ohio, January 30, 1859,

Cameron Papers.

⁵⁷ Joseph H. Barrett to Cameron, Cincinnati, September 7, 1859, and Joseph Casey to Joseph H. Barrett, Harrisburg, September 9, 1859, Cameron Papers.

⁵⁸ Letter to W. E. Frazer, cited in Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lin-

coln: Complete Works, I, 585.

⁵⁹ New York *Times*, February 24, 1860.

60 Ibid., March 2, 1860.

61 Henry K. Strong to Henry C. Carey, n. p., January 23, 1860, Ed-

ward Carey Gardiner Collection, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

62 New York *Times*, February 23, 24, 1860; Cincinnati *Commercial*, February 24, 1860; *National Era*, March 1, 1860; McClure, *Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania*, I, 390-399. McClure's account of the Harrisburg Convention, while inaccurate in many details, does present a fairly good picture of what took place, and in general agrees with the accounts presented in contemporary newspapers. His personal opposition to Cameron is very evident, and his own importance in working out the compromises is perhaps overdrawn.

63 McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 409-410.

⁶⁴ Correspondence of Curtin and McClure with Cameron, March-August, 1860, Cameron Papers; Russell Errett to Cameron, Harrisburg, June 23, 1860, Cameron Papers.

CHAPTER X

¹ National Era, January 26, 1860.

² William Larimer, Jr. to Cameron, Pittsburgh, March 10, 1855, Cam-

eron Papers.

- ³ Cameron Papers, 1857-1860; Elihu B. Washburne Papers, 1860, Library of Congress. The letters on this subject are too numerous to itemize.
- ⁴ A. Lincoln to Cameron, New York, February 26, 1860, Cameron Papers.

⁵ Ante, 201-202.

⁶ New York Times, March 2, 1860. The writer has been unable to locate a copy of the pamphlet.

⁷ Jesse H. Berry to Cameron, Mill Hall, Clinton Co., Pa., March 1,

1860, Cameron Papers.

⁸ Russell Errett to Cameron, Pittsburgh, December n. d., 1859, Cameron Papers.

⁹ Id. to id., Pittsburgh, May 8, 1860, with enclosures, Cameron Papers. 10 R. P. King to Cameron, Philadelphia, June 29, 1861, Cameron Papers.

¹¹ David Wilmot to Joseph Casey, Towanda, March 10, 1860, Cameron Papers.

¹² New York *Times*, May 16, 1860.

13 E. Pershine Smith to Henry C. Carey, Rochester, March 14, 1860,

Henry C. Carey Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

14 Chicago Herald, May 16, 1860. Article bears date-line of Washington, May 10.

¹⁵ Pennsylvania Telegraph, May 26, 1860. ¹⁶ Cincinnati Gazette, February 10, 1860.

¹⁷ Joseph Casey to Cameron, Harrisburg, May 7, 1860, Cameron Papers.

18 There were also those in Illinois who were not favorable to his candidacy. One declared: "Cameron might as well expect to be Emperor as president. His pretentions are laughed at as they deserve." L. H. Bowen to E. B. Washburne, Savanna, Illinois, May 19, 1860, Elihu B. Washburne Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁹ Joseph Casey to Cameron, Chicago, May 10, 1860, Cameron Papers. ²⁰ Cincinnati Commercial, May 12, 17, 1860. Similar accounts appear

in the Cincinnati Gazette, May 12, 17, 1860.

²¹ Cincinnati Commercial, May 15, 17, 1860. Murat Halstead visited all the national conventions in 1860 and wrote eye-witness accounts of them for the Cincinnati Commercial. Later he compiled from this correspondence and from the official reports A History of the National Political Conventions, Columbus, 1860.

²² Simeon Whitely to Cameron, Decatur, May 10, 1860, Cameron

Papers.

²³ William S. Roland to Cameron, Briggs House, Chicago, May 16,

1860, Cameron Papers.

²⁴ Elihu B. Washburne Papers for February to May, 1860, Library of Congress.

²⁵ N. B. Judd to Elihu B. Washburne, Chicago, September 25, 1858,

Elihu B. Washburne Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁶ Ida M. Tarbell, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York, 1917), II, 134-135.

²⁷ In the tariff debates during the thirty-sixth Congress their speeches supplemented one another and their votes were identical.

28 New York Times, March 25, 1859.

²⁹ Ibid., April 1, 1859; National Era, April 7, 1859; Cincinnati Commercial, April 6, 1859.

30 William H. Seward to Thurlow Weed, Washington, April 29, 1859,

in Thurlow Weed Barnes, Life of Thurlow Weed (Boston, 1884), II, 256. Seward failed to obtain the nomination at Chicago in May of 1860, and although Pennsylvania's vote was cast for Lincoln rather than for Seward, the relations of Cameron and Seward remained most cordial. In August of 1860 Cameron visited Seward at his home in Auburn, New York. He was serenaded by the friends of Seward and he acknowledged the recognition with a brief speech in which he alluded to the doubts which he had heard expressed regarding Pennsylvania in the coming election. His state had suffered under the rule of the "sham Democracy." He promised a rousing majority for Lincoln and Hamlin in November. Seward in response defied Pennsylvania to give a larger majority for the Republican ticket than New York could roll up. New York Times, August 22, 1860.

³¹ Preston King to John Bigelow, Washington, January 16, 1860, in

Bigelow, op. cit., I, 250.

³² E. Pershine Smith to Henry C. Carey, Rochester, February 20, April 15, 1860, Henry C. Carey Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

³³ Wm. H. Seward to Weed, Washington, March 15, 1860, in Barnes,

op. cit., II, 261.

34 David Wilmot to Cameron, Towanda, March 10, April 16, 1860,

Cameron Papers.

35 Lyman Trumbull Papers for March to May, 1860, Library of Congress.

³⁶ John A. Nichols to Cameron, Chicago, April 17, 1860, Cameron

Papers.

³⁷ Chicago Herald, May 16, 1860.

38 Thurlow Weed to Cameron, Albany, May 7, 1860, Cameron Papers.

³⁹ Philadelphia Press, May 14, 16, 17, 1860.

⁴⁰ The week before the Chicago Convention the Democratic National Convention at Charleston had adjourned after fruitless efforts to agree on a nomination.

⁴¹ Philadelphia Press, May 17, 1860; New York Times, May 16, 1860; Cincinnati Commercial, May 18, 1860; McClure, Old Time Notes of

Pennsylvania, I, 404-405.

⁴² Thaddeus Stevens' choice was McLean. He felt that the conservative opposition could be disarmed by the nomination of McLean and a vigorous young Republican could be nominated as a running-mate and thus insure a larger national vote. Stevens voted for Cameron and after the first ballot transferred his vote to Lincoln (post., 217). Samuel W. McCall, Thaddeus Stevens, American Statesman (Boston, 1909), 112; Woodburn, Thaddeus Stevens, 151; Alexander K. McClure, Recollections of Half a Century (Salem, 1902), 419.

⁴³ McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 405-406; Frank B. Carpenter, "How Lincoln Was Nominated," Century Magazine, XXIV

(October, 1882), 885-886.

⁴⁴ Halstead, *op. cit.*, 142. ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 138-139; Stanwood, *op. cit.*, 291-294; Chicago *Herald*, May 17, 18, 1860. Kleeberg, op. cit., 60-82, presents a good, brief, secondary account of the Chicago Convention; Curtis, op. cit., 352-360, presents a brief summary of the convention which is rather inadequate.

⁴⁶ Charles Roll, "Indiana's Part in the Nomination of Abraham Lincoln for President in 1860," *Indiana Magazine of History*, XXV (March,

1929), 5.

⁴⁷ Boston Daily Atlas, quoted in Roll, "Indiana's Part in the Nomi-

nation of Abraham Lincoln for President in 1860," loc cit., 2.

⁴⁸ Carpenter, "How Lincoln Was Nominated," *loc. cit.*, 854-855; Thomas H. Dudley, "The Inside Facts of Lincoln's Nomination," *Century Magazine* (July, 1890), XL, 477.

⁴⁹ Two of these were Cameron men, while Mann was anti-Cameron.

⁵⁰ Dudley, op. cit., 478.

51 Ibid., 478.

52 McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 407-408; Alexander K. McClure, Lincoln and Men of War Times (Philadelphia, 1892), 153; M. M. Gresham, Life of Walter Q. Gresham (Chicago, 1919), II, 565; Ward Hill Lamon, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Boston, 1872), 449; Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, II, 341-342. This agreement seems to have been made in the face of Lincoln's command that he should not be bound by any contracts and McClure (Lincoln and Men of War Times, 153) states that "this agreement was not made known at the time to any in the delegation, nor did it become known to Lincoln, at least as a positive obligation, until after the election."

⁵³ Barnes, op. cit., II, 292.

⁵⁴ Halstead, op. cit., 143-144; Cincinnati Commercial, May 21, 1860.

⁵⁵ Halstead, op. cit., 144; Chicago Herald, May 19, 1860.

⁵⁶ Chicago Herald, May 19, 1860; New York Times, May 19, 1860; Philadelphia Press, May 19, 1860; and Halstead, op. cit., 146-148, 151-153, contain an analytical summary of the ballots for both president and vice president.

⁵⁷ Ĥalstead, op. cit., 143.

⁵⁸ Ida M. Tarbell, Life of Abraham Lincoln (New York, 1917), II, 149.

⁵⁹ Halstead, op. cit., 147-148; Chicago Herald, May 19, 1860; Cincin-

nati Commercial, May 21, 1860.

- 60 Halstead, op. cit., 148-149; Horace Greeley, Recollections of a Busy Life (New York, 1868), 391; Chicago Herald, May 19, 1860; Cincinnati Commercial, May 21, 1860. The Indianapolis Daily Journal, May 25, 1860, attributed the nomination to "the unanimity of the Indiana delegation for Lincoln."
- ⁶¹ P. Orman Ray, *The Convention That Nominated Lincoln* (Chicago, 1916), 28. This is an address delivered before the Chicago Historical Society on May 18, 1916; Harold Joseph Laski, *The American Presidency* (New York, 1940), 8-9.

62 Halstead, op. cit., 151-153; Chicago Herald, May 19, 1860; Phila-

delphia Press, May 19, 1860.

63 Philadelphia Press, May 19, 1860.

⁶⁴ John S. Bobbs to Cameron, Indianapolis, May 19, 1860, Cameron Papers. Dr. Bobbs was a brother-in-law of Simon Cameron. His wife was Catherine Maria Cameron.

65 Philadelphia Press, May 20, 1860.

66 Pennsylvania Telegraph, May 21, 1860.

67 Russell Errett to Simon Cameron, Pittsburgh, May 29, 1860, Cam-

eron Papers.

⁶⁸ Pennsylvania Telegraph, May 26, 1860. Rather full reports of Cameron's speech with a brief account of the meeting may also be found in the New York *Times*, May 28, 1860, and in the Indianapolis *Journal*, May 28, 1860.

69 A. K. McClure to Cameron, Philadelphia, June 1, 6, 1860, Cameron

Papers.

⁷⁰ David Wilmot to Cameron, Towanda, July 28, 1860, Cameron Pa-

pers.

⁷¹ Lincoln to Trumbull, Springfield, May 26, 1860, in Gilbert A. Tracy, Uncollected Letters of Abraham Lincoln, (Boston, 1917), 148; William Lambert, ed., "A Lincoln Correspondence," Century Magazine, LXXVII, No. 4 (February, 1909), 625.

CHAPTER XI

¹ E. Pershine Smith to Henry C. Carey, Albany, June 17, 1860, Henry

C. Carey Papers, Hist. Soc. of Pa.

² J. P. Sanderson to Cameron, n. p., October 1, 1860, Cameron Papers. Sanderson stated also that McClure had Stevens in New York to back him up in pleas for money for Pennsylvania elections. He had baited Stevens for the Senate, and Stevens was surreptitiously digging Cameron by representing him as desiring Curtin's defeat.

³ Cameron to Col. Henry Fisher, Lochiel, October 24, 1860, Autograph Collection, Simon Cameron, Hist. Soc. of Pa.; A. Cummings to

Cameron, New York, October 30, 1860, Cameron Papers.

⁴ A. K. McClure to Carl Schurz, Philadelphia, September 6, 1860, Carl Schurz Papers, Library of Congress.

⁵ Quoted in Indiana State Sentinel, October 5, 1860.

⁶ Blaine, op. cit., I, 205-206.

⁷ Tribune Almanac for 1861, 47-48; New York Times, October 12,

1860; Philadelphia Inquirer, October 13, 1860.

⁸ Cameron, of this party, still had two years remaining of his term. Bigler's term was about to expire and he would be replaced by a Republican. If Cameron should resign to enter the Cabinet, as was expected, another Republican would be chosen to succeed him.

9 Smith to Carey, Rochester, October 14, 1860, Henry C. Carey Papers,

Hist. Soc. of Pa.

¹⁰ McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 436-437.

¹¹ John G. Nicolay to Lyman Trumbull, Springfield, June 5, 1860, Lyman Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress.

12 Cameron to Lincoln, Harrisburg, August 1, 1860, Cameron Papers.

¹³ Lincoln to Cameron, Springfield, August 6, 1860, Cameron Papers. ¹⁴ Osborn Hamiline Oldroyd, *Lincoln's Campaign—or The Political Revolution of 1860* (Chicago, 1896), 139-140.

15 Stanwood, op. cit., 297.

¹⁶ These statements are based upon the reading of a vast number of letters, principally the following, from the Cameron Papers: Wilmot to Cameron, Towanda, October ²⁶, ¹⁸⁶⁰; Edgar Cowan to Cameron, Greensburg, December ¹⁵, ¹⁸⁶⁰; J. K. Moorhead to Cameron, Pittsburgh, November ¹², and Philadelphia, January ⁴, ⁵, ¹⁸⁶¹; A. H. Reeder to Cameron, Easton, December ²², ¹⁸⁶⁰, Harrisburg, January ², ¹⁸⁶¹; Thomas A. Scott to Cameron, n. p., January ⁶, ¹⁸⁶¹.

¹⁷ New York *Times*, January 5, 7, 1861.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, January 8, 1861. ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, January 9, 1861.

²⁰ J. P. Sanderson to Cameron, Harrisburgh, January 8, 1861, Cameron Papers.

²¹ B. Rush Petrikin to Cameron, Lock Haven, January 11, 1861, Cam-

eron Papers.

²² Philadelphia *Inquirer*, March 14, 1861; New York *Times*, March 13, 15, 1861.

²³ Richardson, op. cit., V, 626-653, delivered to Congress on December

3, 1860

²⁴ A. H. Reeder to Cameron, Harrisburg, January 2, 1861, Cameron Papers.

²⁵ Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 489.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 114.

²⁷ Pennsylvania Telegraph, January 28, 1861; Philadelphia Press., January 31, 1861.

²⁸ Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 489-493.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 494-496.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 496.

31 Benjamin Champness to Cameron, n. p., December 12, 1860, Cam-

eron Papers.

³² A notable exception was found to exist in west-central Pennsylvania. Russell Errett noted in Pittsburgh a sentiment of fierce opposition to anything that looked like compromise. Russell Errett to Cameron, Pittsburgh, January 23, 1861, Cameron Papers.

33 J. H. Benjamin and others to Cameron, Harrisburgh, January 23,

1861, Cameron Papers.

³⁴ D. K. Jackson to Cameron, Harrisburg, January 22, 1861, Cameron Papers.

35 Wm. M. Piatt to Cameron, Tuckhannock, January 29, 1861, Cam-

eron Papers.

³⁶ G. W. Cass to Cameron, Pittsburgh, January 22, 1861, Cameron

Papers.

37 Samuel Colver to Cameron, Independence, February 11, 1861, Cameron Papers.

38 Saterlee Clark to Cameron, Horicon, Wisconsin, January 30, 1861, Cameron Papers.

³⁹ Richard McCrea to Cameron, Richmond, Virginia, n. d., Cameron

Papers.

40 John D. Kellogg to Cameron, New York City, February 2, 4, 1861,

Cameron Papers.

41 George Fort Milton, The Eve of Conflict (Boston, 1934), 519-536,

42 Isaac G. Coffman to Cameron, Phoenixville, February 26, 1861,

Cameron Papers.

43 W. A. Passavant, Pittsburgh, December 4, 1860; James McKay, Shippensburg, December 27, 1860; N. Ewing, Uniontown, December 27, 1860; W. H. Cobb, New York, December 28, 1860, Cameron Papers.

44 A. H. Reeder to Cameron, Allentown, January 11, 1861, Cameron

Papers.

⁴⁵ D. J. Hoober to Cameron, Philadelphia, February 1, 1861, Cameron Papers.

46 William F. Small to Cameron, Philadelphia, January 28, 1861, Cam-

eron Papers.

47 Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 487.

48 Edward A. Pollard, Life of Jefferson Davis, with a Secret History of the Confederacy (Philadelphia, 1869), 82-84.

⁴⁹ This anecdote was handed down by Cameron to his grandchildren, one of whom, Mrs. Eliza Cameron Bradley, related it to the writer.

⁵⁰ Horace White to Lyman Trumbull, Chicago, December 30, 1860, Lyman Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress.

⁵¹ Horace White to Elihu B. Washburne, Chicago, December 30, 1860, Elihu B. Washburne Papers, Library of Congress.

52 James G. Randall, "The Civil War Re-studied," Journal of Southern History, VI (November, 1940), 454-455.

53 Philadelphia Press, May 21, 1860.

54 R. G. White to Cameron, Wellsboro, Pa., May 22, 1860, and Stephen Miller to Cameron, St. Cloud, Minn., May 27, 1860, Cameron Papers, are cases in point.

55 David Wilmot to Cameron, Towanda, July 28, 1860, Cameron Pa-

pers.

⁵⁶ McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 408.

- ⁵⁷ Paul McClelland Angle, Lincoln, 1854-1861 (Springfield, 1933), 361. Angle cites this letter from the New York Tribune of November 28, 1860.
- ⁵⁸ B. Rush Petrikin to Cameron, Lock Haven, December 10, 1860, Cameron Papers.

⁵⁹ Cameron to B. Rush Petrikin, Washington, December 11, 1860,

Cameron Papers.

60 Edgar Cowan to Cameron, Greensburg, December 15, 1860, Cameron Papers.

61 Lincoln to Hamlin, cited on page 235, and Hamlin to Lyman Trum-

bull, Hampden, December 27, 1860, Lyman Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress.

62 Two telegrams, Leonard Swett to Cameron or Casey, Chicago, De-

cember 26, 1860, Cameron Papers.

63 Leonard Swett to Cameron, n. p., December 28, 1860, Cameron Papers.

⁶⁴ Angle, op. cit., 366.

65 Lincoln to Cameron, Springfield, December 31, 1860, Cameron Papers; Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works*, I, 662-663.
66 Philadelphia *Press*, January 2, 1861. This notice bears the date-line

of Harrisburg, January 1, 1861.

67 McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, I, 408; McClure, Lin-

coln and Men of War Times, 154.

⁶⁸ Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works*, I, 663. This letter, though printed in numerous secondary works, is not among the Cameron Papers. Presumably it was returned to Lincoln in accordance with his request of January 13, 1861, see *post*, 238.

69 New York Times, January 5, 1861.

70 Ibid., January 5, 1861; Cincinnati Gazette, January 5, 1861.

⁷¹ The Cameron Papers, November, 1860, to March, 1861, contain copies of many of these documents. Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln*, *Prairie Years* (New York, 1926), II, 398, estimates that the volume of witnesses and recommendations for Cameron outnumbered that of the opposition three to one.

^{†2} Angle, op. cit., 367; New York Times, January 12, 14, 1861.

73 Lincoln to Cameron, Springfield, January 13, 1861, Cameron Papers; Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works, I, 665. The letter was marked "Private and Confidential."

⁷⁴ Lincoln to Cameron, Springfield, pre-dated January 3, 1861, Cameron Papers; Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln: Complete Works, I,

665-666.

⁷⁵ Cameron Papers for December, 1860, January and February, 1861. One of the strong telegrams to Lincoln on the policy of protection was sent from Philadelphia on January 13, by A. H. Reeder. It was short and to the point: "Pennsylvania knows that the Republican Party is pledged to a tariff Administriation. Her vote was largely based on that pledge, and the best man could not have stood a moment upon any other ground. The redemption of that pledge is expected in the Secretary of the Treasury. Cameron is her champion and representative man on that question. His selection would be regarded as the redemption of that pledge, and his rejection would be eminently disastrous to the party."

76 Philadelphia *Inquirer*, February 5, 9, 22, 1861.

77 Pennsylvania Telegraph, January 7, 1861.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, January 21, 30, 1861.

⁷⁹ Ralph Ray Fahrney, *Horace Greeley and the Tribune* (Cedar Rapids, 1936), 68.

⁸⁰ James H. Van Alen to Lyman Trumbull, n. p., January 8, 1861, Lyman Trumbull Papers, Library of Congress.

81 Thomas J. McCormack, ed., Memoirs of Gustave Koerner, 1809-1896

(Cedar Rapids, 1909), II, 114.

82 Quoted in Lamon, op. cit., 460-461.

83 Horace White, The Life of Lyman Trumbull (Boston, 1913), 145-146.

84 Ibid., 145; Tracy, op. cit., 173-174.

⁸⁵ Report of a statement made by Lincoln to a group supporting Cameron who visited him in Springfield. This report was published in the Philadelphia Sunday Mercury and reprinted in the Chicago Tribune. Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, Prairie Years, II, 402-404.

86 Albert Shaw, Abraham Lincoln (New York, 1929), II, 218.

87 Lamon, op. cit., 461.

88 New York *Times*, February 4, 1861; McClure, *Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania*, I, 452; William Larimer to Cameron, Pittsburgh, February 6, 1861, and M. B. Lowry to Cameron, Erie, February 16, 1861, Cameron Papers.

89 David Davis to Cameron, Bloomington, February 8, 1861, Cameron

Papers.

⁹⁰ John N. Purviance to Cameron, Pittsburgh, February 15, 1861, Cameron Papers. Davis, being one of the negotiators at Chicago, probably felt that he was "on the spot." It is easy to believe that he urged Lincoln to appoint Cameron.

⁹¹ James Milliken to Cameron, Philadelphia, February 19, 1861, Cam-

eron Papers.

92 Three fairly full reports of this interview were made to Cameron and are among the Cameron Papers: James Milliken to Cameron, Philadelphia, February 22, 1861; J. T. Coffee to Cameron, Harrisburg, February 22, 1861; Samuel A. Purviance to Cameron, Harrisburg, February 23, 1861.

93 New York Times, February 27, 1861.

94 Ante, 197-198.

⁹⁵ New York World, March 1, 1861; New York Times, March 2, 1861; Pennsylvania Telegraph, March 2, 1861; Cincinnati Gazette, March 2, 1861; Philadelphia Inquirer, March 4, 1861.


96 Meneely, op. cit., 74; New York Times, March 6, 1861; Cincinnati


Gazette, March 8, 1861.

⁹⁷ R. B. Spink to Cameron, Wooster, March 8, 1861, Cameron Papers.

98 Meneely, op. cit., 84-85.

⁹⁹ William A. Dunning, "The Second Birth of the Republican Party," *American Historical Review*, XVI (October, 1910), 56-58.







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